Introduction -- Constructing social identity through discourse : a socio-rhetorical approach for the study of Valentinian paraenesis -- Defining paraenesis I : historical phases within the academic study of paraenesis -- Defining paraenesis II : towards a functional understanding of paraenesis -- Literary aspects of paraenesis : indicators of moral exhortation from the Greco-Roman world within Valentinianism -- Two schools and the call to reconciliation : literary and social aspects of moral exhortation in the Interpretation of (...) knowledge -- Existing in error : literary and social aspects of moral exhortation in the Gospel of truth -- Conclusion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Awe-Inspiring, in Truth, Are the Mysteries of the Church":Eucharistic Mystagogy and Moral Exhortation in the Preaching of St. John ChrysostomDaria SpezzanoWe entrust to You, loving Master, our whole life and hope, and we ask, pray, and entreat: make us worthy to partake of your heavenly and awesome Mysteries from this holy and spiritual Table with a clear conscience; for the remission of sins, forgiveness of transgressions, communion (...) of the Holy Spirit, inheritance of the kingdom of heaven, confidence before You, and not in judgment or condemnation.—Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom"Awe-inspiring, in truth, are the mysteries of the Church; awesome, in truth, her altar."1 St. John Chrysostom was a founding figure in the development of the Byzantine mystagogical tradition, not only because he is associated with the Divine Liturgy,2 but also because of his preaching on [End Page 413] the Eucharistic mysteries, woven throughout the scriptural exegesis of his liturgical homilies.3 The themes he sounded, in particular the continual exhortation to his hearers to be mindful and properly disposed for the terrible and awe-inspiring mysteries, would become part of the fabric of Byzantine liturgical spirituality. But Chrysostom's influence extends to the West as well, for instance to Thomas Aquinas, who, it is said, would rather have Chrysostom's homilies on Matthew than be lord of Paris,4 and who shares with Chrysostom the title of "Doctor of the Eucharist."5 While the promotion of reverence in liturgical celebration and the demands of social justice are sometimes perceived today as being in tension with each other, for Chrysostom they are inseparable. In accord with the Second Vatican Council's teaching in Sacrosanctum Concilium that the Eucharist is "the source and summit of Christian life," the Catechism of the Catholic Church chooses a quote from Chrysostom to instruct that "the Eucharist commits us to the poor."6 It does so with good reason. Chrysostom urgently and vividly preaches to his wealthy congregation that not only must they approach the altar with awe and holy fear, but they must care for the poor in order to receive the Eucharist worthily. Here his characteristic moral exhortations to almsgiving find their deepest source: without care for the poor, one eats and drinks the Eucharist, like Judas at the Last Supper, to one's own condemnation.Chrysostom's Eucharistic MystagogyChrysostom's preaching on the Eucharist is profoundly rooted in Scripture and shaped by his theological and pastoral concerns. Mystagogy, as Jean [End Page 414] Daniélou has pointed out, is an exegesis of the rites: "It consists of reading in the rites the mystery of Christ and contemplating under symbols the invisible reality."7 The mystagogy of the Greek Fathers is shaped by local traditions, as is their scriptural exegesis. While the distinction risks being overdrawn, Alexandrian mystagogy is characterized by anagogy, while Antiochene mystagogy—including Chrysostom's—by a focus on the relation of the liturgy to the historical events of Christ's earthly life.8 Unlike his contemporary Theodore of Mopsuestia, however, Chrysostom is not concerned to assign to each liturgical action a specific mimetic meaning. Chrysostom everywhere "reads in the rites the mystery of Christ," exemplifying Daniélou's observation that this mystery is the one object of the Christian faith, subsisting under different modes:It is prefigured in the Old Testament; it is accomplished historically in Christ's life on earth; it is contained in the mystery of the sacraments; it is lived mystically in souls; it is accomplished socially in the Church; it is fulfilled eschatologically in the heavenly kingdom.9For Chrysostom, the entire liturgy has a "mystery character," because it is "so much an anamnesis of the saving work of Christ and a revelation of heavenly reality that its earthly form is wholly irradiated by these aspects."10 Chrysostom uses the term "mystery" in relation not only to the sacraments, but more fundamentally to the entire economy of redemption, flowing from the Paschal mystery, in which they operate. The mystery is a secret except to faith; it expresses a relation between, on the one hand, a historic event of salvation history or a material element of the... (shrink)

The paper argues, first, that the range of problems confronting humanity constitutes a global emergency; next, that this cannot be addressed by moral exhortation but by the building of ‘arks’; finally, that community, cultivation of the virtues, and place may be considered key aspects of such ark building.

In this article, James 5:13-20 is investigated. This section deals with the confession of sins in the community of faith and the subsequent healing that will result. James will be compared to Philodemus, a philosopher who comes from Galilee, just like James. It is not argued that James was influenced by Philodemus but that a comparison between the two might open up fresh perspectives for the interpretation of James 5:13-20. This will especially become clear when the themes of moral (...) exhortation, community health, communal confession and the role of the psychagogue are discussed. (shrink)

RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en resaltar y rescatar la apropiación que Gadamer hace del concepto de la amistad, la philía griega. Se intentará ver su sentido específico en una suerte de exhortación, una contribución que no se hace bajo el título de experto ni de especialista sino de ciudadano que interpreta su propia realidad. En primer lugar, observaremos cómo este llamado se puede identificar como una tendencia propia de los análisis que Gadamer realiza sobre problemáticas sociales de (...) actualidad. Luego, se verá en la noción de amistad una forma de hacerle frente, según nuestro autor, a la evasión de sí al rescatar del olvido los vínculos auténticos con los otros que siempre están presentes como posibilidad abierta, pero que es necesario hacer efectiva en el involucramiento activo de cada uno de nosotros. ABSTRACT The aim of the present article is to emphasize and revive Gadamer's appropriation of the concept «friendship». I will try to construe its specific sense as a sort of exhortation, a contribution made, not by an expert or specialist, but by a citizen that interprets his own reality. First we will see how this call can be identified as a characteristic tendency of Gadamer's analysis of actual social problems. Then we will see in the notion of friendship a way to face the evasion of the self by recovering from the oblivion the authentic links with the others which are always present as an open possibility, but which need to be made effective in the active involvement of each and everyone of us. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a theoretical account of a central yet surprisingly overlooked form of legal influence or control, one that I refer to as the law’s ‘exhortative’ influence. The law exercises an ‘imperative’ influence when it purports to control agents’ behavior by imposing on them legal duties to act or refrain from acting in the legally desired or repelled way. By contrast, it exercises what I call an exhortative form of influence when it aims at impacting agents’ reasons (...) for action whilst refraining from mandating or prohibiting the legally desired or repelled conduct. The law’s exhortative control or influence must be distinguished not only from its imperative influence, but also from what I call the law’s merely ‘instructive’ form of influence, such as the one provided by so-called power-conferring laws. Though I illustrate the functioning of this special form of legal control—the law’s exhortative influence—by using primarily the example of the law of contracts, the article offers novel insights about law in general as a mode of social ordering by developing a theory of the structure of ‘legal incentives’. Legal incentives, I contend, are the means through which the law exercises its exhortative influence. Clearly distinguishing different techniques of legal influence is not only of analytical interest, but should invite us to think of accounts of the justification of legal authority that consider the similarities but also the differences in the moral significance of these diverse techniques. (shrink)

Theodore Metochites, a distinguished figure in the intellectual and political landscape of the early Palaiologan period (1261-1341), was born in Constantinople in 1270. The On Morals or Concerning Education is an extensive disquisition about the significance and status of cultural education (paideia) in the context of Palaiologan society. The oration might also be seen at least partly as an autobiographical narrative exposing Metochites's inner reflections and anxieties. The On Morals belongs to the genre of the protreptikos, a hortatory speech designed (...) to encourage its readers to study philosophy and attain virtue. With the On Morals Metochites sought to establish himself as a continuator of ancient moral philosophy in late Byzantium. (shrink)

I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong.2 In 1902, the year after Acton died, the president of the American Historical association, Henry Lea, in dubious celebration of his British colleague, responded to the exordium with a (...) contrary claim about the historian’s obligation, namely objectively to render the facts of history without subjective moralizing. Referring to Acton’s lecture, Lea declared. (shrink)

Changes over time in many large scale human practices such as science and technology seem best understood in terms of progress. Further, regarding such practices as slavery, we seem to have moved on and for the better, that is, to have progressed morally. But moral progress seems something different from other forms of progress. If possible at all, in what can it consist? Progress is understood as falling into three distinguishable categories; namely, progress as mere change, as change culminating (...) in some end‐state, and as change involving improvement or betterment. While scientific or economic progress seem of the last sort, moral progress is best understood as a hybrid of culminative change and improvement, a variety of progress labelled millenarian. Though there is an end towards which moral progress must tend, we do not know what it is. Further, moral progress must occupy a special superordinate and regulatory role regarding other progressive practices; that is, for moral progress to be possible, other progressive practices must come under the aegis of increasingly stringent moral regulation. This paper elaborates a model of moral progress, speculates upon signs of its presence, considers various relativist objections, and makes an exhortative plea for the need to have such a notion as a condition of the very possibility of moral progress. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions Moore's Moral Rules Since the publication of Tom Regan's Bloomsbury'sProphet:G. E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) a controversy has arisen concerning Moore's practical ethical theory. According to Regan, Moore was Bloomsbury's "liberator" whose Principia Ethica provided the rationale for ignoring the conventional rules of morality (except for "a very few") in favor of personal choice. This, (...) says Regan, is the "central thesis" of Principia. Against Regan's interpretation Avrum Stroll (JHP 26:3, July 1988: 5o4-5o5) insists that Regan's evidence is "exiguous" and that "a careful reading of [Principia's] Chapter 5 shows that Moore argues that.., we ought alwaysto follow the dictates of common morality." In a similar vein Thomas Baldwin (Mind, Jan. 1988:129-33 ) claims that Regan's thesis rests upon "a misreading of a passage in [Chapter 5 of] Principia Ethica" and yields an interpretation of Moore which asserts "the opposite" of what Moore actually says. In what follows I wish to examine the crucial passages of Principia to determine just what Moore's view is and whether Regan is indeed guilty of misreading. Because of the severe limitations regarding our knowledge of cause and effect, the most, according to Moore, that we can obtain in practical ethics, is knowledge that "one kind of action will generallyproduce better effects than another."' And this leads him to consider the justification of the rules of common morality. On pp. 162-63 Moore does say that of "any rule which is generally useful, we may assert that it ought alwaysto be observed... [and that] though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it." But, as the text reveals, this assertion is preceded by the hypothesis "/f/t is certainthat in a large majority of cases the observance of a certain rule is useful" (162, emphasis added). Indeed, Moore's discussion on pp. 162-64 is focused explicitly on "those actions as to which some general rule is certainlytrue'' (162, emphasis added). So what sorts of rules are those? Moore has already said on p. 16o: "it seems possible to prove a definite utility in most of those which are in general both recognised and practised." And just which rules are both recognized and practiced? They are those which he frequently refers to as "the rules most universally recognised by Common G. E. Moore, PrincipiaEthica(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 155. Hereafter cited by page number alone. [595] 596 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 98:4 OCTOBER 199 ~ Sense" (156-57). He says that for "most" of these their general utility can be "established " and is "capable of proof" (t 55-56). His examples are rules concerning murder, respect for property, industry, temperance, and keeping promises (156-57). ~ Now, assuming that what is established or capable of proof is, in Moore's parlance, "certain," and taking the moral rules of Common Sense to be roughly what Stroll means by "common morality," we can see that StroU's assertion that "Moore argues that.., we ought always to follow the dictates of common morality" is not quite correct. At most Moore seems to be saying that we ought always to follow the dictates of "most" of common morality. But even this is too strong, because Moore's phrase "the rules most universally recognised by Common Sense" suggests that Common Sense morality may include rules which are not "universally recognised," and hence, less than certain. Also, Moore says that "a great part of ordinary moral exhortation.., consists in the advocating of rules not generally practised." If Moore holds that common morality does indeed inclucJe a significant portion of rules which are neither universally recognized nor generally practiced, then even the claim that he argues that we ought always to follow most of its dictates seems questionable. As Regan observes, Moore goes on in Chapter 5 to say some things which confirm our doubts and make it very difficult to accept Strolrs assertion, even in its modified form. For Moore seems to say... (shrink)

This paper exhorts geographers to become more active in debate about ethical research practice. It also suggests that ethical theory, practical problems, and lessons learned from postmodern thought make the prospects of establishing prescriptive codes of ethics unlikely. Instead, flexible prompts for moral contemplation might be used to encourage careful thought on matters of ethics. Because the practical feasibility of moral prompts rests on the existence of moral imaginations, it is vital to consider ways in which those (...) imaginations might be stimulated and nurtured. Professional associations and university academics have significant roles to play in this. Geographers must position themselves as effective agents in the processes by which professional research ethics are shaped rather than awaiting the potentially inappropriate outcomes of other agencies ' deliberations. (shrink)

This paper proceeds from a sense of dissatisfaction with much of current moral argument about defence policy, in particular the role of nuclear weapons. Discussions of the moral issues tend to divide into two distinct kinds of writing: on the one hand, impassioned calls to action based on and allied with equally impassioned moral exhortations; and on the other hand, usually in academic contexts, meticulous analyses and comparisons of aspects of nuclear policy with paradigm cases of acknowledged (...) moral categories or requirements, with the object of showing by analogy with these that the particular aspect of policy under discussion is or is not morally wrong. My unease is caused by the fact that, while it is difficult not to respond to the impassioned style of argument, as one recognizes in it a practical and moral urgency which our situation seems to demand, nevertheless it plainly appeals only to those already convinced of its conclusions. The unconverted tend to regard it with suspicion or disdain, for in contrast to the analytical style, which manifestly seeks to compel the intellect, the impassioned style seems to make its effect by stirring the emotions as much as if not instead of by compelling the intellect. On the other hand the analytical style can seem curiously irrelevant, even trivial, in relation to the issue. For instance, it has been argued that since: nuclear war is a moral disaster; deterrence is threatening or intending to wage nuclear war; it is wrong to threaten or intend to do something wrong; therefore: deterrence is wrong, and should be abandoned. It is hard to believe that defenders of deterrence as the cornerstone of defence policy are going to be persuaded by such an argument to abandon their advocation of it, if only because the argument totally ignores the object of deterrence. (shrink)

Beginning in The Gay Science, Nietzsche repeatedly exhorts his readers to laugh. But why? I argue that Nietzsche wants us to laugh because the emotion that laughter expresses, mirth, plays an important psychological-cum-epistemological role in his attack on traditional morality. I contend that Nietzsche views mirth as an attitude that is uniquely suited to rooting out beliefs that have covertly infiltrated our psychologies. And given that Nietzsche considers morality to be insidious, or to maintain its hold over us even after (...) we think that we have freed ourselves from it, we need mirth to expose its nefarious workings. Thus, while mirth is not the only attitude that Nietzsche recommends that we adopt toward the dictates of traditional morality – indeed, he suggests that we adopt many others as well – mirth nevertheless enjoys a privileged status within Nietzsche’s spirited polemics, which is why he dubs his philosophy a ‘gay science.’. (shrink)

Morality exercises a deep and questionable influence on the way we live our lives. The influence is deep both because moral injunctions are embedded in our psyches long before we can reflect on their status and because even after we become reflective agents, the question of how we should live our lives among others is intimately bound up with the more general question of how we should live our lives: our stance toward morality and our conception of our lives (...) as having significance are of a piece. The influence is questionable because morality pretends to a level of objectivity that it may not possess. Moral injunctions are meant to be binding on us in some way that is independent of the desires or preferences we may happen to have. When one asserts that a certain action is morally worthy or shameful one is, prime facie, doing more than merely expressing approval or disapproval or trying to get others to act as instruments of one's own will. If moral assertions were shown, at bottom, to be merely such exhortations, then they would be shown to wear a disguise. Morality would be revealed as pretending to an objectivity it does not have, and such a revelation could not but have a profound impact on our lives. It is doubtful that such a revelation could be kept locked up inside our studies. (shrink)

Ethics research literature often uses Rest’s Four Component Model of ethical behavior as a framework to teach business and accounting ethics. Moral motivation, including resolve to have moral courage, is the third component of the model and is the least-tested component in ethics research. Using a quasi-experimental design with pretest and posttest measurements, we compare the effectiveness of several methods (traditional, exhortation, reflection, moral exemplar) for developing resolve to have moral courage in 211 accounting students (...) during one semester. Results show that traditional, reflection, moral exemplar methods increased resolve to have moral courage, and that the reflection and moral exemplar methods were more effective than the other methods. (shrink)

Abstract Applied ethics is commonly carried out on the assumption that moral decisions can be handled by experts. This involves a failure to recognize that being morally serious means recognizing that one cannot hand over responsibility for certain decisions to anyone else. The idea of moral expertise is shown to be based on a misconstrual of the nature of moral discourse, one that can be overcome by following Wittgenstein's exhortation to philosophers to pay heed to the (...) actual uses of language. The sense of a moral judgment cannot be considered in isolation from what the speaker is doing in the context of utterance. The author concludes by suggesting that this discussion can provide the basis for a new reading of Anscombe's essay ?Modern Moral Philosophy? (shrink)

Consider the advice for growth in virtue from the Christian Moral Wisdom tradition and contemporary psychology. What is the relation between the outputs of these sources? We present some of the common moral wisdom from the Christian tradition, spelling out the nuance and justification given for the suggestions. We next canvas contemporary psychological findings to discover the evidential relation they bear toward such advice. Although numerous psychological studies might be provided as evidence, we have chosen literatures we believe (...) are most relevant, primarily from personality, social, and positive psychology. Is current evidence set against these old exhortations? Moreover, if contemporary psychology does support Christian Moral Wisdom, does it support it for the same reasons as given by the proponents of Christian Moral Wisdom? We conclude that contemporary psychology does generally support ancient Christian Moral Wisdom in the instances we discuss but with some important caveats or conditions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Originating Source of Valid Moral Claims or Witness to Moral Truth?Contemporary Revisionist Accounts of Conscience—An Exploration and Response*Thomas Berg"It will not do to identify man's conscience with the self-consciousness of the I, with its subjective certainty about itself and its moral behavior."—Joseph Ratzinger1In his seminal essay "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Michael Sandel observed that the dominant political philosophy that had been implicit in (...) the practices and institutions of the America of his day (he wrote in 1984) presupposed a certain conception of the human person—the unencumbered self. Wrote Sandel:This is … a self understood as prior to and independent of purposes and ends. … For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them. … The unencumbered self and the ethic it inspires, taken together, hold out a liberating vision. Freed from the [End Page 1319] dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are.2This was at the time a most apt description of the modern liberal self. Alasdair MacIntyre captured its essence in similar terms describing the emotivist self, capable of passing moral judgment "from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity. Anyone and everyone can thus be a moral agent, since it is in the self and not in social roles or practices that moral agency has to be located."3 And the moral claims of these autonomous selves are, in principle, to be held as valid simply because, as John Rawls once put it, they emerge from individuals who understand themselves, and who we take to be "self-originating sources of valid claims."4 It is such a conception of the self—unencumbered, emotivist, self-originating and self-validating source of moral claims—which animates the contemporary zeitgeist.It also captures and articulates the underlying anthropological conception of the self which animates much of contemporary Catholic moral theology. Just such a conception is the root and heart of tensions in contemporary moral theology over what constitutes an adequate understanding of moral conscience appropriate for our times. In the twentieth century, these tensions were experienced first as a much-needed corrective to manualist theology and its excessive emphasis on conscience. Today, however, as Matthew Levering has masterfully retraced, any number of "revisionist" moral theologians—as the present essay will examine—have only strained the existing [End Page 1320] tensions with their own brand of conscience-centered moral theology.5 Writes Levering:Twentieth-century Catholic moral theology was marked throughout by an "abuse of conscience." It gave too expansive a place to conscience in the Christian moral life. By the 1950s, Catholic moral theology was poised to overcome this problem, only to fall even more fully into a new version of conscience-centered moral theology after the Second Vatican Council.6And this largely explains why Catholic moral theology today is in a crisis—what we can call very meaningfully a crisis of conscience. Or to put it more precisely, the institution finds itself today at a tipping point in that crisis.What particularly forces the tipping point is the prominence that has been accorded during the pontificate of Pope Francis to post-conciliar conscience-centered moral theology. It was Cardinal Pietro Parolin, among others, who heralded Pope Francis's 2016 post-synodal apostolic exhortation Amoris Laetitia (AL) as embodying a "new paradigm," an expression commonly employed among the latest generation of revisionist moral theologians.7 To be sure, there are many elements of this paradigm, if we are to call it that, as reflected in AL and more broadly in the magisterium of Pope Francis which are most welcome: the priority of pastoral charity and accompaniment, and the call for "a revolution of tenderness."8 Yet AL [End Page 1321] firmly embraces and authoritatively asserts a conception of the moral life in which conscience plays a primary, if not indeed the decisive, role. Cardinal Robert McElroy states this vision succinctly... (shrink)

It is part of our everyday experience that there is a reliable connection between moral opinions and motivation. Thinking that an act is right (wrong) tends to be accompanied by motivation to (avoid to) perform the act in question. This is mirrored in moral talk. We tend to think that someone who says that he thinks that it is right (wrong) to act in a certain way without being motivated, to some extent, will most likely be speaking insincerely. (...) Moveover, moral utterances have a dynamic function to exhort and guide conduct. This suggests that moral utterances involve a kind of attitudinal expressiveness that makes them very different from prosaically factual utterances. These commonsensical features of our moral practice represent the practicality of moral thought and talk. The main purpose of this essay is to investigate how the practicality of moral thought and talk is best represented and whether it supports either a cognitivist or noncognitivist analysis of moral judgments. I argue that sophisticated versions of internalism and externalism, the main competing explanations of the connection between moral judgments and motivation, represent the reliable connection equally good and that the relevant kind of attitudinal expression can be accomodated by both cognitivists and noncognitivists. The upshot is that considerations based on the practicality of moral thought and talk does not cut much philosophical ice. Hence, the rivalry between cognitivists and noncognitivists analyses must be settled beyond considerations based on practicality. Maybe the belief-like features of moral thought and talk can tilt things in favor of cognitivism. However, noncognitivists have different ways of accommodating the belief-like features. In fact, in the wake of different accommodation projects one wonders what remains of the traditional debate between cognitivist and noncognitivist analyses, a debate that shaped metaethics as we know it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Sermon on the Mount and Moral Theology: A Virtue Perspective by William C. Mattison IIIRebekah EklundThe Sermon on the Mount and Moral Theology: A Virtue Perspective William C. Mattison III NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017. 290 pp. £75.00Undergirding this book is a principle from the Catechism of the Catholic Church: the "analogy of faith" or "the coherence of the truths of faith among themselves" (...) (241). the "truths of faith" under consideration are Matthew's sermon on the Mount (sM) and the virtue ethics of thomas aquinas. Mattison aims to restore the sM to a more prominent place in Catholic moral theology by demonstrating the convergence between the teachings of the sM and thomistic virtue ethics.In this endeavor, the book largely succeeds, even if it occasionally over-reaches—that is, the sM is always shown to be in perfect harmony with thomas's teachings on virtue ethics, in which some readers might see points of tension. For example, Mattison uses thomistic action theory to argue that the beatitudes (Mt 5:3–12) and the sM's concluding exhortations (Mt 7:13–29) both demonstrate an "intrinsic relationship" between action and eternal reward; that is, the "qualifying condition" (e.g., meekness) is itself constitutive of happiness and is thus an activity that continues in eternal life (22–25, 209, 221). Purity of heart works well in this framework, but Mattison struggles to make mourning fit. the thomistic lens determines the sense of the text: Whatever mourning is, it is an activity that must persist in heaven, limiting the options for interpretation.Mattison also aligns the seven virtues—faith, hope, love, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude—with the seven beatitudes (following augustine's reduction of the beatitudes from eight to seven), with the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer, and with sections of the sM as a whole. these latter, broad pairings are not always easy to find. Mattison matches the beatitudes with the virtue of faith, and the six antitheses with the virtues of temperance and fortitude. the virtue of love pairs with Matthew 6:1–6, 16–18 (teachings on prayer, alms-giving, and fasting, sans the Lord's Prayer); prudence, with Matthew 6:19–34 (worry and money); justice, with Matthew 7:1–12 (judging, asking, the golden rule); and hope, with Matthew 7:13–29 (concluding warnings and exhortations).similarly, a virtue is assigned to each beatitude (47) and to each petition of the Lord's Prayer (252). In the case of the Lord's Prayer, Mattison insists on a particular order of the virtues, following aquinas's ordering (but reversing [End Page 207] temperance and fortitude). But he does not use the same order of virtues for the Beatitudes or for the broader alignments with the whole SM (the orders are completely different for all three lists), raising the question of why Aquinas's order matters for one set but not for the others.Mattison's alignments show both his indebtedness to patristic and medieval tradition and his innovation. Medieval commentators commonly matched sets of sevens (Beatitudes, virtues, vices, gifts of the Spirit), but (rather remarkably) none of them ever appears to have understood the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer as requests for the seven virtues, as Mattison does. Likewise, Mattison's alignment of the Beatitudes with the virtues follows the practice but not the substance of previous lists; his pairings match neither Ambrose's nor Aquinas's. I would have found a discussion of the differences helpful.The question is whether Mattison's alignments are fruitful or merely forced, and here readers may find the results to be mixed. Some are illuminating, such as the vice of presumption in relation to Matthew 7:21–23; others, such as the alignment of the six antitheses with the seven sacraments, "appear a bit of a 'stretch,'" as even Mattison admits (110).Overall, scholars and graduate students interested in Thomistic virtue ethics, and in the relationship between scripture and Catholic moral theology, will find much food for thought here.Rebekah EklundLoyola University MarylandCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Imagine a human society, perhaps in pre-history, in which people were generally of a psychological kind with us, had the use of natural language to communicate with one another, but did not have any properly moral concepts in which to exhort one another to meet certain standards and to lodge related claims and complaints. According to The Birth of Ethics, the members of that society would have faced a set of pressures, and made a series of adjustments in response, (...) sufficient to put them within reach of ethical concepts. Without any planning, they would have more or less inevitably evolved a way of using such concepts to articulate desirable patterns of behavior and to hold themselves and one another responsible to those standards. Sooner or later, they would have entered ethical space. While this central claim is developed as a thesis in conjectural history or genealogy, the aim of the exercise is philosophical. Assuming that it explains the emergence of concepts and practices that are more or less equivalent to ours, the story offers us an account of the nature and role of morality. It directs us to the function that ethics plays in human life and alerts us to the character in virtue of which it can serve that function. The emerging view of morality has implications for the standard range of questions in meta-ethics and moral psychology, and enables us to understand why there are divisions in normative ethics like that between consequentialist and Kantian approaches. (shrink)

Revitalized interest in "the virtues" has affected the study of Buddhism in recent years, and in this regard we may benefit by focusing on the Zen Master Dōgen (1200-1253). Seeking to describe Dōgen's moral virtues, we might begin by a study of his primer, the "Shōbōgenzō" Zuimonki; a particularly efficacious template for this project would appear to be one provided by Edmund L. Pincoffs in his book "Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics". This "modus operandi" reveals Dōgen's (...) class='Hi'>exhortation of a broad array of mandatory and nonmandatory virtues, partially depend- ing on whether or not the intended recipient is a layperson or one leading the religious life. If valid, this description may benefit Dōgen Studies as well as contribute to, and encourage, other "Western" efforts to articulate Buddhist ethics. (shrink)

Hesiod’s fable of the hawk and the nightingale, addressed to kings, notoriously has no moral. Its depiction of a hawk carrying off a nightingale, preaching the futility of either resistance or pleading, appears to communicate the counsel, commonly designated as “Machiavellian,” that a ruler must know how to imitate a beast as well as a man. Such instruction—which advises that unjust actions are justifiable and necessary for a ruler—is clearly at odds with Hesiod’s explicit exhortations to his brother Perses (...) to work hard and avoid hubris, and his caution that unjust kings or lords will be punished by Zeus. I argue that Hesiod’s addressing the fable to kings “who themselves have understanding” explains the lack of a moral. To substantiate my claim I compare Hesiod’s and Machiavelli’s ranking of intellects, and illuminate Hesiod’s position with particular reference to and comparison with Machiavelli’s Prince, and examples drawn from the Old Testament and Old Irish law. (shrink)

Aristotle lists six different hexeis (stable states of the soul) in Nicomachean Ethics Book VII. The three to be avoided are akrasia (lack of self-control), vice, and beastliness. Their mirrors, the three to be praised, are enkrateia (self-control), virtue, and superhuman virtue. While the beastial and superhumanly virtuous fall out of discussion, the other four remain a focus for most of Book VII. Aristotle thinks that he has described four reliable ways in which people act always or hōs epi to (...) polu (for the most part). However, I argue that he has only given us enough information to delineate three hexeis. On my interpretation, the akratēs (person lacking self-control) and the enkratēs (self-controlled person) are the same kind of person, they differ only in degree. They exist on a spectrum, while the other two hexeis are distinct kinds of people. While this is hardly the received view, I am convinced that it is consistent with the text. By his own lights, Aristotle does not have a description of the akratēs as differing from the enkratēs making a mistake. Therefore, I want to group them together, rather than draw a bright line between them. First, the mistake of the akratēs is very narrow. She does not know, or knows only in the way the drunk person knows, the conclusion to the good practical syllogism. Second, akrasia is only about an excess of the bodily pleasures associated with food and sex. Aristotle lists eleven other areas where her behavior is undetermined. Third, the akratēs and enkratēs lack the psychological unity that I argue the virtuous and vicious each possess. Therefore, I conclude that the akratēs and enkratēs are the same kind of person. The upshot of my view is that, because it focuses on the positives rather than the negatives, it exhorts us to be better people. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE USE OF SCRIPTURE AND THE RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY: THE CATECHISM AND VERITATIS SPLENDOR 1 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, 0.P. L'Universite de Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland T.HE SECOND Vatican Council ratified the biblical reewal that had prepared it. It truly gave Scripture back o the Catholic people and recommended it as " the very soul of sacred theology." 2 The Council invited theologians to show the inner coherence of the (...) mysteries of salvation proposed by the Scriptures. They were exhorted to make use of the teaching of the Fathers and to engage in speculative reflection, with St. Thomas as a guide, in order to search for the solutions to human problems in a manner suitable to contemporary man. In particular, the Council affirmed : Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture and should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world.3 The document on the formation of future priests published on February 22, 1976 by the Congregation for Catholic Education 1 This paper was presented at the Theological Consultation of American Bishops at the Pontifical North American College in Rome, September 12, 1994. The English translation was prepared by Sister Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. 2Dei Verbum 24; English translation by Liam Walsh,O.P., Vatican Council II, ed. Austin Flannery, O.P., revised edition, (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 764. See 0Ptatam totius 16. s Optatam totius 16; English translation by B. Hayes, S.M., S. Fagan, S.M., and Austin Flannery, O.P., Vatican Council II, 720. 1 2 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. makes the directives in this conciliar text beautifully explicit and helps us to perceive its main lines. Notably, it states : In the past, moral theology exhibited at times a certain narrowness of vision and some lacunas. This was due in large part to a kind of legalism, to an individualistic orientation, and to a separation from the sources of Revelation. To counter all this,... it is necessary to clarify the method by which moral theology ought to be developed in close contact with Holy Scripture (n. 96). The Catechism of the Catholic Church and the encyclical V eritatis Splendor have each in its own way effected the reestablishment of the bonds between Scripture and moral theology. I propose to touch upon the principal points of this scriptural renewal in the teaching of moral theology. In order to get an idea of the novelty of these recent developments, a comparison will help. We shall look at the presentation of Catholic moral teaching given in the manuals which have served as textbooks in seminaries and which have oriented preaching and moral catechesis over the last four centuries, following the Council of Trent. These manuals developed and transmitted a certain systematization of moral theology based on categories which have become classic. Even those who criticize the manuals, proportionalists and consequentialists, for example, still use these categories. The moral theory of the manuals constitutes a common cultural base, one whose concepts and categories (for the most part connected with certain currents in modern philosophy such as Kantian ethics) have exercised a determining role in the relationship between the teaching of Christian ethics and Scripture. In our effort to delineate the principal elements of scriptural renewal proposed to us by the Catechism and the Encyclical, we shall examine six points: firstly, the use of Scripture; next, the great moral texts it offers us, the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, apostolic catechesis, and the treatment of cases of conscience ; finally, we shall respond to the difficulty created by new ethical problems and by recent cultural changes. CATECHISM AND VERITATIS SPLENDOR 3 I. SCRIPTURAL QUOTATIONS We need only run through the moral section of the Catechism to see that Biblical citations are there far more numerous than in the manuals of former times. These citations appear even in the section titles, such as " Life in Christ" and " Life in the Spirit," taken from Saint Paul in order to describe the moral life. The table of... (shrink)

Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness of the problems related to implicit biases, and of how to safeguard against discrimination that may result. However, as Atewologun et al (2018) have noted, there is very little systematicity in IBT, and there are many unknowns about what constitutes good IBT. One important issue concerns the tone of information provided regarding implicit bias. This paper engages this question, focusing in particular on the observation that (...) much bias training is delivered in exculpatory tone, emphasising that individuals are not to blame for possessing implicit biases. Normative guidance around IBT exhorts practitioners to adopt this strategy (Moss-Racusin et al 2014). However, existing evidence about the effects of moralized feedback about implicit bias is equivocal (Legault et al 2011; Czopp et al 2006). Through a series of studies, culminating in an experiment with a pre-registered analysis plan, we develop a paradigm for evaluating the impact of moralized feedback on participants’ implicit racial bias scores. We also conducted exploratory analyses of the impact on their moods, and behavioural intentions. Our results indicated that an exculpatory tone, rather than a blaming or neutral tone, did not make participants less resistant to changing their attitudes and behaviours. In fact, participants in the blame condition had significantly stronger explicit intentions to change future behaviour than those in the ‘no feedback’ condition (see experiment 3). These results indicate that considerations of efficacy do not support the need for implicit bias feedback to be exculpatory. We tease out the implications of these findings, and directions for future research. (shrink)

Authors of Greek and Roman philosophical protreptics imitate a kind of exhortation initially associated with Socrates, creating a thread of typically protreptic intertextuality that classifies protreptic as a genre of philosophical literature. Tracing this intertextuality from the Socratic authors to Boethius, the book shows how Greek and Roman protreptics define philosophy as a revisionary form of education, articulate the ultimate goals of this education, and associate their authors and audiences with philosophy as a new discursive practice and a new (...) way of living. These texts constitute the first chapter in the history of educational revision and thus offer thoughts that continue to inform every debate on educational goals. (shrink)

“Stab, smite, slay!” These are not the words of Bashar al-Assad telling his forces how they should deal with the Syrian rebel movement, or indeed those of any other contemporary political leader, but rather the words of Martin Luther exhorting the German nobility to a harsh response to the peasants' rebellion of 1524–1525. His writings show that he sympathized with many of the peasants' grievances so long as these did not issue in rebellion, but when they turned to force of (...) arms, he responded sternly. This was not a peculiarity of Luther. Consider the following from an English courtier, Thomas Churchyard, writing admiringly of the treatment of Irish rebels in 1579 by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, commander of the English army sent to put down the rebellion: He further tooke this order infringeable, that when soever he made any ostyng [military campaign], or inrode, into the enemies Countrey, he killed manne, woman, and child, and spoiled, wasted, and burned, by the grounde all that he might, leavyng nothing of the enemies in saffetie, whiche he could possiblie waste, or consume. (shrink)

In comparison with Lucian, hardly any other author has achieved a similar mastery of the paradox formula of σπουδογέλοιον, the combination of serious moral exhortation with entertainment and delight. These antithetic features made him an appealing point of reference for Renaissance humanists, who not only translated parts of his oeuvre from Greek to Latin, thus casting a particular light on this versatile author and molding his literary identity according to their own tastes, but also inhaled the Lucianic esprit (...) to such an extent that it would frequently resurface in their own writings. This article focuses on Thomas More’s Latin translations of the Greek author and their multifaceted impact on his masterpiece Utopia, ranging from the shaping of the protagonist and the authorial persona to etymological puns, the stylistic devices of irony, parody, and paradox, as well as varying degrees of fictionality that are highly indebted to Lucian. (shrink)

The urgent importance of dealing with the climate crisis has led some influential theorists to argue that at least some demands for justice must give way to pragmatic and strategic considerations. These theorists (Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, and David Weisbach, all academic lawyers, and John Broome, an academic philosopher) contend that the failures of international negotiations and other efforts to change economic policies and practices have shown that moral exhortations are worse than ineffective. Although Broome's position is similar in (...) these respects to that of Sunstein, Posner and Weisbach, it differs in other important respects, including his understanding of the idea of justice, his disagreement with the policy approach (which he calls "efficiency with sacrifice") favored by the economists Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus, and his proposal for establishing a new international financial institution, a World Climate Bank, in addition to putting a price on carbon. Elsewhere I offer a critical analysis of the position taken by Posner and Weisbach in their book, Climate Change Justice. Their arguments against allowing principles of distributive justice (narrowly understood) to constrain treaty negotiations fail to rule out the principles of John Rawls' Law of Peoples (which is a conception of the moral basis of a just international order, including states' obligations to secure basic human rights for all). Therefore their arguments against shaping climate treaties to reflect any principles of justice do not succeed in supporting their position. Here I offer a critical analysis of Broome's position. I raise and discuss objections to Broome's proposal for a WCB, and I argue that the continued relevance of these objections is contingent on how the proposal for a WCB may get developed. (shrink)

Hobbes’s science of politics rests on a dual analysis of human beings: humans as complex material bodies in a network of mechanical forces, prone to passions and irrationality; and humans as subjects of right and obligation, morally exhortable by appeal to the standards of reason. The science of politics proposes an absolutist model of politics. If this proposal is not to be idle utopianism, the enduring functioning of the model needs to be compatible with the materialist analysis of human behaviour. (...) In this paper, I argue that Hobbes's attempts to render his science of politics compatible with his materialism are only partly successful; a fuller compatibility is achieved in the political writings of Spinoza. -/- Published with reply: Luke O'Sullivan, 'Sovereigns and citizens: a response to Field', ibid., 221-224. Reprinted as: Sandra Field (2015), 'Hobbes and human irrationality', in T. Nardin (ed.) Rationality in Politics and its Limits, Abingdon: Routledge, 31-44. With reply: Luke O'Sullivan, 'Sovereigns and citizens: a response to Field', ibid., 45-48. (shrink)

The ancients never confined their philosophy to the systematic exposition of doctrine. Orations, treatises, dialogues and letters aimed at persuading people to become lovers of wisdom. Rhetorical feats, logical intricacies, or mystical experience served to recruit adherents, to promote and defend philosophy and to support adherents. Protreptic was the literary form that served all these functions. This volume seeks to illuminate both the diversity and the continuity of protreptic in the work of a wide range of authors, from Parmenides to (...) Augustine. (shrink)

本书从历史演变、文体书写、文化功能、教化思想和文学价值等五个方面对江南望族家训进行了全面系统地考察和研究；重点探讨了江南家训对江南望族的依附生成和发展演变，以及江南家训在立人教育、理家教育和女性教育等 育人传家方面的重要文化作用；既分析了江南望族家训与中国传统家训的文化共性，又研究了江南家训文化的地域特性，首次从江南地域的空间视角对传统家训研究进行了深化和拓展，也为倡导健康的世风和家风养成提供了有益 的学术参考。.

From the standpoint of a Christian philosopher, heeding the teaching and exhortations of Pope John Paul II and previous popes, I examine three directions in which the recent philosophical debate has developed. In the last seven or eight years there has been 1) a renewed focus on the biological issue of when a human individual comes to be, 2) new arguments for the proposition that personhood is a characteristic acquired after birth, and 3) refinements of the early argument of Judith (...) Thomson. Replying to these developments, I defend, on philosophical grounds, the pro-life position. I argue that a distinct, whole (though immature) human individual comes to be at conception, that he or she is a person, with full moral worth, from the moment he or she comes to be, and the mothers and fathers have a special responsibility to their children which entails (at least) that they ought not to choose to abort them. I conclude by briefly indicating, from the standpoint of Christian faith, why Christian philosophers should vigorously pursue this debate. (shrink)

The pages that follow offer a critical survey of the motivic pursuit of a sober and wakeful way of life in old and late Stoicism (esp. Seneca’s Letters, Epictetus’ Discourses, and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations). The aim is to show the key role that this motif plays in the Stoic conceptualization of conversion to philosophy and the school’s protreptic or rhetoric of conversion, that is to say, the forms of speech and literary strategies employed to instruct their addressees about what they (...) understood by conversion to philosophy and exhort them to change in their way of life. Wakefulness and soberness (and their counterparts, sleep and drunkenness) have been brought up occasionally in studies on Stoic ethics or moral philosophy. Yet, scholarship in the field has, to date, failed to identify the unique light this motif sheds on the Stoic pedagogical heuristics and conversion experience. T. Bénatouïl 2006, however, has already pointed out, in a study on the practical dimension of Stoicism, that despite its apparent triviality, the Stoic discussion on the sage’s use of wine and drunkenness unveils significant insights into the principles which govern the sage’s whole way of life. With a similar conviction, I hope that what follows may also elucidate the unparalleled lens that wakefulness and soberness as a motif for conversion provides for our understanding of the Stoic pursuit of a way of life in wisdom and virtue and its distinctiveness in the interaction process between traditions that characterized the ancient Mediterranean context. (shrink)

This is a response to Giubilini and Minerva arguing that, on the basis of the similar moral status of the fetus and infant, infanticide is justifiable for many of the same reasons that justify abortion. It argues that, although the authors are correct in claiming the logical connection between abortion and infanticide, they are mistaken in their moral anthropology and so misunderstand which way the reasoning should cut. It concludes with an exhortation—especially to fellow pro-lifers—to have a (...) different kind of discourse on these matters. (shrink)

A moral essay by an unphilosophic Victorian poet exhorting man to look within himself for that Spirit which is the soul of the Universe and in which All is One.--R. C. N.

How our everyday interactions as neighbors shape—and sometimes undermine—democracy "Love thy neighbor" is an impossible exhortation. Good neighbors greet us on the street and do small favors, but neighbors also startle us with sounds at night and unleash their demons on us, they monitor and reproach us, and betray us to authorities. The moral principles prescribed for friendship, civil society, and democratic public life apply imperfectly to life around home, where we interact day to day without the formal (...) institutions, rules of conduct, and means of enforcement that guide us in other settings. In Good Neighbors, Nancy Rosenblum explores how encounters among neighbors create a democracy of everyday life, which has been with us since the beginning of American history and is expressed in settler, immigrant, and suburban narratives and in novels, poetry, and popular culture. During disasters, like Hurricane Katrina, the democracy of everyday life is a resource for neighbors who improvise rescue and care. Degraded, this framework can give way to betrayal by neighbors, as faced by the Japanese Americans interned during World War II, or to terrible violence such as the lynching of African Americans. Under extreme conditions the barest act of neighborliness is a bulwark against total ethical breakdown. The elements of the democracy of everyday life—reciprocity, speaking out, and "live and let live"—comprise a democratic ideal not reducible to public principles of justice or civic virtue, but it is no less important. The democracy of everyday life, Rosenblum argues, is the deep substrate of democracy in America and can be its saving remnant. (shrink)

Supererogation seems to be an important concept of common sense morality. However, assuming the existence of such a category seems to pose a serious problem for Kantian Ethics, given the all-encompassing role of duty. In fact, Kant seems to deny the possibility of such acts when he states in the second critique that “[b]y exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, minds are attuned to nothing but moral enthusiasm and exaggerated self-conceit; [...] they are led into the (...) delusion that it is not duty […] which constitutes the determining ground of their actions […]”. (KpV, AA V, 84f.). This paper’s aim is to show that even though it is not possible to include a category of supererogation within Kantian Ethics, the recognition of alleged supererogatory acts is not only a source of self-deception, as Kant seems to fear, but can also serve as a source of self-knowledge. Starting from the premise that within Kantian Ethics self-knowledge is indispensable to aspire to the duties of moral self-perfection, I will argue that supererogation is only a plausible concept regarding the observer-perspective: thus it describes an act that, given the observer's own moral development, seems to be beyond duty but for the agent herself is not. Given an observer has the insight that her judgment relies on her own deficiencies to act accordingly, this fulfills an epistemic function in the process of developing one’s own moral capacities. This seems to be a fairly proper phenomenological account of supererogation as it can, on the one hand, explain the common moral intuition that certain acts are supererogatory. While on the other hand, it can capture the empirical observation that agents of alleged supererogatory acts usually do not perceive their actions as supererogatory because the differing perspectives of the agent and the observer constitute an integral part of the given account. (shrink)

La philosophie morale des stoïques -- Le manuel d'Épictète -- Les responses d'Épictète aux demandes de l'empereur Adrian -- L'exhortation à la vie civile -- De la constance et consolation ès calamitez publiques.

The issues concerning education of children and young people are deeply inscribed into Pope Francis’ profound experience, as he gained knowledge and practised educating in Buenos Aires. He worked there in support of the universal education of children and young people who lived in the so-called barrios and villas miseria, which were the districts of poverty in the suburbs of this metropolis. This and other experiences of Jorge Mario Bergoglio contributed to his decisions to discuss the issues of education in (...) the documents written during his pontificate in the Vatican. The author of the article would like to present the issues connected with education of children and young people in the teaching of Pope Francis. This issue is more relevant than in contemporary times, the emphasis was on upbringing rather than on education. Francis emphasises the importance of education as a method of influencing the development of man. It allows for the conscious and planned influencing of children and young people, while the aim of education is to form certain changes of personality. Pope Francis presents the issue of education in his apostolic exhortation Amoris Laetitia in a particular way, as he introduces ethical, moral and sexual education to the reader. In his encyclical Laudato Si’, the Pope refers to ecological education. Contribution: This research relates to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) sustainable goals with regard to quality education. The article is an attempt to find the answers to the questions concerning the way Pope Francis perceives education and its influence on the development of children and young people, as well as to present its most important aspects. (shrink)

If we read the central message of Caritas in Veritate (CV) through the lens of contemporary business ethics—and the encyclical does seem to invite such a reading (CV 40–41, and 45–47)—there is first of all a diagnosis of a crisis. Then, we are offered a response to the diagnosis: charity in truth , “the principle around which the Church’s social doctrine turns, a principle that takes on practical form in the criteria that govern moral action .” (CV 6) In (...) business ethics, the norms of personal and (especially) corporate responsibility are the natural correlates to “the criteria that govern moral action.” Using this as a point of departure, I propose to relate some recent scholarship in business ethics to the message of CV — with the suggestion that there is significant convergence. I argue, further, that the encyclical breaks new ground with its suggestion that, at the center of our moral thinking in business ethics lies a logic of contribution or gift. I discuss Benedict’s understanding of the crisis, and his exhortation to reach beyond conventional interpretations of corporate responsibility, under the following four headings: Diagnosing a Crisis , Institutionalizing Conscience , A Tripartite View of Corporate Responsibility, and Comprehensive Moral Thinking. (shrink)

This study investigates how one important accounting professional authority—CPA Canada—discusses accounting ethics and exhorts its members to think about ethics-related issues. To do this, we rely on empirical evidence of the types of arguments used by CPA Canada to describe what they consider acceptable moral justifications in a variety of practical situations that accountants may encounter. We argue that the articles contained in the profession’s primary publication for all members, CPA Magazine, offer a wealth of such evidence. We analyze (...) 237 articles about accounting ethics that were published in CPA Magazine from January 2000 to December 2017, and find evidence of moral pluralism. Six categories of justifications dominate: private commitments, utility, perfectionist ends, general duties, and specific obligations, plus self-interest. Of these categories, the specific obligations logic is the most widely used. We offer a tentative explanation, and discuss the implications of our findings for a better grasp of the complexities of accountants’ practical conflicts and a rethink of the ongoing tension between professionalism and commercialism. (shrink)

In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume makes clear that it is his aim to make moral philosophy more scientific and properly grounded on experience and observation. The “experimental” approach to philosophy, Hume warns his readers, is “abstruse,” “abstract” and “speculative” in nature. It depends on careful and exact reasoning that foregoes the path of an “easy” philosophy, which relies on a more direct appeal to our passions and sentiments . Hume justifies this approach by way of an analogy (...) concerning the relevance of anatomy to painting. “The anatomist,” he says, “ought never to emulate the painter.” At the same time, the painter cannot afford to ignore the anatomist: An anatomist [...] is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter ... We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstruse speculations concerning human nature, however cold and uninteresting, become subservient to practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations. As these remarks suggest, Hume’s anatomy of virtue is not without its own practical aims and objectives. It is advanced with a view to identifying and carefully delineating the true foundations of morality in human nature and correcting our practices in light of this. With this improvement in our understanding of the nature and basis of virtue, we can better appreciate the way in which virtue secures happiness for ourselves and others and may also avoid the distortions and corruptions of morality by religious superstition. (shrink)

The pages that follow offer a critical survey of the motivic pursuit of a sober and wakeful way of life in old and late Stoicism (esp. Seneca’s Letters, Epictetus’ Discourses, and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations). The aim is to show the key role that this motif plays in the Stoic conceptualization of conversion to philosophy and the school’s protreptic or rhetoric of conversion, that is to say, the forms of speech and literary strategies employed to instruct their addressees about what they (...) understood by conversion to philosophy and exhort them to change in their way of life. Wakefulness and soberness (and their counterparts, sleep and drunkenness) have been brought up occasionally in studies on Stoic ethics or moral philosophy. Yet, scholarship in the field has, to date, failed to identify the unique light this motif sheds on the Stoic pedagogical heuristics and conversion experience. T. Bénatouïl 2006, however, has already pointed out, in a study on the practical dimension of Stoicism, that despite its apparent triviality, the Stoic discussion on the sage’s use of wine and drunkenness unveils significant insights into the principles which govern the sage’s whole way of life. With a similar conviction, I hope that what follows may also elucidate the unparalleled lens that wakefulness and soberness as a motif for conversion provides for our understanding of the Stoic pursuit of a way of life in wisdom and virtue and its distinctiveness in the interaction process between traditions that characterized the ancient Mediterranean context. (shrink)

Philippe Fournier | : Le point de départ de ma proposition est que la responsabilité est un terme plus approprié que la vertu pour désigner les exhortations au devoir civique dans l’ère contemporaine. De même, à défaut de voir l’implication citoyenne comme l’expression de la rationalité individuelle ou de la conscience morale dans la sphère publique, je propose de comprendre la responsabilité comme une matrice discursive et gouvernementale qui perpétue des modèles comportementaux bien spécifiques. J’entends ainsi démontrer que la responsabilité (...) est devenue une modalité indispensable du « gouvernement de la conduite » au sein d’une rationalité néolibérale. En plus de constituer une série de dispositions morales qui remédierait aux failles et aux lacunes de l’individualisme libéral, la responsabilité se matérialise dans les incitations à une citoyenneté active et participe de ce fait à la rationalisation du retranchement de l’État de la sphère sociale. Comme l’illustrent des courants aussi divers que le néoconservatisme, le communautarisme et l’économie sociale, la responsabilité se présente moins comme une solution de rechange aux créneaux du néolibéralisme qu’une série de techniques et de standards comportementaux visant à compléter et renforcer l’application élargie d’une logique micro-économique. Je montrerai que le recours à la notion de responsabilité est particulièrement visible dans les politiques d’aide sociale et au sein des nouveaux partenariats entre l’État, le milieu communautaire et les communautés locales. En effet, l’aide étatique est de plus en plus conditionnelle à la démonstration de certaines dispositions morales et psychologiques comme la volonté, la ténacité et la probité. L’article se divise en quatre parties. La première s’attarde à définir brièvement la « gouvernementalité », concept initialement développé par Michel Foucault. La deuxième se penche sur des travaux plus contemporains, notamment ceux du sociologue britannique Nikolas Rose qui se préoccupe de la responsabilité en tant que modalité gouvernementale au sein du néolibéralisme. La troisième partie met en relief les particularités du néolibéralisme américain. En vue de cerner les pratiques et discours associés à la responsabilité de façon plus précise, la dernière partie examine l’un des principaux programmes d’aide sociale aux États-Unis, l’Aid to Families with Dependent Children, devenu le Temporary Assistance for Needy Families en 1996, des années 1980 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. | : Our point of departure is that responsibility is a more appropriate term than virtue to designate the contemporary exhortations to civic duty. Instead of seeing civic engagement as a means to express individual rationality or moral conscience in the public sphere, this paper suggests that we should understand responsability as a discursive and governmental matrix that perpetuates specific behavioral standards. More specifically, the article aims to show that responsability has become an indispensable instrument of rule within a neoliberal rationality of government. As well as pointing to a range of moral dispositions that can offset neoliberalism’s shortcomings, the notion of responsibility is mobilised in the repeated public calls to active citizenship and plays a strategic role in the discursive justification of the state’s withdrawal from the social sphere. As illustrated by strands of thought as diverse as neoconservatism, communitarianism and social economy, responsibility is less an alternative to neoliberal tenets than a series of techniques and behavioral standards that complement and reinforce the extension of a microeconomic logic to all spheres of human activity. The appeals to responsibility are particularly visible in contemporary social policies and in the strategic partnerships between the state, community organisations and local communities. Indeed, state assistance has become increasingly conditional on the demonstration of aptitudes and moral qualities like earnestness, tenacity and willpower. The article proceeds in four parts. The first part briefly defines governmentality, a concept initially developed by Michel Foucault. The second part explores Nikolas Rose’s work on advanced liberalism and takes a look at contemporary articulations of responsibility. The third part examines the specificities of American neoliberalism. In order to identify the practices and discourses linked to the notion of responsibility, the final part of the article looks at one of the main social programs in the United States, namely the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, renamed the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in 1996, from the early 1980s to our day. (shrink)

Are the commands and exhortations of the Lord Jesus directed to his disciples only or are they directed to all mankind? The question arises from an examination of traditional Jewish teaching, around the time of Jesus's life in Palestine, that Jewish Law applies only to Jews. Seeing that there is no way of knowing what God requires of humans unless he reveals his requirements, and seeing that God's revealing of any requirements he has made has been carried out by Jesus (...) the Christ and, further, that the best evidence for his teachings are the accounts of his teaching in the New Testament, this article examines it and concludes that his Law applies only to his disciples. (shrink)

Thomas Hoccleve wrote his Regement of Princes in 1411 and addressed it to the patronage of Henry, Prince of Wales, who was to succeed to the throne as Henry V two years later, on the death of his father, Henry IV. The Regement is a book of the governance of princes, drawn from the De regimine principum of Aegidius Romanus and from other similar works including the Secreta secretorum, which purports to be a compendium of Aristotle's advice on kingship to (...) Alexander the Great. Like these works, Hoccleve's Regement lays out a series of unexceptionable moral principles that should guide a prince's behavior: the prince is exhorted, for instance, to be prudent, just, liberal, and receptive to counsel. These recommendations are supported with citations from biblical and classical authorities and a wealth of narratives exemplary of kingly and unkingly conduct. Princes were to look in such books as in a mirror, and there see displayed the image of what they should truly be. They were “Mirrors for Princes.” Princes welcomed them and on occasion commissioned them, not because they specially desired to have instruction in the business of government from clerks, nor because they would much appreciate being told things they did not wish to hear, but because it was important that they should represent themselves as receptive to sage counsel. They are not simply political public relations exercises but, equally, they are not “books of instruction.”. (shrink)

This article explores three aspects of Masterman's language work and applies them to questions of spiritual intelligence: metaphor, coherence, and ambiguity. First, metaphor, which is ubiquitous in ordinary language, both leads and misleads in religious and scientific understanding. Masterman's case for a “dual-approach” to thinking, both speculative and critical, is explored and tied to concepts of moral-spiritual development per Pierre Hadot and Hannah Arendt. Second, Masterman's work on machine translation presents semantic disambiguation as an emerging coherence wherein one gradually (...) hones in on meaning through features of ordinary language (like redundancy and repetition). This is applied to the problem of comprehending difficult spiritual language, and tied to spiritual stretching and spiritual cartography. Third, Masterman's work with thesauri, rather than relying on words as having fixed meanings, appeals to a concept of semantic spaces, nebulae of variously interconnected meanings. This is constructed into an exhortation to reambiguate overfamiliar religious language, to reinvest one's quotidian surroundings with spiritual meaning through defamilarization. (shrink)