A presente pesquisa realiza um estudo de caso de uma rádio transmitida por meio do aplicativo WhatsApp e suas dinâmicas interativas em páginas em redes sociais online. Entre os objetivos deste estudo de inspiração etnográfica de uma rádio segmentada estão a descrição e análise dos processos de transmissão, circulação da produção de textos audioverbovisuais, modelo de negócio e interação com os ouvintes usuários do aplicativo. Pretende-se compreender possíveis experiências de pessoas comuns em ambientes digitais que provocam tensões entre os modos (...) de fazer rádio, as tecnologias digitais, a visibilidade e o suposto empoderamento do ouvinte. (shrink)

A tese defendida no presente artigo é que a autoconsciência, na visão de Searle é uma caraterística do campo unificado de consciência. Após uma discussão de três distinções a respeito da consciência propostas por Rosenthal, é discutido o conceito de consciência de Searle – como um fenômeno qualitativo, subjetivo e unificado – e o caráter holístico desse conceito. A discussão que Searle faz dos conceitos de autoconsciência e de introspecção mostra que ele acredita que uma autoconsciência implícita é uma característica (...) constitutiva do campo unificado de consciência. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a frequente alegação na literatura filosófica de que a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência é incoerente. Após um exame das teses básicas de sua teoria da mente , é discutida sua posição a respeito da identidade entre a consciência e a atividade cerebral . Da adesão de Searle a uma tese da identidade de ocorrências deve-se concluir que não há contradição entre esta tese e a irredutibilidade ontológica que ele defende. Porém, é possível deduzir (...) de sua teoria asserções que contradizem esta mesma teoria , uma vez que essa irredutibilidade resulta em um dualismo de propriedades. (shrink)

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be “dead” (...) would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

O artigo defende a tese de que a irredutibilidade ontológica que Searle atribui à consciência envolve o naturalismo biológico (proposto por ele como uma solução para a parte conceitual do problema mente-corpo) em diversas incoerências, especialmente no que diz respeito ao tema da causação mental. Após uma apresentação das teses básicas da teoria (seção 2), são discutidos os problemas que a tese da irredutibilidade ontológica gera para a visão de Searle sobre a causação mental (seção 3), e as incoerências decorrentes (...) dessa tese (seção 4). A conclusão é que o modo como Searle concebe a irredutibilidade ontológica da consciência é uma fonte de problemas para o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)

Resumo: John R. Searle articulou uma filosofia da mente de acordo com a qual a consciência é o mais importante dos fenômenos mentais, sendo essencialmente caracterizada por uma subjetividade de seu modo de existência. O problema é que a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes coloca essa concepção em dificuldades, pois fenômenos inconscientes existem sem serem vivenciados, ou seja, existem de forma objetiva. Para escapar desse problema, Searle propõe uma teoria disposicional do inconsciente, mas a tese do presente trabalho é que, (...) ao aceitar a possibilidade de causação mental inconsciente, Searle está comprometido com a existência de propriedades mentais genuínas, mas independentes da consciência, de modo que sua tese da subjetividade ontológica da mente desmorona. (shrink)

O artigo examina a teoria de David Armstrong sobre a consciência e sua concepção do inconsciente. Após uma discussão do caráter anti-cartesiano dessa teoria, são discutidas as noções de consciência mínima e consciência perceptiva, bem como o conceito de consciência introspectiva, que é o mais importante para Armstrong. A conclusão é que, apesar do valor explicativo dos seus conceitos de consciência, Armstrong defende uma perspectiva insatisfatória a respeito do inconsciente, pois essa perspectiva não dá conta da real influência do inconsciente (...) em nossa vida mental. (shrink)

Entre os meses de outubro e novembro de 1983, Michel Foucault proferiu, em Berkeley, seisconferências, problematizando as relações do sujeito com a verdade, a partir do conceito grego deparresía (παρρησία). Essas conferências, como tantas outras que compunham uma série de cursosoferecidos pelo filósofo francês, foram gravadas, posteriormente, transcritas e organizadas em livrosque colaboram de modo singular com pesquisas até os dias atuais. As conferências foram editadas pelaUniversidade de Berkeley em 1985 e foram traduzidas no Brasil, ganhando formato de artigos, no (...) anode 2013, organizadas e publicadas pela equipe da Revista Prometeus, sob a coordenação do prof. Dr.Aldo Dinucci da Universidade Federal de Sergipe (UFS). (shrink)

O artigo examina o papel do conceito de ‘forma aspectual’ – o fato de toda representação representar seu objeto sob certos aspectos, e não outros – na argumentação de Searle para sustentar uma teoria disposicional do inconsciente. Após uma discussão dos argumentos de Searle para a conexão entre a intencionalidade inconsciente e a consciência (seção 2), são discutidas as razões para aceitar que a forma aspectual tem existência objetiva (seção 3) e o modo como a causação mental inconsciente exige a (...) presença de propriedades mentais ocorrentes (seção 4). A única razão para Searle negar a existência mental inconsciente é a sua restriçãoexcessiva, e injustificada,ao ponto de vista subjetivo da experiência consciente (seção 5). (shrink)

O objetivo desta pesquisa é averiguar se no caso específico brasileiro, a judicialização da política seria ou não uma relação de correspondência a uma condição de subsidiariedade das demandas sociais dentro da arena legislativa que tem como definição cumprir a função de representação do povo, ou seja, o Poder Legislativo segue uma lógica democrática procedimental que provoca a necessidade da atuação do Poder judiciário sobre demandas da sociedade civil?

Apresentamos um recorte da pesquisa realizada no âmbito do doutorado em Educação na Universidade Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina. Utilizamos partes de entrevistas realizadas em uma escola no Rio de Janeiro, BR e em Córdoba, AR. Trabalharemos com uma categoria criada e desenvolvida na tese a partir de interlocuções com a bibliografia e a posterior análise. Objetivamos analisar as condições materiais dos sentidos dos discursos de alunos da Educação de Jovens e Adultos de Brasil e Argentina sobre a categoria trabalho. Nos (...) fundamentamos em uma metodologia qualitativa. Tivemos como fulcro teórico a Análise de Discurso.A partir dos Recortes discursivos, observamos uma exaltação do trabalho. (shrink)

Este artigo trata de dois eixos epistêmicos, a saber, a questão da parresía em Foucault e a questão da relação mestre-discípulo no estoicismo. Para tanto, propomos a problematização das dimensões históricofilosóficas que circundam a relação entre mestre e discípulo sustentada pelos conceitos gregos: conhecimento de si (gnôthhi seauton) e cuidado de si (epimeleisthai seauton). Mostramos como a coragem da verdade emerge dessa injunção, atravessando o governo do outro. Essa articulação nos lança a uma hermenêutica de si, o que nos permite (...) refletir sobre modos parresiásticos de nosso tempo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Parresía; Mestre-Discípulo; Conhecimento de Si; Cuidado de Si; Governo do Outro; Hermenêutica de Si, Verdade. (shrink)

Searle defende a perspectiva – historicamente associada a Descartes – segundo a qual a consciência é a essência da mente. Isso gera complicações para que ele possa explicar a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes – existência que o próprio Searle aceita. Sua estratégia para conciliar a essencialidade da consciência com a existência de fenômenos mentais inconscientes é recorrer a uma teoria disposicional: estados inconscientes existem na forma de disposições para a causação de estados conscientes. O presente artigo se concentra em (...) uma dificuldade enfrentada por essa teoria, dificuldade decorrente da eficácia causal que o próprio Searle atribui aos fenômenos mentais inconscientes. Se um fenômeno inconsciente causa uma determinada ação, então ele o faz em virtude de suas propriedades mentais aspecto qualitativo de sensações, ou o conteúdo representativo de desejos), mas se estas propriedades mentais desempenham um papel essencial na causação, então elas existem efetivamente, o que significa que o fenômeno inconsciente possui uma existência mental independente da consciência, o que contradiz a visão cartesiana da consciência como a essência do mental. (shrink)

A Era Tecnológica em que vivemos agrava os riscos de despersonalização do ser humano, sobretudo no campo da Medicina, subvertendo a ordem de a ciência servir à pessoa. Cuidados paliativos e direitos do paciente terminal apresenta análise pioneira da terminalidade da vida à luz do Direito Civil, com ênfase nos direitos da personalidade, da Bioética e da Filosofia de Emmanuel Lévinas. São alguns tópicos de destaque- - pessoa e personalidade; - direitos da personalidade; - futilidade terapêutica; - cuidados em saúde (...) para pacientes terminais; - qualidade de vida na enfermidade; - decisões em fim de vida; - ética à beira do leito do paciente; - direitos sobre o próprio estado de saúde; - diretivas antecipadas de vontade. Obra de sensibilidade ímpar, Cuidados paliativos e direitos do paciente terminal destina-se a estudantes e profissionais do Direito e da área da saúde, e a todos aqueles que se interessam por discussão tão delicada e necessária nos dias atuais. Para acessar as atualizações dos textos legais após a publicação da obra e outros documentos sobre o tema, acesse- manoleeducacao.com.br/cuidados-paliativos. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a concepçáo de reduçáo de Searle no que se refere à compatibilidade entre redutibilidade causal e simultânea irredutibilidade ontológica da consciência à atividade cerebral. A reduçáo causal da consciência – a explanabilidade causal de suas características por processos cerebrais e a identidade de suas capacidades causais (seçáo 2) – é incompatível com a irredutibilidade ontológica (seçáo 3), porque a diferença ontológica entre características subjetivas e objetivas torna a identidade das capacidades causais incompreensível (seçáo 4). O principal problema (...) é que a teoria de Searle afirma e nega simultaneamente a identidade entre consciência e processos cerebrais (seçáo 5). (shrink)

A maternidade é uma das mais complexas conquistas da vida de uma mulher, entretanto, esta conquista nem sempre se dá de forma tranquila. Imprevistos podem acontecer no decorrer deste processo. Com o intuito de aprofundar o estudo acerca dos possíveis efeitos da prematuridade na relação mãe e filho,..

O artigo examina a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência (em especial a sua teoria acerca de seus poderes causais), que se mostra obscura e incoerente. Porém, essa incoerência não é inevitável, pois o naturalismo biológico possui elementos que permitiriam a articulação de uma teoria mais clara a respeito das capacidades causais. O exame da teoria de Pereboom e Kornblith possibilita entender por que a afirmação de identidade das capacidades causais leva a um reducionismo. Essa teoria aponta um (...) caminho promissor para que se possa aprimorar o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de (...) propriedades. (shrink)

This paper contains an analysis of a famous criticism from John Searle on materialist tradition. This tradition uses to ignore or even refuse the subjectivity of mental phenomena. This paper examines Searle’s strategy to defend this subjectivity, refusing the essential character of behavior to the mental aspect (section II), distinguishing subjective and objective in epistemic and ontological senses (section III) and showing his solution to the problem of other minds (section IV). However, his attempt to obtain an indirect access to (...) subjective mental phenomena through causal explanations (section V) of these phenomena by brain processes is not enough to integrate the ontological subjectivity in our scientific worldview, once that this supposed ontological irreducibility from subjective to objective phenomena seems to result in the conclusion that mental phenomena are something beyond natural reality. (shrink)

John Searle claims that consciousness is ontologically subjective, since conscious mental phenomena only exist as long as they are experienced. Therefore, mental phenomena are essentially conscious, insofar as their mental character depends on their connection with consciousness. However, to align the acceptance of unconscious mental phenomena with his Cartesian view of consciousness, Searle defends adispositional account of the unconscious. The problem is that some cases of unconscious mental causation require that certain decisive mental properties exist in an occurrent way, and (...) not merely as dispositions. By accepting unconscious mental causation, Searle commits himself to a mental existence that isindependent from consciousness. Such unconscious existence implies that certain mental phenomena are ontologically objective, and not subjective as he claims, because they exist without being experienced.Keywords: Ontological subjectivity, unconscious, disposition, mental causation, objectivity. (shrink)

Reasons can interact in a variety of ways to determine what we ought to do or believe. And there can be cases where two reasons to do an act or have a belief are individually worse than a reason to not do that act or have that belief, but the reasons together are better than the reason to not do that act or have that belief. So the reasons together―which we can call the accrual of those reasons—can have a strength (...) that is an increasing function of the strengths of the individual reasons. In this paper, we will look at how reasons determine what we ought to do and believe in cases where the accrual of reasons is relevant. Our focus will not primarily be on questions about the nature of individual reasons and their weight. Instead, we will at the outset rely on our pretheoretical grip on what reasons there are and how weighty they are individually and ask the more formal or structural question of how to determine the strength of their accrual based on these facts. In looking at these issues, my goal will not be anything as ambitious as developing a full theory of the accrual of reasons. Rather, my goal will be more modest: I will introducing some of the challenges for providing an adequate model and argue that a promising approach to resolving these challenges involves making use of the familiar distinction in moral philosophy between derivative and non-derivative normative notions. (shrink)

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public9s opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey (...) of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma. (shrink)

Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...) explain obligations and show that it solves this problem. (shrink)

How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: How can we represent the strength of a reason? How do the strengths of multiple reasons combine? Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and nonreductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: reductive theories can answer both challenges. Nonreductive theories, with the help of a result in confirmation (...) theory, can answer one, and there are grounds for optimism that they can answer the other. (shrink)

A traditional picture is that cases of deontic constraints--- cases where an act is wrong (or one that there is most reason to not do) even though performing that act will prevent more acts of the same morally (or practically) relevant type from being performed---form a kind of fault line in ethical theory separating (agent-neutral) consequentialist theories from other ethical theories. But certain results in the recent literature, such as those due to Graham Oddie and Peter Milne in "Act and (...) Value", do not sit well this traditional wisdom. My aim in this paper is to argue that both the traditional wisdom and Oddie and Milne are mistaken. I begin by looking more closely at the traditional wisdom and why it fails (§1). Then I develop my account of this fault line in ethical theory and its importance (§2). Finally I show that a diagnosis of where Oddie and Milne go wrong follows as a corollary of this new account (§3). An important upshot will be that discussions of cases of deontic constraints would do best to focus on the account of the nature and importance of the cases identified in this paper rather than continuing to work with the mistaken traditional picture. (shrink)

A “universalist” policy on brain death holds that brain death is death, and neurologic criteria for death determination are rightly applied to all, without exemptions or opt outs. This essay argues that advocates of a universalist brain death policy defend the same sort of coercive control of end-of-life decision-making as “pro-life” advocates seek to achieve for reproductive decision-making, and both are grounded in an illiberal political philosophy. Those who recognize the serious flaws of this kind of public policy with respect (...) to abortion must apply the same logic to brain death. (shrink)

One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...) logic concerning the existence of conflicting obligations. The second problem arises from a tension between the fact that reasons can conflict and a model of how reasons explain ‘ought’s that has been widely accepted. Having presented each of these problems, I develop a unified solution to them that is informed by results in both ethics and deontic logic. An important implication of this solution is that we must distinguish between derivative and nonderivative reasons and revise our conception how it is that reasons explain ‘ought’s. (shrink)

The established view regarding ‘brain death’ in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between (...) appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the ‘brain dead’ are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a ‘brain dead’ patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on ‘brain death’, though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule. (shrink)

The concept of death and its relationship to organ transplantation continue to be sources of debate and confusion among academics, clinicians, and the public. Recently, an international group of scholars and clinicians, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, met in the first phase of an effort to develop international guidelines for determination of death. The goal of this first phase was to focus on the biology of death and the dying process while bracketing legal, ethical, cultural, and religious perspectives. (...) The next phase of the project will include a broader group of stakeholders in the development of clinical practice guidelines and will use expert consensus on biomedical criteria for death from the first phase as scientific input into normative deliberation about appropriate policies and practices. Surely, science alone cannot resolve the normative and philosophical questions intertwined in debates about moral status, legal and moral rights, the ethics of killing, and personhood and the nature of the self; however, scientific input is necessary for informed moral deliberation. An objective and unbiased investigation of the biology of death is independent of, and should be undertaken prior to, an analysis of the normative questions engendered by debate about determination of death. This strategy is explicitly endorsed by the International Guidelines for Determination of Death and reflects the prevailing view of these issues in the mainstream medical literature. However, this mainstream literature, exemplified by the IGDD group's recent report, does not exhibit any of the characteristics usually associated with a scientifically rigorous investigation, such as making empirically testable and falsifiable claims, a commitment to evidence and logic over authoritative assertion, or a willingness to revise hypotheses and theories in light of new evidence. Indeed, the core claims and methodologies of the mainstream medical literature on death, both of which are represented by the IGDD report, are not merely scientifically unjustified; they are not science at all. This situation creates a problem for the integrity of science and the academy, and it unjustly obscures and prevents legitimate democratic and moral deliberation about issues that, at bottom, are normative, not scientific. (shrink)

Engineering is a practice that must function in an environment of incomplete and uncertain knowledge. This environment has become even more difficult in an increasingly complex world. Engineering ethics has to be framed and taught in a way that addresses these realities. This paper proposes a combination of the philosophy of pragmatism and the ethic of care as a possible framework for the practice of engineering ethics that can provide flexibility and openness to address engineering ethics problems more realistically within (...) the ethos and culture of engineering. Embedding values into practice, pragmatism and care provide a broad, reflective, and corrective framework for engineering ethics that can accommodate the realities in which engineering operates. It is shown that these two approaches are more consonant with design methodologies and have a natural fit with design thinking, so they mesh well with what engineers do and with the complexities of their work today. As humans more and more try to alter the socio-techno-natural world, e.g., the earth’s climate, the combination of pragmatism and care will allow enhanced ethical behavior. Alterations to complex adaptive systems will produce highly uncertain results that require engineers to have a mindset that allows them to act with humility in the face of significant uncertainty and potential catastrophic failures. (shrink)

The controversy over brain death and the dead donor rule continues unabated, with some of the same key points and positions starting to see repetition in the literature. One might wonder whether some of the participants are talking past each other, not all debating the same issue, even though they are using the same words (e.g., “death”). One reason for this is the complexity of the debate: It’s not merely about the nature of human life and death. Interwoven into this (...) debate are deep philosophical issues on realism, the normative/descriptive distinction, the relation of thought and language to the world, the mind–body problem, personhood, moral status, and the ethics of killing. There are also social and legal .. (shrink)

John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is certainly right to point (...) out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas, I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy. (shrink)

Legally defining “death” in terms of brain death unacceptably obscures a value judgment that not all reasonable people would accept. This is disingenuous, and it results in serious moral flaws in the medical practices surrounding organ donation. Public policy that relies on the whole-brain concept of death is therefore morally flawed and in need of revision.

The dead donor rule, which requires that organ donors not be killed by the process of organ procurement, is thought to protect vulnerable patients from exploitation and from being harmed through organ procurement. In current practice, the majority of transplantable organs are retrieved from patients who are declared dead by neurological criteria, or "brain-dead." Because brain death is considered to be sufficient for death, it is thought that brain-dead donors are neither harmed nor wronged by organ removal.In this essay I (...) argue that this is not the case. Brain-dead donors can be, and many are, harmed and wronged by... (shrink)

In this chapter, we begin by sketching in the broadest possible strokes the ideas behind two formal systems that have been introduced with to goal of explicating the ways in which reasons interact to support the actions and conclusions they do. The first of these is the theory of defeasible reasoning developed in the seminal work of Pollock; the second is a more recent theory due to Horty, which adapts and develops the default logic introduced by Reiter to provide an (...) account of reasons. However, the implementations are complex enough, in both cases, to prevent anything more than this sketch. And we would not want to give the impression that we think that work on the logic of reasons must follow the path mapped out in either of these theories—indeed, we feel that the field is wide open. In the remainder of the chapter, therefore, will concentrate on a number of issues bearing on the logic of reasons that are either not treated in the work of Pollock and Horty, or whose treatment there is, we feel, either inadequate or incomplete. These are: first, the question of whether it is necessary to understand logical interactions among reasons themselves, rather than simply between reasons and the actions or conclusions they support, and if so, what principles might govern these interactions; second, priority relations among reasons and the notion of reason accrual; and third, some problems posed by undercutting defeat. (shrink)

There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the whole (...) chain of reasoning must also acceptable. In this paper I focus on whether there are good philosophical reasons for thinking that the consensus that good reasoning must satisfy cut is true. My central claim is that we should not accept the consensus—good reasoning might not satisfy cut. In particular, I consider four arguments for the consensus and explain why they are unpersuasive. (§2-5). I then show that the issue of whether good reasoning is cut turns on a substantive yet until now unnoticed question in epistemology (§6). (shrink)

Background Doctors sometimes encounter parents who object to prescribed treatment for their children, and request suboptimal substitutes be administered instead. Previous studies have focused on parental refusal of treatment and when this should be permitted, but the ethics of requests for suboptimal treatment has not been explored. Methods The paper consists of two parts: an empirical analysis and an ethical analysis. We performed an online survey with a sample of the general public to assess respondents’ thresholds for acceptable harm and (...) expense resulting from parental choice, and the role that religion played in their judgement. We also identified and applied existing ethical frameworks to the case described in the survey to compare theoretical and empirical results. Results Two hundred and forty-two Mechanical Turk workers took our survey and there were 178 valid responses. Respondents’ agreement to provide treatment decreased as the risk or cost of the requested substitute increased. More than 50% of participants were prepared to provide treatment that would involve a small absolute increased risk of death for the child and a cost increase of US$<500, respectively. Religiously motivated requests were significantly more likely to be allowed. Existing ethical frameworks largely yielded ambiguous results for the case. There were clear inconsistencies between the theoretical and empirical results. Conclusion Drawing on both survey results and ethical analysis, we propose a potential model and thresholds for deciding about the permissibility of suboptimal treatment requests. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Organismal superposition holds that the same individual both is and is not an organism, as a consequence of organismal pluralism. When coupled with the assumption that death is the cessation of an organism, this entails that there is no unique answer as to whether brain death is biological death. This essay argues that concerns about organismal pluralism and superposition do not undermine a theory of biological death, nor entail any metaphysical indeterminacy about the biological vital status of a brain-dead individual.

In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients (...) in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all. (shrink)