Two issues have been central within political philosophy in the last decade or so. The first is the debate over 'the politics of distribution versus the politics of recognition,' which is usually associated with the work of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. The second is discussion of the phenomenon known as globalization, focusing on the notions of cosmopolitanism and global justice. This book explores the relationship between these two issues. It considers not only the global dimension of the politics (...) of recognition, but also how recognition theory can provide new insights into our understanding of problems of global justice, especially those of a non-distributive nature. A number of the contributors consider the relevance of Hegel's theory of recognition for our understanding of these issues. (shrink)

Experts provide an alternative source of information to classical data collection methods such as surveys. They can provide additional insight into problems, supplement existing data, or provide insights when classical data collection is troublesome. In this paper, we explore the (dis)similarities between expert judgments and data collected by traditional data collection methods regarding the development of posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSSs) in children with burn injuries. By means of an elicitation procedure, the experts’ domain expertise is formalized and represented in the (...) form of probability distributions. The method is used to obtain beliefs from 14 experts, including nurses and psychologists. Those beliefs are contrasted with questionnaire data collected on the same issue. The individual and aggregated expert judgments are contrasted with the questionnaire data by means of Kullback–Leibler divergences. The aggregated judgments of the group that mainly includes psychologists resemble the questionnaire data more than almost all of the individual expert judgments. (shrink)

Much of the attention of philosophy of science, history of science, and psychology in the twentieth century has focused on the nature of conceptual change. Conceptual change in science has occupied pride of place in these disciplines, as either the subject of inquiry or the source of ideas about the nature of conceptual change in other domains. There have been numerous conceptual changes in the history of science, some more radical than others. One of the most radical was the chemical (...) revolution. In the seventeenth century, chemists believed that the processes of combustion and calcination involved the absorption or release of a substance called phlogiston. On this theory, when an ore is heated with charcoal, it absorbs phlogiston to produce a metal; when a metal is burned, it releases phlogiston and leaves behind a residue, or calx. The concept of phlogiston derived from a quite complex Aristotelian/medieval structure that included three concepts central to chemical theory: sulphur, the principle of inflammability; mercury, the principle of fluidity; and salt, the principle of inertness. All material substances were believed to contain these three principles in the form of earths. The phlogiston theory held that in combustion, the sulphurous earth (phlogiston) returns to the substance from which it escaped during some earlier burning process in its history, and that in calcination the process is reversed. However, chemists also knew that a calx is heavier than the metal from which it was derived. So, the theory implies that phlogiston has a negative weight, or a positive lightness. This did not present a problem, though, because it was compatible with the Aristotelian elements of fire and air (the others being earth and water), which were not attracted towards the center of the earth. The development of the oxygen theory of combustion and calcination by Lavoisier in the late eighteenth century has been called the chemical revolution because it required replacing the whole conceptual structure with, for example, different concepts of substance and element and new concepts of oxygen and caloric. In the new system, it was no longer possible to believe in the existence of substances with negative weight. According to the oxygen theory, oxygen gas is released in combustion and absorbed in calcination. Thus calx is metal (substance) plus oxygen, rather than metal minus phlogiston. The concept of phlogiston was eliminated from the chemical lexicon. The reconceptualization of chemical phenomena that took place in the chemical revolution made possible the atomic theory of matter, which, as we know, posits quite different constituents of material substances from the principles central to the earlier conceptual structure. Just what constitutes conceptual change, how it relates to theory change, and how it relates to changes in belief continues to be a subject of much debate. Clearly, though, as the preceding example demonstrates, the three are significantly interrelated. (shrink)

ObjectiveFatigue after burns is often attributed to the hyperinflammatory and hypermetabolic response, while it may be best understood from a bio-psychological perspective, also involving the neuro-endocrine system. This longitudinal multi-center study examined the course of fatigue up to 18 months postburn. The contribution of bio-psychological factors, including burn severity, pain, and acute PTSD symptoms, to the course and persistence of fatigue was studied in a multifactorial model.MethodsParticipants were 247 adult burn survivors. Fatigue symptoms were assessed with the Multidimensional Fatigue (...) Inventory during the acute phase and subsequently at 3, 6, 12, and 18 months postburn, and were compared to population norms. Age, gender, burn severity, acute PTSD symptoms and pain were assessed as potential predictors of fatigue over time in a latent growth model.ResultsAt 18 months postburn, 46% of the burn survivors reported fatigue, including 18% with severe fatigue. In the acute phase, higher levels of fatigue were related to multiple surgeries, presence of pain, and higher levels of acute PTSD symptoms. Fatigue gradually decreased over time with minor individual differences in rate of decrease. At 18 months, pain and acute PTSD symptoms remained significant predictors of fatigue levels.ConclusionsProtracted fatigue after burns was found in almost one out of five burn survivors and was associated with both pain and acute PTSD symptoms. Early detection of PTSD symptoms and early psychological interventions aimed at reducing PTSD symptoms and pain may be warranted to reduce later fatigue symptoms. (shrink)

Pain and posttraumatic stress disorder frequently co-occur but underlying mechanisms are not clear. This study aimed to test the development and maintenance of pain and PTSD symptom clusters, i.e., intrusions, avoidance, and hyperarousal. The longitudinal study included 216 adults with burns. PTSD symptom clusters, indexed by the Impact of Event Scale-Revised, and pain, using a graphic numerical rating scale, were measured during hospitalization, 3 and 6 months post-burn. Cross-lagged panel analysis was used to test the relationships between pain and (...) PTSD symptom clusters. Cross-lagged results showed that in-hospital intrusions predicted pain and avoidance 3 months post-burn. In-hospital pain predicted intrusions and avoidance 3 months post-burn and a trend was found for hyperarousal. In the second wave, intrusions predicted pain and hyperarousal. Pain predicted hyperarousal. This study provides support for an entangled relationship between pain and PTSD symptoms, and particularly subscribes the role of intrusions in this bidirectional relationship. To a lesser extent, hyperarousal was unidirectionally related to pain. These results may subscribe the driving role of PTSD, particularly intrusions, which partly supports the Perpetual Avoidance Model. (shrink)

The aim of the book is twofold: (1) To develop a comprehensive, contractualist theory of intergenerational ethics; (2) To argue that contractualism's ability to be that comprehensive theory of intergenerational ethics contributes to its plausibility as a moral theory in general. The book's core claim is that contractualism provides us with a comprehensive theory of intergenerational ethics that justifies including future people in the scope of what we owe to each other and tells us how much we owe them. It (...) begins by arguing that contractualism is not susceptible to the non-identity problem and so we must consider what future people could reasonably reject. It then argues that contractualism endorses 'reason-balanced sufficientarianism' and develops a series of moral principles guiding our behaviour towards future generations in terms of resource distribution, procreative decisions, optimal population size, and risk imposition. It concludes by applying these general principles to concrete, real-world individual and policy decisions and considering how the principles can and do interact with each other. (shrink)

When discussing the extinction of humanity, there does not seem to be any clear agreement about what ‘humanity’ really means. One aim of this paper is to show that it is a more slippery concept than it might at first seem. A second aim is to show the relationship between what constitutes or defines humanity and what gives it value. Often, whether and how we ought to prevent human extinction depends on what we take humanity to mean, which in turn (...) depends on what we value about humans. Finally, I will offer a definition of humanity that I argue offers a plausible account of when we might say humanity has gone extinct, and reflects what we value about humans, and relatedly, what many actually care about in terms of why we should be preserved. (shrink)

Social isolation and loneliness are ongoing threats to health made worse by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. During the pandemic, half the globe's population have been placed under strict physical distancing orders and many long-term care facilities serving older adults went into lockdown mode, restricting access to all visitors, including family members. Before the pandemic emerged, a 2020 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine report warned of the underappreciated adverse effects of social isolation and loneliness on health, especially among (...) older populations. Social isolation and loneliness predict all-cause mortality at rates that rival clinical risk factors, such as obesity and smoking; they are associated with greater incidence of psychological, cognitive, and physical morbidities. This paper sets forth a proposal to design robots to function as companions and friends for socially isolated and lonely older people during pandemic emergencies and in aging societies more generally. “The proposal” section presents and defends the proposal. The “Replies to objections” section answers objections based on coercive design, replacement of humans with robots, privacy incursions, and counterfeit companionship. The “Conclusion” section submits that sociable robots offer a promising avenue for addressing social isolation and loneliness during pandemics and hold promise for aging societies more broadly. (shrink)

The paper presents an interpretation of Aristotle's views on natural justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. It focuses, in particular, on Aristotle's understanding of the relationship which exists between natural justice and political justice, or between natural law and positive law. It is suggested that Aristotle's views on this subject are often misunderstood. It is also suggested that, contrary to what some commentators might think, Aristotle's comments on natural justice are actually central for our understanding of his political thought as a (...) whole. It is argued that Aristotle is, therefore, definitely a natural law theorist of some description. However, Aristotle's natural law theory is unconventional in certain respects. In particular, Aristotle does not consider natural law to be a critical standard by means of which positive law might be evaluated. This places Aristotle outside the mainstream of natural law theory as it has been traditionally understood. Aristotle is not, in this sense at least, the forerunner of the Stoic natural law tradition and of the individualistic, liberal natural law theory of the modern era. He is, rather, the founding father of what might best be described as the conservative natural law tradition, the most well known adherents of which in modern times are Montesquieu, Burke and Hegel. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between the bonds of practitioner/patient trust and the notion of a justified lie. The intersection of moral theories on lying which prioritize right action with institutional discretionary power allows practitioners to dismiss, or at least not take seriously enough, the harm done when a patient's trust is betrayed. Even when a lie can be shown to be justified, the trustworthiness of the practitioner may be called into question in ways that neither theories of right action (...) nor contemporary discourse in health care attends to adequately. I set out features of full trustworthiness along Aristotelian lines. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are good reasons to limit the scope of luck egalitarianism to co‐existing people. First, I outline reasons to be sceptical about how “luck” works intergenerationally and therefore the very grounding of luck egalitarianism between non‐overlapping generations. Second, I argue that what Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen calls the “core luck egalitarian claim” allows significant intergenerational inequality which is a problem for those who object to such inequality. Third, luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the intuition that it might be required (...) to leave future generations better off than we are, even if it would come at no cost to ourselves. Finally, I argue that following another, broader, version of luck egalitarianism would require us to level down future generations and possibly even ourselves, which is a problem for those persuaded by the levelling‐down objection. (shrink)

Mechanisms are now taken widely in philosophy of science to provide one of modern science’s basic explanatory devices. This has raised lively debate concerning the relationship between mechanisms, laws and explanation. This paper focuses on cases where a mechanism gives rise to a ceteris paribus law, addressing two inter-related questions: What kind of explanation is involved? and What is going on in the world when mechanism M affords behavior B described in a ceteris paribus law? We explore various answers offered (...) by ‘new mechanists’ and others before setting out and explaining our own answers: mechanistic explanations are a species of oldfashioned covering-law explanation and this often accounts in part for their explanatory power; and B is what it takes for some set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their arrangement in M all to be instanced together. (shrink)

For evidence-based practice and policy, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are the current gold standard. But exactly why? We know that RCTs do not, without a series of strong assumptions, warrant predictions about what happens in practice. But just what are these assumptions? I maintain that, from a philosophical stance, answers to both questions are obscured because we don't attend to what causal claims say. Causal claims entering evidence-based medicine at different points say different things and, I would suggest, failure to (...) attend to these differences makes much current guidance about evidence for medical and social policy misleading. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can see our lives as a snapshot happening now or as a moving picture extending across time. These dual ways of seeing our lives inform how we conceive of the problem of age group justice. A snapshot view sees age group justice as an interpersonal problem between distinct age groups. A moving picture view sees age group justice as a first-person problem of prudential choice. This paper explores these different ways of thinking about age group (...) justice and illustrates them using a principle of respect for human dignity, understood in terms of reasonable support for floor level central human capabilities at each stage of life. I argue that different frames are suitable for different kinds of decisions, and each provides a true, but partial, picture of aging and age group justice. (shrink)

This article examines the views of Hegel and Alasdair MacIntyre regarding philosophical disagreements, whether or not they can be resolved and if so how. For both thinkers such a disagreement is thought of as taking place between the advocates of two theoretical positions which are opposed to one another. Each party subscribes to a way of thinking about the issue under discussion which appears to be logically incompatible with the views of the other. We seem therefore to have to make (...) an either-or choice between them. In the case of all philosophical disagreements, therefore, the same questions arise. Is the contradiction in question real, or merely apparent? Can it be resolved? If so, what exactly is involved in such a resolution? Is some form of theoretical compromise, between these two extremes possible? Is there a third-way, a both-and approach, which in some way combines the strengths of each and the weaknesses of neither, or which seeks in some way to balance their respective strengths and weaknesses of each against those of the other? The article suggests that MacIntyre differentiates between two types of philosophical disagreement. In the case of the first, the ideas associated with the two opposed positions are incommensurable. We must, therefore make an either-or choice between them. In the case of disagreements of the second type, the ideas in question are not incommensurable. In these cases, therefore, it is possible for them to be combined or synthesised. The article argues that MacIntyre’s approach to this second type of philosophical disagreement has an obvious affinity with what is often thought to be that of Hegel. In the words of Richard J. Bernstein, it is ‘quasi-Hegelian’. It is therefore fruitful to compare and contrast the views of these two thinkers on this issue. (shrink)

Fostering shame in societies may not curb violence, because shame is alienating. The person experiencing shame may not care enough about others to curb violent instincts. Furthermore, men may be less shame-prone than are women. Finally, if shame is too prevalent in a society, perpetrators may be reluctant to talk about their actions and motives, if indeed they know their own motives. We may be unable accurately to discover how perpetrators think about their own violence.

This Element provides an overview of the central components of recent work in virtue ethics. The first section explores central themes in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, while the second turns the discussion to major alternative theoretical perspectives. The third section focuses on two challenges to virtue ethics. The first challenge is the self-centeredness or egoism objection, which is the notion that certain kinds of virtue ethics are inadequate because they advocate a focus on the person's own virtue and flourishing at the (...) expense of, or at least without due regard for, the concerns of others. The second is situationist challenges to the ideas that there are indeed virtues and that personality is integrated enough to support virtues. (shrink)

What does it mean to develop psychiatric method in a colonial context? Specifically, if the aims of psychiatry have traditionally been couched in the language of ‘psychic integration’ and ‘healing’, then what does it mean to practice psychiatry within structures that organize and reinforce the exclusions of colonialism? With these questions, this article examines Frantz Fanon’s psychiatric practices in light of his radical political commitments. I argue that Fanon’s innovations with the institutional form of the psychiatric hospital serve to intervene (...) differently in psychic conflict. Notably, these changes offer different ways to diagnose and respond to patients, along with different strategies for managing psychic disintegration in colonial contexts. The result is a rethinking of the relation between material and imagined worlds, and so the emergence of the hospital as a waystation between a colonial context and a political freedom yet to come. (shrink)

Significantly, Berkeley, in his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, leveled a sustained attack on just this geometrical theory of distance perception. At first glance it may seem, as it did to Berkeley, that Descartes’ geometrical theory is produced by a simple error: namely, by the idea that a physiological optics provides an adequate description of the psychological processes of judging distances. In truth, this is the weakest of Berkeley’s objections to Descartes’ theory. Obviously we do not see the (...) angles and lines of convergence when we focus on a distant object, nor are we aware of having used any geometrical rules in judging distance. And Descartes never claimed this. (shrink)

Edith Stein is considered a leading figure in the early phenomenological movement and the disciple who performed in the best way the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl, and yet her relationship to phenomenology remains unclear in the literature. This article seeks to add clarity to her relationship to phenomenology while considering three inescapably related questions. (1) What did Stein conceive phenomenology to be? (2) How should we understand Husserl’s influence on Stein? (3) Was Stein an original phenomenological thinker? I argue (...) that Stein conceives of phenomenology as an epistemological critique that aims to clarify the essential foundations of knowledge. It involves intentional analysis that proceeds by way of essential-seeing (Wesensschau), which can be brought about through the method of free imaginative variation, and its intentional analysis involves close attention to the relationship between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment. I argue that the primary influence Husserl exerts on Stein is in the development of phenomenology as conceived in his Logical Investigations. Finally, I offer an understanding of how Stein conceived of her differences with Husserl on the issue of idealism in order to argue that Stein’s phenomenological writings in On the Problem of Empathy and “Sentient Causality” offer us a novel phenomenological account of the human being that begins with the ego but escapes being a mere egology. (shrink)

This paper discusses the significance of the concept of a social formation for historical materialism. It argues that the concept is wrongly thought to be associated uniquely with the writings of Louis Althusser and with structuralist Marxism. It can be found in the writings of Marx himself, as well as those of Lenin, and is central to an adequate understanding of classical Marxism. To illustrate its importance the paper shows how the concept may be used to shed new light on (...) the debate around the transition from feudalism to capitalism. (shrink)

In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.

While Karen Warren offers an ecofeminist ethic that is pluralistic, contextualist, and challenges Cartesian dualism, one area that remains underdeveloped in her theory is embodiment. I will examine Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied subjectivity and show that it would fit consistently with her theory. I will also explore some other areas in which the two theories supplement each other.

Giere's assessment is that the cognitive sciences, especially cognitive psychology, have much to offer the philosophy of science as it attempts to develop theories of the growth, development, and change of scientific knowledge as human activities. Margolis produces a model of scientific change by drawing from recent work in the cognitive sciences and attempts to show how this model explains salient cases of conceptual change. While agreeing with Giere's assessment, I argue that Margolis provides the wrong model both for scientific (...) change and for how the interaction between cognitive science and philosophy of science should proceed. (shrink)

It is more than a platitude to admit that we are always dying. It is a recognition of the fundamental finitude that marks our existence as human persons. It says something essential about the human condition. We are all born. We all die. And the very living of life is, leaving aside for the moment religious considerations, oriented toward death. Phenomenologists make much of this observation, perhaps none more so than Martin Heidegger who argues that our being-toward-death permits the ontological (...) grasping of Da-sein as a whole. Indeed for him, the“existential and ontological concept of death” is “the own most nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypassed possibility of Da-sein.” However, if one spends much time around those who are very close to death it can begin to sound disingenuous to talk about death as one’s own most possibility. It is easy to think these patients are dying—not me. Still, the phenomenologist might claim that, vis-à-vis our being-toward-death, the difference between me and the terminally ill patient is a matter of degree and not kind. But, is this so? One may be excused for thinking not. There appears to be an important difference in the kinds of possible experiences open to us. I may experience healing if I become ill; on the other hand, the very condition of the patient with a terminal illness is defined by the impossibility of her experiencing healing. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that the terminally ill patient can, in fact, experience healing at the end of her life and in the face of impending death. I will not argue that the possibility of experiencing healing at the end of life means leaving room for divine intervention, though neither do I intend to preclude such a possibility. Rather, I will argue that healing is something that we experience quite apart from what happens to our biological make-up. While healing is often correlated with a change in the state of our bodies, it need not be. (shrink)

Experiments show that psi differs from known physical processes in a variety of ways, and these differences are described herein. Because of these, psi cannot be accounted for in terms of presently known physical laws. A number of theories, of which we review a sampling, suggest ways in which known physical laws might be expanded in order to account for psi. However, there is no agreement on which of these theories, if any, will ultimately provide a general explanation. A further (...) problem in studying psi is that it is elusive, i.e., methods are not presently known by which it can be reliably produced. However, if psi is real, its study can open the door to a new frontier of knowledge and contribute to our understanding of consciousness. (shrink)