In the wake of the non-ideal theory turn in political philosophy, few have paused to ask: Is non-ideal theory a form of ideology? And perhaps even fewer have paused to ask: Is the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists itself a form of ideology? To the first question, I argue that non-ideal theory is ideological in virtue of the fact that it rules out more utopian ways of theorizing by methodological fiat, and in so doing, risks entrenching an unjust status quo. To (...) the second question, I argue that the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists is itself a form of ideology, one which serves to reinforce the status quo by convincing political philosophers/theorists that the most pressing problems are problems about what we should think about what we are doing. But this is false. An upshot of my argument is that we ought to abandon the ideal/non-ideal theory debate and address the pressing problems of political philosophy head-on in pluralist fashion, oscillating back and forth between these two modes of theorizing without a decision procedure to tell us when we should take up one perspective or the other. (shrink)

Strawson (1994) and Peacocke (1992) introduced thought experiments that show that it seems intuitive that there is, in some way, an experiential character to mental events of understanding. Some (e.g., Siewert 1998, 2011; Pitt 2004) try to explain these intuitions by saying that just as we have, say, headache experiences and visual experiences of blueness, so too we have experiences of understanding. Others (e.g., Prinz 2006, 2011; Tye 1996) propose that these intuitions can be explained without positing experiences of understanding. (...) Call this the debate between Realism and Anti-Realism about experiences of understanding. This paper aims to advance that debate in two ways. In the first half, I develop more precise characterizations of what Realists and Anti-Realists propose. In the second half, I distinguish the four most plausible versions of Anti-Realism and argue that Realism better explains the target intuition than any of them does. (shrink)

Are demands for equality motivated by envy? Nietzsche, Freud, Hayek, and Nozick all thought so. Call this the Envy Objection. For egalitarians, the Envy Objection is meant to sting. Many egalitarians have tried to evade the Envy Objection.. But should egalitarians be worried about envy? In this paper, I argue that egalitarians should stop worrying and learn to love envy. I argue that the persistent unwillingness to embrace the Envy Objection is rooted in a common misunderstanding of the nature of (...) the charge, what it reveals, and what can be said in response to it. I develop what Bernard Williams might call a vindicatory genealogy of envy, thereby allowing us to see that envy, rather than undermining egalitarian intuitions, can in fact play a distinct justificatory role (when it is fitting), which undermines the Envy Objection. (shrink)

The advent of technologies that drastically reduce the need of human labour calls into question the foundations of the two prevalent theories of value. While this effect is quite apparent for the objectivist theory that equates value to a quantity of labour, these consequences may be true also for the subjectivist, market-based theory. Consequently, in this paper, a different theory of value is proposed, based on social needs, i.e. the human needs as represented in the economic environment of production and (...) exchange of goods and services. This theory is based on Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Otto Neurath's economic works. To clarify the theoretical foundations of this theory, a part of the paper recapitulates them in a perspective that could be relevant in an increasingly post-labour social and economic environment. In this analysis, some of the concepts and methodologies, which could help to answer the challenges of a post-labour social welfare, are outlined. This leads to a definition of the conditions under which a needs-based social welfare could use the potential of a post-labour economic environment in a dual system, providing an efficient satisfaction of social needs while, at the same time, maintaining a viable market economy. (shrink)

"It is a general maxim...’ That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact which it endeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.’" A Bayesian interpretation of the first half is proved as a theorem. (...) A stronger conditional principle, and a biconditional theorem based on it, are substantiated. And a truth that the second part can express is explained. (shrink)

Polytheism is a strange view to hold in modernity. Connected as it is in the popular imagination with archaic, animistic, magical, prescientific systems of thought, we don’t hesitate much before casting it into the dustbin of history. Even if we are not monotheists, we are likely to think of monotheism as the obviously more plausible position. The traditional arguments for the existence of God, which have been enormously influential in Western philosophy of religion, do not necessarily rule out polytheism but (...) they are clearly formulated with monotheism in mind. While there could be multiple first causes, intelligent designers, or beings than which nothing greater can be conceived, the simplest and most natural... (shrink)

One central question of metaethics concerns whether there are any moral facts. I argue that morality as such is characterized by a number of distinctive features, and that metaphysical naturalists should believe that there are moral facts only if there is a plausible naturalistic explanation of the existence of facts which exemplify those features. I survey three prominent (and very different) naturalistic moral theories—the reductive naturalism of Peter Railton, Frank Jackson’s analytic descriptivism, and Christine Korsgaard’s Kantianism—and argue that none of (...) them has the resources to explain the existence of genuine moral facts. (shrink)

Speaking rather grandly, Egoism is the philosophy of self interest. It says that actions are ‘ruled’ by self interest which makes it prima facie a philosophy of selfishness. Whether this is its real character needs to be looked into. But first a complication intrudes, for only a little reflection reveals that egoism as here characterized is not one philosophy, but two. These want to be distinguished, and once distinguished, their relations understood. These preliminaries to investigating the merits of forms of (...) egoism and connections with ordinary ideas of selfishness make the business of the present paper. (shrink)

Key words: liar paradoxes, propositions, definite descriptions A Liar would be a sentence or sentence-token that expresses a proposition that is both true and not true. A Liar Paradox is reasoning that would do the impossible and demonstrate the reality of a Liar. It is sufficient, fully to resolve a Liar Paradox, to turn its purported demonstration that some sentence or sentence-token expresses a proposition that is both true and not true into a reductio of the existence of the proposition (...) that would be expressed, while ‘explaining away’ the particular tricks and charm of the purported demonstration of paradox. The interest of these exercises lies in the seductiveness of the would be demonstration of a Liar Paradox, and in the depth and subtlety of logical/grammatical resources that can be tapped and fashioned to dispel it. The Liar taken on in this paper occasions especially seductive reasoning that exploits ‘scope-ambiguities’ of definite descriptions that, not incidentally, survive unscathed when its argument is symbolized in a Fregean description theory in which scopes of definite descriptions are not discriminated. Symbolizing this argument in a Russellian description theory in which scopes are discriminated makes unavoidable that its scope-ambiguities be settled one way or another, and reveals that however the scope ambiguity of a certain premise is settled the resultant unambiguous argument is unsound, either because it is invalid, though this premise comes out true, or because, though it is valid, this premise comes out not true. These results of Russellian analysis pave the way to a formal demonstration, from premises to which a monger of the paradox would be committed, that contrary to his case the Liar of this paper does not express a proposition. This conclusion is confirmed in the Appendix to this paper by a demonstration from a single empirical premise that no one can deny, in a Russellian calculus enhanced for truth of propositions expressed by tokens of sentences.. (shrink)

I have maintained that some but not all prisoners' dilemmas are side-by-side Necomb problems. The present paper argues that, similarly, some but not all versions of Newcomb's Problem are prisoners' dilemmas in which Taking Two and Predicting Two make an equilibrium that is dispreferred by both the box-chooser and predictor to the outcome in which only one box is taken and this is predicted. I comment on what kinds of prisoner's dilemmas Newcomb's Problem can be, and on opportunities that results (...) reached may open for kinds of cooperative reasoning in versions of Newcomb's Problem. (shrink)

In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play “Russian Roulette’ with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize expected values of possible (...) total consequence of his actions. And utility theory is located within that theory as valid for agents who satisfy certain formal conditions, that is, for agents who are, in terms of that more general theory, indifferent to certain dimensions of ‘risk’. Raiffa- and Savage-style arguments for its more general validity are then resisted. Addenda are concerned with implications for game theory, and relations between ‘utilities’ and ‘values’. (shrink)

We conceive the development of photography along a horizontal axis: the camera mounted on a tripod, the lens looking out at the expanse of the earth. Cinematographic narrative is based on this horizontal gaze. But quite early on the recording device was transported vertically into the air: Militarized vision, with its own specific narrative mode, begins when the images from above are assembled into a database and analyzed to reveal movements, in order to predict their most probable future course. The (...) aim is to track certain objects, to target then, to destroy them. The arrival of computers and networked communications permits the accelerated development of a form of vision entirely devoted to these processes of tracking and targeting, which no longer offer images for our specular reflection a form of vision which is no longer «for us. ». (shrink)

Toward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength.

Cognitive psychologists tend to treat intentionality as a control variable during experiments, yet ignore it when generating mechanistic descriptions of performance. Wynn's work brings this conflict into striking relief and, when considered in relation to recent neurophysiological findings, makes it clear that intentionality can be regarded mechanistically if one defines it as the planning of distal effects.

Das vorliegende Buch versucht in einer systematischen Ge­ samtübersicht den Gedankeninhalt der modernen Physik zu er­ läutern. Mit Einzelheiten der experimentellen Technik sollte der Leser dabei ebensowenig belastet werden, wie mit den mathe­ matischen Formulierungen der Theorie; ohne uns zu sehr in der Fülle betrachtenswerter Einzelheiten zu verlieren, wollen wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die entscheidenden Tatsachen und Einsichten, auf die leitenden Gesichtspunkte der Forschung richten - und auf die geistige Einstellung, welche der modernen Physik ihr charakteristisches philosophisches Gepräge gibt, und (...) welche die Erringung ihrer umstürzenden Erkenntnisse ermög­ licht hat. Wir beginnen mit einer nachdenklichen Betrachtung der klassischen G a I i I e i - N e w t o n sehen Mechanik, deren Sinn und Bedeutung eindringlich verstanden zu haben Vorbedin­ gung ist für jedes Verständnis der revolutionären Entwicklungen der modernen Physik. Uber die Gedankengänge der M a x w e l- sehen Elektrodynamik kommen wir sodann zu den modernen Er­ kenntnissen, sowohl in der "Makrophysik", als auch in der "Mikro­ physik" der Atome, Elektronen und Quanten. Daß die moderne physikalische Forschung zu revolutionären Umgestaltungen der traditionellen naturwissenschaftlichen Vor­ stellungen geführt hat, wird der Leser hier keineswegs zum ersten­ mal erfahren. Aber nicht nur der lockende Reiz dieser wunder­ baren Entwicklungen schien mir eine auch dem Nichtspezialisten zugängliche Darstellung wünschenswert zu machen, sondern ich wünschte auch einen Beitrag zu leisten zur allmählichen Besei­ tigung von Mißverständnissen, denen die neueste Entwicklung der Physik bei manchem Fernerstehenden ausgesetzt gewesen ist. (shrink)

Hartmann's way of conceiving what he terms "the actual ought-to-be [aktuales Seinsollen]" offers a fruitful approach to crucial issues in the phenomenology of action. The central issue to be dealt with concerns the description of the "constitution" of anticipated possibilities as projects for action. Such potentialities are termed "problematic possibilities" and are contrasted with "open possibilities" in most of the works published by Husserl as well as those published by Alfred Schutz. The description given by Alfred Schutz emphasized that the (...) projecting of possibilities is thoroughly conditioned by the agent's habitual beliefs and interests. Schutz, however left open the possibility that other factors might affect the projecting of courses of action and the choosing of one in preference to others. In particular, he left open the possibility that the agent come to take an interest in possibilities in which she had no prior interest. More recent interpretations of his position on this issue have left this possibility undiscussed or else excluded it altogether. The result has been that a sort of value nihilism (subjectivism, sociologism, lingualism, anthropologism, historicism, psychologism, etc.) came to prevail in the phenomenological description of actions. A quite parallel development occurred in interpretations of Heidegger's account of actions (of "explication [Auslegung]" in the vocabulary of Being and Time). Heidegger expressly and emphatically rejected most ways of conceiving values in discussing the forms of action (circumspection and assertion in the vocabulary of Sein und Zeit). it came quite generally to be assumed that he subscribed to some variation of nihilism regarding values despite his insistence in the "Letter on Humanism" that he meant no such thing. The literature on this subject has concentrated on Scheler's work to the complete exclusion of Hartmann's axiology — as happened in Parvis Ermad's Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values, His Critique of Intentionality, foreword by Walter Biernel (Glen Ellyn, Illinois: Torey Press, 1981). Scheler's view entails the radical separation of ontic traits from axiotic traits, of what-is from what-ought-to-be. However, for Hartmann, the set of ontic traits that becomes actual when laws about what-ought-to-be are satisfied is identical with the set of traits that ought-to-be, Hartmann's way of conceiving the ought-to-be, the actual ought-to-be, and the three-fold structure of the finalistic nexus seems entirely compatible with Heidegger's way of thinking about actions. They are also an enlightening supplement to Schutz's description of "Choosing Among Projects of Action" (in Collected Papers 1, 67-96). That description requires that choice and action be thoroughly conditioned by psychological, social, and historical facts about the agent. However, nothing of this vital determination of actions is sacrificed when these concepts that are so central to Hartmann's "absolutism" with respect to values are introduced into the description. Their introduction provides an elaboration that Schutz himself neglected, perhaps due to pragmatic deference to biases which were prevalent then in the intellectual climate of philosophy and sociology in the U.S. Still, the transformation they bring is a significant improvement. It shows decisively that being conditioned linguistically, psychologically, socially, and historically does not enclose the choice among projects within a "Hermeneutical Circle" such as would exclude the possibility that agents be open to previously unfamiliar values. Hartmann's conception of the plurality as well as the absoluteness (or "objectivity") of primary goods allows, put in Kantian terms, that an agent may, however rarely, take an interest in possibilities such as she may never before have been interested in at all; or, put in Heideggerian terms, that she may come to care about possibilities such as have never concerned her before. (shrink)

El presente artículo explora la apropiación discursiva que el poder contemporáneo hace del concepto “terrorismo”. A partir de algunas indicaciones de las filosofías políticas de Platón y de Hobbes, similares en cuanto a su encomio de la violencia como herramienta del poder, se defiende que abusar del concepto “terrorismo” sirve al poder como mecanismo de autolegitimación y autoafirmación. Esto es así porque el poder, a través de sistemas doctrinales muy diseminados, presenta los actos terroristas como una muestra del hipotético estado (...) de caos total que surgiría si se modificara su actual configuración. (shrink)

Contemporary genetic and biomedical research on race and ethnicity has reignited the debate over the biological significance of these categories. This article provides an overview of the critical literature concerning the categorization of Hispanic and Hispanic populations within these research programs. More specifically, this article focuses on issues regarding: The conceptualization of Hispanic identity, issues of data collection and generalization (e.g., the use of a specific Hispanic nationality as a stand‐in for all Hispanics), the tension between social and biological classifications (...) of ethnic populations, and the social, political, and scientific implications of genetic research for Latin America. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas’s explanation of the (then new) doctrine of sacramental character can seem a crudely mechanical view of the causality of rites of church membership. It explains in fact the capacity and horizon for moral action in salvation history. Participation in the priesthood of Christ enables the believer to inhabit the pedagogy through which history is brought back to Trinitarian life. This sort of account, which is for Thomas the indispensable ground of moral theology, sounds archaic to many contemporary Christian (...) readers who nonetheless want to excerpt from Thomas particular ethical conclusions. They fail to appreciate the challenge posed by change in the deep categories of moral performance—a change nowhere more consequential or invisible than in contemporary debates over sexuality. (shrink)