At the beginning of the 20s, Russia was devastated by famine and plagues. This paper deals with the life and work of the Leipzig physician Paul Carly Seyfarth (1890–1950), who participated in the Red Cross relief expedition to Russia. In 1922/23, Seyfarth was appointed director of the German Alexander-Hospital in Petersburg, which he reorganized and modernized for the treatment of infectious diseases.

Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I (...) then ask what else might be involved in our experience of time as passing that is not yet vindicated by the B-theoretic conception. I examine a recent B-theoretic explanation of our ‘illusory’ sense of passage, by Robin Le Poidevin, and argue that it explains away too much: our perception of succession poses no more of a problem on the B-theory than it does on other theories of time. Finally, I respond to an objection by Oreste Fiocco that a causal account of our sense of passage cannot succeed, because it leaves out the ‘phenomenological novelty’ of each moment. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but (...) also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts not being ‘oriented towards’ one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart's paradox to indicate neither the need for a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not to be had: Fine's ‘non-standard realism’ amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender. (shrink)

Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, (...) I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B-theorists need to take to be illusory. (shrink)

The God of Western religion is said to be eternal. But what does that mean? Is God somehow beyond time, living a life that does not involve one thing after another? Or is God's relationship to time much more like ours, so that God's eternality just consists in there being no time at which God doesn't exist? Even for non-believers, these issues have interesting implications for the relation between historical and scientific findings on the one hand, and religion on the (...) other. This Element introduces the reader to the requisite metaphysical background, and then examines reasons for and against thinking of God as timeless. (shrink)

Craig Callender’s What Makes Time Special? (OUP 2017) advocates and practices an innovative, thoroughly interdisciplinary approach to philosophical questions about time and temporal features of our lives. Grappling with it is of intrinsic philosophical interest; it is also part of responding to the methodological invitation the book issues to philosophers of time. This paper is motivated by the wish to clarify WMTS’s philosophical underpinnings. The main claim of the paper is that WMTS relies on an ambiguity between rejecting the A-theory (...) versus B-theory debate, and endorsing a position within that debate. This ambiguity leads to a somewhat unstable position on how a key feature of manifest time, namely our sense of time as flowing, arises from physical time. The paper ends with a suggestion for how to resolve the ambiguity, in a way that is in line with the gist of Callender’s overall vision for the field. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide some evidence for the view that a common charge against those who adopt vegetarianism is that they would be sentimental. I argue that this charge is pressed frequently by those who adopt moral absolutism, a position that I reject, before exploring the question if vegetarianism might make sense. I discuss three concerns that might motivate those who adopt vegetarian diets, including a concern with the human health and environmental costs of some alternative diets, a concern (...) about inflicting pain on animals, and a concern with the killing of animals. While I argue that vegetarianism does not make sense in some situations, I hope that this paper shows that there are many good reasons why the adoption of vegetarian, and—even more so—vegan diets might be appropriate in some situations. In carving out this position, I focus primarily on the question whether a morally relevant distinction between the killing of plants and the killing of animals should be made. I engage primarily with the views of two of the most prominent authors on this issue, arguing that neither Peter Singer nor Tom Regan provide a satisfactory account on the ethics of killing nonhuman organisms. Two views are challenged in particular, the view that relatively simple animals such as molluscs, as well as plants, lack awareness, and the view that animals without a preference to continue living stand to lose little or nothing by being killed. I provide some evidence to support the claim that many share my view that it is more problematic to kill animals than to kill plants, before analyzing why some suppress the negative feelings they associate with killing animals. By exploring these issues I hope to shed some light on the issue of whether the feelings of those who adopt vegetarianism are sentimental or make sense, and to stimulate reflection amongst those with an interest in food ethics. (shrink)

Email archives are important historical resources, but access to such data poses a unique archival challenge and many born-digital collections remain dark, while questions of how they should be effectively made available remain. This paper contributes to the growing interest in preserving access to email by addressing the needs of users, in readiness for when such collections become more widely available. We argue that for the content of email to be meaningfully accessed, the context of email must form part of (...) this access. In exploring this idea, we focus on discovery within large, multi-custodian archives of organisational email, where emails’ network features are particularly apparent. We introduce our prototype search tool, which uses AI-based methods to support user-driven exploration of email. Specifically, we integrate two distinct AI models that generate systematically different types of results, one based upon simple, phrase-matching and the other upon more complex, BERT embeddings. Together, these provide a new pathway to contextual discovery that accounts for the diversity of future archival users, their interests and level of experience. (shrink)

This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus (...) B debate. (shrink)

This paper uses the imaginary case of Gemma, presented initially at the International Swine Flu Conference (London, March 2010), to discuss whether a nurse who disagrees with most ways in which animals are farmed would be wronged if she contracted swine flu. It is argued that the farm animal sector has contributed to the emergence of H1N1 flu, and that the sector in general contributes significantly to the burden of human disease. The aim of this paper is to promote debate (...) on the question as to whether a range of systems used by the farm animal sector survive moral scrutiny in light of these concerns. (shrink)

Does Cynicism as a philosophy of action make it possible to develop a theory of action? The absence of a system and the abundance of anecdotes a priori thwart any description of moral action. Yet Diogenes Laertius’s testimony about asceticism provides some answers about dispositions which are necessary for action: developing strength of body and soul, acquiring health and self-sufficiency, shaping endurance against the blows of fate through habit and making use of one’s representations. However, ascetic gestures are often associated (...) with a display of endurance and therefore with a show, so that cynical communities are astrayed into simple reproduction of anecdotes. This study therefore seeks to compare action with anecdotes, and offers the hypothesis that Diogenes Laertius’s text may be inspired by warnings addressed to exuberant Cynics. (shrink)

This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap ’s stance on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that 1) theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and that 2) instrumentalism about theology is viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap ’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly (...) un-Carnapian. The upshot is that his discussion provides some support to atheism, but none to either of his two official conclusions. (shrink)

The argument has been made that future generations of human beings are being harmed unjustifiably by the actions individuals commit today. This paper addresses what it might mean to harm future generations, whether we might harm them, and what our duties toward future generations might be. After introducing the Global Health Impact (GHI) concept as a unit of measurement that evaluates the effects of human actions on the health of all organisms, an incomplete theory of human justice is proposed. Having (...) shown that the negative GHIs of our current generation cause unfair harm to future generations, I argue that each human being must be allocated a fair threshold of negative GHIs that should not be exceeded. By emphasising the need to consider all the GHIs of human actions, the theory of human justice developed here is highly relevant to evaluate human actions that might affect future generations, for example those related to climate change. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to recent attempts by philosophers to deny the existence of something that is both real and significant: reasonable disagreements between epistemic peers. In their arguments against the possibility of such disagreements, skeptical philosophers typically invoke one or more of the following: indifference reasoning , equal weight principles , and uniqueness theses . I take up each of these in turn, finding ample reason to resist them. The arguments for indifference reasoning and equal weight principles tend (...) to overlook the possibility of a certain kind of agnostic credal state which I call deep agnosticism , the possibility of which derails the arguments. The arguments for uniqueness theses tend to invoke a flawed understanding of the evidential support relation. When these problems and misunderstandings are brought into the light and corrected, the threat to reasonable disagreement vanishes. (shrink)

Educators struggle with how to develop agency, ownership, curiosity, and persistence in learners. This book offers practical ideas and examples of how to do this.

Despite the widespread use of automated decision-making (ADM) systems, they are often developed without involving the public or those directly affected, leading to concerns about systematic biases that may perpetuate structural injustices. Existing formal fairness approaches primarily focus on statistical outcomes across demographic groups or individual fairness, yet these methods reveal ambiguities and limitations in addressing fairness comprehensively. This paper argues for a holistic approach to algorithmic fairness that integrates procedural fairness, considering both decision-making processes and their outcomes. Procedural fairness (...) emphasizes the importance of fair decision-making procedures, which aligns with theories of relational justice that stress the quality of social relations and power dynamics. We highlight the need for substantive procedural fairness to ensure better outcomes and address forward-looking responsibilities. Additionally, we propose leveraging Public Engagement, a core dimension within the well-established Responsible Research and Innovation framework, to enhance procedural fairness in ADM systems. Our contribution underscores the value of Public Engagement in fostering fairer ADM processes, thereby expanding the current focus beyond technical outcome-based approaches to encompass broader procedural considerations. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Bad Sign? Pictures of the Future on Your Skin Never a Tattooed Man Like This Tattoos and Human Nature Covered with Rare and Significant Beauties Creativity, Creativity, Creativity Can't You Recognize the Human in the Inhuman?

Dieses Kapitel ist der Frage gewidmet, ob und inwieweit sich ein Naturalist, dessen Weltbild keinerlei übernatürliche Elemente beinhaltet, am religiösen Leben teilhaben und sich auf religiöse Gedanken und Empfindungen einlassen kann.

Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. Starting with the second claim, which is grounded in Brock’s moral abstolutist position, I argue that Brock has provided no argument on why the religious position should be less rational than the secular position. With regard to (...) the first claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they do not accept racism and sexism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT On 22 January 2001, the UK became the first country to approve of embryonic stem cell research by passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, which legislated new research purposes for which early embryos can be used, in addition to those approved by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Legal advisory committees, most notably the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group and the House of Lords’ Select Committee, have offered various reasons, which can also be found in the (...) ethics literature, to justify this change. Those examined here are the views that: 1. Early embryos lack relevant qualities (or ‘the argument from lack of qualities’) and 2. Early embryos only have a potentiality to become humans with moral status (or ‘the argument from potentiality’). The validity of these arguments is questioned and a case is made for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral status (used here in the restricted sense of the status possessed by all members of the class of beings which deserve the greatest moral significance in equal measure). They have more value than the value that should be assigned to nonhuman beings from the start of fertilisation. Current UK legislation on embryo research is immoral. (shrink)

I examine the relation between naturalistically motivated and other critiques of grounding and similar critiques of the contrast between A- and B-theoretic views of time. I argue that even the combined dialectical upshot of nonunity objections in the latter case is not what it is in the former. I sympathetically discuss the objection that the notion of grounding is not intelligible and part of ‘esoteric’ metaphysics; this objection turns out to be just as serious in the case of the A/B (...) contrast. I then consider whether grounding is needed to draw the A/B contrast in the first place and answer this question in the negative. Finally, I comment on the costs of esotericism in both cases. (shrink)

Many scholars have argued that the distinction between the natural and the unnatural does not have any moral relevance, either because the distinction does not make sense or because, even if it does make sense, it does not make any moral sense. Before we can decide on the latter, we must therefore determine first whether a semantic distinction can be made. In this article, I argue that the distinction can be maintained. In spite of the fact that the categories of (...) the natural and the unnatural are blurred as no unnatural things are completely unnatural, I argue that we can meaningfully distinguish between different types of unnaturalness along the natural-unnatural spectrum. To my knowledge, this article is the first publication to distinguish between three types of unnaturalness. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article is a response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument', in this issue. In that article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry argument, and proposes a view that justifies the existing asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by distinguishing this symmetry argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, which also plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author's solution to the (...) original symmetry argument and explain why I am unpersuaded by it. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their (...) advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during 2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns. (shrink)

What is the relation between metaphysical and psychological insights into temporal asymmetries? This chapter examines that question on the basis of a case study concerning the temporal Doppler effect (Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). Caruso et al. propose that future events seem closer than past ones at an equal objective temporal distance because we experience subjective movement through time. I explore ways of interpreting their discussion in the light of the metaphysical debate between A- and B-theorists over whether (...) time really passes and whether the future is genuinely ‘open’ while the past is ‘fixed’. I argue for the following claims: (1) Caruso et al.’s talk of a subjective movement through time seems best interpreted as concerning our longer term cognitive relationship to time; (2) both A- and B-theoretic interpretations of their discussion are viable as interpretations; (3) if combined with Priorean arguments for the A-theory, it takes some work to make sure the A-theoretic interpretation respects Van Boven and Caruso’s constraint that the objective temporal distance cannot directly influence psychological outcomes without influencing psychological intermediaries; and (4) a third, less metaphysically loaded interpretation may be preferable to both the A- and the B-theoretic ones. (shrink)

Conciliationism is a view—well, a family of views—in the epistemology of disagreement. The idea, simply put, is that, in a wide range of cases where you find yourself in disagreement with another reasoner about the truth of some proposition, you are rationally obliged to adjust your credence in the direction of hers. Conciliationism enjoys a fair bit of prima facie plausibility. Most versions of it, however, suffer from a common (and rather obvious) problem: self-incrimination. Although there is some recognition in (...) the recent literature on disagreement that there is a problem in this vicinity, it, more often than not, is completely ignored. When it is not completely ignored, both the conciliationists and their critics tend to frame the problem incorrectly. As a result, they end up focusing most of their attention on pseudo-problems rather than the genuine worry. Furthermore, even when they have hit on the genuine worry, conciliationists have tended to give surprising and implausible responses to it. Even by their own lights, conciliationists aren’t justified in believing their conciliationist theses. In this paper, I argue that it’s time to come clean. Time to look for a view on the epistemic significance of disagreement that we can actually be justified in believing. (shrink)

I have always found Robin’s writings on religion delightfully insightful and stimulating, and this piece was no exception. What follows are some of the thoughts that occurred to me, in order of occurrence.

If it is true, as Raymond Boisvert wrote almost a decade ago in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, that there are two schools of Dewey scholarship – the ‘method-centered’ set and the ‘lived experience’ group – then the publication of this manuscript, once thought lost, should be a force for reunification of the two. Indeed, providing a common vocabulary between science and generic values such as freedom and consummatory experience, a vocabulary generated through a critical the...

Examines traditional sites of binary thinking in ancient Greek texts and culture to demonstrate surprising ambiguity, especially with regard to sexual difference.

Contemporary Western thinkers recognise the destructive effects of long-standing attitudes of mastery over nature and the dualistic and hierarchical thinking that informs them. Heraclitus’ metaphysical position is ideal for reframing these traditional stances for several reasons: first, Heraclitus’ concept of identity is dynamic and relies on a sophisticated understanding of opposites that recognises ambiguity; secondly, his philosophical position produces a model of truth as multiple rather than univocal; and finally, in Heraclitus’ self-making kosmos, human beings are not separate from the (...) processes of physis but inextricably entangled in them. Heraclitus’ philosophy offers relevant avenues for reimagining contemporary philosophical issues, particularly theories of identity, the multiplicity of truth, and the proper ethical human relation to nature. (shrink)

This chapter reviews Star Trek's course in wrestling with issues of political and social secularization. Any debate about secularization is a set of arguments about the best relationship between religious beliefs and institutions on the one hand, and political, social, and economic structures on the other. The chapter provides several moral arguments as to why liberal democracies like the United States should pursue greater secularism in the future. A popular but particularly unhelpful way of framing this debate is in terms (...) of religion versus reason. Deep Space Nine is the Trek series in which one society's religious interests and the Federation's secular commitments create the most friction. Some characteristics of religious thinking are quite antagonistic to political principles of a liberal democracy. Long since grown out of the antagonistic Roddenberry attitude toward religion in the public sphere, secularism in the Star Trek series reminds the human adventure is just beginning. (shrink)

A timely book that uses science fiction to provoke reflection and discussion on philosophical issues From the nature of mind to the ethics of AI and neural enhancement, science fiction thought experiments fire the philosophical imagination, encouraging us to think outside of the box about classic philosophical problems and even to envision new ones. Science Fiction and Philosophy explores puzzles about virtual reality, transhumanism, whether time travel is possible, the nature of artificial intelligence, and topics in neuroethics, among other timely (...) issues. This thought-provoking volume is suitable for students and general readers but also examines new and more advanced topics of interest to seasoned philosophers and scientists. Susan Schneider is Assistant Professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and an Affiliated Faculty Member at the Institutes for Research in Cognitive Science and Center for Cognitive Neuroscience. (shrink)

Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, (...) a notion to which modern physics is not inhospitable. The contents of perception are best described in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’, rather than ‘past’, ‘present, and ‘future’. (shrink)

This book presents the reader with a comprehensive and structured understanding of the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It describes the main ethical questions that arise from the use of AI in different areas, as well as the contribution of various academic disciplines such as legal policy, environmental sciences, and philosophy of technology to the study of AI. AI has become ubiquitous and is significantly changing our lives, in many cases, for the better, but it comes with ethical challenges. These (...) challenges include issues with the possibility and consequences of autonomous AI systems, privacy and data protection, the development of a surveillance society, problems with the design of these technologies and inequalities in access to AI technologies. This book offers specialists an instrument to develop a rigorous understanding of the main debates in emerging ethical questions around AI. The book will be of great relevance to experts in applied and technology ethics and to students pursuing degrees in applied ethics and, more specifically, in AI ethics. (shrink)

This book presents the first full-length explanation in English of Heinsohn and Steiger's groundbreaking theory of money and interest, which emphasizes the role played by private property rights. Ownership economics gives an alternative explanation of money and interest, proposing that operations enabled by property lead to interest and money, rather than exchange of goods. Like any other approach, it has to answer economic theory's core question: what is the loss that has to be compensated by interest? Ownership economics accepts neither (...) a temporary loss of goods, as in neoclassical economics, nor Keynes's temporary loss of already existing, exogenous money as the cause of interest. Rather, money is created as a non-physical title to property in a credit contract secured by a debtor's collateral and the creditor's net worth. This book is an edited English translation of a highly successful German text, and offers the first book-length treatment of a theory which has received much interest since its first appearance in articles in the late 1970s. (shrink)