PHILOSOPHY of nature is not currently considered standard fare in philosophy. Rather than the title of an area of inquiry, it has become the name of an isolated historical phenomenon—the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, Goethe, and Hegel, or a label for some school doctrine—the continuing tradition built upon the first books of Aristotle’s Physics or the newer one rooted in Whitehead’s Process and Reality. Philosophers do not typically see these systems of thought in terms of a common (...) problematic, certainly not one which is presently viable or important. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive account of vitalism and the Romantic philosophy of nature. The author explores the rise of biology as a unified science in Germany by reconstructing the history of the notion of “vital force,” starting from the mid-eighteenth through the early nineteenth century. Further, he argues that Romantic Naturphilosophie played a crucial role in the rise of biology in Germany, especially thanks to its treatment of teleology. In fact, both post-Kantian philosophers and naturalists were (...) guided by teleological principles in defining the object of biological research. The book begins by considering the problem of generation, focusing on the debate over the notion of “formative force.” Readers are invited to engage with the epistemological status of this formative force, i.e. the question of the principle behind organization. The second chapter provides a reconstruction of the physiology of vital forces as it was elaborated in the mid- to late-eighteenth century by the group of physicians and naturalists known as the “Göttingen School.” Readers are shown how these authors developed an understanding of the animal kingdom as a graded series of organisms with increasing functional complexity. Chapter three tracks the development of such framework in Romantic Naturphilosophie. The author introduces the reader to the problem of classification, showing how Romantic philosophers of nature regarded classification as articulated by a unified plan that connects all living forms with one another, relying on the idea of living nature as a universal organism. In the closing chapter, this analysis shows how the three instances of pre-biological discourse on living beings – theory of generation, physiology and natural history – converged to form the consolidated disciplinary matrix of a general biology. The book offers an insightful read for all scholars interested in classical German philosophy, especially those researching the philosophy of nature, as well as the history and philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Philosopher, physicist, and anarchist Paul Feyerabend was one of the most unconventional scholars of his time. His book Against Method has become a modern classic. Yet it is not well known that Feyerabend spent many years working on a philosophy of nature that was intended to comprise three volumes covering the period from the earliest traces of stone age cave paintings to the atomic physics of the 20th century – a project that, as he conveyed in a letter (...) to Imre Lakatos, almost drove him nuts: “Damn the,Naturphilosophie.” The book’s manuscript was long believed to have been lost. Recently, however, a typescript constituting the first volume of the project was unexpectedly discovered at the University of Konstanz. In this volume Feyerabend explores the significance of myths for the early period of natural philosophy, as well as the transition from Homer’s “aggregate universe” to Parmenides’ uniform ontology. He focuses on the rise of rationalism in Greek antiquity, which he considers a disastrous development, and the associated separation of man from nature. Thus Feyerabend explores the prehistory of science in his familiar polemical and extraordinarily learned manner. The volume contains numerous pictures and drawings by Feyerabend himself. It also contains hitherto unpublished biographical material that will help to round up our overall image of one of the most influential radical philosophers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

The Encyclopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften contains what is rightly called the system of Hegel's philosophy, his other treatises being, in the main, more detailed developments of certain sections of the Encyclopädie. For him the body of philosophical knowledge consists of three main divisions, Logic, Nature-philosophy and the Philosophy of Spirit, forming the supreme triad of the Dialectic and continuous with each other in the dialectical movement of thought. The Philosophy of Nature, however, has been (...) held suspect even by followers of Hegel who adhere to the doctrine of Absolute Idealism; in fact, by some of his most ardent disciples. For the development of the view by both contemporary and later thinkers has led to a position according to which Hegel's excursion into Nature-philosophy appears inconsistent with his own idealism. Whether the alleged inconsistency is supposed to affect the Philosophy of Spirit also is not clear, but it does, at least, throw doubt upon the claim of the second science of the Encyclopædia to be a genuine branch of philosophy. The view which leads to this condemnation of the Naturphilosophie was first voiced by Schelling, but it follows also from what will be called, in the sequel, the 'Bradleian' version of Absolutism, though this should not be taken to imply that Bradley was responsible for the statement of it which follows or that he voiced the objection to Hegel's philosophy here considered. (shrink)

One of the most significant moments in the development of German idealism is Schelling's break from his mentor Fichte. On account of its significance, there have been numerous studies examining the origin and meaning of this transition in Schelling's thought. Not one study, however, considers Goethe's influence on Schelling's development. This is surprising given the fact that in the fall of 1799 Goethe and Schelling meet every day for a week, to go through and edit what came to be Schelling's (...) most path-breaking work. This paper considers Goethe's influence on the development of Schelling's thought, and argues that it was by appropriating Goethe's idea of metamorphosis that Schelling was able to put forth a conception of nature as independent from the mind. (shrink)

Analyzes Schelling's arguments for his idealism and pieces together a description of his theory of nature from among the large number of his writings in this area. It also traces the influence of Naturphilosophie on 19th-century science and connects it with recent System Theory.

The minutiae of F.W.J. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie have been perennially dismissed due to its allegedly infeasible and indefensible assertions about Nature, such as his designation of Nature as “universal organism.” In the realm of post-Kantian German Idealism, such a dismissive attitude toward Schelling’s so-called objective idealism, more often than not, develops itself along the lines of Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s conception of the Absolute. In turn, I aim to accomplish two tasks in the following investigation. First, I intend (...) to clarify Schelling’s characterization of Nature as universal organism through a practical or teleological, instead of a theoretical or metaphysical, approach. Second, I seek to undermine the Hegelian-influenced criticisms of Schelling’s “Absolute” by demonstrating the ways in which the practico-teleological characterization of Schelling’s formulation of Nature extends into his later philosophical works. Through these clarifications, I hope to emphasize the uniqueness and richness of Schelling’s configuration of Nature. (shrink)

In his Hegel: A Re-examination, Professor John Niemeyer Findlay provided the English-speaking academic community with its first sympathetic account of the method and substance of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Until then, with only rare and obscure exceptions, English and American Hegelians had thought fit - as Findlay noted - to ignore the Naturphilosophie mainly on account of the allegedly “outmoded character of the science on which it reposes.” Findlay’s emphatic judgment was that.

Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth ” as a creative adaptation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, this article proposes that “Idea of the Earth” furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation. Specifically, I argue that “Idea of the Earth” responds to the great Enlightenment question concerning the human (...) vocation, but from a distinctive romantic-idealist angle. I begin by demonstrating the influence of Fichte’s 1800 Vocation of Humanity on Günderrode’s thinking, which involves an investigation of both Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s critical response to it. I then turn to “Idea of the Earth” where I analyse Günderrode’s understanding of nature and the self in light of her critique of Fichte, and thereby distinguish her position from Fichte’s and from the position espoused by her fellow romantics and idealists. By reading “Idea of the Earth” alongside Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s remarks on it, this article sheds new light on both Günderrode’s understanding and defence of Naturphilosophie – against Fichte’s critique of it – and her distinctive contribution to romantic philosophies of nature. (shrink)

This paper considers one of the most controversial aspects of Friedrich Schelling’s philosophy, his notion of intellectual intuition and its place within his philosophy of nature. I argue that Schelling developed his account of intellectual intuition through an encounter with--and ultimate critique of--Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. Thus, Schelling’s notion of intuition was not an appropriation of Fichte’s conception of intuition as an act of consciousness. Nonetheless, and in spite of his sympathy with Spinoza, Schelling contended that (...) intellectual intuition must be “productive” or “constructive.” I explicate how Schelling justified his use of intellectual intuition in his Naturphilosophie, and detail its relation to his notion of the philosophical “construction” of nature. (shrink)

Two seemingly contradictory tendencies have accompanied the development of the natural sciences in the past 150 years. On the one hand, the natural sciences have been instrumental in effecting a thoroughgoing transformation of social structures and have made a permanent impact on the conceptual world of human beings. This historical period has, on the other hand, also brought to light the merely hypothetical validity of scientific knowledge. As late as the middle of the 19th century the truth-pathos in the natural (...) sciences was still unbroken. Yet in the succeeding years these claims to certain knowledge underwent a fundamental crisis. For scientists today, of course, the fact that their knowledge can possess only relative validity is a matter of self-evidence. The present analysis investigates the early phase of this fundamental change in the concept of science through an examination of Hermann von Helmholtz's conception of science and his mechanistic interpretation of nature. Helmholtz (1821-1894) was one of the most important natural scientists in Germany. The development of this thoughts offers an impressive but, until now, relatively little considered report from the field of the experimental sciences chronicling the erosion of certainty. (shrink)

This paper proposes an interpretative framework for some developments of the philosophy of nature after Kant. I emphasize the critique of the economy of nature in the Critique of judgement. I argue that it resulted in a split of a previous structure of knowledge; such a structure articulated natural theology and natural philosophy on the basis of the consideration of the order displayed by living beings, both in their internal organisation and their ecological distribution. The possibility (...) of a philosophical discourse on nature that is neither mathematical nor theological stemmed from this shift. I call “hermeneutics of nature” such a program, since it aims at unpacking an immanent meaning in nature that is not explicated by the sciences of nature, which are dealing with the laws of nature. The Naturphilosophie, undertaken by Schelling, as well as the philosophies of nature of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are several realizations of this program. I highlight the structural traits that they share, such as a pregnant sense of conflicts in nature, an emphasis on the riddles of gender, and above all a prominent status given to organisms as a clue to the meaning of nature. Finally, I try to sketch the ramifications of this hermeneutics of nature in contemporary philosophy, especially phenomenology, and argue that the coming philosophy of nature, as shown by the attempts of syntheses between phenomenology and ecology, seems to depart from this hermeneutical program. (shrink)

An adequate review of a work as large and as complex as Dr. Petry’s translation of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie would need to perform at least three tasks. It should critically assess his account of Hegel’s development and philosophical system given in the long introduction; it should comment on the faithfulness and adequacy of the translation of the text, and it should estimate the value of the voluminous notes and commentary. So stupendous an accomplishment as Dr. Petry’s warrants a longer and (...) more detailed discussion than this reviewer can undertake, limited as he is in competence and the availability of space and time. But some attempt, even if too brief to be satisfactory, will be made to fulfill all three of the above tasks. This is the second full length translation of the Naturphilosophie that has appeared in English within a year - after nearly two centuries of complete dearth. So there is also some call for comparison between Dr. Petry’s translation and that of A. V. Miller, and so far as this can be done at all here, it will be only very partial and only when needed to throw light on special issues. (shrink)

According to the accepted view the enterprise of Naturphilosophie was one of the weakest points of German idealism. The idealists stood on firmer ground in venturing upon transcendental reflection and the ensuing reformulation of classical epistemology, or in probing the nature of human freedom and the metaphysics of spirit via innovative analyses of historical-social development in politics, art, religion, and philosophy itself. But they were maladroit at bringing the burgeoning knowledge of the natural sciences within the scope (...) of their systems. Schelling is singled out as a particular villain for foisting speculative schemas and fanciful theories upon the contemporary understanding of nature. Joseph Esposito sets himself steadfastly against this received opinion, seeking instead to rehabilitate the sullied reputation of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Schelling’s philosophy of nature and shows that it contains an original theory of freedom. I argue that human freedom is a potentiated form of a kind of freedom that can already be found in organic life: my claim is that human freedom and other forms of productivity within nature are instances of the same process. I argue that we should see the relationship between different forms of natural productivity and human freedom in the (...) same way that the Schelling of the Naturphilosophie argues that we should see the relationship between mechanical, chemical, and organic phenomena. To say that there is no difference between these phenomena would be absurd; the claim is rather that they are all different manifestations of the same process (the process which drives nature as a whole), and therefore that their difference is one of degree rather than kind. I further demonstrate that Schelling’s Freedom essay builds upon this notion of freedom introduced in the philosophy of nature and offers a solution to the problem of the human ownership of freedom. (shrink)

Despite the general acceptance of Hegel's importance for Marx, virtually no one has paid sufficient attention to Marx's youthful critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Even Alfred Schmidt, whose work refers to the Naturphilosophie most frequently, underestimates its importance in the formulation of Marx's own materialist philosophy of nature and comes close to replicating the very Hegelian views that Marx is attacking. Yet the critique of the Naturphilosophie in Marx's Dissertation and the 1844 Manuscripts (...) foreshadows Marx's later stated intention in Capital to turn Hegel right-side up. It affirms not only a theory of the ontological reality of the material world, but a dialectics of nature whose importance for Marx extends from the Paris Manuscripts to Capital. Marx' s Naturphilosophie criticizes Hegel's replacement of natural history with a Philosophy of Nature derived from logical categories. It affirms Engels' later view that natural history should be restored by discovering dialectics in nature rather than imposing dialectics on it. (shrink)

Various commentators have acknowledged the fact that Schelling was influenced by Spinoza’s philosophical views (cf. Bowie 1993, 2003; Copleston 1963; Esposito 1977; White 1983; Lawrence 2003; Hegel 1995; Beiser 2002; Richards 2002). However, these commentators have not spelled out in detail this influence, and this situation is particularly true of the Anglo-American tradition. In this article, I investigate Schelling’s Naturphilosophie project in search of its Spinozistic roots and I argue that this provides us with a better understanding of the (...) Schelligian system. (shrink)

"Wir mögen an der Natur beobachten, messen, rechnen, wägen und so weiter, wie wir wollen, es ist doch nur unser Maß und Gewicht, wie der Mensch das Maß der Dinge ist." So schrieb Goethe im Jahre 1807. "Die Natur wird uns keine Sonderbehandlung gewähren, nur weil wir uns als 'Krone der Schöpfung' betrachten... Ich fürchte, sie ist nicht eitel genug, um sich an den Menschen als einen Spiegel zu klammern, in dem allein sie ihre eigene Schönheit sehen kann", schreibt der (...) Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr heute. Diesen beiden Stellungnahmen liegen sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis Mensch - Natur zugrunde. Wie überhaupt die Naturphilosophie von den Vorsokratikern bis in die Gegenwart die unterschiedlichsten Varianten dieser Beziehung durchgespielt hat. Dass der Mensch sich jedoch in einem weit über die alttestamentarische Vorstellungskraft hinausgehenden Maße die Natur "untertan" gemacht und dabei großräumig zerstört hat, steht außer Zweifel. Im Rahmen der ökologischen Krise muss das Verhältnis zur Natur neu überdacht werden. Das vorliegende Lesebuch, das sich auch als Studientext und Diskussionsgrundlage für Schulen und Hochschulen bestens eignet, bietet den Blick in die Geschichte der Naturphilosophie, der dafür unerlässlich ist: Die Schwierigkeiten, die heute im Umgang mit der Natur auftreten, sind vielfach auf immer noch wirksame traditionelle Naturvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Andererseits gibt es einige eigenständige, bisher noch zu wenig berücksichtigte Ansätze, die zu neuen Konzeptionen anregen können. -/- ------------------------------------------------------------- Inhalt: Vorwort; Einführung: Traditionslinien der Naturphilosophie; Heraklit und die Atomisten Leukipp und Demokrit; Platon und Aristoteles; Christliches Naturverstehen im Mittelalter: Aurelius Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Jacob Böhme; Naturvorstellungen in der beginnenden Neuzeit: Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton; Kants Naturbegriff; Goethes Naturforschung; Nachkantische Naturphilosophie: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Geschichte der Natur und Kritik des Naturalismus: Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill; Kritik des Substanzbegriffes, Alfred North Whitehead, Werner Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine und Isabelle Stengers; Bibliographie. (shrink)

John Dewey’s pragmatism and naturalism are grounded on metaphysical tenets describing how mind’s intelligence is thoroughly natural in its activity and productivity. His worldview is best classified as Organic Realism, since it descended from the German organicism and Naturphilosophie of Herder, Schelling, and Hegel which shaped the major influences on his early thought. Never departing from its tenets, his later philosophy starting with Experience and Nature elaborated a philosophical organon about science, culture, and ethics to fulfill his (...) particular version of Organic Realism. (shrink)

Various commentators have acknowledged the fact that Schelling was influenced by Spinoza’s philosophical views (cf. Bowie 1993, 2003; Copleston 1963; Esposito 1977; White 1983; Lawrence 2003; Hegel 1995; Beiser 2002; Richards 2002). However, these commentators have not spelled out in detail this influence, and this situation is particularly true of the Anglo-American tradition. In this article, I investigate Schelling’s Naturphilosophie project in search of its Spinozistic roots and I argue that this provides us with a better understanding of the (...) Schelligian system. (shrink)

Philosophies after Kant maybe more than ever, were confronted with a particular epistemic problem: how can representations correspond with the objects they refer to, that is, how is knowledge possible? Against Kant’s negative solution of the problem, proponents of German idealisms sought to establish a philosophical method that would close the gulf between what our concepts and the world they try to grasp. In his writings on a philosophy of nature, the young Schelling put forward methodological solution, which (...) in interesting ways relates to Kant’s statements on philosophical and mathematical methods of knowledge-acquisition. Far away from being a relapse into pre-critical philosophy, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie offers a solution to the epistemic aporia through the concept of Darstellung [presentation]. Taking up on Kant’s theory of mathematical presentation, Schelling devises a philosophical method capable of ‘presenting its concepts’. I take ‘presentation’ to denote a reflective performance, which describes the genesis of its object while simultaneously bringing it into existence. By means of his conception of scientific experiments, Schelling introduces a way of mediating the ideal realm of philosophical construction with real realm of material nature; it is the role of the experiment to make nature present itself. (shrink)

Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik scheinen zwei unterschiedliche, ja, sich ausschließende philosophische Ansätze zu sein. Bestimmt man aber Naturphilosophie als Metaphysik der Natur im Sinne des Projekts, im Ausgang von den naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen zu einer kohärenten und vollständigen Sicht der Welt zu gelangen, ergibt sich eine neue und überraschende Konstellation. Die Bezugnahme auf die Naturwissenschaften verleiht der Metaphysik einerseits die Berechtigung dazu, revisionär zu sein, das heißt, Erkenntnisansprüche, die aus dem alltäglichen Weltverständnis stammen, zu revidieren. Andererseits ist eine solche Metaphysik (...) ebenso hypothetisch wie die Wissenschaften selbst. Michael Esfeld zeigt zunächst, wie man in diesem Rahmen einen wissenschaftlichen Realismus vertreten kann, und begründet dann so umstrittene Thesen wie die eines vierdimensionalen Blockuniversums mit Ereignissen und Prozessen statt Substanzen oder die eines naturphilosophischen Holismus und Strukturenrealismus statt eines Atomismus und rehabilitiert die Idee notwendiger Verbindungen in der Natur. (shrink)

"Wir mögen an der Natur beobachten, messen, rechnen, wägen und so weiter, wie wir wollen, es ist doch nur unser Maß und Gewicht, wie der Mensch das Maß der Dinge ist." So schrieb Goethe im Jahre 1807. "Die Natur wird uns keine Sonderbehandlung gewähren, nur weil wir uns als 'Krone der Schöpfung' betrachten... Ich fürchte, sie ist nicht eitel genug, um sich an den Menschen als einen Spiegel zu klammern, in dem allein sie ihre eigene Schönheit sehen kann", schreibt der (...) Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr heute. Diesen beiden Stellungnahmen liegen sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis Mensch - Natur zugrunde. Wie überhaupt die Naturphilosophie von den Vorsokratikern bis in die Gegenwart die unterschiedlichsten Varianten dieser Beziehung durchgespielt hat. Dass der Mensch sich jedoch in einem weit über die alttestamentarische Vorstellungskraft hinausgehenden Maße die Natur "untertan" gemacht und dabei großräumig zerstört hat, steht außer Zweifel. Im Rahmen der ökologischen Krise muss das Verhältnis zur Natur neu überdacht werden. Das vorliegende Lesebuch, das sich auch als Studientext und Diskussionsgrundlage für Schulen und Hochschulen bestens eignet, bietet den Blick in die Geschichte der Naturphilosophie, der dafür unerlässlich ist: Die Schwierigkeiten, die heute im Umgang mit der Natur auftreten, sind vielfach auf immer noch wirksame traditionelle Naturvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Andererseits gibt es einige eigenständige, bisher noch zu wenig berücksichtigte Ansätze, die zu neuen Konzeptionen anregen können. ------------------------------------------------------------- Inhalt: Vorwort; Einführung: Traditionslinien der Naturphilosophie; Heraklit und die Atomisten Leukipp und Demokrit; Platon und Aristoteles; Christliches Naturverstehen im Mittelalter: Aurelius Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Jacob Böhme; Naturvorstellungen in der beginnenden Neuzeit: Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton; Kants Naturbegriff; Goethes Naturforschung; Nachkantische Naturphilosophie: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Geschichte der Natur und Kritik des Naturalismus: Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill; Kritik des Substanzbegriffes, Alfred North Whitehead, Werner Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine und Isabelle Stengers; Bibliographie. (shrink)

Was ist Natur oder was könnte sie sein? Diese und weitere Fragen sind grundlegend für Naturdenken und -handeln. Das Lehr- und Studienbuch bietet eine historisch-systematische und zugleich praxisbezogene Einführung in die Naturphilosophie mit ihren wichtigsten Begriffen. Es nimmt den pluralen Charakter der Wahrnehmung von Natur in den philosophischen Blick und ist auch zum Selbststudium bestens geeignet.

Jakob Friedrich Fries is one of the most important representatives of the Critical Philosophy, someone who built immediately on the original Kantian philosophy. -/- Fries was born in 1773 in Barby (on the Elbe). In 1805 he was extraordinary professor for philosophy in Jena and in the same year was ordinary professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. Returning to Jena in 1816, one year later he was compulsorily retired because of his participation at the nationalistic and republican (...) Wartburg Festival. In 1924 he obtained a professorship for physics and mathematics, and in 1838 he was given back a professorship for philosophy. He died in 1843 in Jena. -/- The book summarizes the research results of the DFG-Project "Jakob Friedrich Fries' Influence on the Sciences of the 19th Century". The research project was carried out by Dr. Kay Herrmann (Institute of Philosophy, Jena University) and Prof. Dr. Wolfram Hogrebe (Institute of Philosophy, Bonn University). Such a study has special importance. There is available a large amount of literature about the "speculative contemporaries" of Fries, like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In contrast to the "speculative philosophy", there has been published only a few studies about the Friesian natural philosophy. Fries was, in his natural-philosophical studies, looking for a link between philosophy and modern sciences, wheras his "speculative philosophical" contemporaries felt obligated to stick primarily to a descriptive, phenomenal view of nature. So far the question "How was mathematical natural philosophy regarded by scientists and mathematicians of the 19th century?" has hardly been investigated. Archival studies showed that this gap in Fries-research can be filled. The Friesian correspondence turned out to be a rich gold mine. -/- The present publication is more than a research report. The monographic first part is intended to introduce the foundations of the Friesian theory of cognition, the Friesian methodology, and the Friesian natural philosophy. This should facilitate entry into Friesian philosophy. -/- The Friesian theory is analyzed from two points of view: •How did Fries suceed in continuing and improving the Kantian approach? Is Fries able to remove the weak points of Kantian philosophy? -/- •What is the current significance of the Friesian approach? There are some interesting similarities between the Friesian approach and modern philosophical theories (such like Chomsky's theory of "universal grammer"). The lasting core of the Friesian theory of cognition is: To use empirical studies for working on philosophical problems. -/- Chapters 3 and 4 are scientific-historically oriented. These chapters analyze the Friesian position in scientific and mathematical debates (debates about the a priori foundations of physics, the problem of the identification of physics as an independent discipline, the problem of the boundary between chemistry and physics, the problem of mathematization of the sciences, the theory of the imponderabilia, the systematics and structure of sciences and mathematics, problems of infinity, the differential calculus, the theory of parallel lines) and the relation between Fries and the scientists of the 19th century. The book contains the latest findings gained by evaluation of the Friesian unpublished work (for example the correspondence with W. Weber, C. F. Gauß, E. F. Apelt, O. Schlömilch, Ch. Reichel, B. A. v. Lindenau, L. Gmelin, E. G. Fischer, A. N. Scherer, J. S. C. Schweigger) -/- One result of the research project is that some important scientists took a favourable view of the Friesian theory, but the influence of the Friesian philosophy on the sciences of the 19th century was very limited. The causes are very complex: An anti-natural-philosophical spirit of age, the limits of the Kantian inspired philosophy and some unfavourable aspects in the biography of Fries. -/- For the first time the voluminous Fries-Reichel-correspondence was evaluated. The Fries-Reichel-correspondence contains the Friesian approach to prove the 11th Euclidean axiom, and the whole transcript of the Friesian attempt at proof is given. // Der erste Teil des Buches will in die Grundprobleme Fries’scher Erkenntnis­theorie, Methodenlehre und Naturphilosophie einführen, wobei das Hauptaugenmerk auf die Fortführung der kantischen Ansätze durch Fries sowie auf die aktuelle Interpretation der Fries’schen Lehre gerichtet ist. Der wissenschaftshistorisch ausgerichtete zweite Teil analysiert Fries’ Stellung zu naturwissenschaftlichen und mathematischen Diskussionsrichtungen (Probleme der Identifizierung der Physik als eigenständige Disziplin, der Grenzziehung zwischen Physik und Chemie, der Mathematisierung der Naturwissenschaften, der Imponderabilientheorie, der Systematik von Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, des Unendlichen, der Parallelentheorie usw.) sowie sein Verhältnis zu Naturwissenschaftlern und Mathematikern seiner Zeit. Das Buch enthält neue Erkenntnisse, die aus der Auswertung zahlreicher Nachlassmaterialien gewonnen wurden. Erstmalig wird unter dem Blickwinkel „Fries als Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker“ auch der sehr umfangreiche Reichel-Briefwechsel ausgewertet. Dem Reichel-Briefwechsel entstammt auch Fries’ Versuch eines Beweises des Parallelenaxioms, der in diesem Buch erstmalig in transkribierter Form vollständig vorliegt. -/- . (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Natur und Idee ist für jede idealistische Philosophie ein Kernpunkt ihres Ansatzes. Hegel bestimmte die Natur als das Andere der Idee, die sich in Freiheit als Natur aus sich entläßt. In der Natur zeigen sich die logischen Strukturen verhüllt und im Abbild, z. B. die Naturgesetze und die logischen Beziehungen. Auch die Kategorie des Lebens in Hegels Logik belegt die enge Verbindung von Natur und Logik. Die Entäußerung der Idee in der Natur gehört zum Wesen der Idee (...) auf ihrem Weg zum Geist. Diese Thematik wird in acht Beiträgen von bekannten Hegelforschern unter verschiedenen Aspekten bearbeitet. Sie verstehen die Sicht Hegels als einen bedeutenden Entwurf, der die Einheit der Wirklichkeit unter dem Vorzeichen der Idee zur Geltung bringt. (shrink)

The Origins of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and its relation to his transcendental philosophy have for a long time intrigued historians of philosophy.1 When did Schelling’s interest in the philosophy of nature commence,2 and what inspired this apparent transition in his thought?3 How did his Naturphilosophie figure into his later departure from Fichte, and in what ways did his early commitments influence this departure?4 These have been the overarching questions of the debate, and they have been (...) answered from varying angles. However, by emphasizing a transition or even a break between Schelling’s earlier views and his Naturphilosophie, this debate has been largely concerned with locating a moment in Schelling’s .. (shrink)

In his book from 1799 "Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie" Schelling defines philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) as science of nature (Wissenschaft der Natur) a priori but emphasises nonetheless the importance of experience to develop such a science of nature. This raises the problematical question of how this science of nature as an science a priori that has concrete phenomena (Naturerscheinungen) as it's objects can be possible. In this text the author (...) argues that it is Schelling's critical concept of system respective systematicity of nature itself that allows him to develop a (philosophical) system of nature that for us might be known through experience but - as systematical knowledge - must be considered as necessary and therefor a priori. (shrink)

Frontmatter -- Inhalt -- Einleitung -- ERSTER TEIL. Phänomenologie der eigenen Natur: Gegenstand und Methode der Untersuchung -- 1. Der Gegenstand der Untersuchung: die eigene Natur, das Selbst-Natur-sein -- 2. Die Methode einer Phänomenologie der eigenen Natur und die Methode der Untersuchung -- ZWEITER TEIL. Phänomenologie der eigenen Natur in den Philosophien Husserls, Heideggers, Merleau-Pontys und Schmitzens -- 1. Die Leiblichkeit des cogito (Edmund Husserl) -- 2. Dasein und Natursein (Martin Heidegger) -- 3. Die Ichhaftigkeit des Leibes (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) -- (...) 4. Leibliches Befinden und Personsem (Hermann Schmitz) -- DRITTER TEIL. Auf dem Weg zu einer Phänomenologie der Natur: Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung und deren praktische und theoretische Relevanz -- 1. Leibphänomenologie als Naturphilosophie: Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung -- 2. Phänomenologie der Natur in ihrer Relevanz für Wissenschaft, Praxis und Philosophie -- Schluß -- Anhang -- Literaturverzeichnis -- Personenverzeichnis -- Sachregister. (shrink)

From 1801–1807 Schelling continued to refine his early attempts at Naturphilosophie in the metaphysical framework of a transcendental Spinozism that he initially called Identity Philosophy. While mathematics and geometry provided the model for identity and its quantitative differentiation in early versions of identity theory, from 1804–1807, logic and theory of language offered a model of identity capable of unknotting persistent Spinozistic puzzles such as the connection between natura naturans and natura naturata—the absolute and its potencies—and the ontological status (...) of the individual. Schelling’s initial concepts of identity as “indifference” or “the identity of identity and difference,” themselves the offshoot of meditations on polarity and repeating structure in the philosophy of nature, make way for logical concepts such as “expression” or “affirmation” and the propositional operator “bond” or “Position” found in the copula. The new essays approach ultimate reality through Spinoza’s disjunction of God or nature, or productive and produced nature; so in addition to identity theory, a general metaphysics of nature prefaces treatments of specific natural phenomena. These dual metaphysics of God and nature inject a dynamic or expressive movement into identity that is not yet the unfolding of identity as grounding-and-division that Schelling will articulate in the 1809 Freedom Essay, but it carries a sense of motion and differentiation—or evolution and unfolding—not found in his earlier attempts. The entire identity philosophy period is best viewed as a step in Schelling’s lifelong project of reworking Spinoza by adding life and spirit to nature. (shrink)

Wer von Naturphilosophie spricht, kann vielerlei meinen. Sie kann als Form der eigenstandigen Naturerkenntnis auftreten, als Reflexion auf die Naturwissenschaften oder sich dem Verhaltnis von Mensch und Natur zuwenden. Dabei steht Naturphilosophie immer auch in einem Spannungsverhaltnis zu den Naturwissenschaften. Die Diskussion historischer Konzepte der dialektischen Naturphilosophie wird in diesem Buch daher zusammengefuhrt mit dem Versuch ihrer systematischen Reaktualisierung.".

This paper analyses the forgotten concept of “sperm-force” proposed by George Newport (1803–1854). Newport is known for his comprehensive microscopic examinations of sperm and egg interaction in amphibian fertilization between 1850 and 1854. My work with archival sources reveals that Newport believed fertilization was caused by sperm-force, which the Royal Society refused to publish. My reconstruction chronologically traces the philosophical and experimental origins of sperm-force to Newport’s 1830s entomological work. Sperm-force is a remnant of Newport’s speculations on the creation of (...) the active individual. I argue that sperm-force was rooted in British interpretations of German _Naturphilosophie_, which demonstrates Continental influences on mid-Victorian embryology, particularly the role of male generative power. This context provides further evidence that British versions of Romantic science fostered sophisticated experimental work. The refusal by Paleyite stalwarts of natural theology to publish Newport’s ideas illustrates the institutional resistance to German pantheistic and vitalistic influences. This reconstruction of sperm-force’s philosophical foundation and its reception offers new understandings of mid-Victorian attitudes toward the inheritance of mind and body. It situates Newport’s work within the nineteenth century’s scientific project to assign stereotypical genders to the gametes. (shrink)

Naturbegriffe beschreiben naturphilosophische Gegenstandsbereiche und fassen Resultate naturphilosophischer Diskurse zusammen. Gehört ihre Bestimmung zu den grundlegenden Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie, so stellt ihre gegenwärtige Vielfalt für die Naturphilosophie eine Herausforderung dar, Von kaum einer wirkungsgeschichtlich bedeutsamen Definition von Natur ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten behauptet worden, ihr komme keine Relevanz für den Diskurs zu. Der Beitrag zeigt Ordnungsstrukturen in der Pluralität der Verwendungsweisen auf und begründet den aktuellen Geltungsanspruch traditioneller Begriffe im Bezug auf spezifische Erfahrungsweisen. Nach einer Einführung beginne (...) ich mit der Unterscheidung von wissenschaftlicher und nichtwissenschaftlicher Naturerfahrung, beziehe auf diese Differenz die Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie und gehe dann mit einer Klassifikation von Naturbegriffen zum exemplarischen Teil über. In diesem diskutiere ich am Beispiel bestimmter Aspekte der Naturbegriffe von Aristoteles und Descartes ihre für die Gegenwart typischen Bedingungen der Verwendung in nichtwissenschaftlicher Erfahrung sowie darüber hinaus vorkommender Verwendungen. (shrink)

John Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed he shows that emperically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena (...) are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Dieses Lehrbuch behandelt zentrale naturphilosophische Probleme, die durch Theorien der modernen Naturwissenschaften aufgeworfen werden. Es fragt, welches Bild von Raum, Zeit, Materie, Leben und Bewusstsein sich aus ihnen ergibt, aber auch nach den Konsequenzen der aktuellen Umweltkrise für unser praktisches Verhältnis zur Natur. Der Autor Prof. em. Dr. Andreas Bartels hat Mathematik, Physik und Philosophie studiert und ist emeritierter Professor für Natur- und Wissenschaftsphilosophie an der Universität Bonn.

Goethe n'est pas seulement poete, dramaturge, romancier, artiste. Il est aussi philosophe et surtout philosophe de la nature. Il manifeste un interet constant pour des questions scientifiques variees (physique, theorie des couleurs, chimie, meteorologie, geologie, mineralogie, morphologie, botanique, zoologie) et influencera profondement la philosophie allemande de la nature des annees 1780-1830. Goethe est une reference incontournable pour la Naturphilosophie tant idealiste (Kant, Schelling, Hegel) que romantique (Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel). Il est, selon l'historien de la philosophie Johann Hoffmeister, (...) parmi la nebuleuse heterogene des philosophes de la nature, comme " le Soleil au milieu des planetes ". Goethe meme considere ses ecrits scientifiques comme un volet majeur de son oeuvre, et dialogue avec d'eminents savants de son temps (Cuvier, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, les freres Humboldt). Sa Naturphilosophie articule une theorie de la connaissance a une redefinition de l'experience privilegiant le recours a l'intuition visuelle, ainsi que la recherche de " phenomenes originaires " (Urphanomene) et des metamorphoses auxquelles ils donnent lieu. Hegel louera dans la Naturphilosophie de Goethe " l'intuition pleine de sens [...] qui ordonne ce qui n'est que phenomene d'une maniere conforme a la suite interieure du concept ". Le present ouvrage eclaire ce Goethe Naturphilosoph fondateur d'une episteme intuitionniste, phenomeniste, voire phenomenologique, aux antipodes de la science physico-mathematique, quantitative et intellectuelle, de Descartes ou Newton et inaugurant un style original de comprehension des phenomenes naturels qui se joue des frontieres a la fois entre les disciplines scientifiques et entre la philosophie et son autre (science, litterature). (shrink)

There is a broad public interest in the current discussion about evolution and creation, a discussion led mainly by scientists on the one hand and theologians on the other. The scientists argue for the evolution of the cosmos and nature without a creator, while the theologians defend the idea of creation. However, the perspective of natural philosophy is largely missing from the debate. Since this is no longer represented in contemporary philosophical trends, this study revives it from the (...) aristotelian-thomist tradition with its valuable insights into the finality of nature, which the author uses in his attempt to mediate between scientific and theological viewpoints. (shrink)

Hegels Naturphilosophie, früher als der schwächste Teil des enzyklopädischen Systems betrachtet, erlebt in der gegenwärtigen Rezeption eine Renaissance. Die Herausgabe der erhaltenen Vorlesungsnachschriften spielt dabei eine fundamentale Rolle, weil sie eine zuverlässige Textgrundlage für Einzelstudien bereitstellt und es erlaubt, die historische Entwicklung der Hegelschen Reflexion über Natur und Naturwissenschaften zu rekonstruieren. Die vorliegende Edition der von Boris von Uexküll in Auftrag gegebenen Nachschrift der Vorlesung von 1821/22 füllt die Lücke zwischen den bereits edierten Vorlesungsnachschriften von 1819/20 und von 1823/24. (...) Sie wirft neues Licht auf ein relativ frühes und doch bereits ausgereiftes Stadium der enzyklopädischen Naturphilosophie Hegels. Zahlreiche historische Anmerkungen erleichtern das Verständnis des schwierigen, aber an grundlegenden Einsichten reichen Textes. (shrink)

Die "Aphorismen uber die Naturphilosophie" (1806/07) wie auch die zugehorigen "Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie " (1805) sind in der Forschung bisher weitgehend unbeachtet geblieben, obwohl sie einen bedeutenden ubergangstext von der Natur zur Freiheitsphilosophie Schellings darstellen. SIe wurden ursprunglich in der kurzlebigen, in nur sechs Ausgaben erschienenen Zeitschrift "Jahrbucher der Medicin als Wissenschaft" veroffentlicht, die Schelling zwischen 1805 und 1808 herausgab und zu der er die maSSgeblichen Beitrage beisteuerte. DIe 469 "Aphorismen", die sich in zwei Hauptteile (...) sowie eine vorangehende Einleitung gliedern, sind in wesentlichen Teilen Reflexionen uber das Absolute und knupfen zwar noch an das "System der gesammten Philosophie" von 1804 an, enthalten aber zugleich auch den ubergang von der fruhen, von Kant und Fichte ausgehenden Identitatsphilosophie hin in "ein langsames Abdriften zu den dunklen Bereichen des Seins" (X. TIlliette), denen sich Schelling nach 1806 verstarkt zuwendet. SPrachlich und gedanklich entfernt er sich vom "System", spricht von der "Liebe" und den "Relationen" und in Wendungen, die an Jacob Bohme erinnern, von der "Seele" der Dinge, "welche also zwar an sich betrachtet gleich dem Centro, relativ aber auf das Ding, das verworrene Gegenbild ihrer Einheit, nur ein Geschopf des Centri ist". HIer vollzieht sich die systematische Voraussetzung fur das, was die folgenden Schriften wesentlich ausmacht: das Ausloten des Dunklen in der Natur und damit in uns selbst. Die Textgattung "Aphorismus" war um 1800 noch nicht auf jene Bedeutung verengt, die uns heute an ein isoliertes "Kurzestfragment" denken lasst. ES handelt sich um kurze Abschnitte einer genetischen Darstellung, die jedoch anders als ein durchkomponierter Text einzelne Motive freier variieren und von verschiedenen Seiten her beleuchten kann. (shrink)

Abstract:Schelling’s early philosophy and his ground breaking dynamism sought to present what was beneath the surface of nature, in order to reveal the ideal interiority of nature’s real power, which for Schelling, was teeming with intensities, and forces displaying the unique inner life of the natural world. This paper’s thesis, is an attempt to revive Schelling’s early philosophy and Naturphilosophie, in the hopes of reconfiguring the modern conceptual gaze that has turned the natural world into (...) a lifeless, empty, system. With our current climate crisis on the horizon, a return to Schelling’s philosophy is an urgent endeavor and a call to philosophical arms in order to re-create a new relationship between modern humanity and nature, which ultimately seeks to grasps the organic world as not only productive, but also creative and alive. (shrink)