At the outset of the Republic, Polemarchus advances the bold thesis that “justice is the art which gives benefit to friends and injury to enemies”. He quickly rejects the hypothesis, and what follows is a long tradition of neglecting the ethics of enmity. The parallel issue of how friendship affects the moral sphere has, by contrast, been greatly illuminated by discussions both ancient and contemporary. This article connects this existing work to the less explored topic of the normative significance of (...) our negative relationships. I explain how negative partiality should be conceptualized through reference to the positive analogue, and argue that at least some forms of negative partiality are justified. I further explore the connection between positive and negative relationships by showing how both are justified by ongoing histories of encounter. However, I also argue that these relationships are in some important ways asymmetrical. (shrink)

Forgiveness has traditionally been characterized an affective response to a wrongdoing, i.e. a psychological process that involves ridding oneself of resentment or other negative reactive attitudes. In contrast to the prevailing model, this paper advocates for the emerging position that forgiveness should be understood as a normative power akin to a promise. In particular, I argue that forgiveness involves surrendering the right to discount the interests of a perpetrator (a special permission the victim acquires in virtue of having been (...) wronged). I argue that this model fits and/or explains important features of forgiveness, such as the idea that forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy wrong, that forgiveness re-establishes a relation of equality, and that forgiveness is ‘normatively significant’. I further develop the position by showing how it can provide a unified case of paradigmatic forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and third-party forgiveness—this explanatory power distinguishes the view from previous articulations of the idea that forgiveness is a normative power. The final section further explores these distinctions by delimiting the scope of forgiveness to exclude powers related to apologies, compensation, or ‘redemption’. (shrink)

Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the (...) class='Hi'>negative partiality of enmity can be justified through projects or the value inherent in the relationship, following two influential views about the justification of positive partiality. We argue that both accounts of partiality can be conceptually extended to the negative analogue, but doing so brings into focus the problems with such accounts of the grounds of partiality. (shrink)

Previous research has shown a source memory advantage for faces presented in negative contexts. As yet it remains unclear whether participants remember the specific type of context in which the faces were presented or whether they can only remember that the face was associated with negative valence. In the present study, participants saw faces together with descriptions of two different types of negative behaviour and neutral behaviour. In Experiment 1, we examined whether the participants were able to (...) discriminate between two types of other-relevant negative context information (cheating and disgusting behaviour) in a source memory test. In Experiment 2, we assessed source memory for other-relevant negative (threatening) context information (other-aggressive behaviour) and self-relevant negative context information (self-aggressive behaviour). A multinomial source memory model was used to separately assess partial source memory for the negative valence of the behaviour and specific source memory for the particular type of negative context the face was associated with. In Experiment 1, source memory was specific for the particular type of negative context presented (i.e., cheating or disgusting behaviour). Experiment 2 showed that source memory for other-relevant negative information was more specific than source memory for self-relevant information. Thus, emotional source memory may vary in specificity depending on the degree to which the negative emotional context is perceived as threatening. (shrink)

Paradigmatic uses of negative existentials such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’ are problematic because they present the interpreter with a pragmatic paradox: a speaker who uses such a sentence seems to be asserting something that is incompatible with what she presupposes. An adequate solution must therefore explain why we interpret paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as saying something true, even though such uses present us with a pragmatic paradox. I provide such an explanation by analyzing paradigmatic uses of (...) negative existentials as corrections of previous assertions that are judged to suffer from referential presupposition failure. I present the explanation within the framework of a simple version of segmented discourse representation theory. (shrink)

We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries (...) point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call Morality’s Harmonious Propensity. According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones. (shrink)

Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This (...) paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of the domains of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent-centred moral options that concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond our general duties to others and require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive objections. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons-based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and non-reductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for ‘the big three’, according to which partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of either projects, personal relationships, or individuals. I conclude by discussing four newly emerging areas in the debate: normative transitions of various personal relationships, relationships with AI, epistemic partiality, and negative partiality, which concerns the negative analogue of our positive personal relationships. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the question of partiality and impartiality in the application of triage. Triage is a process in medical research which recommends that patients should be sorted for treatment according to the degree or severity of their injury. In employing the triage protocol, however, the question of partiality arises because socially vulnerable groups will be neglected since there is the likelihood that the social determinants of a patient's health may diminish her chance of survival. As (...) a process that is based on the severity of a patient's injury, triage will be unfair, and hence negatively partial, to socially vulnerable people. Thus, I aim in this paper to show that the triage protocol fails as an impartial evaluative process because its only aim is to maximize survivability. I contend that: (i) triage would lead to the neglect of the social condition of patients or victims, and (ii) it will only serve the utilitarian purpose of maximization of outcomes which may not be justified in some cases. (shrink)

Motivated by constraint satisfaction problems, Feder and Vardi (SIAM Journal of Computing, 28, 57–104, 1998) set out to search for fragments of satisfying the dichotomy property: every problem definable in is either in P or else NP-complete. Feder and Vardi considered in this connection two logics, strict NP (or SNP) and monadic, monotone, strict NP without inequalities (or MMSNP). The former consists of formulas of the form , where is a quantifier-free formula in a relational vocabulary; and the latter is (...) the fragment of SNP whose formulas involve only negative occurrences of relation symbols, only monadic second-order quantifiers, and no occurrences of the equality symbol. It remains an open problem whether MMSNP enjoys the dichotomy property. In the present paper, SNP and MMSNP are characterized in terms of partially ordered connectives. More specifically, SNP is characterized using the logic D of partially ordered connectives introduced in Blass and Gurevich (Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 32, 1–16, 1986), Sandu and Väänänen (Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 38, 361–372 1992), and MMSNP employing a generalization C of D introduced in the present paper. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, such as God or a religious community? Doxastic partialists say that it is. Some hold that it is good, from the viewpoint of faith, to form positive beliefs about the object of your faith even when your evidence favours negative ones. Others try to maintain respect for evidence by appealing to a highly permissive epistemology. I argue against both forms of doxastic partiality, on the (...) grounds that they foster an epistemically problematic noetic entrenchment. I instead defend evidentialism—the view that it is good to strive for true beliefs about the object of your faith, be they positive or negative, given relatively stringent evidential norms. I address the objection that evidentialism fosters disloyalty to the other party, not least because it risks losing your faith altogether. What emerges are not just epistemic norms for beliefs about religious matters, but an evidentialist account of what makes for good faith itself. (shrink)

Linear regression and its variants have been widely used for classification problems. However, they usually predefine a strict binary label matrix which has no freedom to fit the samples. In addition, they cannot deal with complex real-world applications such as the case of face recognition where samples may not be linearly separable owing to varying poses, expressions, and illumination conditions. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the kernel negative ε dragging linear regression method for robust classification on noised and (...) nonlinear data. First, a technique called negative ε dragging is introduced for relaxing class labels and is integrated into the LR model for classification to properly treat the class margin of conventional linear regressions for obtaining robust result. Then, the data is implicitly mapped into a high dimensional kernel space by using the nonlinear mapping determined by a kernel function to make the data more linearly separable. Finally, our obtained KNDLR method is able to partially alleviate the problem of overfitting and can perform classification well for noised and deformable data. Experimental results show that the KNDLR classification algorithm obtains greater generalization performance and leads to better robust classification decision. (shrink)

We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann’s model for knowledge [R. J. Aumann, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 263-300]: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s knowledge operator on events, we use a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s awareness operator on events. This is made possible by three ideas. First, like the model of [A. Heifetz, M. Meier, and B. Schipper, (...) Journal of Economic Theory 130 (2006) 78-94], ours is based on a space of partial specifications of the world, partially ordered by a relation of further specification or refinement, and the idea that agents may be aware of some coarser-grained specifications while unaware of some finer-grained specifications; however, our model is based on a different implementation of this idea, related to forcing in set theory. Second, we depart from a tradition in the literature, initiated by [S. Modica and A. Rustichini, Theory and Decision 37 (1994) 107- 124] and adopted by Heifetz et al. and [J. Li, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 977-993], of taking awareness to be definable in terms of knowledge. Third, we show that the negative conclusion of a well- known impossibility theorem concerning unawareness in [Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] can be escaped by a slight weakening of a key axiom. Together these points demonstrate that a correspondence on a partial-state space is sufficient to model unawareness of events. Indeed, we prove a representation theorem showing that any abstract Boolean algebra equipped with awareness, knowledge, and belief operators satisfying some plausible axioms is representable as the algebra of events arising from a partial-state space with awareness, knowledge, and belief correspondences. (shrink)

The author integrates, expands, and deepens his previous publications about irregular (or "metalinguistic") negations. A total of ten distinct negatives-several previously unclassified-are analyzed. The logically irregular negations deny different implicatures of their root. All are partially non-compositional but completely conventional. The author argues that two of the irregular negative meanings are implicatures. The others are semantically rather than pragmatically ambiguous. Since their ambiguity is neither lexical nor structural, direct irregular negatives satisfy the standard definition of idioms as syntactically complex (...) expressions whose meaning is non-compositional. Unlike stereotypical idioms, idiomatic negatives lack fixed syntactic forms and are highly compositional. The final chapter analyzes other "free form" idioms, including irregular interrogatives and comparatives, self-restricted verb phrases, numerical verb phrases, and transparent propositional attitude and speech act reports. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt (...) to mislead or to fail to bring one to the truth. In such cases, faith attunes one to the subject’s true motivations and intentions. Here the partiality of faith constitutes a kind of social acuity or expertise, not a bias. Indeed, to lack faith in such situations—and to give impartialist evidence equal weight with the partial—might constitute a kind of bias against the subject, casting his or her actions in an overly negative light. (shrink)

The unethical behavior of a business founder often leads to negative publicity which substantially affects positive corporate image. The amount of negative publicity relating to business founders’ unethical behavior is on the rise in the age of online social media in China. Based on the stimulus–response theory and balance theory, this paper developed a theoretical model to examine how negative publicity about a business founder’s unethical behavior affects corporate image. The proposed model was tested by the partial (...) least squares technique. Results show that perceived severity, publicity intensity and recovery performance are predictors of corporate image: perceived severity has a negative impact on positive corporate image; publicity intensity and recovery performance have positive impacts on positive corporate image; and founder image mediates the relationships between the three predictors and corporate image. Moreover, initial consumer impression of business founders has a positive impact on positive corporate image. (shrink)

Armstrong famously argued in favour of introducing totality facts in our ontology. Contrary to fully negative (absence) facts, totality facts yield a theory of “moderate” or “partial” negativity, which allegedly provides an elegant solution to the truthmaking problem of negative claims and, at the same time, avoids postulating (many) first-order absences. Friends of totality facts argue that partial negativity is (i) tolerable vis-à-vis the Eleatic principle qua mark of the real, and (ii) achieves a significant advantage in terms (...) of ontological parsimony. But are totality facts, which are partially negative, really more ontologically acceptable than fully negative facts? In this paper, we argue that, comparatively, the case for totality facts is weaker than commonly assumed and that, ultimately, the answer is negative. (shrink)

Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer :307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that truthmaker (...) monism is not necessary for an appropriate solution to the problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths. I conclude that we should reject truthmaker monism once and for all. (shrink)

In this brief comment, I aim to engage with Sandy Goldberg’s fruitful discussion of the doctrine of epistemic partiality in friendship (EPF), as it appears in his new book Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges (2020), and to explore a seemly small distinction that I think could complicate things for the way Goldberg sees the pressures that are put on us when we are confronted with speech acts that come from or relate to friends of ours. If my distinction (...) is shown to be successful, I believe it will impact the efficacy of Goldberg’s response to EPF. My main argument focuses on the way Goldberg argues against EPF and the tension it supposedly creates with the demands of epistemic rationality. I believe that Goldberg’s argument fails to capture an important distinction between our epistemic behaviors in the face of a friend’s say-so and our epistemic behaviors when we encounter third-party reports about a friend. I’ll argue that the route from the valuing of friendship to the epistemic reasons in support of differential doxastic outcomes when our friends are involved is not satisfactory, given that it involves what I see to be an unauthorized move from our desire to preserve a friendship to a differential doxastic reaction when someone reports negatively about our friends. (shrink)

The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well-known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. Tomoji Shogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive, this illustrates, but now in a different way, that the screening-off condition is too restrictive. (...) We therefore weaken this condition to what we call ‘partial’ screening off. We show that the domain defined by partial screening off comprises two mutually exclusive subdomains. In one subdomain disconfirmation is indeed transitive, but confirmation is then intransitive. In the other, confirmation is transitive, but here disconfirmation is once more intransitive. (shrink)

This paper uses a partially ordered set of syntactic categories to accommodate optionality and licensing in natural language syntax. A complex but well-studied data set pertaining to the syntax of quantifier scope and negative polarity licensing in Hungarian is used to illustrate the proposal. The presentation is geared towards both linguists and logicians. The paper highlights that the main ideas can be implemented in different grammar formalisms, and discusses in detail an implementation where the partial ordering on categories is (...) given by the derivability relation of a calculus with residuated and Galois-connected unary operators. (shrink)

The Logic of Partial Terms LPT is a strict negative free logic that provides an economical framework for developing many traditional mathematical theories having partial functions. In these traditional theories, all functions and predicates are strict. For example, if a unary function (predicate) is applied to an undefined argument, the result is undefined (respectively, false). On the other hand, every practical programming language incorporates at least one nonstrict or lazy construct, such as the if-then-else, but nonstrict functions cannot be (...) either primitive or introduced in definitional extensions in LPT. Consequently, lazy programming language constructs do not fit the traditional mathematical mold inherent in LPT. A nonstrict (positive free) logic is required to handle nonstrict functions and predicates. Previously developed nonstrict logics are not fully satisfactory because they are verbose in describing strict functions (which predominate in many programming languages), and some logicians find their semantics philosophically unpalatable. The newly developed Lazy Logic of Partial Terms LL is as concise as LPT in describing strict functions and predicates, and strict and nonstrict functions and predicates can be introduced in definitional extensions of traditional mathematical theories. LL is "built on top of" LPT, and, like LPT, admits only one domain in the semantics. In the semantics, for the case of a nonstrict unary function h in an LL theory T, we have $\models_T h(\perp) = y \longleftrightarrow \forall x(h(x) = y)$ , where $\perp$ is a canonical undefined term. Correspondingly, in the axiomatization, the "indifference" (to the value of the argument) axiom $h(\perp) = y \longleftrightarrow \forall x(h(x) = y)$ guarantees a proper fit with the semantics. The price paid for LL's naturalness is that it is tailored for describing a specific area of computer science, program specification and verification, possibly limiting its role in explicating classical mathematical and philosophical subjects. (shrink)

Gender plays an important role in various aspects of second language acquisition, including lexicon learning. Many studies have suggested that compared to males, females are less likely to experience boredom, one of the frequently experienced deactivating negative emotions that may impair language learning. However, the contribution of boredom to gender-related differences in lexicon learning remains unclear. To address this question, here we conducted two experiments with a large sample of over 1,000 college students to explore the relationships between gender (...) differences in boredom and lexicon learning. In Experiment 1, a cohort of 527 participants completed the trait and state boredom scales as well as a novel lexicon learning task without awareness of the testing process. In Experiment 2, an independent cohort of 506 participants completed the same novel lexicon learning task with prior knowledge of the testing procedure. Results from both experiments consistently showed significant differences between female and male participants in the rate of forgetting words and the state boredom scores, with female participants performing better than male participants. Furthermore, differences in state boredom scores partially explained differences in the rate of forgetting words between female and male participants. These findings demonstrate a novel contribution of state boredom to gender differences in lexicon learning, which provides new insights into better language-learning ability in females. (shrink)

The logic of partial terms (LPT) is a variety of negative free logic in which functions, as well as predicates, are strict. A companion paper focused on nonconstructive LPTwith definite descriptions, called LPD, and laid the foundation for tableaux systems by defining the concept of an LPDmodel system and establishing Hintikka's Lemma, from which the strong completeness of the corresponding tableaux system readily follows. The present paper utilizes the tableaux system in establishing an Extended Joint Consistency Theorem for LPDthat (...) incorporates the Robinson Joint Consistency Theorem and the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Lemma. The method of proof is similar to that originally used in establishing the Extended Joint Consistency Theorem for positive free logic. Proof of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Lemma for formulas possibly having free variables is readily had in LPTand its intuitionistic counterpart. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the theory of definitions in LPD. (shrink)

Background: Interpersonal sensitivity is a prominent mental health problem facing college students today. Trait mindfulness is a potential positive factor that may influence interpersonal relationships. However, the precise relationship between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity remains elusive, which limits the optimization and further application of mindfulness-based intervention schemes targeting interpersonal sensitivity. This study aimed to explore whether negative emotions mediate the relationship between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity and whether the relationship among trait mindfulness, negative emotions, and interpersonal (...) sensitivity is moderated by effectiveness/authenticity. We hypothesize that negative emotions mediate the relationship between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity, and effectiveness/authenticity moderates the indirect association between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity through negative emotions.Methods: One thousand four hundred nineteen Chinese college students, aged from 17 to 23, participated in this study. Their trait mindfulness, negative emotions, the effectiveness/authenticity, and interpersonal sensitivity were measured using well-validated self-report questionnaires.Results: Correlational analyses indicated that both trait mindfulness and effectiveness/authenticity were significantly and negatively associated with interpersonal sensitivity. Mediation analyses uncovered a partial mediating role of negative emotions in the relationship between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity. Moderated mediation analyses showed that in college students with high effectiveness/authenticity, the relationship between trait mindfulness and negative emotions was stronger, whereas the relationship between negative emotions and interpersonal sensitivity was weaker.Conclusion: Negative emotion is a mediator of the relationship between trait mindfulness and interpersonal sensitivity, which in turn is moderated by effectiveness/authenticity. These findings suggest a potential mechanism through which trait mindfulness influences interpersonal sensitivity. Mindfulness-based interventions have the potential to decrease interpersonal sensitivity and offer a basis for predicting individual differences in response to mindfulness-based interventions among individuals. (shrink)

Customer bullying is a common phenomenon, causing short-term emotional distress or having long-term psychological impact on frontline employees of service enterprises, yielding either direct or indirect losses to service enterprises. While existing research has focused on the emotional and psychological impact of customer bullying on employees, little attention has been directed at the impact of customer bullying on negative employee behavior and internal mechanisms. In view of this, this paper draws on conservation of resources theory and discusses how and (...) when customer bullying can lead to unethical behaviors. Furthermore, the mediating role of job insecurity and the moderating effect of organizational identification are analyzed. In study 1, 181 valid questionnaire data were collected at two time points, and regression data analysis was used to explore the effect of customer bullying on unethical behaviors through job insecurity. In study 2, 212 employees were recruited to investigate the moderating effect of organizational identification between customer bullying and unethical behaviors through a scenario experimental study. The results reveal that customer bullying is positively related to employees’ job insecurity and unethical behaviors. Job insecurity partially mediates the positive relationship between customer bullying and unethical behaviors. Further, the regression analysis results indicate that the direct effect of customer bullying on unethical behaviors is moderated by organizational identification. This study provides theoretical guidance for entrepreneurs to reduce both employee job insecurity and unethical behavior. (shrink)

According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such (...) that it ought to be favoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour. All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge : there are circumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due to the personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing on the value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to the partiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and consider Ewing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirely satisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing could have offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer. (shrink)

This essay offers an action-theoretic analysis of the distinction between positively bringing something about and passively letting something happen. The analysis, based on the notion of an agent''s bringing about some state of affairs, is closest to the analysis of omissions of Brand (1971), but utilizes the relatedness logic of Epstein (1979). Syntactic features bring out the idea that an action can be partially positive and partially negative, e.g., by not bringing about one thing an agent can bring about (...) something else. An ethical implication of this analysis is that a passive course of action is sometimes less culpable than an active one, just because it is passive. (shrink)

As intergenerational interactions increase due to an ageing population, the study of emotion-related responses to the elderly is increasingly relevant. Previous research found mixed results regarding affective mimicry – a measure related to liking and affiliation. In the current study, we investigated emotional mimicry to younger and older actors following an encounter with a younger and older player in a Cyberball game. In a complete exclusion condition, in which both younger and older players excluded the participant, we expected emotional mimicry (...) to be stronger for younger vs. older actors. In a partial inclusion condition, in which the younger player excluded while the older player included the participant, we predicted that the difference in player behaviour would lead to a difference in liking. This increased liking of the older interaction partner should reduce the difference in emotional mimicry towards the two different age groups. Results revealed more mimicry for older actors following partial inclusion especially for negative emotions, suggesting inclusive behaviour by an older person in an interaction as a possible means to increase mimicry and affiliation to the elderly. (shrink)

The theoretical framework of the study was the Stressors-Emotions model. The aim of the study was to investigate the mediating role of job-related negative affectivity, and the moderating role of emotional suppression in the relationship between workplace aggression and counterproductive work behaviour. It was expected that workplace aggression would be linked to CWB directly and indirectly and that suppression of negative emotions would intensify the effects of workplace aggression. Two hundred and five nurses participated in the study. The (...) regression analysis with interactional effect was applied to test the research hypotheses. The results confirmed the direct and the indirect effect of workplace aggression on CWB. Two of the three analyzed emotions moderated the effects of workplace aggression on jobrelated negative affectivity and CWB. Results of the study partially support the notion of the Stress-Emotion model and provide further insight into processes that lead to CWB. (shrink)

The affect-as-information (AAI) model proposes that emotions influence the accessibility and value of information (Avramova & Inbar, Citation2013). Furthermore, according to the dual-process model of moral judgement, emotions and cognition influence moral judgement (Greene, Citation2007; Greene et al., Citation2001, Citation2008); however, there is no direct evidence of a causal chain to support this model’s proposition. By using a 3 (emotions: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (primed rule: save lives vs. do not kill) between-participants design, we examined two (...) hypotheses in two experiments: supraliminal (Experiment 1) and subliminal (Experiment 2) priming. Our results partially supported the AAI model and confirmed that emotions and cognition independently influence moral judgement. Specifically, the positive emotions group made more utilitarian decisions after being primed with the “save lives” rule and more deontological decisions after being primed with the do not kill rule. However, priming did not affect moral judgement in the negative emotion condition. Further, irrespective of whether priming was done, the negative emotion group mostly made utilitarian decisions. Accordingly, we propose a dynamic dual-process model of moral judgement, that can help clarify how emotion and cognition influence moral judgement. (shrink)

While face masks prevent the spread of disease, they occlude lower face parts and thus impair facial emotion recognition. Since emotions are often also contextually situated, it remains unknown whether providing a descriptive emotional context alongside the facial emotion may reduce some of the negative impact of facial occlusion on emotional communication. To address this question, here we examined how emotional inferences were affected by facial occlusion and the availability of emotional context. Participants were presented with happy or sad (...) emotional faces who were either fully visible or partially obstructed by an opaque surgical mask. The faces were shown either within an emotionally congruent (e.g., “Her cat was found/lost yesterday afternoon”) or neutral (“Get ready to see the next person”) context. Participants were asked to infer the emotional states of the protagonists by rating their emotional intensity and valence. Facial occlusion by masks impacted the ratings, such that protagonists were judged to feel less intense and more neutral emotions when they wore masks relative to when their face was fully visible. Importantly, this negative impact of visual occlusion by mask was reduced but not fully eliminated when the faces were presented within a congruent emotional context. Thus, visual occlusion of facial emotions impairs understanding of emotions, with this negative effect of face masks partially mitigated by the availability of a larger emotional context. (shrink)

A Partial Combinatory Algebra is completable if it can be extended to a total one. In [1] it is asked (question 11, posed by D. Scott, H. Barendregt, and G. Mitschke) if every PCA can be completed. A negative answer to this question was given by Klop in [12, 11]; moreover he provided a sufficient condition for completability of a PCA (M, ·, K, S) in the form of ten axioms (inequalities) on terms of M. We prove that just (...) one of these axiom (the so called Barendregt's axiom) is sufficient to guarantee (a slightly weaker notion of) completability. (shrink)

Ruling Passions is Simon Blackburn’s latest attempt to defend a theory of practical reason which he calls “expressivism”.2 In the first three chapters Blackburn outlines an account of how we should understand statements of right, good and virtue, as well as their negative counterparts (“the Ethical [or Moral] Proposition”, as he terms this amalgam). This he calls “quasi-realism”. I shall describe what this position entails in the first section. Secondly I shall consider the opposition to this view advanced by (...) McDowell (1987), who in turn takes his inspiration from Wiggins (1976a, 1976b). Finally I shall assess Blackburn’s reply to McDowell and Wiggins (found in Chapter 4 of RP), and argue that it is inadequate. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on shame treats shame as essentially a self-concerning emotion. According to this view, when we experience shame, it is always the self that is subject to negative assessment, and shame concerning others traces back to some form of self-concern. Against this, I argue for an expanded conception of shame. On the view I advance, shame always manifests investment and partiality regarding its target, but investment and partiality need not trace back to self-concern, and shame (...) does not essentially require an appraisal of the self at all. I also argue that this can help us improve our understanding of partial concern for persons more broadly. While we often think of partial concern for a person’s well-being as the paradigmatic form of partial concern, partial concern for a person’s character (broadly construed) plays an equally important role in our moral-emotional lives, and especially in our close relationships. (shrink)

This paper tries to reconstruct Ernst Cassirer's potential reception of the EPR argument, as exposed by Einstein in his letter to Cassirer of March 1937. It is shown that, in conformity with his transcendental epistemology taking the conditions of accessibility as constitutive of the quantum object, Cassirer would probably have rejected the argument. Indeed, Cassirer would probably not have subscribed to its separability/local causality presupposition (which goes against his interpretation of the quantum formalism as a self-suf!cient condition constitutive of the (...) quantum object, without any reliance on spatial intuition), nor to its completeness requirement (as his partial endorsement of Bohr's complementarity, and his rejection of the Kantian "idea of complete determination", illustrate). By rejecting both of its premises, Cassirer's philosophy of physics thus enables to escape the EPR dilemma, and exhibits what, in Kantian terms, might be called a "negative utility" with respect to physical science. A further investigation of the anti-reductionist utility of Cassirer's systematic philosophy with respect to physics and other "symbolic forms" is !nally suggested. (shrink)

People consistently act in ways that harm the environment, even when believing their actions are environmentally friendly. A case in point is a biased judgment termed the negative footprint illusion, which arises when people believe that the addition of “eco-friendly” items to conventional items, reduces the total carbon footprint of the whole item-set, whereas the carbon footprint is, in fact, increased because eco-friendly items still contribute to the overall carbon footprint. Previous research suggests this illusion is the manifestation of (...) an “averaging-bias.” We present two studies that explore whether people’s susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion is associated with individual differences in: environment-specific reasoning dispositions measured in terms of compensatory green beliefs and environmental concerns; or general analytic reasoning dispositions measured in terms of actively open-minded thinking, avoidance of impulsivity and reflective reasoning. A negative footprint illusion was demonstrated when participants rated the carbon footprint of conventional buildings combined with eco-friendly buildings and conventional cars combined with eco-friendly cars. However, the illusion was not identified in participants’ ratings of the carbon footprint of apples. In Studies 1 and 2, environment-specific dispositions were found to be unrelated to the negative footprint illusion. Regarding reflective thinking dispositions, reduced susceptibility to the negative footprint illusion was only associated with actively open-minded thinking measured on a 7-item scale and 17-item scale. Our findings provide partial support for the existence of a negative footprint illusion and reveal a role of individual variation in reflective reasoning dispositions in accounting for a limited element of differential susceptibility to this illusion. (shrink)

The level of organizational self-esteem of employees, whether on the production line or as managers or directors of enterprises, does not only correlate with individual performance but has also become a key factor in determining the completion of team core tasks. Based on the theory of self-consistency, this study explores the correlation between negative workplace gossip and employees’ organizational self-esteem by revealing the intermediary role of workplace exclusion and poor-order atmosphere. A survey of 228 employees from enterprises in Shandong (...) and Shanghai showed that negative workplace gossip exerted a significant negative impact on employees’ organizational self-esteem, suggesting that negative workplace gossip reduces employees’ organizational self-esteem in the context of Chinese organizations. In addition, workplace exclusion exerted a complete intermediary effect between negative workplace gossip and employees’ organizational self-esteem, and poor-order atmosphere perception played a partial intermediary role. This study uncovers the black box that negative workplace gossip affects employees’ organizational self-esteem and has a strong enlightening significance for management practice. (shrink)

I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative (...) partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates. (shrink)

Several scholars have highlighted the importance of examining moral disengagement in understanding aggression and deviant conduct across different contexts. The present study investigates the role of MD as a specific social-cognitive construct that, in the organizational context, may intervene in the process leading from stressors to counterproductive work behavior. Assuming the theoretical framework of the stressor-emotion model of CWB, we hypothesized that MD mediates, at least partially, the relation between negative emotions in reaction to perceived stressors and CWB by (...) promoting or justifying aggressive responses to frustrating situations or events. In a sample of 1,147 Italian workers, we tested a structural equations model. The results support our hypothesis: the more workers experienced negative emotions in response to stressors, the more they morally disengaged and, in turn, enacted CWB. (shrink)

There is a plethora of confirmation measures in the literature. Zalabardo considers four such measures: PD, PR, LD, and LR. He argues for LR and against each of PD, PR, and LD. First, he argues that PR is the better of the two probability measures. Next, he argues that LR is the better of the two likelihood measures. Finally, he argues that LR is superior to PR. I set aside LD and focus on the trio of PD, PR, and LR. (...) The question I address is whether Zalabardo succeeds in showing that LR is superior to each of PD and PR. I argue that the answer is negative. I also argue, though, that measures such as PD and PR, on one hand, and measures such as LR, on the other hand, are naturally understood as explications of distinct senses of confirmation. (shrink)

relative to the actual world) of a propositional theory are defined. A theory is ‘closer to the truth’ the logically stronger its positive content and the logically weaker its negative content. This proposal delivers the same verisimilar preordering of theories that has been defined by Brink and Heidema as a ‘power ordering’. The preordering may be collapsed to a partial ordering and then embedded into a complete distributive lattice. The preordering may also be refined to a partial ordering by (...) employing the ‘convex content’ and the ‘non-convex content’ of each theory. Philosophical implications and historical relations are discussed. (shrink)

If you are kind to me, I am likely to reciprocate and doing so feels fair. Many theories of social exchange assume that such reciprocity and fairness are well aligned with one another. We argue that this correspondence between reciprocity and fairness is restricted to interpersonal dyads and does not govern more complex multilateral interactions. When multiple people are involved, reciprocity leads to partiality, which may be seen as unfair by outsiders. We report seven studies, conducted with people from (...) the United States, in which participants were asked to evaluate situations involving resource distribution in contexts such as economic games, government, and the workplace. Specifically, we find that equal resource distribution in multilateral interactions is seen as more fair than engaging in reciprocity. We also find that negative reciprocity is seen as more fair than positive reciprocity in these multilateral situations because positive reciprocity is perceived as based in favoritism. We rule out alternative explanations and demonstrate that there are contexts where favoritism is not viewed as unfair. These findings are important for theories of fairness and reciprocity as they demonstrate the central role of perceived partiality in the evaluation of multi‐party resource allocation. (shrink)

An overemphasis on the interpretation of language has impeded understanding of the cultural and cognitive logic of sorcery's focal acts: divination and sorcery battle. Among the Piaroa of southern Venezuela, divination and sorcery battle are conducted during hallucinogen‐induced visions, and are predicated on an epistemology that privileges forms of knowing that are neither linguistic nor language‐like. I suggest that Piaroa sorcerers use hallucinogen‐induced visions to map the social ecology of emotions in ways partially explainable by cognitive science, and that mature (...) contemplation may provide the anthropologist with a means of understanding relationships between nonlinguistic thought and culture. I interweave an account of my participation in a sorcery battle with neuropsychological interpretations of cognition and emotion to present a navigation of a negative affect theory of sorcery. The navigation of negative affect theory complements sociological and psychoanalytic approaches while emphasizing the cognitive skills and visionary experiences that underpin the practice of sorcery by shamans. (shrink)

The use of smartphones has become commonplace, even among people with disabilities. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of smartphone use on the negative emotions of people with visual impairment. This study analyzed data from 30 respondents with visual impairments obtained from the 2016 Internet Overdependence Survey in South Korea. The analysis was based on partial least squares regression with information search, leisure, communication, and online transactions as independent variables, and negative emotions comprising depression, (...) anxiety, and loneliness as the dependent variables. Among people with visual impairment, the use of smartphones as a means of communication decreased negative emotions while their use for leisure or information search was related to an increase in negative emotions such as depression and loneliness. Use for information retrieval was found to be associated with a low level of anxiety, and use for online transactions was associated with low loneliness. The results of this study showed that the use of the Internet can be a means of providing interaction opportunities and reducing negation emotions for people with visual impairment. (shrink)

It has been proposed that processing sentential negation recruits the neural network of inhibitory control. In addition, inhibition mechanisms also play a role in switching languages for bilinguals. Since both processes may share inhibitory resources, the current study explored for the first time whether and how language-switching influences the processing of negation. To this end, two groups of Spanish-English bilinguals participated in an encoding-verification memory task. They read short stories involving the same two protagonists, referring to their activities in four (...) different scenarios in Spanish or English. Following each story, the participants received verification questions requiring “yes” or “no” responses depending on whether a given fact was correctly referred to one of the protagonists. Some of the verification questions were in the story’s original language and others in the alternate language. Results revealed that language-switching facilitated negative responses compared to affirmative responses, exclusively for questions switching from dominant language to non-dominant language. This effect might reflect that the domain-general mechanisms of inhibitory control are recruited at least partially for both language switch and negation process simultaneously, although this phenomenon is modulated by language dominance. (shrink)

The article discusses Friedman's classic claim that economics can be based on irrealistic assumptions. It exploits Samuelson's distinction between two "F-twists" (that is, "it is an advantage for an economic theory to use irrealistic assumptions" vs "the more irrealistic the assumptions, the better the economic theory"), as well as Nagel's distinction between three philosophy-of-science construals of the basic claim. On examination, only one of Nagel's construals seems promising enough. It involves the neo-positivistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical ("observable") terms; so (...) Friedman would in some sense argue for the major role of theoretical terms in economics. The paper uses a model-theoretic apparatus to refine the selected construal and check whether it can be made to support the claim. This inquiry leads to essentially negative results for both F-twists, and the final conclusion is that they are left unsupported. (shrink)

Does the moral quality of someone’s past treatment of us, or of other people, change how we are morally permitted or required to treat them? Many philosophers think so. They argue, for instance, that someone’s supererogatory or impermissible behaviour can permit or require certain positive or negative attitudinal responses, such as gratitude or resentment. They also argue that someone’s impermissible behaviour can justify harming the person, either defensively or punitively, and that someone who is imperilled as a result of (...) impermissible behaviour might have a weaker claim to be aided than those who are innocently imperilled. This thesis has two aims. The first is to extend the scope of the idea that we can be morally required to have certain positive or negative attitudinal responses to someone’s supererogatory or impermissible behaviour; the second is to explore novel ways in which our required responses to such behaviour, or our failures to have these responses, can change what others owe to us when aiding. Papers 1-3 advance the first aim; papers 4-6 advance the second aim. In pursuing the two aims, the thesis brings together two philosophical domains that are not normally considered in conjunction: the philosophy of attitudes and deontological ethics. (shrink)

In “Other-Sacrificing Options”, Benjamin Lange argues that, when distributing benefits and burdens, we may discount the interests of the people to whom we stand in morally negative relationships relative to the interests of other people. Lange’s case for negative partiality proceeds in two steps. First, he presents a hypothetical example that commonly elicits intuitions favourable to negative partiality. Second, he invokes symmetry considerations to reason from permissible positive partiality towards intimates to permissible negative (...) partiality towards adversaries. In this paper, I argue that neither the intuition elicited by Lange’s example nor the invoked symmetry considerations support a permission for negative partiality. This does not mean that negative partiality is unjustified. It means only that the justification, if there is one, must take a different form. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of negative partiality, one that mirrors gratitude-based justifications of positive partiality rather than justifications based on intimacy. (shrink)