Este artigo pensa as contingências decorrentes das máquinas autônomas da natureza no universo das utopias concretas. Pensa como artefatos podem ganhar autonomia diante da irracionalidade da matéria? É sabido que as máquinas utópicas podem exteriorizar um poder desconhecido do ser humano e alcançar uma condição autárquica diante do descaso de seu criador. Ernst Bloch situa tais utopias no 3.º nível da categoria, um ainda-não-ser, que na sua ontologia responde a “possibilidade conforme estrutura do objeto real”. Contingências e imprevisibilidades advindas neste (...) nível determinam a dimensão autônoma das utopias técnicas. A evolução do processo dinâmico e complexo da matéria – natura naturata que se acha velada, uma vez desperta assume a dimensão de natura naturans. A natureza que produz natureza revela que a ação do homem sobre a matéria transforma sonhos utópicos acordados em pesadelos distópicos acordados, determinando uma diversidade de utopias autárquicas que ameaçam a humanidade. Esse contexto recepciona o alvorecer de novas utopias técnicas, que aponta uma não conformidade na geração das máquinas autárquicas bem como, a ausência de uma linguagem ética entre homo utopicus e natura naturans. (shrink)

Desde a sua génese, a Arqueologia encontra-se entre as ciências naturais e as ciências sociais e humanísticas. Esta posição partilhada e a procura de uma maior compreensão dos seus objetos de estudo específicos, criou nos profissionais de Arqueologia uma necessidade de recorrerem a várias metodologias (e tecnologias) originárias de outras disciplinas. De forma similar a outras ciências, a Arqueologia é uma área permeável à experimentação e aplicação de conceitos teórico-práticos exógenos que levou, inclusive, à formação de diversas especialidades que unem (...) a Arqueologia e outras áreas, como a Zooarqueologia. Como aconteceu ao longo da sua história, o meio académico está perante um momento de mudança na forma como se processa a aquisição de conhecimento. O fato de estarmos na Era Digital da globalização faz com que a adaptação do meio académico a esta realidade seja mais continuada, não sendo a Arqueologia alheia a esta transformação. Após uma breve introdução ao novo "paradigma digital" das humanidades, revemos alguns dos principais usos de tecnologias relacionadas com o uso da Internet no apoio à investigação em Arqueologia (e.g., bases de dados enriquecidas), e descrevemos algumas questões relacionadas com o uso de novas ferramentas e técnicas, seus principais obstáculos e tendências. (shrink)

This book develops arithmetic without the induction principle, working in theories that are interpretable in Raphael Robinson's theory Q. Certain inductive formulas, the bounded ones, are interpretable in Q. A mathematically strong, but logically very weak, predicative arithmetic is constructed. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting (...) them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.

The Patient in the Family diagnoses the ways in which the worlds of home and hospital misunderstand each other. The authors explore how medicine, through its new reproductive technologies, is altering the stucture of families, how families can participate more fully in medical decision-making, and how to understand the impact on families of medical advances to extend life but not vitality.

The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have (...) a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about finding one. (shrink)

Rastreamos doctrinas unamunianas del Otro en el Edipo, rey de Sólbeles y en el Sofista platónico, edípico hacia el «padre» Parménides al filosofar sobre lo otro (té `ttapov). Examinamos el platonismo del Otro en Del setííimie,zío trágico, en las acotaciones de Unamuno a la tragedia de Sófocles y en su propio drama El Otro.

This is a case study about Better World, the NGO of Seoul-based Onnuri Church. The article is more descriptive than prescriptive and proceeds more inductively regarding explanations for BW’s practices than deductively evaluating BW according to predetermined models. This case study seeks to understand, present, and analyze BW in relation to larger development themes associated with Christian development activities. More than providing answers, the article hopes to sharpen questions. After considering the historical development of various programs, the study examines BW’s (...) philosophy of mission, ministry, and development. The article then closely examines programs and some challenges that BW faces. (shrink)

My aim in this note is to address the question of how a context of utterance can figure within a formal, specifically truth-conditional, semantic theory. In particular, I want to explore whether a formal semantic theory could, or should, take the intentional states of a speaker to be relevant in determining the literal meaning of an uttered sentence. The answer I’m going to suggest, contrary to the position of many contemporary formal theorists, is negative. The structure of this note is (...) then as follows: first, I’ll very briefly sketch three distinct forms of semantic theory. One, ‘strong formal semantics’, will be seen to be immediately problematic, leaving us with two other options: use-based theories and what I’ll term ‘moderate formal semantics’. If we opt for the latter position, the question arises of what kinds of appeals to a context of utterance are legitimate given a formal outlook. I’ll suggest that this question arises in two distinct ways and explore the moderate formal semanticist’s position in regard to both. However, the conclusion I will reach is that what is characteristic of formal semantics is that it makes only the most minimal semantic concessions to context. (shrink)

The overlap and differences between the parallel regulatory systems for research create ample room for confusion and missteps, as discussed by Barbara Bierer and Mark Barnes in their report in this supplement. In practice, beyond the inherent differences in the two systems of regulations themselves, there are many issues that further complicate the application of these regulations. These include the variation in size of the institutions receiving PHS funding, the increased prevalence of multisite research, the allocation of research conduct and (...) oversight to external organizations, and the variability in assignment of human subject protection roles between the IRB and the institution. (shrink)

This book is a wide-ranging examination of rationalist thought in philosophy from ancient times to the present day. Written by a superbly qualified cast of philosophers Critically analyses the concept of rationalism Focuses principally on the golden age of rationalism in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Also covers ancient rationalism, nineteenth-century rationalism, and rationalist themes in recent thought Organised chronologically Various philosophical methods and viewpoints are represented.

Over the past two decades, the competency movement has been gathering momentum internationally within the ranks of professional nursing. It can be argued that this momentum is in response to government initiatives aimed at improving consistency in workforce training and accreditation, and fostering national and international portability of qualifications. At the same time, the competency movement has provided the opportunity for regulators, service providers and government to develop mechanisms to reconstitute competent nurses as accountable, self‐regulating subjects and to monitor this (...) transformation in particular ways. The ways in which competencies have been taken up to do this transforming work in Canada are unique and deserving of some detailed description and analysis.We argue that Canadian nursing regulatory authorities have chosen to view competence as the rehearsal of ethical attributes consonant with the professional role,as opposed to the enactment of skilled conduct. As a result, reflective practices rather than skill and knowledge have become the cornerstone of nursing competency formulation and review. We argue that this distinctly Canadian approach to competency serves three ends. First, it privileges the ‘attribute’ element of the nursing competency model and side steps the ever‐problematic ‘nursing knowledge’ issue; second, self‐surveillance by nurses shifts the onus for professional development from industry to the individual; and third, it concedes responsibility for skill assessment by the regulatory authorities to industry control, leaving employers free to determine skill base and skill mix requirements for practice. Finally, we argue that the reflective component of the regulatory framework for Canadian nurses radically fails as a tool for auditing quality and assessing competency. Rather, it functions as a governmental practice that furthers the deregulatory and economic rationalist aims of the Canadian health reform agenda. (shrink)

Although it is the most widely accepted form of organic guarantee, third party certification can be inaccessible for small-scale producers and promotes a highly market-oriented vision of organics. By contrast, participatory guarantee systems are based on principles of relationship-building, mutual learning, trust, context-specificity, local control, diversity, and collective action. This paper uses the case study of the Mexican Network of Local Organic Markets to explore how PGS can be used to support a more alternative vision of organics, grounded in the (...) notion of food sovereignty. It presents some of the key challenges and opportunities associated with the approach, and highlights its potential to serve as a locally-based institution for collective action, thereby offering some structural support to alternative agri-food initiatives. (shrink)

Over the past two decades the growth of the organic sector has been accompanied by a shift away from first party, or peer review, systems of certification and towards third party certification, in which a disinterested party is responsible for the development of organic standards and the verification of producer compliance. This paper explores some of the limitations of the third party certification model and presents the case of Mexico as an example of how an alternative form of participatory certification (...) has emerged. The paper suggests that participatory guarantee systems (PGS) are reflective of the growing “beyond organic” movement, which focuses on reconstructing the local and re-embedding food systems into their socio-ecological contexts. It argues that PGS offers a number of benefits for producers and consumers, particularly in the South, but that it faces a number of challenges as well, such as a lack of formal recognition, social conflicts and dependence on donated resources. (shrink)

Our response to Sara Fry's paper focuses on the difficulty of understanding her insistence on the fundamental character of caring in a theory of nursing ethics. We discuss a number of problems her text throws in the way of making sense of this idea, and outline our own proposal for how caring's role may be reasonably understood: not as an alternative object of value, competing with autonomy or patient good, but rather as an alternative way of responding toward that which (...) is of value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:347 THE ROLE OF PART XII IN HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION Anyone appreciative of Hume's greatness as a philosopher will want to suppose that the Dialogues both form a coherent whole and express Hume's own views on natural religion or religion based on reason (as opposed to religion based on revelation). In the last connection, given what we know of Hume's epistemology, life, and correspondence, one would be (...) inclined to suppose that he would reject out of hand the claims of revealed religion and contend that if there existed an acceptable religion it would have to be some form of natural religion. But insofar as natural religion claimed to establish scientifically the existence and nature of God one would envisage Hume dissenting. Now as long as we restrict our gaze to Parts I-XI of the Dialogues we seem to be able, easily enough, to satisfy all these suppositions. In Part IV, under the name of 'mysticism, ' revealed religion is summarily and facetiously dismissed as 2 indistinguishable from atheism. Demea's apparently permanent departure from the discussion at the conclusion of Part XI as much as says, symbolically, that revealed religion is not a serious contender for one's belief. Its a priori arguments -- the argument from sufficient reason and the ontological argument -- are almost as shortly attacked and dismissed (D 188-192). Also quite in keeping with Hume's philosophical view on knowledge of matters of fact is, on the other hand, the lengthy and detailed examination he bestows on the empiricist argument from design. That Philo, ostensibly his spokesman, is however able to uncover all kinds of logical short-comings in its claims to scientifically 348 establish the existence and nature of God does not surprise us; it coheres perfectly with our preconceived picture of Hume the skeptic, and his system as restricting science to numbers and quantities or, in the term's looser sense, to human nature and its more immediate surroundings. In short, Parts I-XI seem to be all of one Humean whole. But at first and even second glance Part XII notoriously seems to tear our hopes to find coherence and a plausible representation of Hume to tatters. There are, for one thing, those mocking sentences that seem to paint Hume in the colors of a devout, believing Christian, 'avid' for revelation. Thus, at the end of Part XII, apparently expressing Hume's deepest convictions, Philo says that "a person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity" and immediately afterwards, "To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian" (D 227, 228). For another thing, in Part XII Hume seems to be completely reversing his refutations in Parts I-XI of the argument from design's claims to establish the existence and nature of God. Thus, where in Part II he had Philo reject the use of causal reasoning in the establishment of a Mind as the first cause of the universe on the relevantly Humean grounds that, to do so, "it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds" (D 150), in Part XII he has Philo, apparently speaking for himself (Hume), argue that "as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause than any we have ever observed in mankind. 349 Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly ascertained by reason" (D 217). Indeed, all forms of the argument of design, purely analogical as well as causal, seem resurrected in Part XII, although they were one and all hanged and buried in Parts I-XI. Moreover, it seems that in Part XII Hume via Philo is saying that science itself leads us "to acknowledge a first intelligent Author" (D 214-215). Before proceeding to deal with certain other incoherencies with which Part XII seems to confront us let us address ourselves to the two that I have so far... (shrink)