In order to understand the nature of human embryos I first distinguish between active and passive potentiality, and then argue that the former is found in human gametes and embryos (even in embryos in vitro that may fail to be implanted) because they all have an indwelling power or capacity to initiate certain changes. Implantation provides necessary conditions for the actualization of that prior, active potentiality. This does not imply that embryos are potential persons that do not deserve the same (...) respect as actual persons. To claim that embryos become persons is to understand the predicate person as a phase sortal, roughly equivalent to adult person. This entails that we would not be essentially persons. In order to explain the traditional understanding of person as a proper sortal rather than a phase sortal, the author distinguishes between proximate and remote potentiality, and shows that, unlike feline embryos, human embryos, by their genetic constitution, possess the remote potentiality to later exercise the typically human activities. It follows that they are already persons essentially. (shrink)

The relation between aisthesis and interiority manifests in Wittgenstein’s account of the subject and his private language argument. But it is also an overlooked leitmotif in Dostoevsky’s novels—one of Wittgenstein’s favorite authors, and in W.G. Sebald’s work—who was inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This book reflects on the role literature can play in answering the philosophical question of an adequate presentation of intention and pain.

In this provocative new work, Alfonso Gomez-Lobo proposes that the earliest Platonic writings, in particular Apology, Crito, and sections of Gorgias, contain an underlying moral philosophy that can be attributed to Socrates with some degree of assurance. His aim is to show that Socratic moral philosophy is a reasonably systematic construction generated by a small number of principles or axioms.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Neurology of Culture, or How We Move From Rage to Ritual in the Process of HominizationGregory J. Lobo (bio)The most (or rather the only) effective form of reconciliation—that would stop this crisis, and save the community from total self-destruction—is the convergence of all collective anger and rage towards a random victim, a scapegoat, designated by mimetism itself, and unanimously adopted as such.—René Girard, Evolution and Conversion, 64.INTRODUCTIONHow (...) do we move from rage to ritual? How do we become human? The work of René Girard would seem to offer an answer to this question. In this brief essay I want to simply add some evolutionary and neuroscientific details to Girard's theory, which flesh out while also corroborating the basic components of it. [End Page 255]To do this I need to draw a distinction between religion and culture. I mention this from the outset because the main source upon which I draw to represent Girard's thinking is the book Evolution and Conversion. Dialogues on the Origins of Culture, with Pierpaolo Antonello and João Cezar de Castro Rocha, published in 2008. I use this particular source because, as Girard's interlocutors say in their foreword to it, this book "is intended as a reassessment of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, 30 years on,"1 and it evidences the "ways in which, over 30 years, mimetic theory has matured, and its fruitfulness become more apparent, even since the initial excitement of Girard's groundbreaking works in the 1970s."2 I highlight my need to distinguish between culture and religion due to the fact that in Evolution and Conversion Antonello and Castro Rocha state forthrightly that for Girard (and, one might presume, for Girardians), culture and religion "amount to the same thing."3 But it is not totally clear that this holds. For as Girard, in the same book, says, "religion, as an institution, comes into being through the scapegoat mechanism."4 Thus, the question arises as to what it is that allows humans to have institutions in the first place. Surely the answer is the capacity for culture as such, understood as the very capacity for symbolic thought, for the manipulation of mental images and their combination into new ones. Hopefully, in the discussion that follows, my insistence on the need to analytically distinguish between culture and religion will be born out. For now, I simply ask the reader to play along. If the reader is game, I can restate my purpose: What is the neurology of culture, such that we can become human, or move from blind rage to deliberate ritual?THE MIMETIC MECHANISMGirard, we should recall, insists that we start "from a purely naturalistic standpoint."5 With this injunction in mind, I will give an account of the "mimetic mechanism," an expression that "describes the whole process, beginning with mimetic desire, which then becomes mimetic rivalry, eventually escalating to the stage of a mimetic crisis and finally ending with the scapegoat resolution"6 that strives for naturalistic representation. Therefore, I will avoid terms like "community" or even "group," which already suggest the existence of something like cultural realities. A naturalistic standpoint, which I take to be a scientific standpoint, must strive to circumvent begging the question by using terms like these, for they refer exactly to the phenomena we are trying to explain: a self-conscious sense of belonging and community. [End Page 256]For those familiar enough with its presuppositions about the human nature that underlies, or is the foundation of, human culture, the mimetic mechanism can be presented in a somewhat straightforward fashion. This presentation relies on Chapter 2 of Evolution and Conversion.The desire of Homo sapiens is in essence mimetic. That is, an individual member of the species desires what its proximal conspecifics—its models—desire. That two conspecifics should desire the same thing leads, inevitably, to two intermediate outcomes. First, the desire for what the other desires intensifies, due to the effects of mimesis; second, this drives the two now mutual models almost inevitably into conflict, as they become doubles. This is conflictual mimesis. The conflict can turn violent and... (shrink)

Este trabajo versa sobre la teoría de la acción de Hannah Arendt tal como la encontramos en La condición Humana, obra de1958. En ella Arendt busca recuperar la identidad y el sentido de la acción humana como actividad del hombre qua hombre y como materia prima de la política. Para ello, recurre a dos experiencias fundamentales de la cultura política occidental: la polis griega y la res publica romana. El resultado es una teoría de la acción que se ha considerado (...) una gran contribución al pensamiento ético político contemporáneo. Nos proponemos focalizar nuestra reflexión en dos aspectos de la acción humana históricamente olvidados o confundidos y que Arendt logra recuperar: la acción como revelación y como enérgeia. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo analiza los rituales conmemorativos de los asesinatos de dos miembros del Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados (MTD), Maximiliano Kosteki y Darío Santillán, ocurridos el 26 de junio de 2002. Específicamente, se examinan los cortes del Puente Pueyrredón -que une a la ciudad de Avellaneda, localizada en el conurbano bonaerense, con la Capital Federal- el 26 de cada mes, entre 2002-2008, en los que se desenvuelven los rituales conmemorativos de dichos asesinatos y los modos en que en éstos se (...) actualizan y conjugan las prácticas y los lenguajes de dos narrativas claves de la cultura política nacional: la retórica revolucionaria y de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

The era of post-modernity has completely changed the way that we see, recognize and question the world, and what we accept to be true. During and after the 1960s many witnessed the rise of a greater multiplicity of local narratives. Prior to this, the grand narratives of the past, such as religion, the Enlightenment, and science were taken as whole, singular truths. However, such metanarratives tend to ignore the individual experiences that do not fit neatly into categories constructed by major (...) institutional authorities. This disconnection from the personal pushed more people to doubt, in favour of the narrative where the Self is visible and heard. It can be argued that this revolution in thought, and meaning and narrative-making in America grew after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. By examining Jean-Francois Lyotard’s theory of postmodernity, and those who expanded on his ideas, we can highlight how the assassination of JFK marked the onset and rise of the postmodern conspiracy theory. This includes the deconstruction of trust, the breakdown of “objective” reality and identity markers as well as the use of new mass media technologies, such as the film camera and the television. (shrink)

El artículo relaciona el nuevo orden narrativo con la técnica del “storytelling” y cómo se manifiestan en el periodismo actual. Se estudian los casos de tres periodistas: David Simon, Stieg Larsson y Ryzard Kapuscinski y cómo su obra muestra la difusa línea de los hechos, la recreación, la invención, la fábula, la historia, la apariencia y la verdad. Se contrastan estos casos con las aportaciones del paradigma narrativo de Fisher. Nos preguntamos también cómo se crean narraciones en Internet a partir (...) de los periodistas estudiados. El ámbito de la verdad periodística se entremezcla con una apariencia de verdad mientras la ficción que aparenta realidad se convierte en acercamiento a ésta. La aproxi-mación a este fenómeno, que se inicia a finales del siglo XX y se consolida en la primera década del siglo XXI, se lleva a cabo desde las aportaciones de la Teoría de la Comunicación. (shrink)

: This response to Nikolaus Knoepffler's paper in the same issue of the Journal agrees that if the arguments supporting the first two of the eight human embryonic stem cell research policy options discussed are unsound, as Knoepffler argues, then it seems natural to move to the increasingly permissive options. If the arguments are sound, however, then the more permissive options should be rejected. It is argued that three of the rejected arguments, taken together, constitute very good reasons to hold (...) that a human embryo is endowed with dignity from fertilization onward. Thus, countries that want their public policies to match the moral imperative of respect for human beings should refrain from allowing destructive human embryo research and should devote considerable energy and public funds to research and clinical trials using non-embryonic ("adult") stem cells. (shrink)

This book investigates Hermann Weyl’s work on the problem of space from the early 1920s onwards. It presents new material and opens the philosophical problem of space anew, crossing the disciplines of mathematics, history of science and philosophy. With a Kantian starting point Weyl asks: among all the infinitely many conceivable metrical spaces, which one applies to the physical world? In agreement with general relativity, Weyl acknowledges that the metric can quantitatively vary with the physical situation. Despite this freedom, Weyl (...) “deduces”, with group-theoretical technicalities, that there is only one “kind” of legitimate metric. This construction was then decisive for the development of gauge theories. Nevertheless, the question of the foundations of the metric of physical theories is only a piece of a wider epistemological problem. Contributing authors mark out the double trajectory that goes through Weyl’s texts, from natural science to philosophy and conversely, always through the mediation of mathematics. Readers may trace the philosophical tradition to which Weyl refers and by which he is inspired, and explore the mathematical tradition that permitted Weyl to elaborate and solve his mathematical problem of space. Furthermore, this volume analyzes the role of the interlocutors with whom Weyl discussed the nature of physical space. This volume features the work of top specialists and will appeal to postgraduates and scholars in philosophy, the history of science, mathematics, or physics. (shrink)

This article is a response to Frank Hindriks’ “Restructuring Searle’s Making the Social World.”.

RésuméGian-Carlo Rota est l’un des rares grands mathématiciens de la deuxième moitié du XX e siècle dont l’intérêt pour la logique formelle soit aussi ouvertement déclaré et ne se soit jamais démenti, depuis sa formation d’étudiant à Princeton jusqu’à ses derniers écrits. Plus exceptionnel encore, il fait partie des rares lecteurs assidus de Husserl à s’être aperçu que la phé-noménologie poursuivait un projet de réforme de la logique formelle. L’article propose d’attester l’existence d’un tel projet chez Husserl ; d’en examiner (...) la réappropriation et les prolongements chez Rota.Gian-Carlo Rota is among the few great mathematicians of the second-half of the XXth century whose interest in formal logic is openly declared and has never flagged, since his training as a student in Princeton up to his last writings. Even more exceptional, he belongs to the rare diligent readers of Husserl, who noticed that phenomenology was pursuing a project of reform of formal logic. This paper propose to testify to the existence of such a project in Husserl; to examine how it is taken over and continued by Rota. Gian-Carlo Rota è uno dei pochi grandi matematici della seconda metà del ventesimo secolo, il cui interesse per la logica formale è, dalla sua formazione come studente a Princeton al suo ultimi scritti, apertamente dichiarato e mai negato. Cosa ancora più eccezionale, Rota è uno dei rari lettori assidui di Husserl ad aver percepito che la fenomenologia stava perseguendo un progetto di riforma della logica formale. L’articolo propone di attestare l’esistenza di un tale progetto in Husserl e di esaminare la sua riappropriazione e le sue estensioni proposte da Gian-Carlo Rota.This article is in French. (shrink)

Une épistémologie phénoménologique est nécessairement intéressée aux points de contact et de passage entre problèmes scientifiques et problèmes philosophiques. Il est instructif, dans cette perspective, de revenir sur un moment historiquement décisif, mais éminemment équivoque, encore porteur de prolongements et de retournements dont nous n’avons peut-être pas encore pris toute la mesure : l’énoncé du principe de Pauli. Le statut logique de cet énoncé est lui-même ambigu : règle technique, semi-empirique, postulat, principe ou théorème, etc. Pour le meilleur et le (...) pire, ce principe se trouve accouplé dès l’origine au problème de l’individuation en physique. Nous proposons de revenir sur quelques traits philosophiquement saillants des interprétations que Weyl et de Broglie proposent dudit « principe d’exclusion Pauli » (ou PEP). L’un et l’autre y voient l’occasion d’un approfondissement du principe d’individuation prévalant jusqu’alors dans la physique classique : l’espace. Weyl associe le PEP au principe leibnizien des indiscernables et tente de modéliser l’espace en jeu au moyen de la théorie des groupes. Les changements de position de Pauli lui-même à ce propos ne sont pas moins instructifs. La position de De Broglie sur ce principe est un marqueur de sa trajectoire : de la théorie audacieuse, et, équivoque, de « l’onde-pilote », jusqu’à celle dite de la « double solution », en passant par la période de rétractation consécutive au congrès de Solvay de 1927. Ce qui persiste d’un bout à l’autre, c’est un partage entre espace « réel » empirique et espace de configuration mathématique imaginaire. Chez l’un et l’autre, cette interprétation est ainsi indissociable d’un nouveau partage du subjectif et de l’objectif et d’une réflexion critique sur le principe traditionnel d’individuation qu’est l’espace (ou le temps physique) au profit d’une articulation toujours plus subtile et complexe entre l’espace de la phénoménalisation (de l’observation) et les « espaces » de la modélisation mathématique, en particulier les espaces des états possibles décrits dans le formalisme de la statistique quantique. (shrink)

Wittgenstein and Dostoevsky both ridicule a hypostasizing and fetishizing picture of interiority: viewing sensations and intentions like discrete material objects. The symbols for this misleading view in their respective works are a beetle and a sachet containing thousand five hundred roubles. The beetle in the box passage in the Philosophical Investigations discredits a Cartesian picture of pain as akin to a thing-like entity. The sachet in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov represents Dmitry’s intention to be honourable. Dostoevsky achieves a perspicuous view (...) of entangled webs of intentions, as opposed to labelling them like object-like entities. I show that Wittgenstein’ account of first-personal thought, including intentions, is not based on the Cartesian dualism of the inner and the outer, the mind and the body. To underscore my argumentation, I refer to The Brothers Karamazov, one of Wittgenstein’s favourite novels. I especially focus on Dmitry’s sachet, which inspired Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box example. I show parallels both in content and in form of Wittgenstein’s and Dostoevsky’s approach to intention as a species of first-personal thought. (shrink)

Respect for human embryos is often defended on the basis of the potentiality argument: embryos deserve respect because they already possess potentially the features that in adults are fully actualized. Opponents of this argument challenge it by claiming that if embryos should be respected because they are potentially adults, then gametes should be respected because they are potentially embryos. This article rejects this reductio ad absurdum argument by showing that there are two different types of potentiality involved so that the (...) transitivity of potentiality does not hold up in this case. Respect for embryos does not logically entail respect for gametes. (shrink)

I would like to challenge this view on various grounds, but before I do so, I wish to provide a broader setting for the problems discussed in this paper.

In a recent article published in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, David DeGrazia criticized the two pivotal assumptions that underlie President Bush’s policy on funding stem cell research. Those assumptions are that we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception and that we have full moral status as soon as we originate.In this paper, I would like to concentrate on the first of those assumptions and show in light of recent findings in embryological development that DeGrazia’s (...) criticisms have to be rejected. I shall save my discussion of DeGrazia’s critique of the second assumption for a later article that can take into account DeGrazia’s further elaboration of his position. (shrink)

By going back to the starting point of Derrida’s debates with some of the main representatives of structuralism in France, I propose to highlight the ambiguities that cover the very notion of structure, and to take the measure of the exact role that the reference to phenomenology plays then and will continue to play thereafter. Among these ambiguities: the one that touches the mathematical notion of structure, central in the triumphant structuralist mathematical current in France at that time; and especially: (...) the one called “groups of transformations,” the most important one to understand at the same time the audacities and the impasses of structuralism. The hard core of mathematization of modern physics, with Galileo’s principle of relativity, then developed in a masterly way in Einstein’s theory of relativity rest on this very structure. After tracing the broad outlines of these initial discussions, we engage in an analysis of how it is possible to understand the “epistemological contemporaneity” of relativity theory and Husserl’s transcendental aesthetics. Based on a thorough exploration of the analyses of the intersubjective constitution of space, time and the objective common world, we identify this central structure that Husserl calls “intersubjective group of transformation.” Equipped with this phenomenological structure, we trace this motif in Derrida’s work. Its insistence allows us to understand how the phenomenological premises of his critique of structuralism can help to understand his theoretical positions, especially in contrast to Jean-Luc Nancy. (shrink)

This commentary considers the viability of ovarian tissue cryopreservation (OTC) in the case of an adult who qualified for brain death. Although there has been some success with OTC in achieving pregnancy when the tissue is reimplanted in the original donor, attempting OTC in the case under discussion would have not been medically feasible.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 51, Issue 6, Page 555-573, December 2021. John Searle’s social ontology distinguishes between linguistic and non-linguistic institutional facts. He argues that every instance of the latter is created by declarative speech acts, while the former are exceptions to this far-reaching claim: linguistic phenomena are autonomous, their meaning is “built in,” and this is necessary, Searle argues, to avoid “infinite regress.” In this essay I analyze Searle’s arguments for this linguistic exceptionalism and reveal its flaws. (...) My method is to follow Searle’s argument closely and comprehensively so as to avoid, insofar as is possible, a selective reading of his argument in my favor. Against Searle’s position, I argue that linguistic phenomena are not exceptions to his general theory of institutional facts, for they too always require supplementary representations in order to exist. Language itself is analogous to all other institutions and infinite regress turns out to be unavoidable. (shrink)

This edited collection addresses the problem of how the creation of novel spaces of governance relates to imaginaries of connectivity in time.