Este artículo presenta la traducción al español de la parte sexta del De multiplicatione specierum de Roger Bacon, originalmente escrito en latín, y que posee como tema transversal la filosofía natural. Esta traducción tiene el carácter de ser comprensiva, esto es, fue escrita de tal forma que pueda ser entendida por el lector. También, para efectos de un mejor ejercicio pedagógico, se propone un comentario filosófico– crítico, es decir, una breve paráfrasis explicativa, que otorgue luces a la comunidad de habla (...) hispana en función de potenciar el acercamiento a este texto traducido. Nos encontramos ad portas de la primera traducción comentada en español de una parte de la obra de Roger Bacon3, quien es real e indudablemente el padre del método científico y el verdadero reformador de la ciencia moderna. (shrink)

«Obra en Blanco» es un libro sobre la obra temprana de Julio Enrique Blanco de la Rosa (1890-1986), un olvido más en la historia de la filosofía colombiana. Salvo en notas al margen, a Blanco no se lo encuentra en los estudios sobre la historia de la filosofía. Algunos han atribuido su desconocimiento a la incomprensión de un medio que no supo de su genialidad, otros creen que se debe a que su filosofía fue una necedad que consistió en poner (...) nuevos nombres a las viejas cosas. «Obra en Blanco» no intenta defender su genialidad o censurar a quienes lo han acusado de necedad: analiza y presenta una selección de un periodo juvenil de su obra, comprendido entre 1909-1920. Con ello sólo se busca aportar a la construcción de una historia de la filosofía nacional, y alimentar la discusión sobre la historia de la contribución filosófica de un hombre, cuyas páginas se encuentran aún en blanco. (shrink)

La presente investigación se circunscribe dentro del campo temático de la fenomenología trascendental de Edmund Husserl. Y tiene como objetivo el tratar de dilucidar dentro de la misma inmanencia de la experiencia trascendental del yo pienso, el modo no solo como surge la intersubjetividad, sino cómo este último concepto al igual que el de la egología, tienen como fundamento una noción de subjetividad moderna que por un lado, aparece dentro de la arquitectónica fenomenológica, como constituyente de sentido dentro de la (...) meditación husserliana, y por otro, puede aparecer como una noción que impide la elaboración de un nuevo concepto de hombre que incluya en su seno la alteridad, tal y como piensa Emmanuel Lévinas, y con ello, la posibilidad de hablar de un yo separado que no encuentre en lo otro una mera analogía suya, o extensión de su propia inmanencia, sino antes bien, la posibilidad de hallar en eso otro que nos sale al paso, la condición por la que se puede hablar de tiempo, de mundo y de existencia como relación con otros y para otros. (shrink)

El libro que tengo el placer de reseñar en estas páginas, es decir, de presentar a la comunidad académica y de comentar muy brevemente, es el resultado de una investigación realizada en el contexto del Programa Postdoctoral de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales, Niñez y Juventud, que el autor pudo realizar entre septiembre de 2015 y abril de 2017. En otras palabras, es su tesis postdoctoral publicada como libro de investigación, el cual “[…] no trata de discernir un tramo de la (...) vida del hombre, la primera infancia, sino de probar las estructuras de la conciencia humana desde su origen y qué son ellas, cómo funcionan”. En cuanto a la organización formal del texto hay que decir que se compone fundamentalmente de tres partes: las dos primeras son dos meditaciones fenomenológicas tituladas Vida humana fenomenológica. Balance sobre la relación entre el sujeto humano y el sujeto trascendental en la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl, y Fenomenología de la primera infancia y las experiencias fundantes, respectivamente; la tercera es una disertación lírica sobre la educación, la cual se titula El trabajo de ser profesor es convertirse en nuevo Prometeo. (shrink)

Nos daremos a la tarea de presentar una discusión que se encuentra en la obra del filósofo colombiano Julio Enrique Blanco, y en particular en dos de sus primeros escritos: “De la causalidad biológica I” (1917) y “Caminos de perfección” (1918). Para hacerlo debimos primero recurrir a uno de los textos centrales del inglés John Stuart Mill: Un sistema de lógica (1843). Lo que ha resultado de estas tres lecturas es la reconstrucción de una propuesta metodológica realizada por el colombiano, (...) propuesta que presentamos con complementos que son el resultado de las lecturas de éstas y otras obras suyas. Finalmente, intentaremos demostrar que ante la evaluación de los fundamentos cognoscitivos de nociones heredadas, una de las posibilidades que se presenta es inmovilizar aquellas que sean de carácter hipotético antes que hipertético. (shrink)

La problematica de una critica genuina sobre nuestro presente exige reflexionar acerca de las herencias y las condiciones actuales de la propia critica. Un camino que Nicolas Casullo emprende interpelando la saga mas consecuente y fecunda que contuvo la historia moderna en terminos de disconformidad con lo dado y cuestionamiento a sus presupuestos y logicas. Desde Rousseau y Voltaire, Marx y Nietzxhe, Weber y Lukacs, Canetti y Kraus, recuperando los planteos de Adorno y Benjamin y el debate entre izquierdas y (...) derechas ideologicas en nuestro siglo, este libro recorre la biografia de la critica hasta situarla en la actualidad argentina, atravesada por la memoria del terror genocida, la muerte y las politicas sobre la historia. Su escritura rastrea la conflictiva consitutcion de una cultura critica sobre lo civilizatorio, diferenciando esa saga de pensamiento radicalizado de la de una critica, cada vez mas en boga, que queda acotada simplemente a sus objetos de estudio o a sus productos culturales. (shrink)

Starting in 2005, general logical metatheorems have been developed that guarantee the extractability of uniform effective bounds from large classes of proofs of theorems that involve abstract metric structures X. In this paper we adapt this to the class of CAT\)-spaces X for \ and establish a new metatheorem that explains specific bound extractions that recently have been achieved in this context as instances of a general logical phenomenon.

Many of the most virulent and problematic eukaryotic pathogens have evolved from photosynthetic ancestors, such as apicomplexans, which are responsible for a wide range of diseases including malaria and toxoplasmosis. The primary barrier to understanding the early stages of evolution of these parasites has been the difficulty in finding parasites with closely related free‐living lineages with which to make comparisons. Parasites found throughout the florideophyte red algal lineage, however, provide a unique and powerful model to investigate the genetic origins of (...) a parasitic lifestyle. This is because they share a recent common ancestor with an extant free‐living red algal species and parasitism has independently arisen over 100 times within this group. Here, we synthesize the relevant hypotheses with respect to how these parasites have proliferated. We also place red algal research in the context of recent developments in understanding the genome evolution of other eukaryotic photosynthesizers turned parasites. (shrink)

Because rate of force development is an emerging outcome measure for the assessment of neuromuscular function in unfatigued conditions, and it represents a valid alternative/complement to the classical evaluation of pure maximal strength, this scoping review aimed to map the available evidence regarding RFD as an indicator of neuromuscular fatigue. Thus, following a general overview of the main studies published on this topic, we arbitrarily compared the amount of neuromuscular fatigue between the “gold standard” measure and peak, early and late (...) RFD. Seventy full-text articles were included in the review. The most-common fatiguing exercises were resistance exercises, endurance exercises/locomotor activities, isokinetic contractions, and simulated/real sport situations. The most widely tested tasks were knee extension and plantar flexion. The reason for evaluating RFD was lacking in 36% of the studies. On average, the amount of fatigue for MVF was comparable to late RFD but lower compared to both peak RFD and early RFD. Even if the rationale for evaluating RFD in the fatigued state was often lacking and the specificity between test task and fatiguing exercise characteristics was not always respected in the included studies, RFD seems to be a valid indicator of neuromuscular fatigue. Based on our arbitrary analyses, peak RFD and early phase RFD appear even to be more sensitive to quantify neuromuscular fatigue than MVF and late phase RFD. (shrink)

En el presente escrito se ofrece un compendio de notas críticas en torno a las dificultades con las que se topa actualmente un investigador de temas relacionados con la Edad Media, se exponen los argumentos más comunes y las respuestas que destacados medievalistas han ensayado. El cometido de este trabajo es, en primer lugar, poner de manifiesto el prejuicio que persiste en torno al Medioevo. Luego, el de brindar un cuerpo bibliográfico que ayude a quienes deban justificar todavía hoy las (...) motivaciones de su elección. En tercer lugar, de constituirse en un instrumento de trabajo que vendrá enriquecido y actualizado sucesivamente, por nosotros mismos o por aquellos que se interesen en él. Finalmente, bajo el concepto de “_medioevofobia_”, hemos intentado asuntar las tristes experiencias tenidas y que asumimos continuaremos teniendo algún tiempo más. (shrink)

En los estudios actuales sobre producción de conocimiento científico predomina la tendencia a analizar la producción de conocimiento científico por medio de su estructura relacional, dejando en un segundo plano el análisis de las capacidades de los científicos que inciden en los procesos de investigación. En este trabajo queremos argumentar en favor de una dirección diferente. Concretamente, defendemos que los científicos y sus capacidades -operativamente comprendidas- son una condición indispensable para la producción de conocimiento. Para defender esta posición, en primer (...) lugar, expondremos dos teorías representativas de esta tendencia para posteriormente mostrar sus limitaciones a la hora de analizar las relaciones y entramados que posibilitan producir conocimiento y examinan el resultado de esas relaciones, pero son incapaces de explicar cuál es rol que desempeñan los científicos y sus capacidades dentro del mismo. Dada esta situación, en segundo lugar, proponemos una caracterización operativa de los científicos y sus capacidades en la producción de conocimiento científico. Esta caracterización la desarrollaremos tomando como base la teoría de los sistemas experimentales de Rheinberger. A partir de ella, propondremos una interpretación propia de unas indicaciones hechas por Rheinberger sobre las capacidades científicas y su relación concreta con los sistemas experimentales. Esta interpretación destaca cómo las operaciones y conocimientos no temáticos inciden en el reconocimiento de anomalías y posibilitan intervenciones concretas en el sistema experimental, permitiendo de esta manera la producción de conocimiento. (shrink)

Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...) recently influential response to the debunking challenge (the appeal to phenomenal introspection) fails. It also argues that a Nietzschean approach is well suited to support the challenge and is bolstered by the empirical literature. As strangers to ourselves, we cannot know whether suffering is really intrinsically bad for us. (shrink)

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)

A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications (...) must be acknowledged. If, however, they should not be considered responsible, then we may have to reassess the meaning of animal morality. I discuss ways to eschew responsibility or to tailor it to animals and argue that each requires a revised conception of animal morality. (shrink)

Reseña del libro En el principio existía el axioma de no contradicción (Hacia Guillermo de Ockham por la Literatura y la Filosofía) Andrés Felipe López (2019). Madrid: Editorial Verbum, S.L. 140 pp.

Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On (...) one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory. The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion. One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach (...) within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning. According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons, they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How. (shrink)

Intuitively, collective nouns are pseudo-singular: a collection of things (a pair of people, a flock of birds, etc.) just is the things that make ‘it’ up. But certain facts about natural language seem to count against this view. In short, distributive predicates and numerals interact with collective nouns in ways that they seemingly shouldn’t if those nouns are pseudo-singular. We call this set of issues ‘the distribution problem’. To solve it, we propose a modification to cover-based semantics. On this semantics, (...) the interpretation of distributive predicates and numerals depends on a cover, where the choice of cover is strongly semantically constrained by the noun with which they interact. (shrink)

Henrich and Boyd (2002) were the first to propose a formal model of the role of attraction in cultural evolution. They came to the surprising conclusion that, when both attraction and selection are at work, final outcomes are determined by selection alone. This result is based on a deterministic view of cultural attraction, different from the probabilistic view introduced in Sperber (1996). We defend this probabilistic view, show how to model it, and argue that, when both attraction and selection are (...) at work, both affect final outcomes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines consequences of the computer revolution in mathematics. By comparing its repercussions with those of conceptual developments that unfolded in the nineteenth century, I argue that the key epistemological lesson to draw from the two transformative periods is that effective and successful mathematical practices in science result from integrating the computational and conceptual styles of mathematics, and not that one of the two styles of mathematical reasoning is superior. Finally, I show that the methodology deployed by applied (...) mathematicians in modern scientific computing is a paradigmatic instance of this key lesson. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

This paper intends to bring Austinian themes into methodological discussion about models. Using Austinian conceptual vocabulary, I argue that models perform actions in and outside of the academic field. This multiplicity of fields induces a variety of felicity conditions and types of performed actions. If for example, an inference from a model is judged according to some epistemological criteria in the scientific field, the representation of the world which the model carries will not be judged by the same criteria outside (...) the scientific field. A model can be considered as a standard in a strict scientific framework, while not being used as part of public policies, or vice versa. However, we focus on the dynamics between different fields. (shrink)

To become more broadly applicable, positions on AI ethics require perspectives from non-Western regions and cultures such as China and Japan. In this paper, we propose that the addition of the concept of harmony to the discussion on ethical AI would be highly beneficial due to its centrality in East Asian cultures and its applicability to the challenge of designing AI for social good. We first present a synopsis of different definitions of harmony in multiple contexts, such as music and (...) society, which reveals that the concept is, at its core, about well-balanced relationships and appropriate actions which give rise to order, balance, and aesthetically pleasing phenomena. The mediator for these well-balanced relationships isTaktwhich is an ability to act thoughtfully and sensibly according to the specific situation and to put things into proportion and order. We propose that the central challenge of building harmonizing AI is to make intelligent systems tactful and also to design and use them tactfully. For an AI system to become tactful, it needs to be able to have an advanced sensitivity to the specific contexts which it is in and their social and ethical implications and have the capability of approximately inferring the emotional and cognitive states of people with whom it is interacting. (shrink)

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to “speak” of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary (...) to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. (shrink)

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is (...) empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition to non-emotional (...) concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans. (shrink)

Republican and so-called independence conceptions of freedom stand out from other conceptions by embedding strong modal conditions on what it takes for a person to count as being free to do something. For this reason, the extent of one’s freedom, conceived under republican/independentist lights, cannot be measured by any of the measures of freedom that have been developed so far in the literature on freedom, since these do not register the requisite modal constraints. In this paper I propose a measure (...) of freedom that does capture the requisite modal concerns. I do so by relying on work in the semantics of counterfactuals to define a measure of how modally robustly available an option is to an individual. (shrink)

The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...) explain several methods of moral development that rely on imagination and visualization rather than overt action. These techniques are essential in cases where cultivating virtue the way one practices the harp is impossible. In particular, I focus on single-event virtues, first-time virtuous acts, and morally dangerous situations. (shrink)

COVID-19 has resulted in extraordinary disruptions to the higher education landscape. Here, we provide a brief report on 295 students’ academic perceptions and emotional well-being in late May 2020. Students reported the high levels of uncertainty regarding their academic futures as well as significant levels of stress and difficulty coping with COVID-19 disruptions. These outcomes were related to the higher levels of neuroticism and an external locus of control. Female students reported worse emotional well-being compared to males, and the students (...) of color reported the significantly higher levels of stress and uncertainty regarding their academic futures compared to White students. These results suggest that some students may be at particular risk for academic stress and poor emotional well-being due to the pandemic and highlight the urgent need for intervention and prevention strategies. (shrink)

I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two common views (...) about anger and moral character. First, I respond to several arguments that attempt to show that all anger is vicious. Then I respond to the view that some anger is required to be a virtuous person. Anger, on my view, can be morally virtuous but is not a necessary condition for being a virtuous person. This best accommodates not only morally irrelevant failures to get angry but also allows for emotional variation among virtuous people. (shrink)

In Study 1, we examined the moderating impact of alexithymia (i.e., a difficulty identifying and describing feelings to other people and an externally oriented cognitive style) on the automatic processing of affective information. The affective priming paradigm was used, and lower priming effects for high alexithymia scorers were observed when congruent (incongruent) pairs involving nonverbal primes (angry face) and verbal target were presented. The results held after controlling for participants' negative affectivity. The same effects were replicated in Studies 2 and (...) 3, with trait anxiety and depression entered as additional covariates. In Study 3, no moderating impact of alexithymia was found for verbal-facial pairs suggesting that the results cannot be merely explained in terms of transcoding limitations for high alexithymia scorers. Overall, the present results suggest that alexithymia could be related to a difficulty in processing and automatically using high arousal emotional information to respond to concomittant behavioural demands. (shrink)

The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, and with that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori truth, is being abandoned in much of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of most of the sciences. These distinctions should also be abandoned in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular, we must recognize the strong empirical component in our mathematical knowledge. The traditional distinction between logic and mathematics, on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other, should be dropped. Abstract (...) mathematical objects, like transcendental numbers or Hilbert spaces, are theoretical entities on a par with electromagnetic fields or quarks. Mathematical theories are not primarily logical deductions from axioms obtained by reflection on concepts but, rather, are constructions chosen to solve some collection of problems while fitting smoothly into the other theoretical commitments of the mathematician who formulates them. In other words, a mathematical theory is a scientific theory like any other, no more certain but also no more devoid of content. (shrink)

This paper compares two explanations of the process by which human communication systems evolve: iterated learning and social collaboration. It then reports an experiment testing the social collaboration account. Participants engaged in a graphical communication task either as a member of a community, where they interacted with seven different partners drawn from the same pool, or as a member of an isolated pair, where they interacted with the same partner across the same number of games. Participants’ horizontal, pair‐wise interactions led (...) “bottom up” to the creation of an effective and efficient shared sign system in the community condition. Furthermore, the community‐evolved sign systems were as effective and efficient as the local sign systems developed by isolated pairs. Finally, and as predicted by a social collaboration account, and not by an iterated learning account, interaction was critical to the creation of shared sign systems, with different isolated pairs establishing different local sign systems and different communities establishing different global sign systems. (shrink)

Is a phenomenology of sleep possible? If sleep is the complete absence of experience, including the self-experience of consciousness itself, how can phenomenology, as a description of lived experience, have access to a condition that is neither lived nor experienced? In this paper, I respond directly and indirectly to Jean-Luc Nancy’s challenge that a phenomenology of sleep is impossible. As an indirect response, my sketch of the contours of phenomenology of sleep investigates Husserl’s employment of the distinction between sleep and (...) wakefulness as a metaphor. Specifically, the metaphorical characterization of retentional consciousness is assessed. On the basis of this metaphorical characterization of time-consciousness in terms of sleep and wakefulness, I turn to Husserl’s account of the constitution of sleep. I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness remains incomplete without an account of “sleep-consciousness”(by which we mean, in a restricted manner, dreamless sleep）. In pursuing Husserl’s phenomenological account of sleep, falling asleep and waking up within the context of his genetic phenomenology, I offer a suggestion for how to understand the sense in which consciousness (temporarily) constitutes itself as sleep--as the absence of itself. I conclude with an analogy with Husserl’s investigations into the imaginary: in both instances, consciousness induces within itself its own suspension or self-abstention. In the particular instance of sleep, consciousness disengages itself entirely from the complex of interests while also immunizing itself to the force of affectivity. (shrink)

The classical formulation of libertarianism seems to be incompatible with the requirements of political legitimacy. Some libertarians have endorsed this result, denying that the state is legitimate. This paper argues, however, that the particular nature of that incompatibility represents a problem for the classical formulation of libertarianism. It is argued that acknowledging the existence of a particular minimal form of positive rights might overcome the problem in question. It is further argued that acknowledgment of such positive rights would seem to (...) provide a more adequate normative ground for making sense of some central libertarian insights and concerns. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se propone una ética de la donación a partir de la idea de donación en la fenomenología de Jean Luc Marion, junto a la noción de la acción no recíproca en Kant y la noción de don y gratuidad en Santo Tomás de Aquino. La intención de Marion es liberar al fenómeno de cualquier condición subjetiva que se le imponga; es decir, intenta darle la prioridad a los fenómenos y comprenderlos como lo que se da. De (...) ahí es que teoriza sobre el don y la donación, cuya particularidad es que están libres del intercambio y la deuda. Similarmente, que Kant afirma que el bien debe hacerse sin esperar algo a cambio, mientras que Santo Tomás afirma que el don es hacer el bien gratuitamente. Por eso se puede proponer una ética de la donación cuyos pilares fundamentales son: gratuidad, desinterés, no reciprocidad, libertad, entrega generosa, compasión y responsabilidad afectiva. (shrink)

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history (...) of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life. (shrink)

Since the Industrial Revolution, human societies have experienced high and sustained rates of economic growth. Recent explanations of this sudden and massive change in economic history have held that modern growth results from an acceleration of innovation. But it is unclear why the rate of innovation drastically accelerated in England in the eighteenth century. An important factor might be the alteration of individual preferences with regard to innovation resulting from the unprecedented living standards of the English during that period, for (...) two reasons. First, recent developments in economic history challenge the standard Malthusian view according to which living standards were stagnant until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial England enjoyed a level of affluence that was unprecedented in history. Second, behavioral sciences have demonstrated that the human brain is designed to respond adaptively to variations in resources in the local environment. In particular, Life History Theory, a branch of evolutionary biology, suggests that a more favorable environment should trigger the expression of future-oriented preferences. In this paper, I argue that some of these psychological traits – a lower level of time discounting, a higher level of optimism, decreased materialistic orientation, and a higher level of trust in others – are likely to increase the rate of innovation. I review the evidence regarding the impact of affluence on preferences in contemporary as well as past populations, and conclude that the impact of affluence on neurocognitive systems may partly explain the modern acceleration of technological innovations and the associated economic growth. (shrink)

The idea that cultural evolution exhibits variation, competition, and inheritance and therefore can be studied by adjusting the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection is an attractive one. It has been argued by a number of authors (e.g., Campbell 1960; Monod 1970; Dawkins 1976; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Durham 1991; Aunger 2002; Mesoudi et al. 2004) and pursued in a variety of ways, some (Dawkins and memeticists) staying close to the Darwinian model, others (e.g., Boyd, (...) Richerson, and their collaborators) being more innovative. We agree that there are relevant analogies between biological and cultural evolution and, in particular, that cultural items do exhibit variation, competition, and cumulative modification. On the other hand, we believe that a proper understanding of the mechanisms of cultural propagation drawing on the work of cognitive and social scientists (see Sperber and Hirschfeld 1999 for a review) contradicts the idea that culture exhibits inheritance in the strict sense needed for the theory of evolution by natural selection to apply straightforwardly to it. If so, it will take more than adjusting the Darwinian model to be faithful to the Darwinian inspiration. (shrink)