This is the third volume of Weiss' philosophical journal. The first two volumes, published in 1966, cover 1955 to 1964. The philosophy on these pages is only "in process" in the sense that it is the kind of thinking-out-loud that is not afraid to go back and amend itself in the light of something just considered. Other than that, it reads more like the rich harvest of a ripe mind setting out to reflect on what it thinks to be important (...) at the moment. Each entry is a freely flowing but usually unified essay whose topic is revealed in the first few sentences. Often one day's entry will pick up on a theme touched upon the previous day. The topics range from complex and technical philosophical and metaphysical ones to occasional issues of broader concern like education, employment, welfare, civil rights, mental illness, and even jokes. There is frequent comment and sometimes second thoughts about Weiss' previous books. The language and categories of Modes of Being run through many of the entries as they deal with traditional metaphysical problems concerning being, God, substance, existence, actuality, the one and the many, etc. The index is painstakingly prepared, and each pair of pages has a heading indicating the general topic being discussed there.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Unless the title is a McLuhanesque play on words--which Finkelstein would never allow himself--the book is mistitled, for Finkelstein dwells almost exclusively on what he considers to be the nonsense of McLuhan. Writing with all the venom of an anti-smut campaigner whose moral principles are threatened because they are too weak and too inflexible, Finkelstein wages his polemics against McLuhan in an effort to discredit him and expose him as a false prophet. What nettles Finkelstein most is that McLuhan, a (...) professor--a guardian of truth and goodness--should be so irresponsible as to fail to denunciate T.V. commercials, Madison avenue mind-manipulators, T.V.'s causing the atrophy of the ability to read and think, and the other bogeymen of humanist dogma. How dare McLuhan, the Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at a great University, challenge the foundations of the humanities themselves? Finkelstein is at least thorough in his refusal to come to grips with what is valid in McLuhan: he does us the service of pointing out the errors in McLuhan's reading of history, in his dictum that the medium is the message, in his suggestion that media are extensions of man, and in his advocacy of media involvement. The final and the least weak chapter draws a parallel between McLuhan and Marx, showing how McLuhanism can lead to a world totalitarian monolith. We should pay Finkelstein the courtesy, however, of pointing out that there is a sense in which his criticisms, if not always valid, are at least important to keep in mind while seeking to understand McLuhan without being seduced by him.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This is a very useful collection of important, standard, primary sources. Two-thirds of volume one is taken up with Plato and Aristotle with the rest of the volume evenly divided among the Presocratics, Hellenistic philosophers and Medieval philosophers. Four of the Platonic dialogues are complete. Second edition changes in the first volume include: changes in translators and new entries. In both volumes Kaufmann's prefaces are very brief and mainly biographical. He consistently ties in information about each thinker's contemporaries. The second (...) volume has readings from Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Almost half the second volume is taken up with Hume and Kant. The second edition changes in volume II are: expansion of Spinoza's Ethics, Locke's Essay, Berkeley's Principles; and additions of Descartes' correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, and a short Leibniz essay translated especially for this volume by M. Furth. The selections are adequately long and representational. The volumes contain double columns, no index, no bibliographies, no "Study Guides," just solid and important reading.--S. O. H. (shrink)

In 1963-1964 the Carnegie Corporation awarded Grinnell College a grant to support new interdisciplinary programs. One of these was the "Interdisciplinary Seminar on Order." Scholars came from all over the country to lead discussions and read papers on some aspect of order as it related to their field. Various philosophers, historians, political scientists, psychologists, and people in religion, philosophy, and literature all took part. Philosophers show up under several of the book's headings. Paul Weiss has a short paper on some (...) paradoxes relating to order. Feibleman speaks on disorder. Ernan McMullin kicks off the history of science section discussing cosmic order in Plato and Aristotle. Monroe Beardsley has a paper on order and disorder in art. Hartshorne discusses, among other things, the reality of chance in his essay on order and chaos in the section on Religion and Ethics. Voegelin and Toynbee are naturals in this volume. They comprise the whole section on history. Among the twenty-two other contributors are Talcott Parsons and J. M. Kitagawa on world religions. There is an enterprising introduction by Kuntz in which he brings an historical approach to the problem of order. Somehow, in the process, he manages to tie in most of the other papers.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Cobb's stated purpose in this book is to inquire into what is distinctive about Christianity and into its claim to finality. Hence half the book is taken up with the explication of other "structures of existence" which antedated or which have paralleled "Christian Existence." For Cobb, the term existence refers to how a subject relates itself to itself and what it is in and for itself. Cobb traces the move from the primitive self, which is not yet conscious of itself (...) as a self, across the threshold to "axial" man who breaks with the primitive mythic age by exhibiting a "seat of existence" or center of consciousness which involves a new role for rationality and which for the first time subordinates the unconscious to the conscious. The particular structures of axial existence which Cobb explores are Buddhist Existence, Homeric Existence, Socratic Existence, and Prophetic Existence. In contradistinction to these, Christian existence emerges as the crossing of a new threshold: it is spiritual existence expressing itself in love. Cobb's efforts to fulfill the second purpose of the book are half-hearted and unconvincing, a fact perhaps consistent with the book's objectivity: it is not Christian apologetics. Cobb's well known Whiteheadianism is only subtly and incidentally evident in this work, although occasionally it is used directly to expand and enrich certain explanations. The print in the book is annoyingly small.--S. O. H. (shrink)

We investigate what it means for a (Hausdorff, second-countable) topological group to be computable. We compare several potential definitions based on classical notions in the literature. We relate these notions with the well-established definitions of effective presentability for discrete and profinite groups, and compare our results with similar results in computable topology.

In their logical analysis of theorems about disjoint rays in graphs, Barnes, Shore, and the author (hereafter BGS) introduced a weak choice scheme in second-order arithmetic, called the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of finite choice (hereafter finite choice). This is a special case of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of choice ( $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ ) introduced by Kreisel. BGS showed that $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ suffices for proving many of the aforementioned theorems in graph theory. While it is not known (...) if these implications reverse, BGS also showed that those theorems imply finite choice (in some cases, with additional induction assumptions). This motivated us to study the proof-theoretic strength of finite choice. Using a variant of Steel forcing with tagged trees, we show that finite choice is not provable from the $\Delta ^1_1$ -comprehension scheme (even over $\omega $ -models). We also show that finite choice is a consequence of the arithmetic Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem (introduced by Friedman and studied by Conidis), assuming $\Sigma ^1_1$ -induction. Our results were used by BGS to show that several theorems in graph theory cannot be proved using $\Delta ^1_1$ -comprehension. Our results also strengthen results of Conidis. (shrink)

The journal begins with random memories and reflections on Ionesco's childhood. These soon blend into adult reflections on dreams and other situations which make the reader wonder if the childhood was not a dream also. Ionesco's preoccupation with his dreams and his belief that they hold the key to ultimate truth is one of the organizing principles of the book. The main secondary theme is his preoccupation with death and with his goal: to learn how to die. Ionesco claims not (...) to take himself too seriously, but the tone of this journal is often one of grim earnestness. Granted, there are some lighter moments, but even these reveal a very deep self concern and more than a frivolous insight--"Is life worth dying for?" There are also the reductionisms of wishing, which only the journal style, with its exemption from the need for development, can produce. Basically what we have here is an anxious, neurotic, insightful man graciously sharing his anxieties, his neuroses, and his insights. The work is catalytic for philosophical reflection.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to describe the interaction between the individual and his society. Miller claims that society gets its creative thrusts forward from the minds of its single individuals. Also each individual depends on feedback from his society in order to discover how his quest for the ideal self is going. The work includes a short history of the concept of individualism. There is a distinction drawn between the "open society" which provides the conditions necessary for the individual (...) to become himself and the "closed society" which stifles individual development. The author is aware that some philosophies can overstress the importance of the individual, as he is critical of some individualistic thinkers, e.g., Kierkegaard, because they neglect what he calls the social component of the self. Miller holds the view that work is important for self-actualization, but fails to mention the effect of automation and the crisis of leisure on a society dependent on this kind of self-actualization.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Capital "H" Humanism is the moving spirit behind this book, complete with its quaint, crusading anti-supernaturalism. What starts out as a propagandistic apologia for this "movement" manages to come up with some solid essays on various aspects of ethics and ethical theory. There is a star studded cast including H. J. Blackham, Marvin Farber, Hebert Feigl, Rollo Handy, Sidney Hook, A. H. Maslow, Ernest Nagel, Carl Rogers, and B. F. Skinner covering topics dealing with ethics and religion; the good life (...) ; law, the individual, and social organization; justice and society; and death. Many of the essays are reprinted from The Humanist. Some of them over-simplify the problems of philosophical ethics. Although there are some strong and interesting essays, the usefulness of the book is limited by its effort to advocate the Humanist position.--S. O. H. (shrink)