This article applies change agency to the institutions of higher education in South Africa – referring here to all the post-school institutions and educators in general and more specifically focused on the unique opportunities and responsibilities towards change agency in theological training. The focus is on the characteristics of a change agent, which could be an individual or a group. Seemingly, change is not going to be initiated in a ‘top-down’ approach; therefore, this article suggests a ‘bottom-up’ approach, starting with (...) a change agent (an individual or a group) to become enthusiastic and active to bring about change. The method of constructivism is used, complemented by a general literature review of the past 70 years, filled with definitions of change agents and change agency. After the discussion of a few models, the researcher ventures to propose a way in which change agency can find a foothold among theological educators in higher education institutions in South Africa. (shrink)

This paper studies efficient learning with respect to mind changes. Our starting point is the idea that a learner that is efficient with respect to mind changes minimizes mind changes not only globally in the entire learning problem, but also locally in subproblems after receiving some evidence. Formalizing this idea leads to the notion of uniform mind change optimality. We characterize the structure of language classes that can be identified with at most α mind changes by some learner (not necessarily (...) effective): A language class L is identifiable with α mind changes iff the accumulation order of L is at most α. Accumulation order is a classic concept from point-set topology. To aid the construction of learning algorithms, we show that the characteristic property of uniformly mind change optimal learners is that they output conjectures (languages) with maximal accumulation order. We illustrate the theory by describing mind change optimal learners for various problems such as identifying linear subspaces and one-variable patterns. (shrink)

As its title indicates, this book is concerned with two different fields of philosophy, ethics and epistemology. The bulk of the argument is devoted to epistemological questions, as these arise within the context of morality. Hence, the conclusions I reach could probably best be described as prolegomena to the elaboration of a theory of ethics. I have plans, which I hope will be realized in the next few years, of elaborating such a theory. I started work on Moral Knowledge in (...) the summer of 1958 with the help of a University Faculty Fellowship, for which I am most grateful. of the research for the book, as well as a good bit of its writing, Much was done in two libraries, The University Library, Berkeley, and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Members of the staffs of both libraries, by their courtesy and helpfulness, lightened immeasurably the task of my research. lowe a special debt of gratitude to four people-to Mr. (shrink)

We are happy to present the Fall 2017 issue of Constellations journal. Included within are four diverse undergraduate papers ranging vastly in topic. We made a conscious effort to encourage submissions from a wide range of disciplines, provided the work could be broadly considered “historical” in scope. Interdisciplinary cooperation is something that we feel should be celebrated and promoted, and we are currently working with other student journals and organizations to bring an Arts-wide undergraduate research conference to life this spring.We (...) hope that you enjoy the variety of topics covered in this edition, and appreciate your interest and support in Constellations. We would especially like to thank our review team, without which Constellations would remain starcrossed... Assistant Editors:Lucas Nowosaid and Juliana McPhail Senior Reviewers:Bronte WellsSamantha KallenShelby CollingLiuba Gonzalez De ArmasYunus SahinAlex HoggAnastasia Pavlic General Reviewers:Emily HainesFarah KhalidMiranda RondeauStacy FairfulCassidy MunhollandDana KanervaLexi BrunnerDevonne BrandysKatie DuHeather Mark. (shrink)

This important new book explores the contemporary refugee crisis and the untold realities and experiences of refugees themselves. A team of top scholars offer a critical and necessary diagnosis of the challenges, complexities, and contradictions impacting our philosophical approaches to the contemporary figure of the refugee.

Sensen analyzes Kant’s justification of duties to oneself. Why does Kant say that duties to oneself have priority over other duties? Sensen concludes that there is a common idea behind the different formulas of the categorical imperative: the idea that our human capacities have a high importance. Kant’s ethics needs anthropology to derive concrete duties from this general idea.

C. S. Peirce's indictment that "the chief cause of [metaphysics'] backward condition is that its leading professors have been theo (Collected Papers 6:3) falls heavily at my door. For it logians" was out of reflection upon religious experience and its meaning that the present relational metaphysic was conceived. My hope, however, is that its scope is sufficiently wider than its theological origins to justify its appearance as a work in philosophy. Having been nurtured in existential philosophy and having reached some (...) measure of maturity with the wise counsel of Professor Dr. Fritz Buri, of Basel, I came to feel that theology as a modern discipline had reached an impasse owing to its overextended commitments to a subject-object paradigm of thought. Even those theologians who despaired of these ties seemed unable to find an independent alternative idiom for their ideas. A second tension in my thinking resulted from the inordinate neglect by theologians of the natural world. Also, my natural interest in physical understanding seemed unfulfilled within the narrow confines of theology, even of philosophical theology as then practiced. As I turned decisively toward the study of modern physics, and especially of cosmology, a new world seemed to open up to me. After extensive study with prominent astronomers and physicists, it began to dawn on me that the new physics has devised conceptual paradigms of thought which could be generalized into a metaphysical system of universal interest. (shrink)

From one perspective, the fundamental notions of point-set topology have to do with sequences (of points or of numbers) and their limits. A broad class of epistemological questions also appear to be concerned with sequences and their limits. For example, problems of empirical underdetermination–which of a collection of alternative theories is true–have to do with logical properties of sequences of evidence. Underdetermination by evidence is the central problem of Plato’s Meno [Glymour and Kelly 1992], of one of Sextus Empiricus’ many (...) skeptical doubts, and arguably it is the idea in Kant’s antinomies, for example of the infinite divisibility of matter [Kelly 1995, Ch.3]. Many questions of methodology, or of the logic of discovery, have to do with sequences and their limits, for example under what conditions Bayesian procedures, which put a prior probability distribution over alternative hypotheses and possible evidence and form conditional probabilities as new evidence is obtained, converge to the truth ([Savage 1954], [Hesse 1970], [Osherson and Weinstein 1988], [Juhl 1993]). Some analyses of “S knows that p” seem to appeal to properties of actual and possible sequences of something–for example Nozick’s proposal that knowledge of p is belief in p produced by a method that would not produce belief in p if p were false and would produce belief in p if p were true. Even questions about finding the truth under a quite radical relativism, in which truth 1 depends on conceptual scheme and conceptual schemes can be altered, have been analyzed as a kind of limiting property of sequences [Kelly et al. 1994]. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decision-theoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory – a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions – and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set of constraints than the (...) standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. The Ramsey test is a well-known way of establishing connections between belief revision postulates and axioms for conditionals (“if p, then q”). Pareto-minimal theory change corresponds exactly to three characteristic axioms of counterfactual systems: a theory revision operator that satisfies the Ramsey test validates these axioms if and only if the revision operator is Pareto-minimal. (shrink)

Kant taught us that there are two kinds of norms: Categorical imperatives that one ought to follow regardless of one's personal aims and circumstances, and hypothetical imperatives that direct us to employ the means towards our chosen ends. Kant's distinction separates two approaches to normative epistemology. On the one hand, we have principles of "inductive rationality", typically supported by considerations such as intuitive plausibility, conformity with exemplary practice, and internal consistency. On the other hand, we may assess rules for forming (...) belief by how well they attain the objectives that motivate inquiry; in Levi's words, "the ends of inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences" [Levi 67, p. 241]. A doctrinaire attitude would ignore one of these perspectives in favour of the other; a balanced approach is to develop both and compare [cf. Helmann 97, Sec.2]. There are three possible relationships between hypothetical and categorical imperatives for empirical inquiry. (shrink)

Editor's introduction -- Author's introduction -- Interrelational subjects and social sublimation -- The gestation of the other in phenomenology -- The look of love and ecological subjectivity -- Social melancholy, shame and sublimation -- Responsible subjects and witnessing -- Witnessing subjectivity and testimony -- Witnessing, recognition, and response ethics -- Between ethics and politics -- Response ethics and the nonhumans -- Animal ethics: toward an ethics of responsiveness -- Service dogs: between animal studies and disability studies -- Earth ethics and (...) creaturely cohabitation -- Witnessing in the age of spectacle -- Death as a penalty and instant death -- Rape as spectator sport and creepshot entertainment -- The spectacle of war -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...) we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad’s work on temporal experience. -/- The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ‘Overlap’, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye’s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. (shrink)

Online encyclopedia. 2011, revised, 2014: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gasset/.

_ AS Critical Thinking for AQA_ is the definitive textbook for students of the current AQA Advanced Subsidiary Level syllabus. Structured very closely around the AQA specification, it covers the two units of the AS level in an exceptionally clear and student-friendly style. The chapters are helpfully subdivided into short digestible passages, and include: intended learning objectives at the beginning of each chapter student exercises at the end of each section with a ‘stretching activity’ for more advanced learners exam orientated (...) questions key point summaries at the end of each section cross references. In line with the AQA specification, there is a heavy emphasis on more imaginative forms of source material, for example, music, film, artwork, historical documents, adverts, moral dilemmas and scientific debates, as a means of illustrating key points. A great deal of emphasis is also placed on ‘live’ or ‘real’ arguments, taking topical examples from the world of science, politics, entertainment and sport. The book is accompanied by a companion website with extensive resources for both instructors and students. (shrink)

A brief introduction to the first issue of the Journal of Analytic Theology.