The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa and Smith to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn. However, neither Weak Unrestricted Composition alone nor the different variants of it that have been proposed in the literature can provide us with a satisfying answer to the special composition question, or so (...) we will argue. We will then go on to explore an alternative family of purely mereological rules in the vicinity of Weak Unrestricted Composition, Cardinal Composition: A plurality of pairwise non-overlapping objects composes an object iff the objects in the plurality are of cardinality smaller than $$\kappa $$ κ. As we will show, all the instances for infinite $$\kappa $$ κ s determine fusion and are compatible with junk, and every instance for a $$\kappa > \aleph _0$$ κ > ℵ 0 is furthermore compatible with gunk and dense chains of parthood. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is currently thought (...) of as scientifically respectful metaphysics may end up also being without epistemic value. The core of our claim is that although much emphasis is put on the supposed difference between unconstrained analytic metaphysics, in opposition to scientifically constrained metaphysics, it is largely forgotten that no clear constraining relation of metaphysics by science is yet available. (shrink)

Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only (...) to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently. (shrink)

‘Shallow’ and ‘deep’ versions of scientific realism may be distinguished as follows: the shallow realist is satisfied with belief in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories; by contrast, deep realists claim that realism can be legitimate only if such entities are described in metaphysical terms. We argue that this methodological discussion can be fruitfully applied in Everettian quantum mechanics, specifically on the debate concerning the existence of worlds and the recent dispute between Everettian actualism and quantum (...) modal realism. After presenting what is involved in such dispute, we point to a dilemma for realists: either we don’t have the available metaphysical tools to answer the deep realist’s demands, and realism is not justified in this case, or such demands of metaphysical dressing are not mandatory for scientific realism, and deep versions of realism are not really required. (shrink)

Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go beyond (...) ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics. (shrink)

Der Forschung gelaufig ist die Rede von einer ersten (5./4. Jh. v. Chr.) und der sog. Zweiten Sophistik (2. Jh. n. Chr). Aber auch die Literatur des Hellenismus und der fruhen Kaiserzeit kennt zahlreiche Sophisten. Der Sophist, verstanden als (schlechter) Lehrer und Redner, Gegenspieler des Philosophen oder Vertreter der griechischen Bildung, bildet deshalb den Dreh-und Angelpunkt der Beitrage, die Schlaglichter auf Orte, Methoden und Personen der Bildungsvermittlung werfen. Die Beitrage zeigen, wie pagane und judische Denker, Platoniker und Stoiker Bildung als (...) Weg zum richtigen Welt- und Gottesverstandnis verstehen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Fron, Marco Galli, Johann Goeken, Stefanie Holder, Alexandra Michalewski, Peter Scholz, Paul Schubert, Gregory E. Sterling, Werner Urbanz, Beatrice Wys. (shrink)

As Deleuze says in his essay "Nomadic Thought", it is Nietzsche's movement of uncoding which announces a "new politics". Nietzsche marks the beginning of a counter-culture in the effort "to get something through which is not encodable". In this way, Nietzsche establishes a different kind of philosophical discourse, a "counter-philosophy", inasmuch as its utterances are directed against philosophy conceived as the bureaucracy of pure reason. This chapter attempts to establish an untimely echo of Deleuze's essay, which aims at an actualised (...) understanding of this rather enigmatically announced "new politics". It first illustrates how a recent strain of political thought, postfoundationalism, repeats the recoding of society. It then shows that these efforts of recoding are obsessive expressions of a figure which resembles the Nietzschean priest. Finally, it concludes with an outline of Nietzsche's "new politics". (shrink)

Logical abductivism features in the recent literature as a _new epistemology_ for logic, in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism. According to this account, (i) logical knowledge is obtained by the justified _choice_ of a logical theory using abduction, which (ii) _replaces_ problematic approaches in traditional logical epistemology. We argue that such claims are not properly warranted; they conflate justification and theory choice methods. Abduction requires that one starts with _justified data_, and justification, in such cases, needs to appeal to sources that (...) are not granted by abduction. In this sense, abduction cannot be all there is to the epistemology of logic. Some abductivists, we shall see, even appeal to methods of the traditional epistemology to obtain the data. Keeping justification and theory choice separated may contribute to avoid obscurities in discussion of the nature of data in logic and in understanding more clearly how to frame the anti-exceptional nature of logic. (shrink)

Tillie Olsen (1978) drew attention to an evident, yet underappreciated fact of writing, which is that it takes time: ‘Where the claims of creation cannot be primary, the results are atrophy; unfinished work; minor effort and accomplishment; silences’ (p. 13). Drawing from our experiences as a precariously employed PhD student and a postdoc in philosophy with parenting responsibilities, we want to address this type of silencing in a manner that stylistically corresponds to the exhaustion, lack of time, and lack of (...) leisure experienced by many caregivers in academia. For this, we want to record one of the few occasions in our daily routine where there is sufficient time and mental capacity to reflect on our own situation: the conversation at the kitchen table in the evening when the chores are done. Our contribution consists in a redacted transcription of this conversation for which we propose the term ‘autotheoretical dialogue’ (see Fournier 2021; Young 1997). Our dialogue covers topics such as: care in relation to class and gender (Lightman & Link 2021); teaching in higher education as a form of care work in contrast to the more prestigious work of research (Cardozo 2017); the precarious working conditions in academia and their relation to parenting (Spina et al. 2022); the ignorance and hostility towards parenthood in academia; the effects of this marginalisation like fatigue, self-doubt, and depression, but also the ambivalence that arises from the conflict of the joy of caring; and the institutional and cultural difficulties of reconciling academic work with parenthood. (shrink)

The historiographical concept "Enlightenment" has for a long time wavered between the idea of a single unified Enlightenment and the notion of multiple competing enlightenments. This volume revisits this seeming contradiction by asserting that the Enlightenment should be understood as a shared process of communication, seeking ways to accommodate and mediate rival ideologies and orient enlightenment projects towards the betterment of humankind. Taking the work of the eminent Enlightenment scholar Hans Erich Bödeker as their point of departure, the different chapters (...) seek to explore this perspective through specific case studies of political communication. Readers are offered a selection of Bödeker's texts never previously translated into English, along with a series of contributions from his former colleagues, students, and collaborators. In doing so the book displays the broad scope of Bödeker's own work, as well as the multiplicity of themes captured within the framework of the Enlightenment. Genres, modes, and strategies of communication are contrasted with the institutions and cultural practices underpinning them. In exploring the depth and scope of Bödeker's work, the volume pays tribute to a German tradition rooted in historical semantics, while at the same time querying its present state and its future. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva analisar aplicativos de transporte individual de passageiros sob a luz do princípio da livre iniciativa, bem como o desenvolvimento deste trabalho sob a ótica das leis trabalhistas. A Constituição de 1988 resguarda tanto os direitos sociais do trabalho quanto a livre iniciativa como princípio da ordem econômica. Atualmente a prestação desse serviço é apresentada como uma tecnologia disruptiva. Motoristas dos aplicativos de mobilidade fazem uso da tecnologia fomentando a economia e desenvolvendo o mercado de trabalho em (...) meio à crise. A pesquisa será bibliográfica e o método utilizado será o dedutivo, abordando a teoria.Palavras-chave: Jurídico; Econômico; Tecnologia; Startups; Trabalho. ABSTRACT The present article aims to analyze individual passenger transport applications in the light of the principle of free initiative, as well the development of this work under the perspective of labor laws. The 1988 Constitution preserves both the social rights of labor and free enterprise as the principle of the economic order. Currently the provision of this service is presented as disruptive technology. Drivers of mobility applications make use technology by fostering the economy and developing the job market in the midst of the crisis. The research will be bibliographical and the method used will be the deductive, approaching the theory. Keywords: Legal; Economic; Technology; Startups; Job. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spinoza and the Theory of Organism HANS JONAS I CARTESIANDUALISMlanded speculation on the nature of life in an impasse: intelligible as, on principles of mechanics, the correlation of structure and function became within the res extensa, that of structure-plus-function with feeling or experience (modes of the res cogitans) was lost in the bifurcation, and thereby the fact of life itself became unintelligible at the same time that the (...) explanation of its bodily performance seemed to be assured. The impasse became manifest in Occasionalism : its tour de force of an extraneous, divine "synchronization" of the outer and the inner world (the latter denied to animals) not only suffered from its extreme artificiality, the common failing of such ad hoc constructions, but even at so high a cost failed to accomplish its theoretical purpose by its own terms. For the animal machine, like any machine, raises beyond the question of the "how" that of the "what for" of its functioning---of the purpose for which it had thus been constructed by its maker.1 Its performance, however devoid of immanent teleology, must serve an end, and that end must be someone's end. This end may (directly) be itself, as indeed Descartes had implied when declaring self-preservation to be the effect of the functioning of the organic automaton. In that case the existence as such of the machine would be its end--either terminally, or in turn to benefit something else. In the former case, the machine would have to be more than a machine, for a mere machine cannot enioy its existence. But since, by the rigorous conception of the res extensa, it cannot be more than a machine, its function and/or existence must serve something other than itself. Automata in Descartes ' time were mainly for entertainment (rather than work). But the raison d'etre of the living kingdom could not well be seen in God's indulging his mechanical abilities or in the amusement of celestial spectators--especially since mere complexity of arrangement does not create new quality and thus add something to the unrelieved sameness of the simple substratum that might enrich the spectrum of being. For quality, beyond the primitive determinations of the extended per se, is the subjective creature of sensation, the confused representation of quantity in a mind; and thus organisms cannot harbor it because as mere machines they lack mentality, and pure spirits cannot because they lack sensuality, or the privilege of confusion and thereby of illusion with its possible enjoyment. And as to their intellectual enjoyment, even that, deprived of the thrill of discovery by the same token, would pale in the contemplation of what to sufficiently large The concept of "machine," adopted for its strict confinementto efficientcause, is still a finalisticconcept,even thoughthe final cause is no longer internal to the entity, as a mode of its own operation,but external to it as antecedent design. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY intellects is nothing but the ever-repeated exemplification of the same few, elementary (and ultimately trivial) truths. There remained, then, the time-honored--Stoic as well as Christian--idea that plants and animals are for the benefit of Man. Indeed, since the existence of a living world is the necessary condition for the existence of any of its members, the self-justifying nature of at least one such member (= species) would justify the existence of the whole. In Stoicism, Man provided this end by his possession of reason, which makes him the culmination of a terrestrial scale of being that is also self-justifying throughout all its grades (the end as the best of many that are good in degrees) ; in Christianity, by his possession of an immortal soul, which makes him the sole imago Dei in creation (the end as the sole issue at stake) ; and Cartesian dualism radicalized this latter position by making man even the sole possessor of inwardness or "soul" of any kind, thus the only one of whom "end" can meaningfully be predicated as he alone can entertain ends. All other life then, the product of physical necessity, can be considered his means. However, this traditional idea, in its anthropocentric vanity never a... (shrink)

Jak je již z názvu patrné, tato kniha, třebaže obsahuje filosofické fragmenty a texty, je sbírkou spíše osobních autorových výpovědí a otevřeného přemítání než uzavřenou odbornou studií. Filozof, teolog a religionista Otakar A. Funda se v ní ohlíží za dosavadní cestou svého myšlenkového směřování. Kniha zachycuje jeho klíčová životní témata, dává nahlédnout do jeho myšlenkového vývoje i do současné názorové pozice. V tomto smyslu může čtenářům sloužit také jako klíč k lepšímu porozumění Fundovým předchozím textům. Publikace přináší rovněž kompletní (...) autorovu bibliografii z let 1965-2008. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...) F to vary according to the context in which F appears. Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ‘location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ‘evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favour of conditionalism. Thereafter I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism. (shrink)

Ačkoli v pozadí této knížky jsou odborné diskuse k problematice evropanství, kultury, civilizace, kulturní identity, ekologie a hranic i nových obzorů vědy a techniky, je poslední práce Otakara A. Fundy především "filosoficky laděným zamyšlením nad námi lidmi, nad naší planetou, nad naší civilizací, nad naší Evropou".

Výbor z vědeckého díla předního českého estetika, hudebního vědce, kritika a skladatele O. Zicha zahrnuje kromě dosud nepublikovaných univerzitních přednášek o hudební estetice (převážně z r. 1932) také rukopisnoua idealismus v hudbě. Do výboru byla zařazena i dvoudilná Zichova habilitační práce. Estetické vnímání hudby, která představuje důležitý mezník v Zichově vědeckém postoji.

Philosophical counseling is a helping profession that relates to the ancient concept of philosophy as a discipline with therapeutic potential. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence supporting the claim of therapeutic effects philosophy is supposed to have. Philosophical counselors do not have any exclusive methods – distinctive from the procedures used in psychotherapy – that we could find as sources of therapeutic effects. Philosophical counselors often do not understand the processes that generate therapeutic effects and mistakenly attribute these effects to (...) the usage of their philosophical “methods”. Lack of knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychiatry that philosophical counselors show begs the question whether philosophical counseling is not harmful in some cases. There is no reason to solve the issue of relationship between philosophy and psychotherapy by establishing separate field of philosophical counseling. Instead, the aim should be to help psychologists and prospective psychotherapists acquire proper philosophical competences – in terms of philosophical skills and knowledge. (shrink)

Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said (...) for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons. (shrink)

Although the production and recognition of social actions have been central concerns for conversation analysis from the outset, it has recently been argued that CA is yet to develop a systematic analysis of ‘action formation’. As a partial remedy to this situation, John Heritage introduces ‘epistemic status’, which he claims is an unavoidable component of the production and recognition of social action. His proposal addresses the question how is social action produced and recognized? by reference to another question how is (...) relative knowledge recognized? Despite the importance placed on the latter question, it is not clear how it is to be answered in particular cases. We argue that the introduction of epistemic status builds on a reformulation of the action formation problem that unnecessarily de-emphasizes the importance of the sequential environment. Our re-analyses of key sequences cast doubts on the empirical grounding of the epistemic program, and question whether the fundamental role of epistemic status has been convincingly demonstrated. (shrink)

Schlussfolgern setzt voraus, dass die schlussfolgernde Person sieht, dass ihre Konklusion aus den Prämissen folgt und sie sie deswegen aus den Prämissen herleitet. Dies hat Paul Boghossian jüngst als eine Bedingung für eine adäquate Erklärung des Schlussfolgerns formuliert. Jonas Held entwickelt eine Erklärung, die sich diese Bedingung zum Maßstab setzt. Zugleich greift er kritisch in die neuere Debatte zum Thema ein, in der der Vollzug einer Schlussfolgerung zumeist als kausale Abfolge mentaler Einstellungen verstanden wird. Indem er auf Immanuel Kants (...) Verständnis von Urteil und Schluss zurückgreift, weist Jonas Held diese Annahme zurück und entwickelt einen alternativen Erklärungsansatz. Der systematische Anspruch des Buches wird so zugleich historisch verortet und untermauert. (shrink)

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with (...) reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Let intentionalism be the view that what proposition is expressed in context by a sentence containing indexicals depends on the speaker’s intentions. It has recently been argued that intentionalism makes communicative success mysterious and that there are counterexamples to the intentionalist view in the form of cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct interpretation. In this paper, I argue that these objections can be met, once we acknowledge that we may distinguish what determines the correct interpretation (...) from the evidence that is available to the audience, as well as from the standards by which we judge whether or not a given interpretation is reasonable. With these distinctions in place, we see that intentionalism does not render communicative success mysterious, and that cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct one can easily be accommodated. The distinction is also useful in treating the Humpty Dumpty problem for intentionalism, since it turns out that this can be treated as an extreme special case of mismatch. (shrink)

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual (...) claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reasons); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons – and consequently no moral facts – in reality. I accept this version of moral error theory and I try to unpack what it amounts to in Section 2.1 In the course of doing so I consider two preliminary objections: that moral error theory is (probably) false because its implications are intuitively unacceptable (what I call the Moorean objection) and that the general motivation for moral error theory is self-undermining in that it rests on a hidden appeal to norms. The above characterization seems to entail the standard formulation of moral error theory, according to which first-order moral claims are uniformly false. Critics have argued that the standard formulation is incoherent since – by the law of excluded middle – the negation of a false claim is true. Hence if ‘Torture is wrong’ is false, ‘Torture is not wrong’ is true. Contrary to what moral error theorists contend, then, moral error theory seems to carry first-order moral implications that by the theory’s own lights are uniformly false. In Section 3 I suggest a formulation that is consistent with the standard formulation of moral error theory, free of first-order moral implications, and subject to no logical difficulties. In Section 4 I consider and rebut Stephen Finlay’s recent attack on moral error theory. According to Finlay the conceptual claim is false because all moral claims – and indeed all normative claims – are, or should be understood as, relativized to some moral standard or system of ends. Moral error theorists thus attribute to ordinary speakers an error that simply isn’t there. I argue that Finlay’s view has some very implausible implications and that it does not avoid commitment to various forms of error theory. This becomes especially clear when we focus on fundamental moral claims. In Section 5 I consider the worry that error theorists’ rejection of categorical reasons proves too much; in particular, the worry that error theorists’ qualms about categorical reasons apply equally to claims about hypothetical reasons, that is, claims to the effect that there is reason to take the means to one’s ends. In my view error theorists such as Mackie and Joyce have failed to pay due consideration to this problem. What the challenge establishes, I submit, is that error theorists cannot just take for granted that hypothetical reasons are metaphysically unproblematic; they must offer an account of hypothetical reasons that shows that they are. I argue that the only plausible account available to error theorists is one according to which claims about hypothetical reasons reduce to non-normative claims about relations between means and ends. (shrink)

We believe that an account of the role of mirror neurons in language evolution should involve a greater emphasis on the auditory properties of these neurons. Mirror neurons in premotor cortex which respond to the visual and auditory consequences of actions allow for a modality-independent and agent-independent coding of actions, which may have been important for the emergence of language.