Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 1) and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of (...) care is discussed. Within the clinical domain, we contrast epistemic injustice with epistemic privilege and authority. We then argue that testimonial and hermeneutic injustices also affect individuals with mental disorders not only when communicating with their caregivers but also in the social context as they attempt to reintegrate into the general society and assume responsibilities as productive citizens. Following the trend of the movement of mental health care to the community, the testimonies of people with mental disorders should not be restricted to issues involving their own personal mental states. (shrink)

Au cours du séminaire Arts, appareils et diffusion de la MSH de 2003-2004, furent explorés les rapports entre les appareils modernes projectifs et leurs époques, suivant une hypothèse benjaminienne : ce sont les appareils dits, au ...

This article seeks to show the interaction between cultural and anatomic evolution in the birth and differentiation of cultures and languages. The diversity which characterizes our world does not preclude logical regularities due to the coherence of the human mind, which evolved slowly through the paleontological phases of its emergence over millions of years. The anatomical retroaction of the hominids is analyzed to show that, in the long run, anatomy reflected ‘cultural selection’. With the anatomic evolution of man, culture became (...) a crucial component for all human beings and their anatomy simply adapted progressively to this fact. (shrink)

In this article I investigate Rowe's recent probabilistic argument from evil. By using muddy Venn diagrams to present his argument, we see that although his argument is fallacious, it can be modified in a way that strengthens it considerably. I then discuss the recent exchange between Rowe and Plantinga over this argument. Although Rowe's argument is not an argument from degenerate evidence as Plantinga claimed, it is problematic because it is an argument from partitioned evidence. I conclude by discussing the (...) modified argument and the epistemic framework Rowe is assuming in his argument. (shrink)

The concept of biodiversity has entered the law. Article intends to make the conceptual suppositions and the ethical profile of the biodiversity concept explicit. Article takes “biodiversity” as a hybrid concept located at the intersection of biological science, environmental ethics, and international conservation policies. It proceeds with sections on genealogy and definitions of the concept. Further, a matrix-scheme is construed serving the purpose to make debates on biodiversity more specific and precise. Moreover, different approaches in environmental ethics are assessed trying (...) to substantiate the conservation of biodiversity in its entirety (“all”), but mostly fail in the attempt. A “strong” sustainability approach, however, can justify the protection of many and most components. Finally, the dialectics of biodiversity is outlined. On the one hand, a method is outlined how to proceed in order to reach resonable judgements about conservation and utilization of specific components of biodiversity while, on the other hand, the philosophical dimension is taken into account. This philosophical dimension is two-fold: a) epistemology of living beings and b) biophilic existentialism. Finally, some open questions with respect to implementation of “biodiversity” into law are asked. (shrink)

In 1985, Swiss legal philosopher Walter Ott visited Herbert Hart in Oxford and made this record of their meeting, which casts novel light on some of Hart’s ideas. Ott engaged Hart in a fresh encounter with the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, particularly Hart’s and Radbruch’s reasons for a minimum content of justice in law. They also discussed the grudge informer, state responsibility under laws of an earlier régime, and questions of the definition and falsifiability of legal theories. Hart surprisingly (...) reported Hans Kelsen as stating, when they had met at Berkeley in 1961, that Hume (and not Kant, and certainly not Wittgenstein) was the greatest philosopher who had ever lived. The translation is accompanied with annotations explaining references, assumptions and contexts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christian Naturalism: Christian Thinking for Living in This World Only by Karl E. PetersDaniel J. OttChristian Naturalism: Christian Thinking for Living in This World Only. Karl E. Peters. Boston: Wipf & Stock, 2022. xvi + 152 pp. $25.00 paperback; $22.00 eBook; $40.00 hardcover.The number of scholars who would call themselves Christian naturalists and the number of books that think through what it means to be both Christian and (...) naturalist are quite small. Karl E. Peters has been an outstanding figure in this small group for many years. He is a leader in the science and religion dialogue in the United States and has been thinking theologically for a long time about what it means to be a Christian in an age of science. For these reasons, I was eager to read Peters’s Christian Naturalism as it promised to be a concise and systematic summary of his thinking about Christian Naturalist theology. What I found was a book that may have its uses but is not always successful in both its approach and its argumentation.Peters states in the Introduction that the book is “intentionally written for a general audience” (xi), and he maintains an accessible style and vocabulary throughout. Often, the book has an autobiographical quality as Peters weaves in reflection on his own educational journey in both science and theology. Chapters 1 and 3 helpfully lay out a brief comparison of ancient cosmologies and a contemporary scientific cosmology. Chapter 3 is a good example of some of the interesting heuristics that Peters uses throughout as he tells the story of the beginnings of the universe and the emergence of life on Earth in a first-person narrative. The rest of the book proceeds in brief and accessible treatments of categories one would typically find in theology primers: God, Jesus, evil and sin, salvation, ethics, and after death. The remainder of this review will take up two of these categories: 1) evil, sin, and ethics and 2) after death. The former will serve as an example of the book’s relative weaknesses and the latter as an example of the book’s promise and usefulness.“Human Evil,” chapter 4, begins promisingly. Peters builds on an earlier introduction to the idea that we can associate “God” with the creative processes at work in the universe or with creativity itself. Here, Peters argues that being faithful to creativity becomes the norm for Christian faith and morality. “So, being moral means sustaining the well-being of already created dynamic systems and at the same time being open to creativity (God) and the emergence of new systems” (42). Perhaps these arguments would be better positioned at the [End Page 97] beginning of a chapter on morality and ethics rather than the chapter on evil and sin, though, especially since the corollary definition of sin doesn’t come for another twenty-four pages. There, Peters explains that “sin (the Christian term for human evil) is the attempt to limit the work of creativity (God) and to limit what is included in the family of life that arises from the work of creativity (God)” (66). These two definitions taken together offer one of the most theologically pregnant ideas in the book. Unfortunately, they are not pursued and applied in a systematic way throughout the remainder of this chapter and into chapters 7 and 8 on ethics and Christian practice. What we get, instead, is a collection of reflections on various ethical topics including: racism, xenophobia, sexism, and climate change.Perhaps if these sections were retitled “Karl’s Reflections on Wrestling with White, Male Privilege,” the reader would have the right expectation and their usefulness would reemerge. But as they stand they often lose the thread of their connections to his theological definitions and sometimes slip into problematic assumptions. The latter is exhibited when Peters employs the first-person again, this time in reference to certain social histories, as when “you and I” migrated from north Africa to the Caucasus Mountains (47), or when “you and I arrived in America from England in 1630” (58). The assumed “you” seems to be white, male people of anglo origin and therefore cuts... (shrink)

Charles Chihara has presented a problem he claims Bayesian confirmation theory cannot handle. Chihara gives examples in which he claims the change in belief cannot be construced as conditionalizing on new evidence. These are situations in which the agent suddenly thinks of new possibilities. I propose a solution that incorporates the important ideas of Bayesian theory. In particular, I present a principle which shows that the change of belief in Chihara's example is due to simple conditionalization.

The so-called structuralistic view of theory-formation is applied to the discourse-theory of normative validity in order to shed some light on the relation between the core and some basic application of discourse ethics. First, metatheoretical notions as core, model and intended paradigmatic applications will be introduced. Second, the two supreme principles of discourse ethics will be justified and a basic model will be explained. Two possibilities to define the very core of this ethical theory will be distinguished. In the following (...) section, special attention is given to three paradigmatic applications of the theory. It is argued for the moral validity of some basic norms of action including several types of moral and legal rights. The article ends up with a discussion on conceptual modifications which are due to the enlargement of the scope of discourse ethics and with some brief remarks on the state of discourse ethics being a comprehensive ethical theory. (shrink)

The dynamics of the historical growth of mathematics as well as natural science is reflected by the interaction of the continuity principle and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Aristotle, for example on the one side is responsible for introducing the continuity principle into natural history. On the other hand he is regarded as the great representative of a logic which rests upon the assumption of the possibility of clear divisions and rigorous classification. In modern times the Aristotelian antithesis (...) presents itself in the problem of the concept of mechanical motion, and its mathematical formulation by means of the function concept. Leibniz' philosophy provides a differentiated and broad picture of the problem in which both principles play a major role. To talk of these means, according to Gueroult, "to take a central perspective from which one can perceive the unity of this colossal world of ideas as well as the sometimes contradictory components inherent in it". The contradictory elements alluded to here are I believe strongly related to the difference between philosophical and positive thought. Within positive scientific thought the continuity principle ranks very prominently, whereas the real importance of the principium indiscernibilium gets into view only from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

This paper investigates the differences between two conceptions of causation which are claimed to amount for causation in indeterministic situations. Recent analyses of indeterministic causation have been based upon mark transmission, and upon probability relations. Both types of analyses were proposed by Reichenbach, who claimed that they were extensionally equivalent. I demonstrate that they are not equivalent, and discuss some implications of this for models of scientific explanation.

In this chapter probability and confirmation theory are used to investigate the problem of evil, concentrating on whether a theist should consider our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil to support a non-religious alternative over a typical theist's beliefs. It is argued that according to Likelihoodism, our ignorance of a good reason does not favor a competing hypothesis over the religious view that there is an incomprehensible good reason for God to permit evil. Bayesian accounts of (...) comparative confirmation, which are alternatives to Likelihoodism, have the same result. Furthermore, according to both Likelihoodism and Bayesian accounts of contrastive confirmation, our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil may actually support typical religious beliefs over the alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.

I claim that Berkeley's main argument against abstraction comes into focus only when we see Descartes as one of its targets. Berkeley does not deploy Winkler's impossibility argument but instead argues that what is impossible is inconceivable. Since Descartes conceives of extension as a determinable, and since determinables cannot exist as such, he falls within the scope of Berkeley's argument.

In Human Nature, Hobbes argues for what I call the ‘Great Deception Thesis’: “whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only.” I argue that both the thesis and Hobbes’ arguments for it have been misunderstood. Rather than arguing for indirect realism or a primary/secondary quality distinction, Hobbes claims that no sensory experience resembles its object. I conclude by showing how Hobbes can account for the (...) usefulness of images even in the absence of any resemblance between those images and the objects that cause them. If I am right, Hobbes presents a distinctive and intriguing theory of perception, one that emphasizes the dynamic nature of experience. (shrink)

How much is given in perceptual experience, and how much must be constructed? John Locke's answer to this question contains two prima facie incompatible strands. On the one hand, he claims that ideas of primary qualities come to us passively, through multiple senses: the idea of a sphere can be received either by sight or touch. On the other hand, Locke seemingly thinks that a faculty he calls “judgment” is needed to create visual ideas of three‐dimensional shapes. How can these (...) accounts be made consistent? The problem comes to a head in the discussion of Molyneux's problem: can a person born blind and then made to see identify a sphere and a cube, when he had only touched them in the past? Locke's answer is no, but, as George Berkeley points out, it is hard to see why: if the ideas of shapes come to us through sight as well as touch, nothing should stop Molyneux man from instantly recognizing sphere and cube. Pace much of the existing literature, I argue that although Locke does think we receive visual ideas of primary qualities, the faculty of judgment is required to “inflate” those ideas into three dimensions and to correct for other perspectival distortions. I then show how this answer is consistent with the rest of his theory of perception. (shrink)

The popular Cartesian reading of George Berkeley's philosophy of mind mischaracterizes his views on the relations between substance and essence and between an idea and the act of thought in which it figures. I argue that Berkeley rejects Descartes's tripartite taxonomy of distinctions and makes use of a fourth kind of distinction. In addition to illuminating Berkeley's ontology of mind, this fourth distinction allows us to dissolve an important dilemma raised by Kenneth Winkler.

Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas ...

On a currently popular reading of Locke, an idea represents its cause, or what God intended to be its cause. Against Martha Bolton and my former self (among others), I argue that Locke cannot hold such a view, since it sins against his epistemology and theory of abstraction. I argue that Locke is committed to a resemblance theory of representation, with the result that ideas of secondary qualities are not representations.

This book analyses some of the seminal texts of the Chinese tradition and shows how they exemplify aspects of embodiment theory: the Analects of Confucius, the Zhuangzi, and the Treatise on Music. Margus Ott also develops far-reaching possibilities of an embodied philosophy. The embodied understanding did not go unchallenged in Ancient China. There were important counter-currents, most notably the Mohists and the so-called Legalists. By using embodiment theory Ott demonstrates how these ideas can be seen as a decontextualizing tendency of (...) thought that plays an important role in human affairs. (shrink)

BackgroundThe proper and ethical inclusion of PWLHIV and their young children in research is paramount to ensure valid evidence is generated to optimize treatment and care. Little empirical data exists to inform ethical considerations deemed most critical to these populations. Our study aimed to systematically review the empiric literature regarding ethical considerations for research participation of PWLHIV and their young children.MethodsWe conducted this systematic review in partnership with a medical librarian. A search strategy was designed and performed within the following (...) electronic databases: Ovid MEDLINE, Embase and CINAHL. We screened titles and abstracts using the following inclusion criteria: (1) a study population of PWLHIV or children under 5 years of age; and (2) collection of qualitative or quantitative data regarding ethics of research participation. Excluded were reviews, commentaries, policy statements, clinical care-related ethics concerns, abstracts, case studies, or studies unrelated to HIV research. Studies were appraised for quality, data were extracted, and studies were qualitatively analyzed using a principle-based ethical framework within the Belmont Report.ResultsOf the 7470 titles identified, 538 full-text articles were reviewed for eligibility and only three articles met full criteria for inclusion within this review. While we allowed for inclusion of studies involving young children born to mothers with HIV, only articles focused on PWLHIV were identified. Within the results of these studies, four themes emerged: (1) adequacy of informed consent; (2) consideration of paternal involvement; (3) balancing risks; and (4) access to research and treatment. A strength of this review is that it included perspectives of international research investigators, community leaders, and male partners. However, only two studies collected empiric data from PWLHIV regarding their experiences participating in researchConclusionResearchers and funding agencies should be aware of these considerations and appreciate the value of and critical need for formative research to ensure clinical trials involving PWLHIV promote ethical, well-informed research participation and, ultimately, improve care outcomes. More research is needed to create a comprehensive ethical framework for researchers when conducting studies with PWLHIV. (shrink)

Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the attitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.