Since its publication in 1959, Individuals has become a modern philosophical classic. Bold in scope and ambition, it continues to influence debates in metaphysics, philosophy of logic and language, and epistemology. Peter Strawson's most famous work, it sets out to describe nothing less than the basic subject matter of our thought. It contains Strawson's now famous argument for descriptive metaphysics and his repudiation of revisionary metaphysics, in which reality is something beyond the world of appearances. Throughout, Individuals advances some highly (...) influential and controversial ideas, such as 'non-solipsistic consciousness' and the concept of a person a 'primitive concept'. (shrink)

The author is primarily concerned with the explanation of behavior in regard to (1) the mecanical model, (2) the effects of physical-organic processes on behavior, (3) the lack of understanding between philosophers and psychologists as to sufficient conditions for predicting a behavioral event, (4) conditions leading to expalantions of behavior that could predict behavior exclusive of any antecedent psychological behavior, and (5) variations of the mechanical-model introducing differing sorts of explanation. (staff).

We study a notion of ‘o-amorphous’ which bears the same relationship to ‘o-minimal’ as ‘amorphous’ 191–233) does to ‘strongly minimal’. A linearly ordered set is said to be o-amorphous if its only subsets are finite unions of intervals. This turns out to be a relatively straightforward case, and we can provide a complete ‘classification’, subject to the same provisos as in Truss . The reason is that since o-amorphous is an essentially second-order notion, it corresponds more accurately to 0-categorical o-minimal, (...) and our classification is thus very similar to the one given in 565–592) for that case. More interesting structures arise if we replace ‘interval’ in the definition by ‘convex set’, giving us the class of weakly o-amorphous sets. Here, in fact, there are so many examples that a complete classification seems out of the question. We illustrate some of the structures which these may exhibit, and classify them in certain instances not too far removed from the o-amorphous case. (shrink)

A set is said to be amorphous if it is infinite, but cannot be written as the disjoint union of two infinite sets. The possible structures which an amorphous set can carry were discussed in [5]. Here we study an analogous notion at the next level up, that is to say replacing finite/infinite by countable/uncountable, saying that a set is quasi-amorphous if it is uncountable, but is not the disjoint union of two uncountable sets, and every infinite subset has a (...) countably infinite subset. We use the Fraenkel–Mostowski method to give many examples showing the diverse structures which can arise as quasi-amorphous sets, for instance carrying a projective geometry, or a linear ordering, or both; reconstruction results in the style of [1] are harder to come by in this case. (shrink)

This paper argues against the common, often implicit view that theories are some specific kind of thing. Instead, I argue for theory concept pluralism: There are multiple distinct theory concepts which we legitimately use in different domains and for different purposes, and we should not expect this to change. The argument goes by analogy with species concept pluralism, a familiar position in philosophy of biology. I conclude by considering some consequences for philosophy of science if theory concept pluralism is correct.

Upshot: Time constraints, locked curriculums, strict management, and possible anarchy in the classroom are some of the themes that originated from the commentaries. I argue that these challenges should be viewed holistically in the broader picture. I also question the educator’s role in mitigating these obstacles. My advice: Do it anyway.

The weak objectification of physical properties is shown to yield the same probabilistic implications as strong objectification and can therefore be refuted on the basis of suitable interference experiments. An alternative test of hypothetical objectification statements, as they occur in the EPR experiment, is based on joint probabilities and the ensuing Bell inequalities. Quantum mechanics turns out to be partially compatible with Bell's inequalities even in cases where weak objectification is excluded by interference.

The arrival of democracy in Ukraine in the 1990s was regarded by Christians as special opportunities in the development of spirituality. Church members, pastors, presbyters went to school and began to teach kindness, talk about God, and lay the foundations of religious ethics. All denominations participated in it. Who is more, who is less, but each did as he saw fit. The Seventh-day Adventist Church also participated in this. An extensive network of teachers, their training, and special textbooks were introduced. (...) There were sponsors who supported this ministry financially. All this was done in a semi-legal manner, based on personal contacts. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background The Tractatus The role of the Tractatus in the history of analytic philosophy The collapse of the Tractatus vision The Philosophical Investigations Philosophy of language Philosophy of mind The critique of metaphysics and nature of philosophy Wittgenstein's place in postwar analytic philosophy Notes Bibliography.

The physical world consists of relatively enduring objects that exist in an objective spatiotemporal framework, that consist of matter of one kind or another, and that interact with each other in physical processes and events. In the course of his reflections on the idea of a private language, and more generally in his ruminations on psychology and the philosophy of psychology, Wittgenstein subjected the traditional philosophical picture to critical scrutiny. In every respect he found it a distortion of grammar in (...) the flawed mirror of metaphysics. The concept of pain‐location is parasitic on the concept of the sufferer from pain, for the location of a pain is where the sufferer points and where he avows it is. Frege presented the idea that pains (experiences in general) are inalienably owned by the person whose pains or experiences they are as a metaphysical insight into the essential nature of things. (shrink)

In reviewing Ellis' OCT of Catullus, Housman scorned the ‘diction and metre’ of Carm. 64.37, ‘Pharsaliam coeunt, Pharsalia tecta frequentant’. Yet several subsequent editors have agreed with Ellis and have also refrained from emending Pharsaliam. Even if there has not been enough discomfort with the MS reading to put some editors off retaining it, they might yet welcome a piece of positive evidence to support this decision. I will make the case that a passage in Statius' Achilleid may indicate that (...) the later poet was familiar with the line as the MSS have it. (shrink)