The paper defends the thesis that phenomenological methods can play key role in explications of the transformation reasons of philosophical images of science. It can be made by the comparative analysis among phenomenology and other approaches revealing strong and weaknesses of separate approaches. Such principles of an explication of the transformation reasons of philosophical images of science were allocated: 1) the science is a set of the idealizing consciousness attitudes which allow to build images of (...) the world in borders of regional ontologies (or «particular ways of understanding of reality»);2) idealizing attitudes correspond to the comprehension of intentionality experiences structures; 3) the general transformation reason of images of science is the change of consciousness attitudes. (shrink)

"Churchland and Hooker have collected ten papers by prominent philosophers of science which challenge van Fraassen's thesis from a variety of realist perspectives. Together with van Fraassen's extensive reply... these articles provide a comprehensive picture of the current debate in philosophy of science between realists and anti-realists."—Jeffrey Bub and David MacCallum, Foundations of Physics Letters.

So much of the history of science has been written from the point of view of the scientist or the proto-scientist that it may be salutary for the modern reader occasionally to consider how science and its early practitioners were viewed from the outside. We must not be too surprised if a pioneering activity performed by controversial agents was misunderstood or misrepresented and if what emerges is, therefore, sometimes less of a portrait than a caricature. We are concerned (...) here much less with what natural philosophers actually did than what they were thought to have done, or what they were thought to stand for. The image is sometimes more influential than the reality. Considering that the period to be studied is one of major political and social unrest and that the principal spokesman, Edmund Burke (1729–1797), had made his reputation mainly in the arena of parliamentary politics, we can anticipate rather more polemic than dispassionate argument. In the formation of public opinion a colourful exaggeration or even an occasional sneer are often more effective than the objective exposition of a case. The spectacles through which Burke looked at his world sometimes magnified and often distorted, but they produced a view of knowledge and society shared by many of his contemporaries and of considerable subsequent influence. (shrink)

An important question facing contemporary philosophy of science is whether the natural sciences in terms of their historical records exhibit distinguishing developmental patterns or structures. At least two philosophical stances are possible in answering this question. The first pertains to the plurality of the individual sciences. From this stance, the various sciences are analyzed individually and compared with one another in order to derive potential commonalities, if any, among them. The second stance involves a general philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>science in which a thorough theory of the natural sciences is developed. The latter stance strives to account for more than possible commonalities among the sciences but also to provide a broad-spectrum philosophical framework to account for, or to explicate, the nature of science itself and its progress. In this paper, the second stance is taken in which an evolutionary philosophy of science is proposed. To that end, Thomas Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science is initially discussed and critiqued. An evolutionary philosophy of science is then proposed based on a revision of Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science in terms of George Gaylord Simpson’s various tempos and modes for biological evolution. Next, two historical case studies from the biological sciences are reconstructed to illustrate the robustness of the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science for explicating the progress of the natural sciences. A concluding section discusses the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science with respect to providing a broad-spectrum framework or general philosophy of science for understanding the nature and progress of the natural sciences. (shrink)

The philosophical analysis of chemistry has advanced at such a pace during the last dozen years that the existence of philosophy of chemistry as an autonomous discipline cannot be doubted any more. The present paper will attempt to analyse the experience of philosophy of chemistry at the, so to say, meta-level. Philosophers of chemistry have especially stressed that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have tried to argue for chemistry as its own type of science (...) and for a pluralistic understanding of science in general. However, when stressing the specific character of chemistry, philosophers do not always analyse the question ‘What is science?’ theoretically. It is obvious that a ‘monistic’ understanding of science should not be based simply on physics as the epitome of science, regarding it as a historical accident that physics has obtained this status. The author’s point is that the philosophical and methodological image of science should not be chosen arbitrarily; instead, it should be theoretically elaborated as an idealization (theoretical model) substantiated on the historical practice of science. It is argued that although physics has, in a sense, justifiably obtained the status of a paradigm of science, chemistry, which is not simply a physical science, but a discipline with a dual character, is also relevant for elaborating a theoretical model of science. The theoretical model of science is a good tool for examining various issues in philosophy of chemistry as well as in philosophy of science or science studies generally. (shrink)

Azarya Polikarov was born in Sofia on October 9, 1921. Through the many stages of politics, economy, and culture in Bulgaria, he maintained his rational humanity and scientific curiosity. He has been a splendid teacher and an accomplished critical philosopher exploring the conceptual and historical vicis situdes of physics in modern times and also the science policies that favor or threaten human life in these decades. Equally and easily at home both within the Eastern and Central European countries and (...) within the Western world. Polikarov is known as a collaborating genial colleague, a working scholar. not at all a visiting academic tourist. He understands the philosophy of science from within, in all its developments, from the classical beginnings through the great ages of Galilean, Newtonian. Maxwellian science. to the times of the stunning discoveries and imaginative theories of his beloved Einstein and Bohr of the twentieth century. Moreover, his understanding has come along with a deep knowledge of the scientific topics in themselves. Looking at our Appendix listing his principal publications, we see that Polikarov's public research career, after years of science teaching and popular science writing, began in the fifties in Bulgarian, Russian and German journals. (shrink)

In this essay, I provide a reconstruction of the history of and surrounding the bust of Kant, together with its plaque, which jointly compose the monument created in honor of the sage of Königsberg at the Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences (FAFICH) of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. In so doing, I have the following aims: first, to examine the relationship between the monument and the ideas that guided the creation of the Faculty (...) of Philosophy of Minas Gerais by one of its founders, Prof. Arthur Versiani Velloso; second, to highlight and register the authorship of this work by the plastic artist Frederico Bracher Júnior, as an important part of Kant’s international and indeed truly cosmopolitan iconography. (shrink)

The study presents the Russian historical-philosophical process in the context of the discovery of a new object, themes, personae, set of reactions and formation of a product for the intellectual community. The author's reliance on philosophical empirical material and appropriate hermeneutics in its processing allows the author to highlight those factors that influenced individual and collective reception. The author sees as a convenient case study the “discovery” by the Russian philosophical community of the early 20th century of (...) both American philosophy in general and C.S. Peirce in particular. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russian thinkers have turned their attention to American philosophy in all the diversity of its manifestations. Russian intellectuals paid special attention to American pragmatism and everything associated with it. In Russia, in addition to translations, numerous reviews of foreign publications on this topic are appearing. Of particular interest to us in the Russian “collective reflection” of American ideas is the system of preferences for ideas, texts, events, and names. The point is that what might have been a priority for a European thinker, for a Russian one turned out to be on the “periphery” of his consciousness, as well as vice versa. While James appeared among the priority figures for Russian thinkers, Peirce was in his “shadow”. Using rich empirical material, the author shows all the stages of Peirce’s image formation in the Russian intellectual community. The research shows that “image” of Peirce, which represents not so much the thinker himself, but characterizes the intellectual community that turned to him. The results of the study may be useful both for contemporary foreign and Russian interpreters of Peirce and for historians of philosophy who are rethinking the past and forming in the present new objects of reception and reflection. (shrink)

The main purpose of article is representation of conceptual introduction to a cycle of the future researches devoted to reconstruction of phenomenological views on processes of creation of images of science. That purpose is achieved as a result of detection of key features (the conceptual bases) of pre-phenomenological and phenomenological ways of a reflection of science. Research leans on a method of the comparative analysis. Classical and non-classical variant of creation of images of science were compared. Members (...) of classical philosophy assumed that there is a way to present science in an image of unity of knowledge. Such image could be valid without any exceptions. Since works of Neo-kantianism, modern philosophy has developed the idea that creation of a uniform image of science is problematic. The phenomenology keeps classical idea of unity of images of science, but the unity is interpreted as a complex of «comprehension» intensions of consciousness. Such complex of intensions gives the horizon of judgment of each of images of science in terms of their relations to concrete subject domain. Theoretical value of the work consists in identification of conditions under which phenomenological approach leads to institutionalization of the pluralistic image of science. As a result research leads to the original conclusion that the problem of phenomenology consists in constituting a pluralistic image of science. (shrink)

How can human experience, vibrant with colours, sounds, flavours, emotions and meanings, arise from the skeletal dance of matter depicted in the physical sciences? Today the mind-body problem confronts not only metaphysicians and moral philosophers, but also workers in the fields of cognitive science, artificial intelligence and neuroscience. Paul Marshall offers a radical solution to the mind-body problem by rejecting the idea of a purely material world and asserting instead the primacy of experience. As many have recognized before, experience (...) is not reducible to material bodies and processes alone. Marshall goes a step further and suggests that the matter investigated by modern science corresponds to structural features of an experiential universe that supports and includes our familiar experiences. Utilizing clues furnished by mystical experience and responding to a challenge posed by the physics of motion, Marshall takes up Leibniz's philosophy of 'living mirrors' and arrives at a holistic world-picture that has suggestive links with quantum physics and the visionary cosmologies of East and West. (shrink)

Sellars (1962) contains some of the most important metaphilosophical reflections from the analytic tradition. He insightfully describes the relationship between philosophy and science, by identifying the philosophical task of integrating the manifest image into the scientific image. But while this description is sound, it is importantly incomplete. Here, I first suggest that a more complete picture shows philosophy in “superposition” in relation to science; philosophy occuplies multiple positions in relation to science, owing to the (...) variegated tasks that philosophers pursue. In the final section, we shall see that our catalogue of philosophical tasks provides means for confronting that obstinate question “How is metaphysics possible?”. (shrink)

Of all the scientific disciplines chemistry seems to be particularly concerned about its public image. Indeed, popular associations with chemistry range from poisons, hazards, chemical warfare, and environmental pollution to alchemical pseudo-science, sorcery, and mad scientists. Despite repeated campaigns for convincing the public that chemistry would bring health, comfort, and welfare, chemists frequently meet with hostility in popular culture. As student enrollment numbers has been shrinking, chemistry departments have been closed in several countries. Also in humanist culture chemistry (...) has a very low profile; philosophers in particular keep to their traditional neglect of anything related to chemistry. Of course, chemists have always been complaining about their low prestige, the lack of public acknowledgment of their achievements, and the misguiding popular associations with chemistry, such that we now have a long record of complaints of almost two centuries. More recently, in response to their public image, chemists have tried to launch slogans such as ‘green chemistry’ or even dropped the term ‘chemistry’ altogether and adopted more fashionable labels such as ‘materials science’, ‘molecular science’, or ‘nanotechnology’. Surprisingly or not, chemists have never translated their complaints into serious research programs to understand the public image of chemistry in its cultural and historical contexts. To be sure, chemical societies and, particularly, the chemical industry have commissioned many reports for promotional or marketing purposes. Yet, such reports usually scratch only on the surface and may well have recommended one or the other camouflage tactics. Even the recent boost of academic research in Public Understanding of Science (PUS) has virtually excluded chemistry and, instead, focused on topics such as ‘Frankenfood’ and genetic engineering. The failure to deal with chemistry in PUS studies is more serious than the traditional neglect in the humanities, because stereotypes of chemistry have dominated the popular image of science in general.. (shrink)

The article continues to study the topic of the uprising of the image of the Kyiv philosophical school as a prominent leading Ukrainian participant in the world philosophical process of the Cold War period in the scientific and socio-political thought of the Western block, especially in the USA, Canada and Western Germany, in the second half of the twentieth century. The history of the formation of this image by scholars of the democratic world, mainly from the (...) Ukrainian diaspora, can be conditionally divided into the following stages: 1. Scientific international interaction between the USSR and the Western bloc during the transition of the USSR from Khrushchew's "thaw" to neo-Stalinist "stagnation" (early 1960s – early 1970s); 2. Intensification of the ideological confrontation between the USSR and the Western bloc countries during transition of the USSR from said "stagnation" to Gorbachev's "perestroika" (early1970s – second half of the 1980s). In contrast to the first separate critical assessments by diaspora philosophers P. Fedenko, D. Soloviy and their colleagues of philosophy in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1950s and early 1960s, primarily articles of T. Shevcenko by the director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR D. Ostryanin (1952 – 1962), the image of the Kyiv philosophical school in the 1970s and 1980s was significantly emphasized abroad. The political aspect of this image, dominant in which became, primarily due to its popularization by the Canadian philosopher T. Zakydalsky, the figure of a prisoner of conscience V. Lisovyi, was supplemented in the same and subsequent decades by the scientific aspect. In the memoirs of the Soviet prisoner of conscience and political immigrant L. Plyushch and in the publications of scientists from the US M. H. Teeter and B. Vitvitsky the image of the said school was generally drawn on the basis of their study of the history of the mentioned institute and the directions of its work in the 1940s – 1970s. At the same time, philosophers of the Ukrainian diaspora K. Mytrovych, W. Oleksiuk, W. Shayan and some their colleagues critically assessed the Ukrainian historical and philosophical achievements of this institute in the 1950s and 1980s. (shrink)

Philosophy of science has characterized scientific knowledge as fundamentally propositional . This account leads to an inability to recognize and articulate the significant role of non-propositional, visual representation in the practice of science. Toward the development of a more productive framework for understanding visual representation in science, the present study critiques the standard philosophical view, reviews the literature on visual representation in science, and examines the scientific case of neuroscience. Specifically, the study looks at current (...) research known as "functional mapping of the human brain" which uses neuroimaging technologies such as positron emission tomography in the localization of particular functions in the human brain. This case study suggests that, contrary to previous accounts in philosophy of science, visual representation and propositional representation work together as parallel, interacting, interwoven practices in the discovery/construction of scientific knowledge. Visual representations are not reduced to--translated into--linguistic and mathematical propositions, but instead are used in their multidimensional forms. The present study focuses on the external, materialized visual representations used in the practice of science, as opposed to internal, mental images that might be studied by cognitive psychology. Several hypotheses are proposed which describe aspects of the role of these visual representations in the practice of science. These include the following: a primary function of visual representation is the representation of structure which is made possible by the use of actual space in the process of visual representation; visual comparisons among visual representations of real objects and processes, visual representations of theoretical models, and visual representations of integrations of the two are used to assess the fit of the theoretical models to the real objects and processes; the construction of visual prototypes or prototypical visual representations of objects of scientific research are used to categorize and stabilize--hold stationary for the purposes of scientific examination--such objects; and the construction of material models make it possible for scientists to interact with and/or manipulate materialized structures as representations of real systems. (shrink)

Thanks to the development of modern technologies, there is a feeling that the machine can do anything: write a pseudoscientific article, perform household chores, and remind us of important things. Questions arise: what can't the machine do? What does it mean to be human today? The article examines the versions of how the border between the human and non-human in a person is interpreted in fiction. Such variations of "artificial man" as golem, robot, and artificial intelligence are studied. Created from (...) different materials and animated by different methods, these creatures reflect different ideas about who a person is. We propose two approaches to the idea of creating a "man — artificial man" — mythological and natural science, supported by posthumanist philosophy. The deanthropologizing tendency in literary works anticipates the logic of transhumanism. A person is reduced either to a biological datum (a set of genes, a game of hormones, neural connections), or to intelligence, competing with artificial intelligence and inevitably suffering defeat. The anthropological approach in works of art continues the mythological tradition. Man is thought of as a being endowed with consciousness, which is not reducible to the world. "Artificial man" is a double, an antipode, another, that is, absolutely different, in relation to which a person can establish his own identity. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the pragmatist image of humanity based on a re-reading of the philosophical “manifesto” of Wilfrid Sellars in which he became entangled in the dichotomy between “scientific” and “manifest” images. The key to solving this problem, according to the author, is the new pragmatist understanding of science as a cultural practice, which provide us with a new framework for transcending this dichotomy. By reconstructing Sellars in an anthropological rather than a scientistic way and by (...) drawing on humanistic philosophical intentions that are present both in pragmatism and in Sellars, it becomes possible to outline a concept of “science with a human face.” The purpose of all kinds of images, including scientific ones, is to serve the enrichment of human understanding and life. (shrink)

A considerable group of contemporary philosophers and theologians—including those engaged in the science-theology dialogue, such as Barbour, Clayton, Davies, and Peacocke—supports panentheism, i.e., a theistic position which assumes that the world is in God, who is yet greater than everything he created. They see it as a balanced middle ground between the positions of classical theism and pantheism. In this article, I offer a presentation and a critical evaluation of the most fundamental principles of panentheism from the point of (...) view of classical theism. First, I list six main species of panentheism and the motivations of those who support it. In the second part, I analyze the three main difficulties concerning its ontological and theological principles, i.e., (1) the meaning of the preposition ‘in’ (_en_) in ‘pan_en_theism’; (2) the accuracy of panentheistic definition of divine immanence, and (3) the question of whether panentheism is successful in protecting God’s transcendence. I conclude that panentheism fails as a Christian theistic position. Nevertheless, it might still be valuable and play an important role in addressing the cognitive drama of the modern human beings, often seduced by secular (scientific) or spiritual naturalism, or pantheism. (shrink)

The article is devoted to philosophical anthropology in the works of Russian religious thinkers of the 20 th century during their period of emigration. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the main approaches to understanding human nature and its image in the philosophy of Russia abroad. The article identifies a common direction in the development of anthropological concepts, despite individual differences in the views of Russian religious philosophers. The review and analysis begin with the personalism of N.A. (...) Berdyaev, who considered the problem of man to be central to philosophy. In his work The Fate of Man in the Modern World, Berdyaev offered a personal understanding of the new epoch of the 20 th century and proposed his own project of Christian anthropology. His intellectual ally, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, in the book The Ethics of Transfigured Eros, developed an interpretation of anthropological ideas based on an original understanding of the conscious and unconscious in man. Vysheslavtsev extended his ethical framework by introducing the concept of self-knowledge, which he considers the essence of a creative personality. The article further examines the book Reality and Man by S.L. Frank, which provides a comprehensive view of this philosopher’s anthropological beliefs. The foundation for Frank’s anthropology is the idea of personal being, which has been substantiated and developed in Christian thought. L.P. Karsavin developed anthropology from the perspective of the philosophy of all-unity, understanding individual personality as dependent on higher (“symphonic”) personalities. He fully incorporated the doctrine of personality into the metaphysics of all-unity, in which the Trinity serves as the main principle in the development of the entire created world. The last section of the article delves into an analysis of anthropological ideas as presented in the works of V.V. Zenkovsky. In his work Principles of Orthodox Anthropology, Zenkovsky built his argument on the image of God found in human consciousness and justified an anthropological ideal grounded in church doctrine and Orthodox theology. According to the author of the article, all the considered thinkers of Russia abroad recognized the significance of philosophical anthropology and the need for its further substantiation in the context of the Christian worldview. (shrink)

This paper argues that the AI ethics has generally neglected the issues related to the science communication of AI. In particular, the article focuses on visual communication about AI and, more specifically, on the use of certain stock images in science communication about AI — in particular, those characterized by an excessive use of blue color and recurrent subjects, such as androgyne faces, half-flesh and half-circuit brains, and variations on Michelangelo’s The Creation of Adam. In the first section, (...) the author refers to a “referentialist” ethics of science communication for an ethical assessment of these images. From this perspective, these images are unethical. While the ethics of science communication generally promotes virtues like modesty and humility, similar images are arrogant and overconfident. In the second section, the author uses French philosopher Jacques Rancière’s concepts of “distribution of the sensible,” “disagreement,” and “pensive image.” Rancière’s thought paves the way to a deeper critique of these images of AI. The problem with similar images is not their lack of reference to the “things themselves.” It rather lies in the way they stifle any possible forms of disagreement about AI. However, the author argues that stock images and other popular images of AI are not a problem per se, and they can also be a resource. This depends on the real possibility for these images to support forms of pensiveness. In the conclusion, the question is asked whether the kind of ethics or politics of AI images proposed in this article can be applied to AI ethics tout court. (shrink)

The word “samurai” firmly rooted in the modern Russian language, along with Fujiyama, geisha and sakura. Though obviously this was not always the case. This article traces the initial process of perceiving the concept of samurai in pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union: from the 1890s, from the first military victories of rapidly modernizing Japan, to the RussoJapanese War and further to the beginning of the Second World War. Initially endowed with features of “childishness” or “femininity,” gentleness and grace, the (...) image of Japan is gradually becoming “masculine” and is increasingly associated with the concept of “samurai.” At first, this concept is related to such qualities as belligerence and cruelty but also loyalty to lord and “knightly” honor. Often, following Nitobe Inazo, the best qualities of the Japanese are generally traced back to the samurai tradition. Later, the Japanese appear in an increasingly caricature form, as greedy but powerless aggressors. At first, this image is not associated with the concept of “samurai” but by the 1930s fused with it. At the same time, Soviet authors criticize the “feminine” perception of Japan – they describe both the ruling exploiter and the exploited worker with “masculine” traits. The article examines the early Japanese borrowings in Russian dictionaries of foreign words, the images of the Japanese in the writings of Russian and Soviet writers, the characteristics of the country and its inhabitants in popular editions devoted to Japan as well as in propaganda texts and pictures. (shrink)

This article will explore different images of nature and their implications for the meaning of life in the face of death. First we will elaborate on life as creation, as expressed by Francis of Assisi in his Canticle of the Sun, and see how the imaginative power of this story gives meaning to life and death. Then we will go into the evolutionary approach of life by Richard Dawkins. In his work a totally different significance of finitude becomes visible: death (...) as a necessary segment in the development of life. The philosopher Leo Apostel states that an intellectual/scientific understanding of death is not enough; we need to explore our emotional response to the universe in order to be able to create meaning and value. The work of the biologist Ursula Goodenough and the philosopher Ton Lemaire are discussed as examples of such an affective admiration of life and death based on scientific knowledge. In the end I will conclude that scientific insights give us a lot of information about human beings as concerns their nature and the inevitability of death. But how we can affectively value and give meaning to life in the face of death is still an open question which cannot be answered by science alone. (shrink)

What is science and what can it do? Nancy Cartwright here takes issue with three common images of science: that it amounts to the combination of theory and experiment; that all science is basically reducible to physics; and that science and the natural world which it pictures are deterministic. The author's innovative and thoughtful book draws on examples from the physical, life, and social sciences alike, and focuses on all the products of science – not (...) just experiments or theories – and how they work together. She reveals just what it is that makes science ultimately reliable, and how this reliability is nevertheless still compatible with a view of nature as more responsive to human change than we might think. Her book is a call for greater intellectual humility by and within scientific institutions. It will have strong appeal to anyone who thinks about science and how it is practised in society. (shrink)

A scholarly examination of the centrality of the mind-body problem within and across the science of cognition--from philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to neural science. Conceptions of the mind-body problem range from the heritage of Cartesianism to the identification of the circumscribed brain structures responsible for domain specific cognitive mechanisms. Neither narrowly technical nor philosophically vague, this is a structured and detailed account of advancing intellectual developments in theory, research, and knowledge illumined by the conceptual vicissitudes of (...) the mind-body problem. This unique treatment will be of special interest to creative scholars in the disciplines of he sciences of cognition. (shrink)

I should like to qualify my remarks at the outset by saying that I lay no claim to a philosophical, rigorously scientific solution of the problem of the interaction between science and art. And although this problem has concerned me as an artist, for me it is, I must admit, even a bit uncomforatable to address an audience of philosophers with my random observations and notions on this subject. However, the problems posed by the development of modern (...) class='Hi'>science and technology today concern all human beings; artists are no exception. Moreover, it is specifically from artists that many people await an explanatory presentation of today's "magi and sorcerers," upon whose activity so much in life now depends. In accordance with our capacities we, artists of the film, also seek to find some view of our own on the processes and changes currently occurring in the world. It is precisely for this reason , that I have been so bold as to undertake to share a number of my impressions, with the hope that the editors and readers of the journal will forgive my lack of training in philosophy. (shrink)

In Rousseau, Nietzsche, and the Image of the Human Paul Franco explores the relationship between Nietzsche and Rousseau and their critique of modern life. Franco begins by arguing that "among philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche are perhaps the two most influential explorers and shapers of the moral and cultural imagination of late modernity." And yet Nietzsche was often highly critical of Rousseau. Indeed, their critiques of modern life differ in important respects. Rousseau focused on the growing political and (...) economic inequality in modern society and proposed a more egalitarian politics. Nietzsche decried the inability of society to take account of the exceptional individual and found Rousseau's political ideas wrong-headed. It is Franco's objective to explore their critiques of the modern life they observed--in the mid 18th century of the French Enlightenment and the late 19th century of industrializing and increasingly secular and scientific Europe--and show how they differed and how the earlier thinker formed the basis of much of the later thinkers' ideas. (shrink)

According to Joshua Alexander, philosophers use intuitions routinely as a form of evidence to test philosophical theories but experimental philosophy demonstrates that these intuitions are unreliable and unrepresentative.1 According to Herman Cappelen, philosophers never use intuitions as evidence (despite the vacuous sentential leader ‘intuitively’) and experimental philosophy lacks a rationale for its much-touted existence.2 That two books are diametrically opposed on methodology in philosophy is not noteworthy. But eyebrows might be raised at such contradictory accounts of the phenomenology of (...) philosophical inquiry. What is it that (analytic) philosophers do? Why is it so difficult to achieve consensus on the professional activities in which we engage? (shrink)

The present volumes unites papers which explore the European image of god in an intercultural context. They range from classical antiquity to contemporary philosophy and science.

It is often supposed that the spectacular successes of our modern mathematical sciences support a lofty vision of a world completely ordered by one single elegant theory. In this book Nancy Cartwright argues to the contrary. When we draw our image of the world from the way modern science works - as empiricism teaches us we should - we end up with a world where some features are precisely ordered, others are given to rough regularity and still others (...) behave in their own diverse ways. This patchwork makes sense when we realise that laws are very special productions of nature, requiring very special arrangements for their generation. Combining classic and newly written essays on physics and economics, The Dappled World carries important philosophical consequences and offers serious lessons for both the natural and the social sciences. (shrink)

The present volumes unites papers which explore the European image of god in an intercultural context. They range from classical antiquity to contemporary philosophy and science.

The central aim of this thesis is to confront the world-view of positivistic materialism with its nihilistic implications and to develop an alternative world-view based on process philosophy, showing how in terms of this, science and ethics can be reconciled. The thesis begins with an account of the rise of positivism and materialism, or ‘scientism’, to its dominant position in the culture of Western civilization and shows what effect this has had on the image of man and consequently (...) on ethical views. After having shown the basic weaknesses of this world-view, the positivist account of science is criticised and an alternative epistemology is developed in which the aim of disciplined inquiry is seen to be understanding. It is argued on the basis of this epistemology that science and metaphysics are indissociable, and that the materialist conception of being is open to challenge from a different ontology. Having reviewed the various conceptions of being which have been developed in the past, a version of process philosophy is outlined and it is argued that this promises to be far more effective than materialism as a foundation for the natural sciences. In particular it is shown how in terms of process philosophy it is possible to conceive of living, sentient organisms as having emerged from inanimate being. This provides the basis for the development of a conception of humanity as an emergent form of life. The human order is then seen as a process of becoming within nature with its own unique dynamics, irreducible to any other processes, involving both intentional and unintentional processes. It is shown how on the basis of this conception of humanity it is possible to develop an ethical theory and a critical social science, and in this way, to transcend the disjunction between science and ethics. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science from the perspective of philosophy. In particular, I examine two philosophical objections against the idea that the history of science can provide evidences to the philosophy of science. The first objection is metaphysical and suggests that given Hume’s law, i.e. that norms cannot be derived from facts and given that the history of science is a (...) descriptive enterprise while the philosophy of science is a normative endeavor, the former cannot be informative for the latter. The second is epistemological and is often called the ‘case studies dilemma’. According to this dilemma, we can neither deduce general philosophical theories from particular historical cases nor test the former through the latter. I argue that although those objections fail to be fatal for the idea that the historical data can provide evidence for the philosophical theories of science, they can help us draw a proper image of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. I conclude that this picture presupposes the constant epistemic iteration between the two disciplines. (shrink)

Recent philosophical analyses of the epistemic dimension of images in the sciences show a certain trend in acknowledging potential roles of these images beyond their merely decorative or pedagogical functions. We argue, however, that this new debate has yet paid little attention to a special type of pictures, we call ‘visual metaphor’, and its versatile heuristic potential in organizing data, supporting communication, and guiding research, modeling, and theory formation. Based on a case study of Conrad Hal Waddington’s epigenetic landscape (...) images in biology, we develop a descriptive framework applicable to heuristic roles of various visual metaphors in the sciences. (shrink)

Six essays by noted philosophers of science include the following topics: explanation in science and in history; philosophy and the scientific image of man; ...

The overarching theme of Locke’s Image of the World, by Michael Jacovides, is that Locke’s belief in the best science of his day shapes his philosophy in important ways. Jacovides contends that “by understanding the scientific background to Locke’s thoughts, we can better understand his work” (1), including both his positions and his arguments for those positions. To a lesser extent, Jacovides’s book also treats Locke as a case study in thinking about how much scientific theory should influence (...) philosophy. While much of the science Locke relies on is incomplete or problematic, and so leads him into errors, Jacovides is sympathetic to Locke’s approach of using the best scientific theories to help develop and justify his philosophical positions. Throughout the book Jacovides shows how science – Locke’s study of medicine, and later Boyle’s corpuscularianism, and then later Newton’s physics – influence Locke’s thinking on a variety of topics. The result is an impressive account of the history of science at a critical point in its development through the lens of one of the great philosophers of that time. (shrink)

This article investigates the origins of the experiences involved in the diagnostics (detection and normative evaluation) of biological entities in image-based medical praxis. Our specific research aim presupposes a vast discussion regarding the origins of knowledge in general, but is narrowed down to the alternatives of anthropomorphism and biomorphism. Accordingly, in the subsequent chapters we will make an attempt to investigate and illustrate what holds the diagnostic experiential situation together—biological regularities, manifestation via movement, conscious synthesis, causal categories, or something (...) else. We argue that as long as knowledge originates out of practices, a promising way forward is to oscillate between the prominent although controversial ideas of the history of philosophy and observations of concrete human practices, such as, in our chosen example, image-based medical diagnostics of biological pathologies. Although a number of thinkers are involved in the discussion, Aristotle and Husserl are most important here as the representatives of historical paradigms on the matter. The body in this research was not taken solely as the physical entity (Körper) but rather as a transcendental, constitutive structure where diagnostic and biological processes synchronize in teleological movement (Leib). However, philosophical speculations are illustrated by actual radiograms, the interpretation of which brings us back to the aforementioned question of primacy regarding cognition. (shrink)

This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can (...) be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other. (shrink)

There seem to be some very good reasons for a philosopher of science to be a deductivist about scientific reasoning. Deductivism is apparently connected with a demand for clarity and definiteness in the reconstruction of scientists' reasonings. And some philosophers even think that deductivism is the way around the problem of induction. But the deductivist image is challenged by cases of actual scientific reasoning, in which hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless significantly condition what practitioners (...) accept as cogent argument. And arguably, these problem cases abound. For example, even geometry--for most of its history--was such a problem case, despite its exactness and rigor. It took a tremendous effort on the part of Hilbert and others, to make geometry fit the deductivist image. Looking to the empirical sciences, the problems seem worse. Even the most exact and rigorous of empirical sciences--mechanics--is still the kind of problem case which geometry once was. In order for the deductivist image to fit mechanics, Hilbert's sixth problem (for mechanics) would need to be solved. This is a difficult, and perhaps ultimately impossible task, in which the success so far achieved is very limited. I shall explore some consequences of this for realism as well as for deductivism. Through discussing links between non-monotonicity, skills, meaning, globality in cognition, models, scientific understanding, and the ideal of rational unification, I argue that deductivists can defend their image of scientific reasoning only by trivializing it, and that for the adequate illumination of science, insights from anti-deductivism are needed as much as those which come from deductivism. (shrink)

In the past twenty years, all the key authors who wrote about the state of postmodernity either began to be engaged in other research areas (Fredric Jameson) or declared that the postmodernism is dead (Linda Hutcheon). Since 2000, when the fatigue from the postmodernism became evident to everyone, various researchers, critics and theorists began to offer their concepts of our era. However, all these theories, emphasizing the change of cultural paradigms, interpret culture traditionally not paying attention to total digitalization and (...) the introduction of new technologies into our lives. However, in two concepts of our time these processes become central. These are the concepts of the digimodern and automodern. The focus of this article is the idea of automodernism, proposed by the American social theorist Robert Samuels in 2007/2009. He believes that our world is characterized by two contradictory tendencies – automation and the desire for autonomy (personal freedom). From his point of view, the former often does not allow to reach the latter due to certain circumstances. Samuels, using the example of a car, a personal computer, the Internet, etc., shows what exactly our culture is in the broadest sense. Analyzing the concept of “digital youth,” he also pays attention to the formation of a new subjectivity of the era of automodernity. Finally, the most interesting part of the concept of automodernism, which is most relevant today, is the criticism of leftwing social and philosophical concepts (Slavoj Žižek, Jameson) and cultural theories (Henry Jenkins). At the end of the article, the author mentions Adam Greenfield’s latest book Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life. Thanks to this book, Samuels’ theory can be verified. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the numerous critiques that have been leveled at the field of positive psychology over its short history, the field and its practitioners continue to enjoy substantial growth and popularity. Although several factors have no doubt contributed to their advancement, work in the field of science studies suggests that rhetorical demarcation in scientific writing, by which scientific fields establish their domains and distinguish themselves from other forms of intellectual activity, may be equally significant. Such “boundary work” is an important (...) means through which fields defeat their competitors, persuade their public, and compete for legitimacy. In light of this, I examine the discursive demarcation and legitimization of positive psychology as performed through historical narratives of its origins in its own writings. I offer an analysis of the ways in which these narratives exploit alternating and contradictory images of scientists, legitimate scientific activity, and in particular, images of American society, to perform the ideological and rhetorical work of describing, and making visible, the kinds of issues and problems for which positive psychology presents itself as the natural solution. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The article discusses an actual problem of the contemporary social theory – a problem of post-postmodernism that is the answer to the question: what comes to replace the supposedly outdated postmodernism. Post-postmodernism in an umbrella term that brings together various concepts like digimodernism, automodernism, metamodernism, hypermodernism, supermodernism, etc. One of the replacing postmodernism theories is the French curator and art theorist Nicolas Bourriaud’s concept that was called “altermodern” or “other modernism.” In his previous books Bourriaud proposed to rewrite modernism and, (...) as the result, developed a new theory. The concept appeared in 2009 when Bourriaud presented the exhibition in London, timed to the publication of his manifesto Altermodern, and edited and published the book of collected papers of the same title. Globalization, which opened borders for art, is a central concept of the altermodernism theory. The main terms of altermodern are heterochrony (time diversity) and viatorisation (nomadism). The main social subject of the alternodern era is a free travelling artist, who interprets the meanings of “rewritten” art for the public. They are “rewritten” because Bourriaud proposes to use phenomena and products of past ages to make them work in a new way. However Bourriaud’s concept should be considered critically, as it was formerly done by several researchers. The article proposes a critical review that answers to the question: to what extent the idea of altermodern is heuristic and therefore it could compete with other concepts that abolish postmodern. The author gives a negative answer to this question first of all because altermodern just borrows a lot of elements of the language and apparatus of postmodernism and actually does not offer anything new. (shrink)

In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Richard Rorty locates the perceived ills of modern philosophy in the "epistemological turn" of Descartes and Locke. This chapter argues that Rorty's accounts of Descartes' and Locke's philosophical work are seriously flawed. Rorty misunderstood the participation of early modern philosophers in the rise of modern science, and he misdescribed their examination of cognition as psychological rather than epistemological. His diagnostic efforts were thereby undermined, and he missed Descartes' original conception of (...) a general physics, and Locke's probabilist analysis of the grounds for rational belief. (shrink)

According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view”, “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing (...) so. In the second, positive part of the paper I suggest a novel way of evaluating RPV empirically, relying on the influential object files framework. (shrink)

The paper analyses Aleksei F. Losev’s position in respect to the notion of time, which he considers in a dialectical perspective. The Russian philosopher proceeds from the Platonic interpretation of the relationship between the one and the many, according to which each plurality carries in itself a unifying principle, as its ontological grounding. This anti-modern perspective represents a rejection of the positivist “objectification” of the world, which introduced the “metaphysical” notions of absolute space and time. According to Losev, time as (...) an indefinite continued progress of events that occur in an apparently irreversible succession does not exist as such and cannot be considered other than within the framework of the overall unity of temporal fragments, so that they acquire a common background. By placing the interpretation of time on the ontological plan, in its dialectical connection with its opposite, Losev manages to overcome the problem of the measurability of time, raised in Aristotle’s definition of time as a “measure of motion.” Losev also rejects modern subjectivist ideas about time as an experience of the present or as pure duration, both conceptions inevitably leading to the problem of identifying in the continuous flow of time a stable ground that serves as the basis for any temporal change. Besides that, Losev’s approach to the interpretation of time leads to criticism of the modern idea of progress, understood as an endless striving for the future, which always remains unattainable. The main task then is to find “mobile rest,” a unifying principle that can give meaning to human existence through the combination of past, present and future. (shrink)

Daniel Fernald argues that the rhetoric and imagery of the Phenomenology constitute the substance of the Phenomenology. His conclusion shows the entire Phenomenology to be an aporia, an impasse designed to teach the central lesson that the True, which is the Whole, is not to be found in phenomenal experience alone. Understanding the structure of Phenomenology is essential in the transition to Science of Logic.

The article presents philosophical views on music in the context of the transformations of the worldview from Antiquity to the Modern Time. In this research author also mentions the contemporary issues, and uses her own philosophical concept of the music, which can be described as following: the value of music as a substance and the way of the valuable interaction of a person with the world affirm the essence of musical being, in which the invariable principle of Harmony, (...) the principle of Chaos-Form movement, is preserved. Music expresses the fluid essence of the world and changes of being in space and time. Philosophy of music as a field of philosophical knowledge considers music from ontological-epistemological and phenomenological-axiological prospectives, as something more than just a form of art. It explores the deep, ultimate foundations of the existence of music as such and the philosophical and aesthetic foundations of musical art. Since ancient times music has been a representation of the world in the human conscience and served as the harmonic equivalent of cosmological philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and astrophysics. The scientific view on music was enriched in the Modern Time by the expanded view on the cosmo-sound space reflected in musical art, which at the same time transforms the mathematical ideas of geometricity, squareness etc. The tendency to create integral world music in the musical practice of the XX-XXI centuries explains the attempt of mankind to present music by modern methods of composing musical art as an expression of fear towards the secret Harmony of universal existence, and, on the other hand - as a form of search for salvation and mental balance, intuitively reflecting what is happening in natural science, which more and more points to the abyss of unknowable universe, and the unstable place of man in the world. (shrink)

The Kuhnian 'Revolution' and its implications for sociology --Verdade, realismo e virtude 2.0 -- Images and imaging in science : modes of perception, algorithmic imagism and big data -- Dos experimentos de pensamento na ciência e na filosofia em relação com outras modalidades de experimentos -- Um savant-philosophe : Michael Polanyi e a filosofia da ciência -- Tempo e explicação : pré-formação, epigénese e pseudomorfose nos estudos comparativos nas ciências sociais -- Why some physical theories should never die -- (...) Sobre a relação entre filosofia natural e teologia natural no pensamento de Newton -- L'harmonie de l'inattendu : Henri Poincaré entre physique et philosophie -- A recepção das ideias do Círculo de Viena em Portugal : duas tentativas de teses de doutoramento sobre o empirismo lógico -- Riscos tecnológicos, agricultura transgénica e alternativas. (shrink)

Naturalism in the philosophy of science has proceeded differently than the familiar forms of meta-philosophical naturalism in other sub-fields, taking its cues from “science as we know it” (Cartwright in The Dappled World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 1) rather than from a philosophical conception of “the Scientific Image.” Its primary focus is scientific practice, and its philosophical analyses are complementary and accountable to empirical studies of scientific work. I argue that naturalistic philosophy (...) of science is nevertheless criterial for other versions of meta-philosophical naturalism; relying on a conflicting conception of scientific understanding would constitute a “first philosophy” imposed on the sciences. Moreover, naturalistic philosophy of science provides the basis for a “radically” naturalistic alternative to the familiar forms of orthodox or liberal naturalism. Goodman, Sellars and Hempel had previously challenged empiricist scruples against causal connections or nomological necessity by arguing that scientific concepts already had modal import. The radical naturalism I defend similarly challenges meta-philosophical naturalists’ conception of the Scientific Image as anormative, and instead shows how the normativity of scientific understanding in practice is a scientifically intelligible natural phenomenon. This account then provides a basis for naturalistic reflection on how other practices and normative concerns fit together with the best scientific understanding of human ways of life. (shrink)

One cannot blame all this on the dead hand of, say, the Aristotelian conception of First Philosophy, although that and other classic positions have played their part. It can hardly be held that those who doctrinally profess allegiance to the conception of philosophy as created in the image of science have helped much more than they have hindered. Accepting the older, orthodox account of the course of previous philosophic thinking as detached from science, they have been happier (...) demonstrating their predecessors' vulnerability than in reshaping that account fruitfully. There is a vacuity about the pronouncements of men so eminent-and diverse--as Bertrand Russell and John Dewey, which renders their extensive influence unfortunate in many respects. (shrink)