As part of Project Theophrastus this volume covers the material related to Theophrastus’ work on logic. As Aristotle’s pupil, he largely followed his master, but made important changes in modal logic, and some of his innovations passed into medieval logic.

It is odd that something that Wittgenstein says is clear should have been so puzzling to English-speaking philosophers. 5.542 begins:— ‘Es ist aber klar, dass “A glaubt, dass p”, “A denkt p”, “A sagt p” von der Form, “p ‘sagt p” sind.’ I would like to suggest that one reason for the difficulties that have been felt with this lies in a misleading translation, particularly of, “p ‘sagt p”. For this both English translations have “p” says p’. But since German (...) has a single present tense where English has two, ‘sagt’ may be rendered either ‘says’, or ‘is saying’, and I want to argue that ‘“p” is saying p’ is preferable. (shrink)

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images. I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 : ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when (...) the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. (shrink)

Historically there have been two main freewill problems, the problem of freedom versus predestination, which is mainly theological, and the problem of freedom versus determinism, which has exercised the minds of many of the great modern philosophers. The latter problem is seldom stated in full detail, for its elements are taken as so obvious that they do not need to be stated. The problem is seen as an attempt to reconcile the belief in human freedom, which is essential if men (...) are to be able to act morally, with determinism, the belief that every event is fully determined in all its details by the sum of its precedent causes. But even the meticulous Moore does not trouble to explore at length what is meant by determinism. He devotes one very short paragraph to the matter, and sums it up immediately afterwards as the view that ‘everything … has a cause’. (shrink)

This volume forms part of the large international Theophrastus project started by Brill in 1992 and edited by W.W. Fortenbaugh, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas. Together with volumes comprising the texts and translations, the commentary volumes provide a new generation of classicists with an up-to-date collection of the fragments and testimonia relating to Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and successor as head of the Lyceum. This will be the fourth volume of commentary on _Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought (...) and Influence_, and is on the psychological and epistemological material. It includes contributions by Dimitri Gutas on the Arabic passages, and Pamela Huby has covered the rest, including close study of the quotations given by Priscian of Lydia and the extensive but little known medieval Latin passages. Different approaches to the use of medieval material as evidence for Theophrastus' thought are discussed in the Introduction. (shrink)

"Orginally published by: Leiden, NV: Koninklijke Brill, 1993.".

Mr Newton-Smith and Mr Boyce, in discussion notes in the January 1972 number of Philosophy , have raised a number of interesting points about my original paper. But I feel that they have not gone beyond a simple denial of the central argument, which is to be found on pp. 124–126 and 128–130 of the April 1971 number, and that much of what they say therefore fails by petitio.

The interpretation of these words is important for understanding the meaning of in Aristotle. For here, exceptionally, it has been taken to refer to sense-perceptions rather than images.I quote the Oxford translation of 462a15–24 : ‘From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is that the dream is a sort of presentation (), and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the (...) sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily a dream. (shrink)

Theodore Waitz, in the section of his introduction to Aristotle's Organon called De Codicibus graecis organi, prints a number of passages found in various manuscripts, which are not to be treated simply as scholia on Aristotle, but are still of some interest to the student of Aristotle's logic. In this paper I am concerned with three leaves, fos. 84–6, from Laurentianus 71, 32, a fourteenth-century manuscript containing paraphrases of several works, which Waitz uses for scholia on the Categories and the (...) De Interpretatione. These leaves are in a different hand from the rest of the manuscript, and Waitz thinks they originated elsewhere. The heading is: Περ τς το ποτ κτηγορς, and the work falls into two parts, a discussion of Time, based on Physics 4, and an independent section in which the category of When, which Aristotle does little more than mention in a number of lists, is treated at length. In Waitz' text there are a number of references to scholia: these are in fact from Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories, and a comparison with these and still other passages of Simplicius not mentioned by Waitz suggests that the author of this work was Boethus of Sidon, the Peripatetic. I propose to examine it and argue that it is indeed by Boethus. Boethus, known as ‘the Peripatetic’, to distinguish him from the Stoic philosopher of the same name, was head of the Peripatos in succession to Andronicus of Rhodes. There is some uncertainty about Andronicus' dates, but he lived some time in the middle of the first century b.c. and we may place Boethus somewhat later in the same century. Andronicus is well known as the editor, and in a sense the rediscoverer, of the esoteric works of Aristotle; it is less well known that he had an independent attitude to Aristotle and put forward what he presumably thought of as some improvements in doctrine. What concerns us here is his attempt to substitute the category of Time for that of When. In opposition to him Boethus may be seen as a conservative, coming to the defence of Aristotle against these innovations. (shrink)

We initiate the study of reducts of relational structures up to primitive positive interdefinability: After providing the tools for such a study, we apply these tools in order to obtain a classification of the reducts of the logic of equality. It turns out that there exists a continum of such reducts. Equivalently, expressed in the language of universal algebra, we classify those locally closed clones over a countable domain which contain all permutations of the domain.