In Passive Obedience Berkeley argues that we must always observe the prohibitions decreed by our sovereign rulers. He defends this thesis both by providing critiques against opposing views and, more interestingly, by presenting a moral theory that supports it. The theory contains elements of divine - command, natural - law, moral - sense, rule - based, and outcome - oriented ethics. Ultimately, however, it seems to rest on a notion of spiritual reason — a specific God - given (...) faculty that all rational human beings have. Berkeley’s work on immaterialism, for which he is better known, could thus perhaps best be seen as an attempt to find a scientific justification for his moral doctrine. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Berkeley argues in Passive Obedience that what he calls morality is based on the divine laws of nature, which God gave us and whose validity is like that of the principles of geometry. One of these laws is the categorical demand for loyalty to the supreme political power. This is to say, rebellious action is strictly impermissible and passive obedience is morally required: we may disobey but only in terms of action omission and then we (...) must accept the penalty or punishment. This paper clarifies the logic of Berkeley’s argument and evaluates the acceptability of his results, especially when he considers possible exceptions in the case of a tyrant, usurper, and mad prince. What should one do? We may ‘sit still and pray for better times’ and think of the day of divine judgement; is this enough when a citizen is under a tyrannical political rule? Can we trust the good will of magistrates, or expect God’s help? Berkeley speaks of your moral duty to supreme power but in the last part of his treatise he also mentions the possibility of two competing princes, or no supreme power. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Berkeley’s Passive Obedience, moral duties are negative and positive as well as civil or legal and natural. Natural duties are from God and therefore valid norms. The supreme civil authority makes civil laws. We must obey the law because loyalty to supreme civil power is one of our natural duties: to be loyal is to obey, which means ‘do not rebel.’ This is a negative duty and as such categorical or unconditional. Positive duties are conditional on (...) conscientious acceptance. I show in detail how this system of norms and duties works. These key ideas have not been studied in detail before. Next, can we criticize Berkeley’s unquestioning acceptance of chattel slavery if we apply his own notion of duties to it? The slave laws are necessarily evil, and hence they, according to Berkeley’s own doctrine, cannot be accepted. But first we need a clear conception of his idea of conscience and, a fortiori, conscientious objection and its legitimate scope. This paper fills the gap and helps us understand Passive Obedience better. (shrink)

Scholars disagree about the nature of the doctrinal apparatus that supports Berkeley’s case for passive obedience to the sovereign. Is he a rule-utilitarian, or natural law theorist, or ethical egoist, or some combination of some or all these elements? Here I argue that Berkeley is an act-utilitarian who thinks that one is more likely to act rightly by following certain sorts of rules. I also argue that Berkeley mischaracterizes and misevaluates Locke’s version of the social contract theory. Finally, (...) I consider the potentially practically self-defeating nature of Berkeley’s claim that there is no obligation to submit to the rule of “madmen” or “usurpers.”. (shrink)

Why did the Lord Justices make strong representation against Berkeley? According to Joseph Stock, Berkeley's first biographer "Lord Galway [a Lord Justice in 1716] having heard of those sermons, published in 1712 as Passive Obedience represented Berkeley as a Jacobite, and hence unworthy of the living of St. Paul's. From the beginning, Passive Obedience was rumored to be politically heterodox...

Berkeley's Passive Obedience presents a fragment of morality. Moral duties are dictated by divine natural laws that the good God gives to all people. This justifies morality but may not motivate right conduct. Only God's commands may properly motivate the agent. Morality guides people from this unhappy world to heaven and has political consequences, especially the citizen's duties of obedience and loyalty to a supreme political authority. Loyalty and obedience to God are virtues that earn eternal (...) happiness. Berkeley is a divine-command theorist who supports a morality focused on a heavenly reward. His moral reflections serve political ends. (shrink)

A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a state could have the moral authority to enforce laws, promulgate laws which citizens are thereby obliged to obey, give new duties to citizens and levy taxes. Many rival solutions to this problem of political authority have been offered by contemporary and recent philosophers but none has obtained wide acceptance. The current debate takes no cognisance of George Berkeley’s ‘Passive Obedience’, in which he defends the exceptionless duty (...) of not using force to resist the state and offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which indicates an explanation of political authority as grounded in the social connectedness of human beings. I expound, criticise and develop Berkeley’s explanation to provide a promising solution to the problem of political authority. The solution impugns the political authority of all existing states as well as the duty of passive obedience. (shrink)

By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. (...) When thus juxtaposed with Hobbes, Berkeley can be understood as endorsing a theologically inflected version of deontological ethics in which moral laws are linked directly to the constitution of the self. (shrink)

Berkeley's sermons on passive obedience in the Irish context -- Science and sociability: Berkeley's "bond of society" -- Piety, perception, and the free-thinkers -- Luxury, moderation, and the south sea bubble -- Planting religion in the New World, 1722 - 1732 -- Improving Ireland: luxury, virtue, and economic development -- Bishop of Cloyne: protestantism, patriotism, and a national panacea.

As ethical agents, teachers regularly must decide whether compliance to rules and norms is in the best interest of their students. Yet, teachers in the United States are educated to be passively obedient. In this paper, I argue that part of pre-service teacher education ought to learn ways of resisting. I describe one approach to verbal resistance, what Michel Foucault calls Truth-Telling. Building on a qualitative self-study with pre-service teachers, I explain how a form of team-teaching called Interruptions can promote (...) Truth-Telling. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Suggestions about the Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley* PAUL J. OLSCAMP WHILE TRAVELLINGIN ITALYin 1716, Berkeley lost the second part of his Principles of Human Knowledge. Much later he wrote to Dr. Johnson in America, saying that he did not have the energy to do something so disagreeable as writing the same thing twice? This manuscript contained Berkeley's ethics and metaphysics, but in spite of its loss, there (...) is much to be learned about Berkeley's moral philosophy from his extant writings. Surprisingly, very little has been written about Berkeley's ethics, and what has been written usually concentrates on Passive Obedience and virtually ignores the rest of his worksY Most of the terminology now used to classify and criticize ethical theories was, of course, unknown to Berkeley. In spite of this, much of what he says may be fruitfully compared with some of the claims of modern ethicists. I shall try to show that many of his claims might have been strikingly modern, a In this paper however, I can only deal with what would now be called the normative part of Berkeley's theory, so, perhaps, it would be of some use to give a general *All references to Berkeley's writings are to the Jessop and Luee edition, The Works o] George Berkeley, Bishop o] Cloyne (9 vols.; London: Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948). I shall abbreviate the titles of the works in this collection as follows: A/c. for A/~phron, or the Minute Ptdlosopher; DraJt for The First Dra]~ o] the Introduction to the Priuciple8 o] Human Knowledge; Principles for The Principles o] Human Knowledge; P.O. for Passive Obedience; Disc. for A Discourse to the Macistrates; T.V. for An Essay Towards a New Theory o] Vision; T.V~E. for The Theory o] Vision Vindicated and Explained; P.C. for philosophical Commentaries; Corr ]or Philosophical Correspondence; DHP for Three Dialooucs Between Hylas and Philonous. I am deeply indebted to Professor Richard T. Garner for his help in the preparation of thispaper. 1Corr., II, 282. 'The other references are: C. D. Broad, "Berkeley's Theory of Morals," Revue Internationale de Philosophie (1953); Graham P. Conroy, "Berkeley on Moral Demonstration, Journal o] the HisLory o] Ideas, XXII (1961), and Conroy's doctoral dissertation, Language and Morals in Berkeley's Philosophy (Berkeley, 1957); H. D. Aiken, "The Fate of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," The Kenyon Review (Spring, 1962); kvrum Stroll, The Emotive Theory o] Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954); Ernest Albee, A History o] English Utilitarianism (London: Alien & Unwin, 1901), chap. xv; I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, The Meaning o] Meaning (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1923), p. 42; P. J. Olscamp, A Berlceleyan Analysis o] the Uses o] Language in Ethics, (doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1962); W. V. Denard, "Berkeley's Theological Utilitarianism," Acres de XI" eongr~s internationale de philosophic, XIII (1953), 87-93; G. A. Johnston, "The Development of Berkeley's Ethical Theory," Philosophical Review, XXIV, 419-430; H. W. Orange, "Berkeley as a Moral Philosopher," Mind, XV (old series), 514-523. =The definitions of any technical terms I may use will be found in William K. Frankena, Ethies, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series, 1963). [147] 148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY outline of the main features of what I think his entire system would have been, before examining part of it in more detail. Berkeley was first and last a Christian clergyman, and he therefore believed in the existence of a personal, wise, and benevolent God whose being was relevant to our daily lives. He was convinced that the natural world provides evidence for this belief, evidence as sound as that which we have for the existence of other minds. Given that the esse of objects consists in their being perceived, that only minds are active, and that no human perceiver perceives all things at all times, it follows that a cosmic mind maintains the universe it created. Moreover, the system of nature is not random, but regular; it is, in fact, a divine language in which God makes his intentions known to us, and demonstrates his wisdom... (shrink)

My education in political poetry begins with William Blake’s remark about John Milton in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.”1 The statement is usually taken as a charming misreading of Milton or as some sort of hyperbole. We find it lumped with other readings which (...) supposedly view Satan as the hero of Paradise Lost, such as Percy Bysshe Shelley’s in A Defence of Poetry, although neither Blake nor Shelley says anything of the kind.2I consider Blake’s statement simply accurate. I think it the best single thing anybody has ever said about Paradise Lost. If not clear as a bell, then at least as compressed as diamonds. The insouciant opening gesture takes for granted what to Blake is obvious” that the poetry qua poetry is better, more exciting, more energetic in the sections dominated by Stan, worse, duller, less poetic in the sections dominated by God. As a lover of poetry Blake has evidently struck a perplexity. Why does Milton’s Satan excite me and this God bore me even though he plainly intends me to adore God and scorn Satan? The answer could have been that Milton “wrote in fetters” where constrained by theology and the danger of lapsing into inadvertent sacrilege, but “at liberty” otherwise. Other critics have claimed that it is impossible to make God talk successfully in a poem, but the Book of Job is enough to refute that position. Why did Milton choose to make God talk at all? Dante cleverly avoided that difficulty.The second half of Blake’s sentence not only solves the Paradise Lost problem but proposes a radical view of all poetry which might be summarized as follows: All art depends on opposition between God and the devil, reason and energy. The true poet is necessarily the partisan of energy, rebellion, and desire, and is opposed to passivity, obedience, and the authority of reason, laws, and institutions. To be a poet requires energy; energetic subjects make the best material for poems; the truer the poetry, the more it will embody the truths of Desire. But the poet need not think so. He can be of the devil’s party without knowing it. 1. William Blake, “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” Complete Poems, ed. Alicia Ostriker , p. 182.2. Let one instance serve: Marjorie Hope Nicolson wonders whether the members of the “‘Satanic School’ of Milton criticism” have read past books 1 and 2 of Paradise Lost . Alicia Ostriker, professor of English as Rutgers University, is the author of Stealing the Language: The Emergence of Women’s Poetry in America. Her most recent book of poetry is Imaginary Lover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:171. JACOBITISM AND DAVID HUME: THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKLASH FOILED It has often been said, and with some truth, that one of the weaknesses of the Jacobite movement was its lack of a systematic ideology or of a truly firstrate mind to expound its doctrines. There are of course those who would claim that in an earlier period Charles Leslie or Francis Atterbury easily fulfilled the necessary conditions as expositors, (...) and that this tradition was continued in the years immediately before the '45 by Carte and Chevalier Ramsay. Yet there were weaknesses in Jacobite doctrine, some of which will be noted below. It is less often realised that, qua logical cogency, the arguments of the Whigs and other opponents of Jacobitism were, to say the least, in no better case. In a word, anti-Jacobite ideology completely failed in the task of devastating the Stuarts and their followers. This failure is apparent when we consider the writings of David Hume, who addressed himself on many occasions, either explicitly or implicitly, to the question of Jacobitism. One of Hume's aims was to give the Revolution settlement and the Hanoverian succession the respectable intellectual basis it did not possess from official Whig ideology. In this aim Hume unquestionably failed, his arguments being either internally inconsistent or lacking in the intellectual rigour necessary to topple his targets. Following the method attributed to Karl Popper by Brian Magee, it will be instructive at this point to consider the anti-Jacobite case, not at its weakest, but at its strongest. In a word, it is proposed to consider in detail the political writings on the issue of Jacobitism of a man widely acknowledged to be the greatest British thinker of the eighteenth century and one of the finest philosophers of the ages. If the 172. most powerful mind in British philosophy was unable to contrive a theory or theories that could unseat Jacobitism as an ideology, this tends to indicate that the intellectual supports of the' doctrine were nothing like so feeble as Whig apologists claimed, and that historians have been rather too quick to claim that eighteenth-century Jacobitism depended on a defunct or discredited belief-system. First, however, two comments are necessary. Neither Jacobitism itself nor Hume's own writings possess the coherence the scholar might ideally wish for. Hume's critique has to be extracted from books and essays written over a thirty-year period, and none of these is a work of political theory per se. Moreover, these works address differing audiences and assume quite different things about the knowledge and philosophical acumen of their readers. This is quite apart from the fact that on some important issues Hume changed his mind over the years. At this level assessing Hume's meaning is often as difficult as the notorious problem of pinning down the 'real' Marx. As for Jacobitism, its ideology is difficult to articulate, since it was composed of many heterogeneous strands. The ideology of English Jacobites was a 'partial' view of the world. It embraced the pre-1688 Tory notions of hereditary and indefeasible right, passive obedience and non-resistance. It took in the 'Country' critique of corruption and its nostalgia for a lost 'golden age'. The ideology of Scottish Jacobitism came nearer to being a Weltanschauung. Apart from its role as an ideology of nationalism, stressing the importance of a unique Scottish culture, it depended on a providential and mystical view of the world. Basically, there were three types of ideological Jacobitism. The first type, whose major 173. tenets had been exhaustively debated during the period 1688-1720, concerned the notions of divine, indefeasible right, passive obedience and nonresistance. This doctrine, particularly associated with pro-Stuart polemicists like Charles Leslie and Francis Atterbury, was still very much alive in Jacobite circles by 1745, though the debate between Whig and Tory on its implications had to some extent given way to the debate between exponents of Court and Country positions. The second type was Jacobitism as an ideology of Scottish nationalism. This was particularly associated with the mystics of NorthEastern Scotland like Chevalier Ramsay, and was a powerful influence in the '45 rebellion. The third type was Jacobitism as... (shrink)

Berkeley “argues with the learned and speaks with the vulgar.” I use his double maxim to interpret his ethics. My approach is new. The Sermons and Guardian Essays mainly speak to the vulgar and Passive Obedience and Alciphron reason with the learned. The reward of ethics is eternal bliss in a future state: religion and ethics are connected. I study a set of problems: resurrection, eternal life, happiness, benevolence, the goodness of God, and self-love. Divine bliss is unlike (...) any earthly happiness. The idea of law does not support benevolence, even if it is a Christian duty and virtue. God is good, but how to prove it? The learned must study the complex theodicy problem; the vulgar need assurance based on their sensuous experience and fervent hope of eternal bliss. Self-love may be a vital issue to the learned, although the vulgar may not realize their need to overcome it. The main questions concern Berkeley’s two approaches to ethical problems: first, how do their topics differ, and second, are they mutually consistent? (shrink)

In June of 2012 scholars from Europe and North America met in Montreal to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the publication of George Berkeley's *Passive Obedience*. In this article Stephen Daniel summarizes the English presentations, and Sébastien Charles summarizes the French presentations, on how Berkeley invokes naturalistic themes in developing a moral theory while still allowing a role for God.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Edited by EDMUND SANTURRI AND WILLIAM WERPE· HOWSKI. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xxii + 307. $35.00 (paper). The essays in this volume address numerous philosophic and theological issues surrounding the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbor. A brief review cannot do justice to the careful argumentatation contained in the essays. (...) Forced to make an unhappy choice, I have decided to provide some sense of the main line of argument in each piece and to add a few general comments about the dominant approaches to Christian charity in the volume. Gene Outka's "Universal Love and Impartiality," which sets the stage for many of the other pieces, asks: Should there be " no disparity between our consideration of others and our consideration of ourselves? " (3). On the basis of a sustained comparison of Christian universal love with impartiality, Outka concludes that, " while universal love allies itself with impartiality at certain junctures, it represents an advance over impartiality because it more readily accommodates differences between neighbor-love and self-love" (79-80). Christianity's normative emphasis on regard for others goes beyond impartiality toward altruism. Christian ethics is not, however, identical with altruism if the latter means that the " self does not matter." This would be contrary to the theocentric framework of the commandments, which refer directly to the "self's well-being" (82). In contrast to both impartiality and altruism, universal love accents " inclusiveness " over " comparative measurement." On a descriptive level, impartialists " fall to take seriously enough the power of self-preoccupation." The simple assertions of equal regard do not meet the need for ameliorative strategies to correct our tendencies toward selfishness and pride. There are other disparities between self- and neighbor-love and thus between universal love and impartiality. In contrast to impartiality, universal love includes "legitimate, normative self-regarding considerations." This provides a response to the criticism that Christian love involves selfannihilation. A complete passivity to others can result in a loss of a determinate sense of self; but, as Outka argues, such passivity is not 313 314 BOOK REVIEWS to be confused with Christian humility. Rather, it can be rooted in the sin of sloth, disguised as humility. The theocentric concern with the self avoids both pride and sloth through obedient willing. Finally, there are legitimate and ineradicable self-regarding considerations at the descriptive level: I cannot "promote and protect" the well-being of neighbor and self in " exactly the same way" (87). In "Who is My Neighbor? Love, Equality, and Profoundly Retarded Humans,'' Edmund Santurri contrasts the humanist and inclusive view of equal worth with the rationalist view, which identifies being a person with having a rational capacity to desire, choose, evaluate, and so forth. As a way of clarifying the Christian-humanist view, Santurri considers various interpretations of the scriptural language concerning man as an image of God. He argues that in the biblical narrative all beings born of humankind are created in God's image. He then addresses two rival construals of personhood. The first limits personhood to those who have the capacity to value their existence, while the second accords equal standing to those who can participate in communal deliberation. Both views abstract from historical and social con· nections embedded in species life (124). The argument for inclusion of the severely retarded rests not on reductionist biological principles, hut upon social phenomena: " the retarded are born of us, look like us, and interact with us in a wide assortment of highly distinctive social settings " (126). In "'Agape' and Special Relations," William Werpehowski begins by engaging Gewirth's attempt to justify ethical particularism on the basis of ethical universalism. While his view is not as susceptible to criticism as some have thought, Werpehowski is nonetheless sympathetic with the concerns of Amelie Rorty, who worries that a view like that of Gewirth " locates the focus of moral theory and moral action in the processes and rules for justification " which thus " underdescribe and underdetermine the detailed thoughtfulness required for appropriate action" (146-147). As a corrective, Werpehowski appeals to Christian moral discernment or prudence. In a number of... (shrink)

As reflected in the spirit of the times, certain fundamental changes have occurred in such concepts as nature, reason, and life. While in the liberal era nature appeared to man as a sphere to be conquered by him for the enhancement of his material happiness, today it is an ideal offering an escape from the vicissitudes of social life. Confidence in the power of reason and of science turns into hatred of intelligence, because the latter is an instrument of domination (...) for the privileged classes, and leads the majority of men to accept utopian dreams which cannot be realized. Whereas the philosophy of liberalism glorifies the individual as an active agent having a higher meaning, he now falls into disrespect as a merely passive link in the overpowering totality of life.This article analyses Hamsun as a typical representative of such a postliberal ideology. At all points where he develops his own interpretation of life and the world, he portrays the longings of a disillusioned bourgeois civilization in terms of these new concepts. The ideal which he pictures as an escape from the bourgeois civilization of our times is only superficially in conflict with it. His most important subjects and themes derive their social function from a historical situation which calls for an attitude of obedient subordination to authority.There are two elements in Hamsun's dream of a return to nature : the resentful disillusionment which wants to fence off nature as its private property, because it has little to expect from the social reality in which it lives, on the one hand ; and on the other, the adoration of the heroic as reflected in the overpowering sweep of the forces of nature. This admiration of power is further enhanced by the glorification of peasant life. The ideal of nature is finally characterized by a biological interpretation of erotic relationships. Brutality and sentimentality interchange abruptly within such an ideology as they do in actual authoritarian character types of the present day.Hamsun criticizes all important aspects of urban life, exhibiting another form of his anti-rational attitude. However, it is important to notice his relationship to industry : he has contempt for the working class but utters not one critical word against the employers.His philosophy of life, which minimizes the individual and exalts the powers that be, corresponds to the trends of the time : men are scurrying around like ants, without plan or aim ; most of them are crushed, and this is justified because the forces of life require unconditional obedience and absolute subordination of the individual.Finally the author presents some characteristic documents about the influence which Hamsun has exerted. In the post-war period socialists and liberals were singing the same paeans of praise for Hamsun as the fascists more recently.Les trois transformations les plus importantes de la conscience sociale au cours de ces cinquante dernières années, concernent les idées de nature, d'esprit et de vie. Dans le libéralisme, la nature apparaît avant tout comme une réalité que l'homme doit maîtriser pour accroître ses richesses matérielles. Aujourd'hui, dans son apparence immédiate, elle devient un idéal qui doit libérer les hommes des déceptions que leur inflige l'existence collective. Au lieu de la confiance ancienne en l'esprit et en la science, éclate maintenant la haine de l'intellect, qui sans doute offre aux classes privilégiées un instrument affiné de domination, mais n'apporte à la majorité des hommes que des utopies rationalistes sans signification concrète. L'individu, que la philosophie libérale transfigurait en lui attribuant une fonction supérieure, apparaît comme un élément passif d'une totalité toute puissante, la vie.L'article montre ensuite en Hamsun un représentant typique de cette idéologie post-libérale. Sur tous les points décisifs, sa conception de l'homme et de la nature révèle sa véritable signification : elle traduit dans des catégories nouvelles les aspirations de la bourgeoisie déçue. L'opposition entre son idéal et la société bourgeoise est d'ailleurs tout apparente. La fonction sociale de ses thèmes les plus importants est la préparation d'une humanité soumise, prête à s'incliner sans protester devant l'autorité.Derrière le rêve de Hamsun d'une existence en accord immédiat avec la nature, on aperçoit le ressentiment petit bourgeois, qui veut faire de la nature sa propriété privée parce qu’il a peu à attendre dans la réalité. On aperçoit aussi le culte de l'héroïque en soi, que symbolise la violence desphénomènes naturels. Le culte de la force est encore accentué par la transfiguration du paysan. L'idéal d’une vie conforme à la nature est finalement caractérisé par la représentation biologique que se fait Hamsun des rapports érotiques. Constamment, dans cette idéologie, sentimentalisme et brutalité se juxtaposent sans intermédiaire — mélange qui appartient en propre également au type d’homme autoritaire du présent.L’anti-intellectualisme de Hamsun se manifeste sous forme d’une critique des éléments les plus importants de la civilisation urbaine. En particulier, son jugement sur l’industrie est décisif ; il méprise le prolétariat, sans jamais dire un mot contre les entrepreneurs.Sa représentation, marquée par l’actualité, du néant de l’individu et du respect qui convient devant les puissances existantes, s’exprime aussi dans une philosophie de la vie. Les hommes grouillent comme des vers, beaucoup sont piétinés ; mais cette destinée est juste, car la puissance de la vie a le droit d’exiger de l’individu obéissance sans réserve et soumission absolue.A la fin, l’article rassemble quelques témoignages caractéristiques de l’accueil fait à Hamsun. Il en résulte qu’en particulier après la guerre, socialistes et libéraux ont admiré sans critique Hamsun de la même manière que des littérateurs fascistes. (shrink)

The interpretation and appropriation of Romans 13:1–7 have been a challenge for generations because this text confuses Christians as to how they should relate and participate in the politics of the day. This article interprets the text in its historical and literary context before appropriating it to the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. The conclusion reached is that the text does not directly speak to church–state relations but rather should be understood in its context in Paul’s time. Appropriating the text to (...) the Second Republic requires us to delineate whether the governing authorities of the Second Republic are doing the will of God or whether they are terrorising people into obedience. The article concludes that the text does not forbid people from resisting illegitimate and brutal governments and does not demand passive citizenship.Contribution: The article is an interpretation and appropriation of Romans 13:1–7 to the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. Appropriating the text to the Second Republic requires one to delineate whether the governing authorities are doing the will of God or not. It is within the scope of this theological journal that issues of church-state relationships and theological reflection should be addressed, hence this article fits well within this scope. (shrink)

This article argues against the doxa that Foucault's analysis of education inevitably undermines self-originating ethical intention on the part of teachers or students. By attending to Foucault's lesser known, later work—in particular, the notion of ‘biopower’ and the deepened level of materiality it entails—the article shows how the earlier Foucauldian conception of power is intensified to such an extent that it overflows its original domain, and comes to ‘infuse’ the subject that might previously have been taken as a mere effect. (...) What emerges, accordingly, is a subject divested of ‘traditional’, substantial, formation, located wholly on an immanent plane, and yet centrally concerned with the practice of freedom and ethical resistance. In turn, what seemed to have no place at all in the earlier Foucault becomes central: in general, active subjectivization (subjectivation) as a counter to passive subjection (assujetissement); more particularly, subjects' ongoing production and creation (via strategic decisions and localized opposition) of a new ethos, new ‘practices of self’, and new kinds of relations. With this alternative Foucauldian position outlined, the article then focuses more particularly on the practices of education: it concludes that, instead of being rendered merely the factories of obedient behaviour, schools or colleges can be the locus for a critically-informed, oppositional micro-politics. In other words: the power-relations that (quite literally) constitute education can now be regarded, on Foucault's own terms, as being creative, ‘enabling’ and positive. (shrink)

English royalists with absolutist leanings developed a specific discourse of honouring during the English civil wars. The discourse directed men to engage in active obedience and to become political activists for the king. As a theory of praxis, it is distinguishable from accounts offered by scholars who emphasize aristocratic honour and its role in the civil wars. The discourse of honouring also differs from accounts offered by social historians who emphasize the ways in which honouring was contested. Moreover, the (...) author distances the discourse of honouring not only from those who construe it as a passive acquiescence but also from those who see it as flattery. Active honouring is divided into two inward and outward honouring. The former refers to love and will, understanding and motivation, which reflect inner reverence. The latter includes such actions as obedience to the King's commandments, helping him financially, engaging for him in battle, and praising him in speech. In this last form of honouring, the subject is specifically asked to hide and cover royal infirmities and weaknesses. (shrink)

The peculiarities of the worldview of a "typical" European student of the second half of the 20th century in Robert Merle's novel "Behind the Glass" are determined, his ability to live and communicate in society, to remain himself and at the same time to be a "cell" of a single whole among the large organism of the university. The author justifies the students' worldview positions by comparing the views of people from different strata of French society, as well as emigrants.Dissimilar (...) rebellious characters, "adaptive" moods, and individual interests of the students of that time are considered through personal relationships. The analysis of modern approaches of scientists to the work of Robert Merle is carried out, the modern realities of the "world of students" and "student life" are taken into account in comparison with the previous era. The aim – to reveal peculiarities in the worldview of a European student of the second half of the 20th century based on Robert Merle's novel "Through the Looking Glass". The tasks of the research are the analysis of the novel "Behind the Glass", the characteristics of the inner world of man in the creative vision of Robert Merle and its significance for the present. Research methodology. The leading research methods were: retrospective, which contributes to the study of the phenomenon of R. Merle's work against the background of the era from his early to late works; terminological selection – for the purpose of selection, clarification and modification of the system of individual terms used by the author in his novels; the method of personalization, which ensures the study of R. Merle's works through the images of his heroes. Research results: the problems raised by R. Merle in this novel affect not only student life, but also their teachers and the entire French society. for example, Professor Fremencourt cannot be heard in the hall, also because he "announces" as if into the void: there is no element of discussion in the lecture, only a few manage to get answers to questions after the lecture, the system of seminars is poorly developed in France, and they are not conducted by professors, and ordinary teachers. The student is assigned the role of a submissive and passive listener; verbally they call him to independent thinking, and demand spiritual obedience. It is not surprising that a selective but representative sociological questionnaire showed that 52% of French respondents assessed the May student riot as a "revolt of youth against outdated structures" of school and society. Conclusion. Through the events of one day, the characters of the main characters – typical students and professors of the middle of the last century – are gradually revealed, and at the same time, the worldview of a "typical" European student of the second half of the 20th century is revealed. However, we still feel similarities with them today, they are concerned about problems similar to ours, they feel the same as we do. Therefore, Robert Merle's novel "Through the Glass" will never lose its relevance, because it reflects inevitable values – the inheritance of generations, the interests of young people, social contradictions and ways of solving one's own problems. (shrink)

As long as we care about suffering in the world, says political philosopher Simona Forti, we are compelled to inquire into the question of evil. But is the concept of "evil" still useful in a postmodern landscape where absolute values have been leveled and relativized by a historicist perspective? Given our current unwillingness to judge others, what signposts remain to guide our ethical behavior? Surveying the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophical debates on evil, Forti concludes that it is time to (...) leave behind what she calls "the Dostoevsky paradigm": the dualistic vision of an omnipotent monster pitted against absolute, helpless victims. No longer capable of grasping the normalization of evil in today's world—whose structures of power have been transformed—this paradigm has exhausted its explanatory force. In its place, Forti offers a different genealogy of the relationship between evil and power, one that finally calls into question power's recurrent link to transgression. At the center of contemporary evil she posits the passive attitude towards rule-following, the need for normalcy, and the desire for obedience nurtured by our contemporary mass democracies. In our times, she contends, evil must be explored in tandem with our stubborn desire to stay alive at all costs as much as with our deep need for recognition: the new modern absolutes. A courageous book, _New Demons_ extends an original, inspiring call to ethical living in a biopolitical age. (shrink)

Together with its kissing cousins ‘authority’ and ‘obligation’, legitimacy is a notion that should arouse apprehension. Governments that are legitimate have the ‘right to rule’, to demand obedience from their citizens or subjects. It is at least partly correct to say that this authority is independent of the content of the laws or commands issued by those invested with it, that the authority of a law or command is a reason for obeying it regardless of its contents or their (...) merits. As widely construed, reasons of this kind are conclusive in that they leave those subject to authority with but two choices: either obey the command or disassociate from the political association of which authority is a constitutive feature. Theories of ‘passive’ and ‘civil’ disobedience add the third option of disobedience to commands judged to be unjust but on condition of peaceful submission to the penalty assigned. (shrink)

Spinoza’s project of showing how the mind can be freed from its passive affects and the State from its divisive factions (E IV.Appendix and V.Preface) ultimately coincides with the aims announced in the subtitle of the Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus (TTP) “to demonstrate that [the] freedom to philosophize does not endanger the piety and obedience required for civic peace.”1 Both projects rest on a set of provisional isomorphic distinctions—between adequate and inadequate ideas, between reason and the imagination, between active and (...) class='Hi'>passive affects—that Spinoza proceeds to blur, and indeed to renounce. In using these distinctions while also moving to overcome them, Spinoza is not confused or indecisive. Every philosopher, every wise Sovereign, every free man who attempts to incorporate adequate ideas in inadequately framed, perspectivally limited contexts must use these distinctions and also see how deeply misleading they are. I want to offer a friendly amendment to Hasana Sharpe’s essay “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza” arguing that Spinoza refuses her distinction between the force of an idea and its truth.2. (shrink)

As long as we care about suffering in the world, says political philosopher Simona Forti, we are compelled to inquire into the question of evil. But is the concept of evil still useful in a postmodern landscape where absolute values have been leveled and relativized by a historicist perspective? Given our current unwillingness to judge others, what signposts remain to guide our ethical behavior? Surveying the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophical debates on evil, Forti concludes that it is time to (...) leave behind what she calls "the Dostoevsky paradigm": the dualistic vision of an omnipotent monster pitted against absolute, helpless victims. No longer capable of grasping the normalization of evil in today's world—whose structures of power have been transformed—this paradigm has exhausted its explanatory force. In its place, Forti offers a different genealogy of the relationship between evil and power, one that finally calls into question power's recurrent link to transgression. At the center of contemporary evil she posits the passive attitude towards rule-following, the need for normalcy, and the desire for obedience nurtured by our contemporary mass democracies. In our times, she contends, evil must be explored in tandem with our stubborn desire to stay alive at all costs as much as with our deep need for recognition: the new modern absolutes. A courageous book, New Demons extends an original, inspiring call to ethical living in a biopolitical age. (shrink)

Introduction. Anthropotechnical turn in culture is based on educational practices that characterize a person as a subject and at the same time as an object of educational and corrective influence. Theoretical basis. We use the method of categorical analysis, which allows revealing the main outlook potentials of anthropotechnical turn as an essential transformation of modern socio-culture. Originality. For the first time, we conducted a categorical analysis of the glossary of anthropotechnical turn as dialectic of active and passive in the (...) personal and social modes such as education. Conclusions. The anthropotechnical turn of modern socio-culture means the actualization of the dialectic of active and passive in the process of socialization and formation of a person in a modern society. The world-view potential of the anthropotechnical turn is producing a new maxim and stratagem of person's behaviour through the formation of a new way of self-identification and self-esteem. The modern educational system, given the theory of anthropotechnical rotation, should change the content of timological energies from obedience to self-actualization and self-improvement. A prerequisite for this task is the change in the motivation of the education sector and the improvement of the social status of the teacher as an intellectual and leader of opinion. The analysis of the specificity of the information society and its determinatory impact on the individual provides grounds for identifying modern culture as a culture of lost opportunities. Thus, the main cause of disorientation and ignorance of a person is not the lack of information, but the lack of motivation. Therefore, the fundamental principles of anthropotechnical turn are productive in solving pressing problems of our time. (shrink)

Prevailing philosophical genealogies of modernity trace its origin to Descartes’s metaphysics of representation. This is true of both Hegel and Heidegger. By contrast, Reiner Schürmann’s Broken Hegemonies links modernity to the theological thinking of MartinLuther. I ask what is at stake philosophically in this difference. What Schürmann’s reading shows is that, under the figure of a passive transcendentalism, Luther inaugurates the epoch in which self-consciousness reigns as an ultimate principle. The broader importanceof Schürmann’s reading is to identify a “recessed” (...) and “obedient” side of modernity—a side tragically and covertly linked to its more familiar self-assertive side. Schürmann’s resituating of modernity allows a crucial corrective to many contemporary efforts at a critiqueof the modern. In particular, it suggests that to restrict one’s critique of modernity to the critique of representational or egological consciousness (as happens for example in Heidegger, Levinas and Marion) is to run the risk of a repetition of its obedient, recessed side. (shrink)

This is a phenomenological description of existential obedience, which draws out a contrast between it and ressentiment and existential envy, and compares it with pedagogical obedience. The discussion is developed with reference especially to the work of Erich Fromm, Emerson, and Nietzsche. Eds: This paper forms part of a special issue titled ‘Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age’, in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of ‘transvaluation’. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from (...) agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. (shrink)

This article offers a general framework for thinking about civil disobedience as transformative political action. Positing authority as the mode of power corresponding to obedience, and authority and freedom as internally related, it proposes a model of freedom and political authority as a basis for this framework. The framework is sufficiently general to allow for context-dependent variations – for example, as to whether publicity or non-violence is required – while specifying a view of civil disobedience as transformative action driven (...) by a constellation of ethical, legal and political concerns. A reconfigured conception of conscience has a place within this account, but is not an indispensable element. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Husserlian notion of “passive synthesis” can make a substantial contribution to the understanding of aesthetic experience. The argument is based on two empirical cases of qualitative interview material obtained from museum visitors and a world-renowned string quartet, which show that aesthetic experience contains an irreducible dimension of passive undergoing and surprise. Analyzing this material through the lens of passive syntheses helps explain these experiences, as well as the sense of subject–object fusion that (...) occurs in some of the most intense forms of aesthetic experience. These analyses are then contrasted with a potentially contradicting take on aesthetic experience from a recent trend in cognitive science, namely enactive aesthetics, which insists on the active subjective construction and sense-making of aesthetic experience. Finally we show that the two positions are in fact compatible. (shrink)

The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity (...) assumption. Section 2 suggests three major reasons for the emergence of this assumption in the seventeenth century: the mental-physical gap, the causal theory of perception, and epistemological considerations regarding the status of the sensory given. In the last section a critical discussion is presented. The passivity assumption is found to have serious empirical and theoretical flaws. (shrink)

Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which the (...) Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers – including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)

Examines the notion of passivity in the work of Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben.

This volume is designed to be an in-depth and nuanced philosophical treatment of the virtue of obedience in the context of the professional military and the broader civilian political community, including the general citizenry. The nature and components of obedience are critical factors leading to further discussions of the moral obligations related to obedience, as well as the related practical issues and implications. Pauline Shanks Kaurin seeks to address the following questions: What is obedience? Is it (...) a virtue, and if it is, why? What are the moral grounds of obedience? Why ought military members and citizens be obedient? Are there times that one ought not be obedient? Why? How should we think about obedience in contemporary political communities? (shrink)

The concept of obedience is included as a basic concept in the Holy Quran. In addition to the command to obey Allah, obey Muhammad was also stated and ordered. Obeying the Messenger was considered obedience to Allah and it was explained that absolute obedience belonged only to Allah. Obedience to the Messenger of Allah, Muhammad, is also in the category of absolute obedience in accordance with the command of Allah. In addition, "obeying the ulu’l-amr" is (...) also commanded in the Quran, but this is introduced as limited obedience. "Ulu’l-amr", which we translate as "those with authority/command", are Muslim knowledgeable people, scholars and administrators who are in administrative positions both familiarly and socially. The main subjects of obedience are the principles of faith. In Islam, obligations of servitude such as prayer (salah), almsgiving (zakat), fasting (sawm) and pilgrimage (hajj) are appearing of obedience. However, these obligations are primarily based on the principles of obedience such as Islamic tawhid, prophethood and belief in the afterlife. Even after belief in Islamic tawhid (monotheism) and therefore other aspects of faith are established in people obedience to the principles of faith continues by means of preserving faith. At this point, the importance of obligatory duties and good deeds is clear. The most obvious example of obedience in the principles of faith was seen in the Meccan period of the Prophet Muhammad. In this period, even though there were deeds such as tahārah (purity), salāt (prayer), and sadaqah (almsgiving); belief in one God, in the existence of a day of reckoning in which he will repay good deeds and evil deeds, and in the nubuwwah (prophethood) of the Prophet Muhammad, who communicated all these; constituted the primary agenda of obedience in Mecca at that time. Because shirk (polytheism) was dominant in Mecca. This study examines the literal meanings of obedience, obedience in the Qur'an and Hadith, and the nature of obedience in general terms. Later, some events that took place in the Meccan Period of Islam were interpreted within the framework of "obedience to Allah and His Messenger Muhammad". This section constitutes the main subject of this research. This article tries to see how the Messenger of Allah and the Companions responded to the divine command of obedience in Mecca. It is thought that this article will be a horizon for the idea of “obedience to Allah and His Messenger” in the 21st century. (shrink)

In the United States, all military personnel swear to obey “the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me.” Military personnel must obey orders promptly in order to facilitate effective military functioning. Yet, obedience to orders has been associated with the commission of war crimes. Military personnel of all ranks have committed torture, rape, genocide, and murder under orders. “I was just following orders” (respondaet superior) is no longer accepted as (...) a complete defense to a charge of war crimes. In the words of the Nuremberg court: “The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent”. This means that military personnel cannot evade responsibility for their actions under orders. But when and under what conditions should military personnel disobey orders? If obedience is sometimes morally wrong, how can obedience be a military virtue? In this chapter I argue that the only plausible conception of military obedience as a virtue is reflective obedience: obedience governed and constrained by the ends of the military profession serving a legitimate state and by the laws of armed conflict. Section 1 explains the concept of obedience and outlines the idea of virtuous obedience. Section 2 explores when the military has legitimate authority to compel obedience. Section 3 concludes by exploring the limits on obedience that derive from the military’s status as a profession and the legitimacy of the military’s authority to issue orders. (shrink)

I argue that there is a mutually illuminating parallel between the concept of obedience and the concept of believing a person. Just as both believing what a person says and believing what a person says for the reason that the person says it are insufficient for believing the person, so acting as a person demands and acting as a person demands for the reason that the person demands it are insufficient for obeying the person. Unlike the concept of believing (...) a person, however, the concept of obedience has two distinct senses, one applying to coerced action and one applying to non-coerced action based on authoritative directives. While the former sense of obedience has no theoretical analogue, the latter sense of obedience can be understood as the practical analogue of the theoretical case of believing a person, making room for a deep parallel between believing and acting on authority. (shrink)

PART I PROLEGOMENA ACTING ON ORDERS "First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do ...

Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which the (...) Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers — including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered. (shrink)

To explain the phenomenon that certain English verbs resist passivization, Pinker proposed a semantic constraint on the passive in the adult grammar: The greater the extent to which a verb denotes an action where a patient is affected or acted upon, the greater the extent to which it is compatible with the passive. However, a number of comprehension and production priming studies have cast doubt upon this claim, finding no difference between highly affecting agent-patient/theme-experiencer passives and non-actional experiencer (...) theme passives. The present study provides evidence that a semantic constraint is psychologically real, and is readily observed when more fine-grained independent and dependent measures are used. We conclude that a semantic constraint on the passive must be incorporated into accounts of the adult grammar. (shrink)

In the article by Vitalii Bondarchuk "Obedience to the Pope as the identifying features of the Uniate Church — a debate between Christopher Filalet and Ipatii Potii" authentic points of view of polemicists who were direct participants in the Union of Brest are analyzed. It was determined that the opponents have a different purpose dealing with this issue and resolve it using different methods. Both discussants have exemplary erudition concerning the past of the issue but they don’t outline the (...) issue in the context of the future of the Uniate Church. (shrink)

Passive Cooling addresses all of the existing creative energyless means of keeping buildings cool. Unlike passive heating, which draws on the sun, passive cooling relies on three natural heat sinks - the sky, the atmosphere, and the earth to achieve temperature moderation. This book describes and evaluates mechanisms for coupling buildings to these sinks and ways of integrating multiple strategies into effective passive cooling systems.In "Radiative Cooling," Marlo Martin explains how the sky specifically outer space - (...) acts as the ultimate absorber to balance energy inputs from the sun as well as other sources. "Ventilative Cooling" by Subrato Chandra and "Evaporative Cooling" by John Yellott describe two ways in which the atmosphere can serve as a medium of heat transfer. The third natural heat sink the earth, is evaluated by Kenneth Labs in "Earth Coupling." Gene Clark in "Passive Cooling Systems" explains how each of these cooling resources affects the design of a building in a dramatically different way and shows how they can be combined. And Jeffrey Cook reviews the current state of basic and applied research projects and anticipates promising future directions of study and application.Because passive cooling techniques have a rich and diverse history of worldwide development and application, the editor has taken special care to relate developments in the United States to international practice and research, providing a broad base for professional redirection in building design.Jeffrey Cook is Regents Professor of Architecture at Arizona State University. Passive Cooling is volume 8 in the series Solar Heat Technologies: Fundamentals and Applications, edited by Charles A Bankston. (shrink)

This paper does not present an advocacy of a passive education as opposed to an active education nor does it propose that passive education is in any way ‘better’ or more important than active education. Through readings of Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida and B.S. Johnson, and gentle critiques of Jacques Rancière and John Dewey, passive education is instead described and outlined as an education which occurs whether we attempt it or not. As such, the object of critique (...) for this essay are forms of educational thought which, through fate or design, exclude the passive dimension, either within or outside of formal educational settings. An underlying component of this argument is therefore also that education does occur outside of formal educational settings and that, contra Gert Biesta and his critique of ‘learnification’, we may gain rather than lose something by attending to it as education. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish a distinction and relationship between two types of noise – active noise and passive noise – while giving emphasis to the latter. Active noise is the discourse of negativity and violence that some theorists associate with noise’s materiality, an association particularly pronounced in engagements with Japanoise. The problem with this discourse is that it relies on a culturally normative understanding of noise as well as novelty. This narrative inevitably leads to a dead end. Noise, (...) and artistic practices like Japanoise that draw on noise sounds, have a short lifespan if their entire purpose is one of shock and disturbance. However, Japanoise is not dead: it persists both as a genre and as a sonic idea/gesture. This article suggests that noise persists, and Japanoise remains relevant, because it comes from a region not exhausted by categories of negativity and violence. This article will show how underneath active noise there resounds a deeper, more profound a-cultural noise. Drawing on Maurice Blanchot’s account of passivity, which names the anarchic region of absence in his thought, this noise will be described as passive noise. In this context, passivity must be understood differently from the conventional sense as something opposed to activity. Likewise, passive noise does not refer to background noise. Instead, passive noise will be described as the interiority of excess that manifests as a breach in the closure of active noise. This breach will be shown to be consistent with Blanchot’s view of the inexhaustibility of art and will be described, specifically in the context of Japanoise, as the intimacy of excess that is the lifeblood of maximalist forms of noise-making. This will also amount to a reconsideration of the idea of transgression by reframing Japanoise in terms of inertia. (shrink)

A number of scholars have suggested that Milgram’s laboratory studies of obedience offer an incisive analysis of the behavior of the Holocaust perpetrators. The present paper rejects that position. The contrasts between the two events, at every level of analysis, are striking: In Milgram’s research, innocent peers were harmed in the context of science; in the Holocaust, rabidly hated, subhuman enemies were murdered in the context of ‘war’. With regard to underlying psychological mechanisms, the evidence questioning the relevance of (...) Milgram’s research is equally compelling: obedience pressures had little role in the Holocaust. Most of the Nazi perpetrators showed no remorse or moral distress over the murders and perhaps most critically, virtually all of the killers knew that they could choose not to participate in the killings. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung. In der Auseinandersetzung um die Frage, ob aktive Sterbehilfe mit dem ärztlichen Ethos vereinbar ist, werden häufig deskriptive Unterscheidungen wie Tun vs. Unterlassen, aktiv vs. passiv oder auch intendieren vs. in Kauf nehmen benutzt, um eine kategorische moralische Differenz zwischen Töten und Sterbenlassen auszuweisen. Als zusätzliche Schwierigkeit erweist sich dabei zum einen, daß zentrale Begriffe zwischen einer deskriptiven und einer ethischen Bedeutung changieren, und zum anderen, daß die Kennzeichnung des Problems (z.B. Sterbehilfe) selbst ethisch nicht neutral ist. Nach der (...) Entwicklung einer ethisch neutralen Problemstellung werden kategorische Argumente gegen die ethische Zulässigkeit aktiver Sterbehilfe diskutiert und verworfen. Anschließend werden Begründungen diskutiert, die mittels intrinsischer oder extrinsischer Situationsmerkmale eine ethische Unzulässigkeit aktiver Sterbehilfe aufzuweisen versuchen. Dabei zeigt sich, daß graduelle ethische Unterschiede zwischen passiver, indirekt und direkt aktiver Sterbehilfe begründbar sind, die ein jeweils höheres Maß an Rechtfertigungsgründen erfordern. (shrink)