Bien que Hegel occupe dans les préoccupations philosophiques d'aujourd'hui une place prépondérante, nos contemporains sont peu enclins à accepter, et même à comprendre, ses audaces métaphysiques et systématiques. Tout aussi inacceptable paraît, à première vue, sa prétention d'être l'héritier légitime de Kant, le couronnement nécessaire de l'idéalisme allemand. L'auteur du présent article ne s'attaque pas au problème de la valeur du système et de la méthode de Hegel. C'est en historien qu'il essaie de dégager leur allure propre, en les étudiant (...) à la lumière de l'évolution de l'idéalisme allemand à partir de Kant. Il montre combien les prétentions métaphysiques de Hegel, vues dans cette perspective, sont naturelles. Ce n'est pas, pourtant, que son analyse confirme l'idée d'une connexion nécessaire entre les systèmes. Il souligne l'originalité profonde des grandes idéalistes, dont chacun cherche sans doute son inspiration dans la problématique de son prédécesseur, mais plutôt sous la forme d'un schéma de pensée, qu'il étoffe d'une manière très personnelle. Chez les idéalistes, l'enthousiasme messianique de l'Aufklärung prend une allure presque eschatologique ; ce trait explique pour une part l'ardeur qu'ils ont mise à édifier leur système, ainsi que la tendance de Hegel à présenter sa philosophie comme le sommet de l'histoire. Dans son interprétation de Hegel, l'auteur s'appuie surtout sur la Préface et l'Introduction de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit. Pour éclairer celles ci à la lumière de l'histoire de l'idéalisme, il suit l'itinéraire dressé par Hegel lui-même dans son premier essai philosophique, sur la différence entre le système de Fichte et celui de Schelling. Il décrit l'évolution de la philosophie depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel comme une réalisation progressive de l'idée d'identité absolue, que Hegel hérite de Schelling mais qu'il interprète d'une manière différente. Cette analyse permet à l'auteur de préciser la méthode de Hegel, les relations entre la Phénoménologie et le système, ainsi que les concepts de vérité, de sujet, d'esprit, d'en soi et de pour soi, dont Hegel se sert pour définir l'Absolu. Par la force même des choses, elle trace également l'évolution de l'idée de Dieu dans l'idéalisme. La conception hégélienne de Dieu est susceptible d'interprétations diverses. Tout en ne cachant pas ses préférences personnelles, l'auteur estime que l'état des études hégéliennes ne permet pas encore de se prononcer avec certitude. C'est sur cette invitation au travail qu'il termine son article. (shrink)

Comparative studies demonstrate that homologous neural structures differ in function and that neural mechanisms underlying behavior evolved independently. A neural structure does not serve a particular function so much as it executes an algorithm on its inputs though its dynamics. Neural dynamics are altered by a neuromodulation, and species-differences in neuromodulation can account for behavioral differences.

The social sciences contribute in important ways to our understanding of current Christian realities, especially ‘newer’ or ‘emerging’ Christianities. Recent research by social scientists on contemporary Christian groups – in historical anthropology and more recently in the anthropology of Christianity – has yielded important insights into modes of Christian agency and identity. Those interested in the spread of Christianity today – including missiologists – should familiarize themselves with such anthropological and sociological research. For their part, those engaged in social-scientific research (...) on newer Christianities should attend more closely to Christianity in its historical and communal dimensions by developing an historical sociology. (shrink)

In this rejoinder to Eric Scerri's response to my first comment on his paper on the reduction of chemistry to physics, the main point concerns laws in chemistry. But other themes touched upon include the assumptions involved in ab initio calculations, the question of what is reduced to what on Scerri's view, and the significance he attaches to the term "naturalism".

This volume brings together insights from religion (represented by Buddhism and Christianity) and science to address the question, What can we know about ...

'[T]he good man should be a lover of self.' Aristotle wrote. 'For he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows … '. Yet in much of contemporary moral philosophy, concern for one's own interests is considered a non-moral issue, while concern for the interests of others is paradigmatically moral. Indeed, a central issue in ethical theory involves the proper balance to be struck between prudence and morality, between the pursuit of one's own good and (...) the pursuit of the good of others. When deliberating over what action to take, should one weigh one's own interests more heavily than those of others? Or is it possible to accommodate both self-interest and regard for others, to show that we have self-regarding reasons for helping others? The twelve essays in this volume - written from a range of perspectives - address these questions and examine related issues. (shrink)

Three general problems in self-regulation theory and research are discussed in terms of their application to the model of biofunctional cognition. The three problems are: the development of a tractable conceptual foundation and consistent nomenclature for discussing self-regulation, clarification of the structures or components of self-regulation, and clarification of the processes of self-regulation. These issues are discussed in terms of how they apply to the model of dynamic self-regulation as represented in the articles for this special issue. It is suggested (...) that the model of dynamic self-regulation, as well as all models of self-regulation, can be improved by serious theoretical and empirical attention to these issues. (shrink)

«... M. Teste avait peut-être quarante ans. Sa parole était extraordinairement rapide, et sa voix sourde. Tout s'effaçait en lui, les yeux, les mains. Il avait pourtant les épaules militaires, et le pas d'une régularité qui étonnait. Quand il parlait, il ne levait jamais un bras ni un doigt: il avait tué la marionnette. Il ne souriait pas, ne disait ni bonjour ni bonsoir; il semblait ne pas entendre le « Comment allez-vous? » Sa mémoire me donna beaucoup à penser. (...) Les traits par lesquels j'en pouvais juger, me firent imaginer une gymnastique intellectuelle sans exemple. Ce n'était pas chez lui une faculté excessive, - c'était une faculté éduquée ou transformée. Voici ses propres paroles: « Il y a vingt ans que je n'ai plus de livres. J'ai brûlé mes papiers aussi. Je rature le vif... Je retiens ce que je veux. Mais le difficile n'est pas là. Il est de retenir ce dont je voudrai demain!... J'ai cherché un crible machinal... »...». (shrink)

"De venatione sapientiae" (entstanden 1463) nimmt unter den Werken des Cusanus (1401-1464) eine Sonderstellung ein, ist sie doch, ein Jahr vor seinem Tod verfaßt, so etwas wie sein philosophisches Testament. Das Werk nimmt seinen Ausgang von Diogenes Laertius' Lebensbeschreibungen der griechischen Philosophen, die Nikolaus beim Abfassen der venatio als Abschrift vor sich hatte - dies ist durch dortige Randbemerkungen belegt, die in die venatio eingegangen sind. Diese Randbemerkungen zeigen, unter welchem Gesichtspunkt Nikolaus die Geschichte der Philosophie betrachtete: Sie ist für (...) ihn die Geschichte menschlichen Ringens um Erkenntnis, und Erkenntnis ist für ihn in erster Linie Gotteserkenntnis. Nikolaus beschreibt drei Regionen und in ihnen zehn Felder (campi), in denen die philosophischen Jäger ihre Beute finden können. Einige dieser zehn Felder erinnern unmittelbar an Cusanusschriften, andere indirekt: "Das erste Feld nenne ich die belehrte Unwissenheit, das zweite das Können-Ist, das dritte das Nicht-Andere, das vierte das Feld des Lichtes, das fünfte das des Lobes, das sechste das Feld der Einheit, das siebte das der Gleichheit, das achte das Feld der Verknüpfung, das neunte das der Grenze, das zehnte das Feld der Ordnung". In den erwähnten drei Regionen wird die gesuchte Weisheit unterschiedlich angetroffen, in der ersten, wie sie in ewiger Weise ist, und als solche entzieht sie sich jeder menschlichen Erkenntnis und kann nicht adäquat benannt werden. In der zweiten Region wird die Weisheit in immerwährender Ähnlichkeit gefunden, und hier gibt es größtmögliche Annäherung an die Wahrheit als beständige Ähnlichkeit mit der ewigen Weisheit. In der dritten Region "leuchtet die Weisheit im zeitlichen Fluß der Ähnlichkeit von weitem auf"; die zeitliche Ähnlichkeit des intelligiblen Wahren (verum) ist 'verisimile', dem Wahren ähnlich. Die Kenntnisse der "Jagdzüge" antiker Philosophen nach Weisheit ordnet er nun in die Übersicht über das eigene Bemühen ein. Er zitiert die wichtigsten seiner philosophischen Schriften, weist ihnen ihren Platz in seinem Lebenswerk zu und geht ein weiteres Mal auf die "Jagd nach Weisheit". (shrink)

Quine is usually read as arguing either for a non-factualism about analyticity (1) ... Or, at the very least, for an error thesis about it: (2) ... These attributions — including the stronger non-factualist thesis — seem licensed by many passages, including the famous one which concludes Quine's discussion in "Two Dogmas" ... Nevertheless, Paul Horwich does not wish to read Quine as endorsing either (1) or (2). He certainly does not wish to attribute (1) to him. And he (...) wishes to attribute only a restricted version of (2). What this restriction is and why Paul wants to make it are matters I'll come to in just a moment. (shrink)

What should our buildings look like? Or is their usability more important than their appearance? Paul Guyer argues that the fundamental goals of architecture first identified by the Roman architect Marcus Pollio Vitruvius - good construction, functionality, and aesthetic appeal - have remained valid despite constant changes in human activities, building materials and technologies, as well as in artistic styles and cultures. Guyer discusses philosophers and architects throughout history, including Alberti, Kant, Ruskin, Wright, and Loos, and surveys the ways (...) in which their ideas are brought to life in buildings across the world. He also considers the works and words of contemporary architects including Annabelle Selldorf, Herzog and de Meuron, and Steven Holl, and shows that - despite changing times and fashions - good architecture continues to be something worth striving for. This new series offers short and personal perspectives by expert thinkers on topics that we all encounter in our everyday lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Phenomenalistic Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Knowledge PAUL MARHENKEt Introduction THw FOLLOWINGARTXCLEwas one of two previously unpublished papers found in the effects of the late Paul Marhenke (1899-1952), who was a professor at the University of California from 1927 until his death. Because of the intrinsic interest of the paper, the editors of the Journal o/the History of Philosophy have kindly consented to publish it. I (...) have made a few revisions in the manuscript in order to prepare it for publication. These revisions do not affect the sense of the argument in any way, being confined mainly to the expansion of abbreviations, the correction of typographical mistakes, and so on. It is not known when this paper was written, or for what occasion. Professor W. R. Dennes, who wrote the biographical sketch of Paul Marhenke which is included in the In Memoriam volume published by the University of California, informs me that he was unaware of the existence of this paper. Professor Dennes writes in this connection: I can only say that ever since our year of graduate study together (1919-19207) Paul and I often discussed the question how far Kant's apparatus of Categories and so on merely expressed a strong confidence in various sorts of regularities in phenomena; and if the apparatus really grounded the confidence, did it do so by a question-begging procedure of, for example, assuming causal regularity, and then grounding and guaranteeing such regularity by a "deduction" of the category of causation. In our discussions that went on, off and on, for thirty years, Paul at various times took various positions--all interesting-and I often urged him to write out his views on the matter. I wish I knew at which stage he did write them out, but I do not. This was one subject upon which I think Paul changed his mind a good deal in the course of his years of study and teaching. Paul Marhenke's main interests in philosophy lay in epistemology and particularly in the realist-phenomenalist issue which he here discusses in the context of Kant's philosophy. For those readers who will be making their [47] 48 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY first acquaintance with his work, this paper will provide an impressive illustration of the subtlety of his mind and of the care with which he drew distinctions. For those of us who were familiar with the cast of his mind, former students and colleagues alike, it will evoke the man himself, with his insistence upon rigor and precision as viae mediae toward an understanding of philosophical issues--AvRuM STROLL Two CURRENTSRUN through the Kantian theory of knowledge, one subjective, the other objective. These two currents follow very often in extreme proximity, so that we find Kant speaking in the same paragraph or even in successive sentences of the object of knowledge as being nothing but a synthesis of representations, i.e., sensations, and as being distinct from those sensations and merely represented by them in the individual mind of the perceiver. The former position is indistinguishable from Berkeleyan subjectivism as far as the existential status of the objects of immediate awareness is concerned; the world perceived is merely a subjective representation of the real world of things in themselves. The argument by which this position is reached presupposes, however, the truth of the realistic assumption which is denied in the conclusion based on the argument. For the argument presupposes the causal theory of perception with its realistic presupposition of real objects, sense-organs, nerves, a brain, etc. According to Kant sensations arise in the mind due to the impinging of physical stimuli on our senseorgans. Henceforth, however, it is denied that we perceive anything but these sensations and the truth of the realistic premises on which the conclusion is based must therefore be denied. The manifold of sensations constitutes the originally given material of the mind. The question to which Kant now attempts to give an answer is how this manifold becomes organized into a world of objects. This answer is given in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. The Kantian solution of the problem is a failure if for no... (shrink)

‘The formulas of advanced English politicians are as stiff and arrogant as the formulas of theology. Truth itself becomes distasteful to me when it comes in the shape of a proposition. Half the life of it is struck out of it in the process.’.

En el texto se analiza la experiencia del sufrimiento. No se persigue orientar el acto terapéutico sino tan sólo comprender esta experiencia común y universal. Se distingue entre dolor y sufrir, a la manera de tipos ideales, para mostrar que el sufrimiento no es sólo físico sino que afecta a todo el ser humano, en todas sus dimensiones. Se proponen dos ejes de análisis de esta experiencia: la relación sí-mismo-otro y la relación entre el hacer y el padecer. Todo sufrir (...) y toda expresión del sufrimiento puede ser comprendida en este marco. Pero, ¿el sufrimiento enseña? Para evitar el dolorismo y el sentimentalismo es preferible decir que el sufrimiento “interroga” y “apela”. El sufrir es también un “aguantar” y un perseverar en el esfuerzo por existir. Así queda trazada una fenomenología hermenéutica del sufrimiento. (shrink)