This essay examines Paul Ricœur’s views on recognition in his book The Course of Recognition . It highlights those aspects that are in some sense surprising, in relation to his previous publications and the general debates on Hegelian Anerkennung and the politics of recognition. After an overview of Ricœur’s book, the paper examines the meaning of “recognition” in Ricœur’s own proposal, in the dictionaries Ricœur uses, and in the contemporary debates. Then it takes a closer look at the ideas (...) of recognition as identification and as “taking as true.” Then it turns to recognition (attestation) of oneself, in light of the distinction between human constants (and the question “What am I?”), and human variables (and the question “Who Am I?”). The last section concerns the dialectics of struggles for recognition and states of peace, and the internal relationship between the contents of a normative demand and what counts as satisfying the demand. . (shrink)

Proposing his conception of narrative identity in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur holds that human life is comprehensible, once the story of a man’s life has actually been told, and it is the narrative of one’s life which constructs one’s identity. Developing his theory of heteroglossia and the polyphony of human speech, explicated chiefly in Speech Genres and The Dialogic Imagination, Mikhail Bakhtin recognizes the intrinsically intertwining character of utterance and response. According to him, utterance is always (...) addressed to someone and antedates an answer. Bakhtin’s “addressivity,” as well as his view of discourse as fundamentally dialogic, are convergent with Ricoeur’s elucidation both of man’s answerability to the Other and of narrative identity. The dynamic character of narrative identity, as construed by Ricoeur, converges with the dynamic nature of language as viewed by Bakhtin. The aim of this article is to study the intersections of Ricoeur’s narrative theory and Bakhtin’s recognition of the polyphonic nature of speech. I view these as inherently interrelated, and as testifying, respectively, to the philosophical and linguistic aspects of one and the same phenomenological vision. That vision accounts for selfhood, understood as vulnerable and contextualized, while also recognizing that it is conveyed by means of language with its essentially dialogic openness. (shrink)

Time has a very important function in considering the identity of a person. It is the factor that brings identity into question. The core of the problem is the question of whether the person is the same as he or she was at another time. The problem of personal identity was one of the most important issues in Paul Ricoeurs philosophy. He considers this problem in the context of time and notes that traditional models of identity as sameness and (...) as selfhood have been entangled in various aporias. He, therefore, proposes two new models of identity that are related in different ways to temporality: character and promise. Character is a model that changes over time through the acquisition or loss of various traits. The promise, on the other hand, is a model that resists the pressure of time attempts to keep a given word. In this way, these two different models create the framework for Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity. In this concept, time enables the development of action in a story. It allows the action to turn around, but it also allows the human being to look at the story of his or her life. Character and promise are models that allow the human being to look at his or her life as a certain temporal entity that is constantly threatened by unforeseen accidents and events but also constantly absorbs them and, through to time, gives the possibility of retrospection leading to synthesis. This synthesis allows us to look at a single life as a whole, belonging to the same person endowed with the character and challenge of keeping a promise. (shrink)

Apart from being a pervasive concept of present-day law, human dignity is a phenomenon regularly experienced by people in their lives. Yet before any protection for it can be advanced, it is imperative that an explanation of how human dignity is at all possible be established, including a description of its constitutive figures. Paul Ricoeur made a significant contribution to the lacking phenomenology of human dignity. Despite only rarely using the term dignity directly, he identified and (...) described its three constitutive and interdependent figures—self-esteem, self-respect, and recognition—and embedded them amongst such notions as self, identity, narrative, passivity, bodiliness, fragility, morality, and law. He activated the phenomenological, existentialist, and hermeneutic legacies in understanding human dignity and succeeded in modifying certain sharp-edged structures that have periodically been associated with the notion of human dignity. In this paper I argue that human dignity is a high-ranking topic in Ricoeur’s writings, identify and synthesize the phenomenology of human dignity scattered throughout his works, and reveal the profound existential aspects he attributed to it. Finally, I discuss and evaluate his phenomenological-existentialistic account of human dignity, particularly taking into consideration the contemporary use of human dignity in law and its associated discourses. (shrink)

The 4th volume of “Manuscripts and Speeches” by the prominent contemporary thinker Paul Ricoeur (1913‑2005) contains works discussing one of his central themes — the problem of a common existence of men considered from the point of view of politics, economics, power, law, culture, morality, and ethics. At the same time, the French thinker specifically highlights and discusses such burning problems of modern life as mutual recognition, the fragility of human existence and earthly civilization in general, tolerance, care, (...) justice, responsibility for the future of humanity, for the very idea of man. In a number of works, Ricoeur expresses his views on the possible future of Europe — on its new ethos overcoming the boundaries and structures of national states, on the combination of their “identity” and “otherness” at the global level. Translation from one language to another as a kind of a priori communication, exchange of memory as a preliminary transfer to a different cultural environment, forgiveness that stems from the suffering of others and raises the question of the burden of debt, — all this is being considered as a models of integration. Originally presented at philosophical congresses and symposia, as well as qua journal publications, the highlighted problems were fundamentally studied by the philosopher in his works “History and Truth” (1955), “Oneself as Another” (1990), “Ethics and Responsibility” (1994), “The Just” (vols. 1, 2 — 1995, 2001), “Ideology and Utopia” (1997), “Memory, History, Oblivion” (2000), “The Way of Recognition” (2004). The book “Paul Ricoeur. Politics, Economics and Society. Manuscripts and Speeches 4” is addressed to philosophers, cultural and political scientists and scholars representing different branches of humanitarian studies, as well as to readers interested in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

In this work, Xavier Lakshmanan argues for a textual linguistic approach to Christian theology. The book takes its shape in conversation with Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical thought, demonstrating how Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy can inform the way Christians interpret and appropriate biblical narratives without delimiting the potential of the text or eroding the distinctiveness of its language. The text can be appropriated in ways that address the fundamental questions of life. New meanings are constantly generated from the same text in order (...) to describe and redescribe existence, and form human identity. The self is linked inseparably with narrative; every interpretation of narrative is at the same time a reinterpretation of the self and of its possibilities. In such interpretative processes, the reader interprets the text and the text interprets the reader at the same time through an interactive reading. Accordingly, the aim of interpreting the narratives is to open up the world of the text in front of the text and in front of the reader. Here what the text uncovers is the «textual» structure of existence itself. The reality that unfolds through language discloses the possibilities of existence, and in this way the text creates a future. A revised identity emerges against the horizon of that future to give a coherent and dynamic account of the self against a horizon of hope. (shrink)

This article explores how readers recognize their personal identities represented through data visualizations. The recognition is investigated starting from three definitions captured by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur: the identification with the visualization, the recognition of someone in the visualization, and the mutual recognition that happens between readers. Whereas these notions were initially applied to study the role of the book reader, two further concepts complete the shift to data visualization: the digital identity stays for the present-day passport of (...) class='Hi'>human actions and the promise is the intimate reflection that projects readers towards their own future. This article reflects on the delicate meaning of digital identity and the way of representing it according to this structure: From Personal Identity to Media is a historical introduction to self-recognition, Data Visualization for Representing Identities moves the focus to visual representation, and The Course of Recognition breaks the self-recognition in through the five concepts above just before the Conclusion. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE The spotlight that Martha Nussbaum turns on the plight of women in developing nations brings the disproportion between human capabilities and the opportunities to exercise them sharply into focus. Social prejudices, economic discrimination, and deep-seated traditions and attitudes all harbor the seeds of systemic injustices within governing policies and institutions. The refusal on the part of a dominant class to recognize the rights and (...) claims of subaltern individuals and groups has both symbolic and material consequences. The power that one group exercises over another brings the refusal to recognize the rights and claims of others to the fore. Thanks to the moral priority that Paul Ricoeur accords to the victim against such refusals, I tie the fragility of identity to the idea of justice’s federating force. This federating force, I therefore argue, accompanies the struggle for recognition among capable human beings. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur is a philosopher of wide ranging interests whose main concern is hermeneutics. His hermeneutics is self-reflexive, an existential appropriation that eventually gives way to self-understanding. Questions pertaining to self-identity, the problem of the other and intersubjectivity are presented by him in a tensive style, keeping the scope of interpretations wide open. While discussing the question of self-identity, he moves towards intersubjectivity which is centred on self-esteem. It provides a context for self-constancy which gives to a moral identity, (...) an attestation of Here I am. Here arises the basic issue, how the narrative identity which is hermeneutical give rise to an ethical relation. If so, Ricoeur must be ready to see that there is an asymmetric relation between the same and the other which can be termed ethical. Though he says that conscience contains an injunction to attest ourselves to say, Here I am, it is a statement of “said” and not one of “saying”. Only a statement of “saying” can interrupt ontology and enact the movement from the same to the other which is ethical. Hence, Ricoeur stands at the hemeneutical level which cannot abandon ontology. But the polysemic nature of alterity posed by him never closes the possibilities of an ethical interpretation. (shrink)

Care ethics takes as central the discerning of needs in those being cared for and attempts to meet those needs. Perceptive caring agents are more likely to be able to identify needs in those for whom they are caring. The identification of needs is no small matter, not least in teaching encounters. This paper modestly proposes that at least some of the needs a caring agent should attempt to meet are a function of the identity of the patient of caring (...) action. Taking Nel Noddings’ account of care ethics as representative, I present it in outline. This leads to the needs-identification problematic. Following this I turn to Soran Reader’s account of needs. I interpret this to offer what I designate as identity as ‘what-ness’. Such an understanding of identity-based needs is a starting point for the caring agent but a more nuanced account, of identity as ‘who-ness’, is argued to be preferable. Identity as ‘who-ness’, as expressed in Paul Ricoeur’s work, advances the discussion, culminating in his concept of the ‘capable human being’. Having brought this aspect of Ricoeur’s thought into conversation with care ethics, I offer an account of identity-based needs conducive to the broader aims of the care ethical project. Finally, I consider what this bolstered account of care ethics might say about a brief and illustrative teaching encounter. (shrink)

The author of the paper analyzes John Milton’s great epic narrative through the lenses of Paul Ricoeur’s biblical hermeneutics and his philosophical reflection, in particular the second chapter of the philosopher’s last book, Parcours de la Reconnaissance, devoted mainly to the prospects and pitfalls of recognizing oneself. Two excerpts from St. Paul’s Letter to Romans and the Letter to Corinthians highlight the main points of reference in this argument: the concept of involuntary wrongdoing and the contrast between the (...) present opacity and the projected transparency of the knowing subject, connected with the promise of seeing face-to-face, whose fulfilment is rooted in God’s antecedent knowledge of a human being. It is argued that Ricoeur’s focus on the precarious fate of the “fallible man” and his simultaneous desire to outline the destiny of the “capable man” elucidate Milton’s masterpiece evocations of the Aristotelian anagnorisis in Paradise Lost. (shrink)

What is the relationship of “strong evaluation” and self-identity? What exactly is personal identity? Does identity consist of interpretations or facts? Do strong evaluations have a constitutive role in identity-formation? If there is no given individual essence or true self waiting to be found, but identity is dialogically construed in self-interpretation, then can identities be criticized at all, when there is no pre-given true self, which would serve as the basis of criticism? I follow Charles Taylor in defending an interpretational (...) and evaluational conception of self-identity, but I hope to be more precise in distinguishing several meanings of “identity” and correspondingly several different roles that strong evaluation has for identity in different senses. Further, I try to show that identities are criticizable despite the lack of pre-given essences. I will first differentiate between various meanings of identity: idem-identity, ipse-identity, collective identity and species identity (4.1). Then I take a closer look at ipse-identity in four different meanings: practical identity, biographical identity, qualitative identity and “singularity” (4.2). This survey tries to capture the most important meanings of the concept, but the concept of identity is used in philosophy, social psychology and human sciences in so many different ways that a comprehensive survey is probably impossible. However, this survey may help to sort out what sense of identity is relevant for strong evaluation, or for what “identities” strong evaluations are crucial. Having distinguished these several meanings, I turn to the formation of identity in self-interpretations. Charles Taylor has been (wrongly) accused of presupposing a pre-political identity that persons or groups are supposed to have, and for which they want recognition. That would overlook the way in which identities are constituted dialogically, and in interpretations. I will defend the view that personal identity is a matter of self-interpretation, and collective identity is a matter of collective selfinterpretations. While dialogues and recognition by others plays a crucial role in the formation of one’s identity, the views of others are not directly constitutive of a person’s identity, unless the contents are known or accepted by the person herself. Being a person or a self is an active business. Having a self in a fullfledged sense means having a conception of oneself, and having conceptions is an active business. People don’t have beliefs like things have properties. As Sellars (1963) has stressed, the relation of two mental episodes has to be normative if it is to count as knowledge; it cannot be merely causal. And as the “transcendental tradition” from Kant onwards has stressed, being a subject is not merely a matter of having mental contents (which could possibly be caused by the world) but being aware of the reality, taking the mental contents to be about the world.144 In addition to normativity and intentionality, the activity of self-defining is one aspect of the spontaneous activity of the subject. One’s self-identity does not rest simply on having features, but on one’s activity, on identification with some actual or possible features. In this sense, everyone’s identity is self-made. The point in saying this is not to overlook the cultural and social mediations that are intertwined in this self-definition, but to stress the fact that one’s identity is not a matter of natural features. Self-identity is a tentative result of an ongoing process of self-interpretation. Depending on the precise meaning of self-identity, strong evaluation has a more or less central role (4.3). In the last section I ask whether identities can be criticized, or whether (in the absence of pre-given true selves) self-interpretations are the ultimate “court of appeal” not only in the sense of what constitutes identity, but also in questions about their ethical and existential worth, or coherence, or authenticity or epistemic adequacy. I hope to show that self-interpretations stand open for criticism in these respects, even though self-interpretations are directly constitutive of one’s identity (4.4). (shrink)

How do human beings become human? This question lies behind the so-called human sciences. But these disciplines are scattered among many different departments and hold up a cracked mirror to humankind. This is why, in the view of Paul Ricoeur, we need to develop a philosophical anthropology, one that has a much older history but still offers many untapped resources. This appeal to a specifically philosophical approach to questions regarding what it was to be human (...) did not stop Ricoeur from entering into dialogue with other disciplines and approaches, such as psychoanalysis, history, sociology, anthropology, linguistics and the philosophy of language, in order to offer an up-to-date reflection on what he saw as the fundamental issues. For there is clearly not a simple, single answer to the question what is it to be human? Ricoeur therefore takes up the complexity of this question in terms of the tensions he sees between the voluntary and the involuntary, acting and suffering, autonomy and vulnerability, capacity and fragility, and identity and otherness. The texts brought together in this volume provide an overall view of the development of Ricoeurs philosophical thinking on the question of what it is to be human, from his early 1939 lecture on Attention to his remarks on receiving the Kluge Prize in 2004, a few months before his death. (shrink)

In an intentionally provocative essay published in the journal Esprit (January, 1983) on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, I ventured the following slogan: “Death to personalism; long live the person!” I was attempting to suggest that Mounier's formulation of personalism was, as he himself readily admitted, connected with a certain cultural and philosophical constellation which is no longer ours today: existentialism and Marxism are no longer the only opponents. They are no longer even opponents at all, against which personalism (...) would be required to define itself, at the risk of becoming one or another system or `ism'. I concluded my essay with the following citation from Mounier's Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?: “We are witnessing [...] the first meanderings of a cyclical course where the explorations pursued to exhaustion along one path are are given up only to be rediscovered farther on, enriched by this forgetting and by the discoveries for which it cleared a path” (p. 11). In addition, I wanted to say that the person is still the most appropriate term to designate those investigations for which neither the term `con-sciousness', nor `subject', nor `individual' really apply, for the various reasons that I invoked at the time. I would like to discuss some of those investigations here, beyond the point reached in that essay, where I restricted myself to defining the person by an attitude in Eric Weil's sense, or as one would say in hermeneutics, by the everyday understanding that we have of it. Following Paul Landsberg, I used the criteria of crisis and commitment, adding to the latter certain corollaries such as fidelity over time to a higher cause, and acceptance of alterity and difference within personal identity. Now I would like to make use of contemporary investigations into language, action and narrative in order to provide the ethical constitution of the person with a substratum and roots, comparable to those explored by Emmanuel Mounier in Traité du Caractère. In this sense, the present study is an extension of Mounier's book. (shrink)

In the realm of the humanities, Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) is widely viewed as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. He published an impressive and comprehensive oeuvre that made an impact on almost all areas of the humanities. By combining the resources and insights of phenomenology and hermeneutics, he developed new perspectives on the text, on metaphor, on narrative, and on personal identity that pervaded theology, history, linguistics, psychoanalysis, ethics,(philosophical) anthropology, cognitive sciences, and so on. In (...) light of his centennial in 2013, the question arises whether his theories have a future and can be extended to capture new phenomena studied in the humanities: What is the impact and meaning of the oeuvre of Paul Ricoeur for the humanities? In particular, one may develop this question as follows: Which of Ricoeur’s major contributions can be expected to remain relevant for the humanities? In what way can we relate Ricoeur’s oeuvre to ideas and methods of other philosophers and scientists? Does Ricoeur’s paradigm of the text still provide a relevant framework for thinking about the basic questions that concern the humanities today? If so, how can we bring Ricoeur’s perspective in a fruitful tension or dialogue with other, competing paradigms? (shrink)

This book examines the later work of Paul Ricoeur, particularly his major work, Time and Narrative. The essays, including three pieces by Ricoeur himself, consider this important study, extending and developing the debate it has inspired. Time and Narrative is the finest example of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics and is one of the most significant works of philosophy published in the late twentieth century. Paul Ricoeur's study of the intertwining of time and narrative proposes and examines the possibility that (...) narrative could remedy a fatal deficiency in any purely phenomenological approach. He analysed both literary and historical writing, from Proust to Braudel, as well as key figures in the history of philosophy: Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. His own recognition of his limited success in expunging aporia opens onto the positive discovery of the importance of narrative identity, on which Ricoeur writes here. Other contributors take up a range of different topics: Tracing Ricoeur's own philosophical trajectory; reflexively applying the narrative approach to philosophy, or to his own text; reconstructing his dialectic of sedimentati and tradition. An essential companion to Time and Narrative, this collection also provides an excellent introduction to Ricoeur's later work and to contemporary works in philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

This article presents Paul Ricoeur's ideas about translation in view of giving some guidelines for the interpretation of cultures. Ricoeur's `hermeneutics of the self', which stresses the creativity of capable human being, has its source in a conviction of the superabundance of sense over the abundance of nonsense. It is the problem of the transmission of meaning from one language to another, from one culture to another that gives impetus to his preoccupation with translation. Ricoeur's radical astonishment before (...) the plurality of languages and cultures and his deep conviction about `communication' among human beings made him realize the urgent `task of translation' that is accompanied by a `task of morning'. If translation is the paradigm of all exchanges, its practice can provide us some guidelines in the dialogue of cultures. First, one must courageously open oneself to the `test' of the Other, to welcome difference and respect it as unsurpassable. Second, one must wager on the possibility of an `equivalence without identity', to take a non-hierarchical view of cultures. Third, one must undertake the `task of mourning', to learn to narrate otherwise, to interpret otherwise. (shrink)

L’admiration de Paul Ricoeur pour Merleau-Ponty est connue, lui qui entendait donner à la Phénoménologie de la perception sa « contrepartie pratique » avec le premier tome de la Philosophie de la volonté, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire. Il faut d’emblée s’étonner que celui-ci n’ait pas reconnu la teneur pratique de la philosophie de son aîné, dont les diverses analyses au Collège de France, et en particulier l’intérêt marqué de Merleau-Ponty pour la pensée marxiste comme philosophie de l’homme charnel, et (...) le motif naturaliste de l’être agissant et souffrant à partir de 1956, font état. Car c’est bien depuis ce motif que Ricoeur, en 2004, expose le parcours de la reconnaissance : de l’homme agissant et souffrant, à l’homme capable. L’enjeu, nous semble-t-il alors, de ces deux philosophies en leur dimension pratique se résume aisément par les exigences formulées par Paul Ricoeur dans l’ouvrage Soi-même comme un autre, en particulier lorsque celui-ci se donne pour but de « déterminer les traits nouveaux de l’ipséité correspondant à la pratique politique » – détermination du Soi agent qui se dessine, au dire même de l’auteur, à la croisée d’une phénoménologie de l’agir et d’une ontologie du Soi. En effet, comme le souligne Ricoeur, l’effacement paradoxal de la question de l’ipséité dans la philosophie morale kantienne, entre autres, s’explique par l’absence d’une telle théorie de l’action. En bref, le « Je veux » analysé en 1950 par Ricoeur s’ancre dans un « Je peux », qui ne se limite jamais au seul plan spatial chez Merleau-Ponty. Ainsi, à la figure phénoménologique de nos expériences de la passivité correspond la catégorie ontologique de l’altérité, mentionnée par l’expression du Visible et de l’invisible reprise en titre de cet article et dont l’attribution à Ricoeur ne choquerait pas.Paul Ricoeur’s admiration for Merleau-Ponty is well-known given that he presented his “practical counterpart” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the form of his Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. One is immediately surprised that this is not recognized as the practical content of his predecessor’s philosophy given the diverse analyses at the Collège de France of which, in particular, the marked interest Merleau-Ponty had in Marxist thought as the philosophy of the fleshly human being, as well as the naturalist motif of the active and suffering being beginning in 1956, are part. For, it is due to this motif that Ricoeur, in 2004, presents the trajectory of recognition: from the active and suffering human being to the capable human being. As we see them, the stakes in these two philosophies, as far as their practical dimensions are concerned, are easily summarized by the requirements Paul Ricoeur formulated in his work, Oneself as Another. This is particularly the case given that this text has for its aim, “determining the new traits of individual identity which correspond to practical politics” – the determination of Self as a self-designing agent, which, according to the author, lies at the intersection of a phenomenology of action and an ontology of the Self. In fact, as Ricoeur himself underlines, the paradoxical effacement of the question of ipseity in Kantian moral philosophy, among others, is explained by the absence of just such a theory of action. Briefly, the “I want” analysis by Ricoeur in 1950 is anchored in the “I can,” which is never limited to the single spatial outline we find in Merleau-Ponty. Thus, to the phenomenological figure of our experiences of passivity correspond the ontological category of alterity, as mentioned in the phrase from The Visible and the Invisible taken up in the title of this article and which it would not be shocking to attribute to Ricoeur.È ben nota l’ammirazione di Paul Ricoeur per Merleau-Ponty: col primo tomo della Philosophie de la volonté, intitolato Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Paul Ricoeur intendeva offrire alla Fenomenologia della percezione una vera e propria “contropartita pratica”. Ma è singolare il fatto che Ricoeur non abbia riconosciuto il risvolto pratico presente nella filosofia del suo predecessore, risvolto ampiamente attestato nei corsi merleau-pontyani al Collège de France e in particolare nelle lezioni che pongono al centro delle loro analisi il pensiero marxista come filosofia dell’uomo carnale e il motivo naturalistico dell’uomo agente e dell’uomo sofferente almeno a partire dal 1956. È proprio prendendo le mosse da questo motivo che Ricoeur nel 2004 espone quanto definisce come il percorso del riconoscimento: dall’uomo agente e dall’uomo sofferente all’uomo “capace”. La posta in gioco, ci sembra, di queste due filosofie, considerate nella loro dimensione pratica, si riassume facilmente nelle esigenze che Ricoeur formula nel suo libro Sé come un altro, in particolare quando si assegna il compito di “determinare i tratti peculiari dell’ipseità corrispondente alla pratica politica” – cioè di determinare i tratti di quel Sé agente che si delinea, a dire dell’autore stesso, al crocevia tra una fenomenologia dell’agire e un’ontologia del Sé. In effetti, come sottolinea Ricoeur, la paradossale cancellazione dell’ipseità operata dalla filosofia morale kantiana si spiega tra l’altro con l’assenza di una adeguata teoria dell’azione. In breve, l’“Io voglio” analizzato da Ricoeur nel 1950 si àncora in un “Io posso” che non si limita mai, in Merleau-Ponty, al solo piano spaziale. Così, alla figura fenomenologica delle nostre esperienze di passività, corrisponde la categoria ontologica dell’alterità, che proprio Il visibile e l’invisibile menziona con l’espressione che noi riprendiamo nel titolo di questo articolo e che ci si aspetterebbe essere anzitutto ricoeuriana. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The reconstruction of Paul Ricoeur's philosophical project presented in this thesis endeavours to bring together his various ideas concerning human willing in order to assess the contribution they are able to make to contemporary Christian theology. This critical assessment identifies the field of concepts and issues that comprise Ricoeur's Kantian account of willing; it also challenges his reliance on a paradoxical account of the human subject (...) as being both temporal and non-temporal. ;Ricoeur's dual-aspect account of willing assumes that the human subject is not merely passive in receiving the intuitions of experience but is actively involved in the constitution of objective experience and in the self-recognition of human freedom as 'a captive free will'. Human freedom, then, can only be adequately understood in terms of the symbolism of 'captivity' and 'deliverance'. For Ricoeur it is the Judaeo-Christian 'myths' concerning the origin and the end of evil which uniquely symbolise the experience of deliverance from captivity by representing Jesus Christ as the decisive figure of hope for a transformation of human consciousness and circumstances. ;However, at the same time as offering this positive assessment it is argued that Ricoeur's dual-aspect account of human willing--privileging, as it does, the conceptual hypostases of 'the temporal' and 'the non-temporal'--is founded upon a transcendental idealist problematic. In order to go beyond adherence to an abstract and possibly mystifying view of 'the non-temporal' the ultimate emphasis in this thesis is placed upon the transformative and transignifying possibilities of the dual reconstructive process which both constitute and are constituted by Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of suspicion' and 'hermeneutics of faith'. An authentic faith--and thus the paramount condition of an authentic theology itself--depends, in Ricoeurian terms, upon both a critical and restorative reconstruction and reconstitution of the human bond with the sacred. (shrink)

The article analyzes a wide range of philosophical and anthropological subjects in the works of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Rejecting the idea of system-creation, Ricoeur creates a generalized image of a person in the form of polemical, sometimes marginal notes in relation to other European thinkers. His works reveal an original view on the problems of human subjectivity, Ego, personality, selfness, identity, etc. The author of the article shows that all the variety of anthropological topics in Ricoeur (...) can be clarified through the phenomenon of human subjectivity, which the philosopher connects with spirituality, which is born in pre-reflexive forms of life and culture. Special attention is paid to the consideration of the personality as an individuality of a special kind and to the process of identification of the person as an individual. P. Ricoeur managed to give a new interpretation to the concept of identity through a complex dialectic of internal and external self-identity. (shrink)

Recognition and freedom function not only most prominently as a key concept in current social and political theory, notably in critical theory and in (post‐)structuralist debates as well as in pragmatic‐skeptical conceptions, but the concept also receives considerable treatment within the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition. Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, and Jean‐Paul Sartre have elaborated the concept of recognition in a significant way. However, there are seminal indications for a nuanced understanding of the intrinsic relation of recognition and (un)freedom (...) in the thinking of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, and Martin Heidegger. A positive understanding of recognition takes its departure from the assumption that the subject can only achieve a practical self‐relation if she experiences affirmation and acceptance from Others. The negative understanding starts with the observation that existing orders of recognition force the subject to adopt given identity attributions in conformity with the system and with an effective apparatus of power. (shrink)

In this article, we examine two philosophical theories of recognition: those of Paul Ricoeur and Alexandre Kojève. We trace this line of development in the theory of recognition as a return from Ricoeur to Kojève. Our hypothesis is that over the past twenty years, the theory of recognition has undergone a change in content and has transformed into a theory of misrecognition. In turn, the theory of misrecognition is grounded in the struggle between subjects and brings us back to (...) the discourse of the struggle between the Slave and the Master. This transformation from struggle to reciprocity and vice versa, we argue, suggests that a theory of identity formation as a process of resistance to assujettissement is in demand at this moment in history. In the 2010s, as the theory of misrecognition took shape primarily in the English‑speaking world, the constitution of the subject began to be understood once again as the outcome of struggles within feminist, Marxist, and other emancipatory theories. We examine both Ricoeur’s arguments against Kojève, Althusser, and the theory of misrecognition in general, as well as the «return» of Kojève’s arguments in the contemporary theory of misrecognition. (shrink)

Poststructural criticisms of classical and neoclassical economic conceptions of human motivation and agency often include rejections of how market exchange is conceived to involve only the desires and rationality of a solitary human agent. While many of these criticisms are illuminating, they also tend not to offer a positive, constructive alternative. In this chapter, I discuss the contributions of Paul Ricoeur's understanding of mutual recognition and how it can be used--albeit perhaps despite Ricoeur's own intention and critical (...) assessment of economics--to retrieve a theory of exchange in which mutuality is possible. My analysis consists of five sections. First, I recapitulate Ricoeur’s criticism of exchange. Second, I examine how the economist Richard Ebeling attempts to read mutuality in exchange through the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and why this attempt fails. Third, I revive Ricoeur’s broader conception of value in relation to care for the other. This allows me, in the fourth section, to correlate Ricoeur’s discussion of ethical value to exchange-value. Finally, I join exchange to mutual recognition via Ricoeur’s discussion of epieikeia. (shrink)

This article proposes to retrace the path of trust that Paul Ricœur has drawn across his works. If the concept of trust is never themed as such, nevertheless it unfolds in subtle ways in fields as diverse as ethics, morality, politics, and religion. We will argue that trust is a solid but fragile foundation for Ricœur’s recognition theory. Rooted in man’s structural disproportion, trust is a perpetual tension between the finitude of existence and the infinitude of mutual recognition, between (...) the ability and fallibility of the human being -it is thus a continuous search, always disappointing but always renewed, of a mediation between the self and the other, the hope of happiness and the reality of evil. The analysis of various forms of trust, including interpersonal and institutional forms, will then be coupled with a study of trust in practical terms, based on Ricœur’s approach to healthcare relationships, or the perception of foreigners. (shrink)

The amplitude and the diversity of Ricoeur’s philosophical production is astonishing. Three factors shed light upon this fact. First, his philosophical career covers seventy years wherein he witnessed the rise and the decline of tlve philosophical -isms. Further, he is a typical dialogical thinker: in conversation with the great classical and modern philosophers, and eager to listen to the methods and results of human an linguistics sciences. A third reason, particularly of differentiation, stems from his double conviction and commitment. (...) On the one hand, he wants to be a rigorous philosopher, even keeping on a methodic agnosticism. On the other hand, however, he is a convinced Christian, and so he also likes to think critically – a rigorous philosophizing here is inappropriate – on religion, belief, and biblical language and topics. Nevertheless, it is only since 2000 that he is getting fully aware of the disintegrated impression many readers have from his publications. In his opinion, this impression is perfectly understandable: a reading public and myself are on completely different wavelengths. From reading my books people spontaneously nurture their own expectation with regard to coming publications, whereas my concern always was: am I answering your questions? So, in four recent articles Ricoeur speaks of his technical philosophy composed of eleven books: from The voluntary and the Involontary to the Course of Recognition . He argues that the continuity of his basic philosophical writings is, each time, determined by a residue, a question the preceding publication left open. But, where to situate then his twenty-two other books into a global and consistent picture? All these other works are explorations of specific philosophical issues, and reflections and topics as prophecy, tragedy and religion bordering philosophy. For this matter, a fully rigorous philosophical discourse is not always possible. These writings, however, find their setting around the hard core of his philosophy. Ricoeur himself only mentions two genres: volumes of articles for a larger audience as History and Truth and university lectures as Lectures on Ideology and Utopia . But other headings need to be added to umbrella other publications: historical and autobiographic writings, collection of articles on political topics, on the sacred and biblical language, on philosophy of law, and on medical ethical issues. On a more remote distance from the heart of his philosophy are located hundred of articles and interviews on philosophical topics, reflections on actual themes, an even some homilies. To amazement of many, two eminent Ricoeur commentators recently characterized his philosophy as “An Ontology of Life”. This is not as strange as it looks! Already in The voluntary and the Involontary. Ricoeur offers a phenomenology of “life, to be in life and birth”. To him, life also is a lived and hard-won value. In fact, belief in life is related to his main category of “originative affirmation” and of “hope”. Hope, however, is never a knowledge but only the regulative idea of my metaphysical thinking, and it remains inextricably bound up with the anguish for a senseless totality. “Nothing is closer to the anguish of nonsense than timid hope.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 347-352 [Access article in PDF] Idem, Ipse, and Loss of the Self Gerrit Glas The case histories of Dr. Wells and the comments on them require first of all more conceptual clarity. In this article I will first introduce, with Paul Ricoeur, a distinction between idem identity and ipse identity. Then, I will discuss the merits and pitfalls of applying narrative theory (...) to pathologies of the self. Behind the discussion on the breakdown of narrative unity, deep questions loom, most notably about conceivability and meaning of the notion of breakdown of self-relatedness as such; and about the moral basis for clinical action given the lack of a self to treat. These questions amount to the acknowledgment of a normative component in the concept of self and personhood, which can not be accounted for by idem identity solely. Individual and Structural Identity Let us begin with identity. When I identify a tree, at least two aspects, are implied in the act of identification. The first aspect concerns the recognition of the tree as member of a certain class (or family) of living things. In the tree we recognize certain features, or aspects, that are typical for this particular class (or family) of trees. This recognition is based on similarity or sameness. The second aspect in the act of identification consists of the recognition of the tree as this individual tree. We are dealing here with a basic, rather mysterious capacity: the capacity to distinguish one individual entity from the other; or: the capacity to know individuals.Both aspects, the recognition of similarity and of individuality, are interwoven in everyday acts of identification. So, we discern the specific features of a particular tree against the background of an overall (or general) image of trees. At the same time we recognize these general features given our capacity to distinguish one tree from the other. There are, accordingly, two sides in the concept of identity: structural identity and individual identity. Individual identity refers to the uniqueness of a thing and structural identity to the properties a thing shares with others things.This distinction can be applied to human beings, but only in a certain way and to a certain extent. So, John is a human being, and as a human being he has both distinctive and general features. However with regard to John himself, that is, the particular person I aim at when I speak about John, the picture is slightly different. Individuality and similarity (universality) refer here to one and the same person. The uniqueness of John is now commonly referred to as numerical identity. There is only one singular John. Even if there were a John with the same birth date, fingerprint and DNA profile, this would be another John, John 2 so to say. This uniqueness is sometimes articulated in terms of the position John 1 and John 2 occupy in the space-time continuum. Because John 1 and John 2 cannot occupy the same spatiotemporal position, [End Page 347] they must be separate, two distinct entities. This is of course a limited view on uniqueness of persons; so, we will have to say more about this in a moment.The structural (or general) characteristics of John, the John-ness of John so to say, is commonly called qualitative identity. Qualitative identity consists of the sum of all those enduring properties which could serve as criterion to distinguish John from other persons in the world. Qualitative identity, however, does not completely coincide with structural identity, mentioned earlier. This is obvious from the fact that the John-ness of John refers to those structural (enduring, general) properties for which only this particular John qualifies, whereas the human being-ness of John refers to the properties John shares with all other human beings. So, in those cases in which the structural dimension of identity refers to only one entity, for instance in the case of the John-ness of John, the emphasis is not on intersubject similarity but on intrasubject similarity. This intrasubject similarity refers to continuity in time and to... (shrink)

English summary: Beate Bengard deals with the ecumenical hermeneutics of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. His theory is of interest for ecumenical theology particularly in the area of ecumenical reception. The specificity of ecumenical reception is that it requires the acceptation of otherness - of the alterity - of the ecumenical partner. Obviously, this process goes far beyond the ratification of ecumenical documents. In order to clarify the process of reception, a hermeneutical model is needed which explains the interrelation (...) of the interpersonal recognition of otherness, the reception of texts, as well as of changing collective identities. A complex model of the reception process is deduced from the theory of Paul Ricoeur and Ricoeur's model is compared with three concrete ecumenical processes in France. This shows there is a high degree of accordance between these ecumenical examples and Ricoeur's hermeneutical process. The conclusion points to ways in which this contributes to building an ecumenical culture inspired by Ricoeur's philosophy. German description: Beate Bengard stellt erstmals der Beitrag des franzosischen Philosophen Paul Ricoeur zum okumenischen Dialog detailliert vor. Die Studie, die im Rahmen eines deutsch-franzosischen Promotionsprojekts entstanden ist, beruht auf teilweise bisher unveroffentlichten Zeugnissen. Fur die okumenische Theologie ist Ricoeurs Beitrag primar fur die Frage der 'okumenischen Rezeption' interessant. Die Besonderheit der okumenischen Rezeption gegenuber anderen Rezeptionsprozessen besteht darin, dass sie die Annahme des Anderen, d.h. die Rezeption der Alteritat des okumenischen Partners verlangt. Was das im Einzelnen bedeutet, kann nicht durch eine Rezeptionsforschung geklart werden, die sich nur auf die Ratifikation von okumenischen Dokumenten konzentriert. Zu seiner Klarung braucht es vielmehr ein hermeneutisches Modell, das den Zusammenhang von interpersonaler Anerkennung, Textrezeption und dem Wandel kollektiver Identitaten erklart. Eine solche komplexere Rezeptionstheorie rekonstruiert Bengard aus der Fulle von Ricoeurs philosophischem Werk und uberpruft dieses anschliessend auf ihre Plausibilitat hin. Dazu untersucht Bengard drei sehr unterschiedliche okumenische Rezeptionssituationen aus Frankreich: die Rezeption der Leuenberger Konkordie in den evangelischen Kirchen, die unabhangig fur den katholisch-evangelischen Dialog arbeitende Groupe des Dombes und die Communaute de Taize. Abschliessend gibt sie Anregungen fur eine Okumenekultur, die Inspiration aus dem Werk von Paul Ricoeur bezieht. (shrink)

Doing violence and evil always indirectly or directly leads to making someone else suffer. Such is the dialogical structure of evil and it seems to be the dialogical structure of elder abuse as well. There is a perturbing sameness between definitions of evil and definitions of elder abuse. It is hard at times to see how or if there is any line of demarcation between the subjects. Two modern‐day philosophers, Paul Ricoeur and Simone Weil have delved particularly into the (...) concept of evil. The symbolism Ricoeur analyses in depth is that of defilement, sin, and guilt and the concept of the servile will. Integral in Weil's description of evil are the concepts of suffering and the special situation of extreme suffering, termed affliction. Grounded in the writings of Ricoeur and Weil, this paper is a series of reflections on the intersection of evil and elder abuse as exemplified in the narrative of an abused older woman. This woman provided around the clock care at home for her husband who had vascular dementia. She was also abused by her husband. This was witnessed by both family and others but no one intervened. In her narrative there were indications of defilement, sin, guilt, and true affliction as a servile will. This paper illuminates the evil of elder abuse that is harm and suffering, and the challenge of untangling issues of blame, free will, responsibility, and self‐determinism. When engaging with abused, older persons it can be worthwhile for nurses to enter the encounter with non‐judgemental compassion founded on the human to human connection and recognition of our mutual fallibility and potential for evil that is part of our human fragility. (shrink)

What does it mean that understanding is the primary mode of human being in the world? How can new symbols refigure human temporal possibilities and narrative understandings? How do we interpret life, and what can be claimed as "truth"? These and related questions are explored by a collection of distinguished scholars from a variety of disciplines in Meanings in Texts and Actions. These essays constitute a critical encounter with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, who - along with (...) Hans-Georg Gadamer - was largely responsible for the postwar emergence of a new hermeneutics. Having engaged in critical debates with thinkers in virtually every humanistic discipline, Ricoeur has managed to create a conversation among them, as this collection attests. Volume contributors - representatives of a range of disciplines including literary theory, theology and religious studies, comparative literature, film studies, history, political philosophy, ethics, and global studies - take up Ricoeur's questions and pose questions of their own in return. In so doing, they work toward new formulations in our thinking that address the contemporary challenges of deconstruction and postmodernism and pay particular attention to theology and its relation to humanistic culture. (shrink)

Pandemic infection by COVID‐19 could be changing the public image of the nursing profession in Italy. Recently, as in any western country, we were being registered with an increase in the number of violence against healthcare professionals. Nevertheless, due to pandemic in the social media, the nursing profession is remembered for competence, determination, courage, and humanity, and it is continually remercied by people, politicians, and journalists. In this paper, we will conduct a phenomenological argument that proposes both phenomena can be (...) explained by Paul Ricoeur's courses of recognition. In cases of violence, patients and their family members reacting because they feel betrayed for a real or alleged injustice—primarily not to be listened to by health professionals. Nurses and other professionals are often unable to take the right grade of involvement for understanding patient's needs. On the other hand, during COVID‐19 pandemic, patients and family members perceive the extraordinary daily work of caring, and they react thanking. The principle of the gift is implicated in both cases: the crisis of gift received or donated can be explaining violence; gratitude and thanks can be explaining by gratuitousness of care. (shrink)

Resumen: El supuesto de la constitución del yo a partir de la relación intersubjetiva que surge con el reconocimiento del otro hace emerger el problema del fundamento ontológico del yo. Por una parte, el yo no puede existir de manera aislada, pero por otra, subordinar su constitución a la relación con el otro puede debilitar el yo al hacerlo dependiente, para su constitución, en algo distinto de él. Hacer que la constitución del yo dependa de la relación intersubjetiva plantea la (...) cuestión del inicio: ¿Qué son, antes de relacionarse, aquellos que entran en relación? ¿Si el yo se reconoce a sí mismo reconociendo a otro, qué es aquello que reconoce? Estas preguntas apuntan a la búsqueda de un fundamento ontológico o metafísico para la antropología fenomenológica: el uno no puede depender del otro y a su vez este del primero. La antropología filosófica de Paul Ricoeur, con su énfasis en la corporalidad e historicidad del hombre, además de su diálogo con Aristóteles, ofrece respuesta a estas preguntas. Ricoeur estudia al hombre desde dentro, pero no olvida aquello propio del hombre que hace que el ser humano pueda ser reconocido y capaz de reconocer.: The proposition of the constitution of the self as starting from the intersubjective relationship that emerges from the recognition of the other, presents the problem of the ontological foundation of the self. On one hand, the self cannot exist in isolation, but on the other, making its constitution subordinate to the relation with the other can debilitate the self as it is made dependent, for its constitution, on something different from the self. If the constitution of the self is dependent on the intersubjective relation the question of its origin arises: What are those who enter a relation before relating? If the self only recognizes itself recognizing another, what is it that it recognizes? These questions are directed towards the search for an ontological or metaphysical foundation for the study of phenomenological anthropology. The self cannot depend on the other, and this one, in turn, on the self. Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, with its emphasis on the corporeal and historical nature of man, and its dialogue with Aristotle, offers answers to these questions. Ricoeur studies man from his inner life but does not forget that which makes it possible for a human being to recognize and to be recognized. (shrink)

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...) objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs. (shrink)

As attested by Taylor, Calhoun and others, recognition is central to (cultural) identity and to a related sense of self-worth. In contrast, by denying the comparable worth of other cultures, non-recognition represents a potentially damaging mode of intercultural relations. Although not widely acknowledged, a related consideration has been at issue in the rationality debate, initiated by Peter Winch, throughout its several phases. Briefly stated, the problem is that the polarized alternatives of ethnocentric universalism and self-sealing relativism that have characterized this (...) debate serve either to preclude mutual recognition altogether or to promote 'invidious comparison' (Dascal). As will be apparent, these alternatives pose significant barriers to intercultural research and relations on terms of mutual recognition and respect. The present paper seeks to come to terms with this problem by developing an account of cultural rationality, and a concomitant account of the logic of cross-cultural inquiry, which can promote growth of understanding through intercultural learning, and so help to foster more productive modes of intercultural relations. Specifically, the intent is to identify the conditions that need to be fulfilled if this more productive mode of cross-cultural inquiry is to be possible. Throughout, appeal is made to core hermeneutic tenets to ground the viability of a conception of cross-cultural inquiry that can transcend the terms of reference of the original Winchian debate. Following elucidation of the requisite conditions, the paper concludes with a reflection on possible barriers to their acceptance and implementation. Key Words: culture • dialogue • intersubjectivity • learning • rationality • understanding. (shrink)

Religious identity has, in recent times, become an important point of inquiry because of the growing awareness of religious diversity. On the one hand, this reality of diversity has served as an impetus to return to the roots of one’s religion. On the other hand, others have called for a more pluralist stance, out of the need to open up to other traditions. In light of this polarity, I argue that one can commit to one’s religion while opening up to (...) the religious other in a way that does not threaten one’s own tradition. This is done through a hermeneutic analysis of the religious identity, taking off from Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics – how this identity is formed and informed by the different significations of meaning within the tradition, and how the believer interacts with this tradition to construct his or her own narrative identity, through his or her imagination, mapping out the constellations of possible human action that root themselves in the necessity in encountering and working with the religious other, for this necessity is constitutive of one’s commitment to the tradition, embodied in the biblical narratives that call for this encounter. In sum, it is possible to be committed to one’s faith conviction while being hospitable to the religious other because it is constitutive of religion itself to encounter its other, and it is in this encounter that faith is truly understood as conviction. (shrink)

When Paul Ricoeur died in 2005, the New York Times described him as "one of the most eminent philosophers of the twentieth century." In his lifetime, Ricoeur published influential works on language, memory, identity, and history, creating an innovative blend of hermeneutics and phenomenology. Despite his major interest in the imagination, however, he never wrote a complete text on the topic. The present volume, Lectures on Imagination, fills this gap, providing an indispensable resource for philosophically inclined readers from all (...) backgrounds. Over the course of these lectures, Ricoeur examines classical and contemporary philosophical theories of imagination, ranging from thinkers such as Aristotle, Pascal, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant to Husserl, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Ryle. He argues that, with few exceptions, Western philosophy has focused on reproductive rather than productive imagination, thus diminishing the creative capacity of the human mind. For Ricoeur, productive imagination is a form of fiction-a new dimension of reality generated by the human mind. His theory has far-reaching implications. In all domains, we are not restricted by existing structures or institutions, because the productive imagination has the power to break through and transform our sense of our own horizons. (shrink)

Proposing his conception of narrative identity in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricœur holds that human life is comprehensible, once the story of a man’s life has actually been told, and it is the narrative of one’s life which constructs one’s identity. Developing his theory of heteroglossia and the polyphony of human speech, explicated chiefly in Speech Genres and The Dialogic Imagination, Mikhail Bakhtin recognizes the intrinsically intertwining character of utterance and response. According to him, utterance is always (...) addressed to someone and antedates an answer. Bakhtin’s “addressivity,” as well as his view of discourse as fundamentally dialogic, are convergent with Ricœur’s elucidation both of man’s answerability to the Other and of narrative identity. The dynamic character of narrative identity, as construed by Ricœur, converges with the dynamic nature of language as viewed by Bakhtin. The aim of this article is to study the intersections of Ricœur’s narrative theory and Bakhtin’s recognition of the polyphonic nature of speech. I view these as inherently interrelated, and as testifying, respectively, to the philosophical and linguistic aspects of one and the same phenomenological vision. That vision accounts for selfhood, understood as vulnerable and contextualized, while also recognizing that it is conveyed by means of language with its essentially dialogic openness. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur declares that “being-entangled in stories” is an inherent property of the human condition. He introduces the notion of narrative identity—a form of identity constructed on the basis of a self-constructed life-narrative, which becomes a source of meaning and self-understanding. This article wishes to present chosen instances of life writing whose subjects resist yielding a life-story and reject the notions of narrative and identity. In line with Adam Phillips’s remarks regarding Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975), such (...) works—which I refer to as fragmentary life writing—emerge out of a profound scepticism about any form of “fixing” oneself and confining the variety and randomness of experience to one of the available autobiographical plots. The primary example of the genre is Joe Brainard’s I Remember (1975)—an inventory of approximately 1,500 memories conveyed in the form of radically short passages beginning with the words “I remember.” Despite the qualified degree of unity provided by the fact that all the recollections come from the consciousness of a single person, the book does not arrange its content in any discernible order—chronological or thematic; instead, the reader is confronted with a life-in-fragments. Although individual passages could be part of a coming-of-age, a coming-out or a portrait-of-the-artist-as-a-young-man narrative, Brainard is careful not to let any of them consolidate. An attempt at defining the characteristics of the proposed genre will be followed by an indication of more recent examples of fragmentary life writing and a reflection on its prospects for development. (shrink)

Le témoignage a retenu de très près l’herméneutique philosophique de Paul Ricœur. De son sens quasi empirique, celui du témoin d’un procès, à sa signification religieuse, celle du témoin de la foi, en passant par sa signification morale, le témoin vit du bien dont il témoigne. Se trouvant donc au croisement du juridique, de l’historique, de l’éthique et du religieux, le témoignage trouve, dans les analyses de Paul Ricœur, son principe unificateur dans le concept d’identité narrative. J.-Ph. Pierron (...) montre que pour le philosophe de Temps et récit, le témoignage dans le témoin est texte. Il donne donc à penser, ce qui implique une herméneutique de la réception, axée sur l’analyse d’un accueil du témoignage. Corrélativement, parler d’identité narrative, c’est donner l’occasion au témoignage de passer insensiblement d’un pôle d’extériorité, celui du narrateur qui n’est pas l’acteur de ce qu’il raconte, à un pôle d’intériorité, qui fait constitution progressive de soi. En quoi doit se définir une éthique du témoignage. Bearing witness is a very important concept in the philosophical hermeneutic of Paul Ricoeur. From its quasi-empirical meaning, that of the testimony of a witness in a trial, to its religious significance, that of a witness to the faith, and its moral significance, the witness lives from the good to which he bears witness. Bearing witness, which lies at the core of legal, historical, ethical, and religious testimony, finds its unifying principle in the analysis of Paul Ricoeur in the concept of narrative identity. J.-P. Pierron shows that, for the philosopher of Time and Narrative, the testimony of the witness becomes text in the one who bears witness. Thus, it leads to thinking, which implies a hermeneutic of receiving, centered on the analysis of how testimony from a witness is received. Correlatively, to speak of narrative identity is to give an opportunity for bearing witness to move imperceptibly from a position of exteriority, that of a narrator who is not the actor of that which he recounts, to a position of interiority, which makes for a progressive constitution of the self. This ought to define an ethic of bearing witness. (shrink)

Human identity is a complex process linked to the subject and his environment, both constantly evolving. Personality is developed and changed throughout lifetime, but it has a core that remains constant. Thus a person can secure his continuity; he recognizes himself and is recognized by the others as time goes by. In fact, we are all the same, even after experiencing changes and years later. The constitution of the other and the self are – from the phenomenological point of (...) view – two components of the same process, which is the origin of the subjectivity of self and the objectivity of me. These are conditions for the identity’s construction, a continuous process that takes place throughout time. Human tendency to the community emerges with priority from the above definition. That deep desire of being part of a social group interprets others as constituent of the identity of the self. “Having an identity” actually means not only a set of characteristics noticed by ourselves after actions done or the “image” of us, but also to be recognized by the rest of society. Therefore, community turns out in the ultimate horizon that responds to an individual’s recognition need. The recognition of self by me is linked to the issue of the recognition of self through the other until mutual recognition as reciprocal act is reached. Hence, “gift” becomes an emblem of mutual recognition, highlighting the relational and inter-subjective structure of the person. The identity development goes through the mutual recognition experience and gift. Somebody who gives himself recognizes the others and simultaneously, participates in his constitution and his self-understanding. (shrink)

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical (...) subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity. (shrink)

From the end of the seventeenth century to now well into the 21st, John Locke’s theory of personal identity has been foundational in the field of philosophy and psychology. Here we suggest that there are two fundamental threads intertwined in Lockean identity, the flux of perception-thought-action (i.e. continuity of consciousness) and memory. Using Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and Bernard Steigler as guides we will see that these threads constitute a phenomenological self (l’ésprit), a lived experience of our identity that (...) is not only perhaps the most essential component of our humanity, but also the most threatened in today’s ongoing, commercial convergence of the real and the virtual in the “Age of Disruption”. (shrink)

This essay aims to correct a prevalent misconception about Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which understands it to support a conception of human understanding as finite as Heidegger did, but in a more “conceptuallyconservative” way. The result is that Ricoeur’s work is viewed as incapable of addressing the most pressingproblems in contemporary Continental metaphysics. In response, it is argued that Ricoeur is in fact the firstto develop an infinite hermeneutics, which departs significantly from Heideggerian finitude. This positionis demonstrated by tracing (...) the itinerary from Heidegger’s account of aletheia to Ricoeur’s account ofattestation. The conclusion, then, not only clears Ricoeur of the stated charges, but also presents a moreviable path for the future of hermeneutics. (shrink)

The Other's War is an intervention into a set of contemporary moral, political and legal debates over the legitimacy of war and terrorism within the context of the so-called global War on Terror. Tarik Kochi considers how, despite the variety of its approaches âe" just war theory, classical realist, post-Kantian, poststructuralist âe" contemporary ethical, political and legal philosophy still struggles to produce a convincing account of war. Focusing on the philosophical problem of the rightness of war, The Other's War responds (...) to this lack. Through a discussion of a number of key Western intellectual traditions, Kochi demonstrates how often conflicting and contradictory conceptions of warâe(tm)s rightness have developed in modernity. He shows how a process of ordering violence around different notions of right has constantly redrawn the boundaries of what constitutes âe~legitimateâe(tm) violence. Such a process has consequences for anyone who claims to be fighting a âe~just warâe(tm). Building upon this account and drawing upon the philosophical heritage of G.W.F. Hegel and Ernst Bloch, The Otherâe(tm)s War proposes a new understanding of war, not just as a social condition characterised by violent conflict and struggles for power, but as the attempt of individuals and groups to realise their normative claims through violence. Kochi argues that both of these aspects of war are an expression of the metaphysics of human subjectivity. War begins with, and is the radical exaggeration of, a fundamental activity of human subjectivity, in which the subject constitutes its normative and material identity; realising and positing itself through acts that involve negation and violence. By drawing consideration of the problem of war back to the level of a philosophical examination of the metaphysics of human subjectivity, The Other's War develops a novel theory of war that helps us to better understand the nature of contemporary conflict as a process of recognition. From this perspective, judgment, it is concluded, needs to be constantly guided by the effort to recognise the ethics of the other's war. (shrink)

This special section on the later work of Paul Ricoeur is an attempt to examine the fruitfulness of that work for the social sciences. Of particular interest are his theorization and application of the notions of memory, identity, justice, and the relation to the other to political and ethical problems in the present. For example, his discourse links up the question of memory with that of justice and the problem of constructing new polities which can be considered just. To (...) do this, he introduces the concepts of ‘translation ethos’, the ‘exchange of memories’ and ‘non-forgetful forgiveness’ in order to examine the problem of the conditions for the imaginary construction of political entities in which dialogue can take place between interlocutors with different, maybe conflicting, interests and historical locations, and thus with different senses of belonging and identities. His philosophical apparatus is shown to have particular salience for the analysis of contemporary society. (shrink)

Milbank employs a static notion of otherness and a dynamic understanding of difference, i.e., he seeks the erasure of difference and the simultaneous recognition of the perduring reality of otherness. Otherness we will always have with us, but difference is to be overcome. This is illustrated by reference toMilbank’s treatment of “the problem of other religions” in his 1992 article “The End of Dialogue.” A contrast to Milbank’s position is found in panentheistic views (e.g., McFague, Hodgson) which seek the erasure (...) of otherness and the recognition of difference as an existential but perduring quality of human life. A foundational otherness is simply not there; difference is a constant factor in human life, in creation, in the God-world relation and in the life of Godself. This view finds support in post-modern natural science: which affirms the radical interdependence of all beings and all lifeforms. Otherness is an error and difference is purely epiphenomenal. We are all connected. There is no other. (shrink)

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl had a permanent and profound impact on the philosophical formation of Paul Ricoeur. One could truly say, paraphrasing Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s brilliant 1959 essay ‘The Philosopher and his Shadow’,that Husserl is the philosopher in whose shadow Ricoeur, like Merleau-Ponty, also stands, the thinker to whom he constantly returns. Husserl is Ricoeur’s philosopher of reflection, par excellence. Indeed, Ricoeur always invokes Husserl when he is discussing a paradigmatic instance of contemporary philosophy of ‘reflection’ and also of (...) descriptive, ‘eidetic’ phenomenology. Indeed, I shall argue in this chapter that Husserl’s influence on Ricoeur was decisive and provided an eidetic, descriptive methodology which is permanently in play, even when it has to be concretized and mediated by hermeneutics, as Ricoeur proposes after 1960. (shrink)

Since the publication of Oneself as Another , many sociologists have referred to the work of Paul Ricœur, some of them considering his notion of narrative identity to be a useful means of analyzing some aspects individual identity left unresolved by Bourdieu’s notion of habitus . Bourdieu had, however, already discredited the sociological relevance of the notion of narrative in his 1986 article “The Biographical Illusion.” Through a careful re-reading of both texts, this article will determine to what extent (...) the sociological use of Ricœur’s notions can escape the confines of Bourdieu’s analysis and, moreover, the different conceptions of the human being and of ethics underlying the two distinct frameworks of analysis.  . (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur's Search for a New Foundation of Human Rights and Dignity by Means of the Capabilities and his Application of phronesis The aim of the following article is to reconstruct Paul Ricoeur's concepts of human rights and human dignity by exploring some little-known texts, and to exemplify how these concepts are connected to a specific philosophical conception of human being, which is grounded in a Dialectics between transcendence and incarnation, freedom and dependence, identity (...) and difference, capability and fallibility. In doing so, I will argue that Ricœur interprets human dignity, which he has never explicitly defined, through the prism of human capabilities, especially of the capability of being responsible. This interpretation allows him to take a differentiated position in the current bioethical debates on the rights of "potential persons" and to illustrate how the Aristotelian phronèsis can be used in ethical cases where decisions are difficult to take. (shrink)