Ch. 1. Filosofskoe osmyslenie kulʹtury -- ch. 2. Problemy mnozhestvennosti kulʹtur.

Introduction. The article is focused on analyzing the aesthetic aspect of A. Kojève’s philosophy, the ability of his philosophy, from an aesthetic point of view, to clarify a number of key problems of the modern political and cultural environment. The purpose of the study is to determine the epistemological attitude of A. Kojève’s philosophy able to clarify the way in which his philosophy problematizes the current cultural and political reality. Methods. Hermeneutics, comparative analysis and deconstruction are used as research methods. (...) Comparative analysis allows us to demarcate A. Kojève’s own line of reasoning, in the context of aesthetic and epistemological theories, as well as Hegelian themes themselves. Hermeneutics is the central method in the work, since the philosophy of A. Kojeve requires interpretation as an aesthetic theory. Deconstruction, formalized to the status of a method according to P. de Man, allows us to detect inconsistencies, the principle of mutual problematization of Kojeve’s philosophy and the current political and epistemological agenda. Scientific novelty of the research. The standard way of interpreting the work of A. Kojève is to evaluate him as an interpreter of G. Hegel. The author analyzes some meaning of A. Kojève’s philosophy, separate from G. Hegel’s explanation of the text. The novelty lies not only in the fact that A. Kojève’s philosophy is defined as theorizing that goes beyond technical hermeneutics (clear presentation), but also as a specific representation of such theorizing as epistemological aesthetic theory. The latter is a rather rare interpretation of the philosophy of A. Kojeve. This allows us to expand the traditional assumption that post-Hegelian epistemesthetics is the property of an extremely limited number of authors (for example, B. Croce). Moreover, such an interpretation of A. Kojève’s theories is a new element in the emerging trend of considering political issues within the framework of epistemological aesthetics. Results. The specific mode of interpreting G. Hegel, which is carried out by A. Kojève, turns the philosophy of the former into a unique aesthetic project. In this project, the category of aesthetic experience comes to the foreground, indicating the empty, formal nature of any discourse. In this regard, any claim to knowledge of reality, to a correct idea of the subject is replaced by the idea of creating the subject of discourse. Consistent treatment of this idea is symptomatic of the philosophy of A. Kojève. This philosophy is a reflection of those historical changes that gave rise to the culture of “aesthetic rationality”: empty and formal. In A. Kojève’s philosophy, one can see how such a culture of the End of History is, contrary to Hegelian ideas, not the era of the struggle decline, but the era of its strange transformation, a symptom of increasing political violence. Conclusions. A. Kojève’s philosophy is considered not as a utopian political project, but as a problematization of the modern cultural and political sphere. The latter is understood as an indication of the inconsistency of ontological discourses of Truth, the discovery in the very essence of discursive practices of an empty, formal principle, and therefore primarily of interest to aesthetics. The modern era of the End of History and the end of the era of persuasive speech gives an idea of the main political paradox (at least for the philosophy of A. Kojève, and at most for the modern political environment). The era of disappointment in discourse should become an era of refusal to fight for discourses, but it becomes an era of maximizing violence, since it is in a situation of disappointment that discourses can only be supported by force. We move from unconvincing speech to convincing violence, but it is possible to understand the origins and specifics of this transition only by considering A. Kojève’s philosophy in the light of such a discipline as aesthetics. (shrink)

Traditional approaches describe ethical decision-making of leaders as driven by conscious deliberation and analysis. Accordingly, existing approaches of ethically-oriented leader development usually focus on the promotion of deliberative ethical decision-making, based on normative knowledge and moral reasoning. Yet, a continually growing body of research indicates that a considerable part of moral functions involved in ethical decision-making is automatic and intuitive. In this article, we discuss the implications of this moral intuition approach for the domain of ethically-oriented leader development. Specifically, we (...) introduce a conceptual model and develop a set of theoretical propositions, suggesting that the moral intuition perspective significantly contributes to effective ethically-oriented leader development. The discussion examines theoretical implications and practical applications of the presented propositions and outlines directions for future research. (shrink)

The paper deals with the semantics of mathematical notation. In arithmetic, for example, the syntactic shape of a formula represents a particular way of specifying, arriving at, or constructing an arithmetical object (that is, a number, a function, or a truth value). A general definition of this sense of "construction" is proposed and compared with related notions, in particular with Frege's concept of "function" and Carnap's concept of "intensional isomorphism." It is argued that constructions constitute the proper subject matter of (...) both logic and mathematics, and that a coherent semantic account of mathematical formulas cannot be given without assuming that they serve as names of constructions. (shrink)

When historians of the future come to study our times, rich in contradictions, revolutionary achievements, and possibilities, their attention will unquestionably be attracted by one phenomenon that is, at first view, totally paradoxical: if one is to believe the capitalist mass information media, the ruling circles of the imperialist countries, it appears, had no more urgent business than concern for "human rights.".

Pár slov úvodem k dopisu, který poslal Pavel Tichý z University of Otago Pavlu Maternovi (který v té době ´pracoval´ na brněnské univerzitě bez možnosti učení a publikování). K dataci dopisu: Shoduji se s odhadem Dr. Raclavského, že jde patrně o r. 1975. Ti, kdo neprožili normalizaci, si těžko představí situaci. To nebylo tak, že můj přítel Tichý momentálně působí na Novém Zélandě a píše mi z momentálního zahraničního pobytu. Tichý byl emigrant, což mj. znamenalo, že žádnou z jeho (...) odborných statí nebylo možno u nás citovat, dále že dík faktu, o kterém každý věděl, že dopisy emigrantů jsou u nás na příslušných institucích otvírány, znamenala korespondence s emigrantem kádrovou skvrnu. O tom jsem tehdy nepřemýšlel, už proto, že četba Tichého dopisů byla nesmírně zajímavá. Byl jsem na shromažďování korespondence lajdák. Moje krátkozrakost zavinila, že se z této korespondence zachoval nepatrný zlomek. Dopis, který následuje, je ovšem obzvlášť zajímavý, a to z následujícího důvodu: Tichý měl už od šedesátých let – ještě v Československu – v hlavě zárodky svého přístupu k logice a logické analýze přirozeného jazyka (svědčí o tom jeho stati v tehdejším Filosofickém časopise, zejména stať „Smysl a procedura“ z r. 1968). Dopis, který zde uveřejňujeme, má však hodnotu historického dokumentu. Jde o první ´neformální´ formulaci jeho pojetí tzv. konstrukcí a jeho postoje k logice, což se postupně promítlo do systému Transparentní intenzionální logiky (TIL), vyloženého souvisle v monografii The Foundations of Frege´s Logic, vydané asi 13 let po tomto dopisu. Ze vzhledu dopisu je patrné, že byl psán na psacím stroji, což v těch letech bylo standardní. Musíme omluvit překlepy (ostatně to byl osobní dopis), pokud jde o nespisovnosti, vím, že Tichý ovládal češtinu velmi dobře, ale dával přednost psát přirozeně, blízko k hovorové češtině. Jistě připustíte, že jeho jazyk je zde velmi živý a že úpravy směrem ke spisovnému jazyku by narušily kouzlo bezprostřednosti a jistého emocionálního zaujetí, které z dopisu vyzařuje. Tichý posílal mně a Pavlovi Cmorejovi i nadále jednak osobní dopisy, jednak rukopisy svých statí, takže jsme měli výhodu být účastni procesu budování TIL, kterou oba (a dnes už nejenom my) pokládáme za podstatný přínos ke světové logice. --Pavel Materna. (shrink)

Chapter One: Constructions. Entities, constructions, and functions When one travels from Los Angeles to New York, going, say, by way of St. Louis, Chicago, ...

As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance (...) and Robert Brandom's logical expressivism. Arazim then draws on proof-theoretical approaches to present a convincing argument for a dynamic version of logical inferentialism, which opens space for a new freedom to modify our own logic. He explores the scope, possibilities and limits of this freedom in order to highlight the future paths logic could take, as a motivation for further research. Marking a departure from logical monism and also from the recent doctrine of logical pluralism in its various forms, this book addresses current debates concerning the expressive role of logic and contributes to a lively area of discussion in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

While much research has focused on the effects of ethical and unethical leadership, little is known about how followers come to perceive their leaders as ethical or unethical. In this article, we investigate the co-creation of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Specifically, we draw from emerging research on moral congruence in organizational behaviour and empirically investigate the role of congruence in leaders’ and followers’ moral foundations in followers’ perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. By analysing objective congruence scores from 67 (...) leader–follower dyads by means of polynomial regression with surface response analysis, we find partial support for our theoretically derived predictions. Significant effects were revealed for the fairness, loyalty, and authority moral foundations but not for the care and sanctity moral foundations. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings. (shrink)

It is well known that the manner in which a definitely descriptive term contributes to the meaning of a sentence depends on the place the term occupies in the sentence. A distinction is accordingly drawn between ordinary contexts and contexts variously termed non-referential, intensional, oblique, or opaque. The aim of the present article is to offer a general account of the phenomenon, based on transparent intensional logic. It turns out that on this approach there is no need to say (as (...) Frege does) that descriptive terms are referentially ambiguous or to deny (as Russell does) that descriptive terms represent self-contained units of meaning. There is also no need to tolerate (as Montague does) exceptions to the Principle of Functionality. The notion of an ordinary (i.e., non-intensional) context is explicated exclusively in terms of logical structure and it is argued that two aspects of ordinariness (termed hospitality and exposure) must be distinguished. (shrink)

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so-called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model, assumes that parsing is non-deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When (...) disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task-dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task-dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self-paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task-dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task-driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings. (shrink)

2 Popper's Logical Definition of Verisimilitude. 3 Popper's Probabilistic Definition of Verisimilitude. 4 Conclusion.

Jan Patočka’s philosophical development was varied. Over the course of fifty years of philosophizing, he gradually, and to varying degrees, developed close to a dozen systematic projects, whose ambition was, at least initially, to present what he called a “unified philosophy.” However, the dynamism with which he changed his philosophical plans and incessantly embarked on new projects invites the question of how to approach the various and often mutually “contradictory” transformations of his philosophical thinking, if neither the continuity and integrity (...) of Patočka’s thought nor the essential specificity of any of these positions is to be lost. Through the notion of the “personal a priori” found in one of Jan Patočka’s early texts, and in a critical, “overcoming-preserving” reference to two antagonistic conceptions of Patočka’s philosophical development, the article attempts to sketch a solution to this general interpretative problem. In the context of the search for Patočka’s “basic position of seeing” as the integrating framework of his diverse philosophical attempts, it simultaneously reconstructs the early question about the meaning of philosophy in general, which Patočka developed in a series of texts from the 1930s, some of which are still available only in the Czech language. (shrink)

The article offers a rigorous explication of the intuitive notion of verisimilitude, I.E., Of the distance of a theory from the truth. The proposal is defended against charges of material inadequacy made by popper, Niniluoto, And miller.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken by Peter (...) Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

This article provides an ethical analysis of the moral conflict over access to premium audio-visual online content, which is currently regulated by geo-blocking in the domain of digital film distri...

В книге прослежены разнообразные виды обманов, вплоть до парадоксально положительных, уточняется понимание терминов. Для специалистов и широкого круга читателей.

In my comment on Katerina Ierodiakonou’s paper, I outline my understanding of the programme of De anima and how it bears on Aristotle’s discussion of the transparent in De anima 2.7, in contrast with his discussion of the transparent in De sensu 3. I then explore Aristotle’s notion of transparency and sketch an alternative to Ierodiakonou’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views as to how colours are generated in physical objects. At the end, I raise two objections to Alexander’s interpretation of the (...) transparent as discussed by Ierodiakonou. (shrink)

Based primarily on original sources in Tamil as well as interviews, the article seeks to portray the attitude of Tamil Dalit intellectuals and political leaders towards the question of religion. It seeks to discover the role of religion in their discourse and how they utilise religious matters to mobilise their fellow caste members. It maps their efforts to distance themselves from Hinduism and to propagate the particularity of Dalit deities and Dalit religion as a part of their newly constructed identity. (...) Their opinions on the possibility of conversion are also briefly noted. These attitudes are examined from the viewpoint of the differing emancipation strategies of the three major Tamil Dalit castes. The Paraiyar as well as the Arunthaiyar leaders try to reject the Hindu identity, though the common folk consider themselves to be Hindus. The Devendrars on the contrary associate themselves with the Hindu gods and Hindu temples, they claim direct connection with some of them. Even they, however, tend to emphasise particularity of their deities as a part of their identity building. (shrink)

The terms denotation and reference are commonly used as synonyms. A more fine-grained analysis of natural language as offered by TIL shows that we can distinguish these terms in the case of empirical expressions. The latter are shown to denote non-trivial intensions while their reference is the value of these intensions in the actual world.

Buzaglo (as well as Manders (J Philos LXXXVI(10):553–562, 1989)) shows the way in which it is rational even for a realist to consider ‘development of concepts’, and documents the theory by numerous examples from the area of mathematics. A natural question arises: in which way can the phenomenon of expanding mathematical concepts influence empirical concepts? But at the same time a more general question can be formulated: in which way do the mathematical concepts influence empirical concepts? What I want to (...) show in the present paper can be described as follows. The problem articulated by Buzaglo deserves some semantic refinements. Following explications are needed: What is meaning? (In particular: What are concepts?) What are questions? (Or, equivalently: Semantics of interrogative sentences.) -/- Further, a useful notion will be the notion of problem. Taking over the notion of conceptual system from Materna (Conceptual Systems. Logos, Berlin, 2004) and using Tichý’s Transparent intensional logic (TIL) I can try to solve the problem of the relation between mathematical and empirical concepts (not only for the case of expanding some mathematical concepts). (shrink)