In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:First Order Relationality and Its Implications:A Response to David ElsteinRoger T. Ames (bio)David Elstein has asked a series of important questions about Human Becomings that provide me with an opportunity to try to bring the argument of the book into clearer focus. Let me begin by thanking David for his always generous and intelligent reflection on not only my new monograph [End Page 181] but also on Henry Rosemont's (...) and my best efforts to expand upon the idea of "role ethics" as a productive way to read Confucian ethics.David asks: Is relationality truly a part of original Confucian thought? Does relationality rule out any notion of essential human nature, and does it necessarily imply or entail role ethics? Is relationality true or merely a useful way of thinking (if these can be distinguished)? Do we know that it's useful?I think the answer to these questions turns on two very different ways of understanding relationality, namely the doctrines of first and second order relationality. The term 'ontology' as "the science of being per se or in itself" gives us a doctrine of external, second order relations. Ontology was introduced into our philosophical vocabulary as a new term for an old way of thinking at the beginning of the seventeenth century by two German philosophers.1 For the classical Greeks, "the science of being per se" (to on he on) was posited as their "first philosophy" with all of its implications for metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, philosophy of religion, and so on. Ontology is that branch of metaphysics that seeks to classify and explain the things that exist, with its underlying assumption that there are unchanging substances or essences internal to things that are available to us to classify them as this and not that. Ontology privileges "being per se" with its categorical language and its "substance" and "attribute" dualism, giving us a grammar of substances as property-bearers and properties that are borne, respectively.Such ontological thinking animates Plato's pursuit of formal, "real" definitions in his quest for certainty (that is, definitions not of words but of what really is), and underlies Aristotle's taxonomical science of knowing "what is what." For these classical Greek philosophers, only what is real and is thus true can be the proper object of knowledge, giving us a logic of the changeless. Corollary to ontology is causal thinking, formal definitions, and, important for David's question, a doctrine of external, second order relationality in which relations conjoin discrete and self-sufficient things, such as human "beings." As the contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽 avers, this kind of substance ontology defining the real things that constitute the content of an orderly and structured cosmosprovides a "dictionary" kind of explanation of the world, seeking to set up an accurate understanding of the limits of all things. In simple terms, it determines "what is what," and all concepts are footnotes to "being" or "is."2In the Book of Changes, we find a vocabulary making explicit cosmological assumptions that stand in stark contrast to this substance ontology and that brings with it a doctrine of first order, constitutive relations. This alternative "first philosophy" has prompted me to create the neologism "zoetology," with the Greek zoe- "life" and -logia "discourse," as my own new term for an old way of thinking that we might translate into modern Chinese as shengshenglun 生生論: "the art of living." The starting point in this zoetological cosmology, then, is that nothing does anything by [End Page 182] itself; association is a fact. Since the very nature of life is associative and transactional, the vocabulary appealed to in defining Confucian cosmology is irreducibly dyadic and collateral: always multiple, never one.And further, it is the nature of life itself that it seeks to optimize the available conditions for its continuing growth, where such growth has a persistent existential and thus intentional aspect. "Life" is the productive correlation between organism and environment that gives rise to correlative, relational, ecological thinking that many of our best sinologists (Marcel Granet, David Keightley, Tang Junyi, K. C. Chang, A. C. Graham, and many others) would ascribe to the earliest semblances of Chinese... (shrink)

This text is an exploration of the metaphysical principle, "Every agent acts for an end." It is split into two parts, the first being primarily pedagogical and general, the second topical. In the first part, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange sets forth the basics of the Aristotelian metaphysics of teleology, defending its place as a central point of metaphysics. After defending its per se nota character, he summarizes a number of main corollaries to the principle, primarily within the perspective established by traditional Thomistic (...) accounts of metaphysics, doing so in a way that is pedagogically sensitive yet speculatively profound. In the second half, he gathers together a number of articles which he had written, each having some connection with themes concerning teleology. Thematically, the texts consider the finality and teleology of the human intellect and will, along with the way that the principle of finality sheds light on certain problems associated with the distinction between faith and reason. Finally, the text ends with an important essay on the principle of the mutual interdependence of causes, causae ad invicem sunt causae, sed in diverso genere. (shrink)

This article aims to test the hypothesis that metaphysical grounding is an instance of essentially ordered (or per se ) causation, a species of causation identified by medieval philosophers and theologians like Aquinas and Scotus, but largely forgotten from then on. The article reviews some of the consensus of grounding theorists on the nature of metaphysical grounding (or ontological dependence) compared to some of the crucial characteristics of essentially ordered causal series as articulated by scholastic and neo-Aristotelian philosophers then and (...) now. The authors emphasize their similarities, which they hold is enough to render strongly plausible the thesis that grounding is essentially ordered causation (G = EOC). Moreover, they highlight the potential benefits of this identification both for theories of grounding and EOC, especially as it concerns matters of fundamentality. Finally, they consider the limits of their hypothesis. (shrink)

Many discussions of per se and per accidens series focus on efficient causality and how a consideration of the metaphysics of the matter can deliver us a primary efficient cause of all that is (God). Drawing on my own previous work on causal series, I offer in this article a model for the understanding of per se causal series wherein the causality involved is that of finality. I then consider whether or not such per se final causal series are infinite. (...) Finally, I consider the implications this has for our conception of God as creator. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In this paper, I will examine the Goldstein-Cassirer approach to neuropathology to determine its current potential for yielding valuable insights. To this end, I will reconstruct the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of such a standpoint in the first four sections. What will emerge is that it entails a definition of pathology as the loss of balance in the adaption of human beings to the environment, leading to a lack of proclivity to categorical behaviour and symbolic performances. Furthermore, we will (...) see that there are behavioural alterations which are not related to the locus of lesions. In the fifth section, I will compare and contrast the holistic stances with current research in neuropsychology. The sixth section is dedicated to conclusive remarks. _Keywords_: Psychopathology; Neuropathology; Ernst Cassirer; Kurt Goldstein; Holism _ La mente ordinatrice. La concezione di Goldstein e Cassirer della neuropatologia e la sua rilevanza oggi _ _Riassunto_: In questo articolo intendo analizzare l’approccio Goldstein-Cassirer alla neuropatologia per comprendere se esso può rivelarsi ancora utile alla luce delle ricerche attuali. A tal fine, ne ricostruirò le basi filosofiche e teoriche nei primi tre paragrafi. Scopriremo che esso implica una definizione di patologia come perdita di equilibrio nell’adattamento degli esseri umani all’ambiente, a seguito della quale viene a mancare la naturale tendenza verso il “comportamento categoriale” e le prestazioni simboliche. Vedremo, inoltre, che vi sono alterazioni del comportamento non collegabili al sito delle lesioni. Nel quinto paragrafo, metterò a confronto le istanze olistiche con le ricerche contemporanee nel campo della neuropsicologia. Il sesto paragrafo contiene le considerazioni conclusive. _Parole chiave_: Psicopatologia; Neuropatologia; Ernst Cassirer; Kurt Goldstein; Olismo. (shrink)

We present a solution to the ghost problem in fourth order derivative theories. In particular we study the Pais–Uhlenbeck fourth order oscillator model, a model which serves as a prototype for theories which are based on second plus fourth order derivative actions. Via a Dirac constraint method quantization we construct the appropriate quantum-mechanical Hamiltonian and Hilbert space for the system. We find that while the second-quantized Fock space of the general Pais–Uhlenbeck model does indeed contain the negative norm energy eigenstates (...) which are characteristic of higher derivative theories, in the limit in which we switch off the second order action, such ghost states are found to move off shell, with the spectrum of asymptotic in and out S-matrix states of the pure fourth order theory which results being found to be completely devoid of states with either negative energy or negative norm. We confirm these results by quantizing the Pais–Uhlenbeck theory via path integration and by constructing the associated first-quantized wave mechanics, and show that the disappearance of the would-be ghosts from the energy eigenspectrum in the pure fourth order limit is required by a hidden symmetry that the pure fourth order theory is unexpectedly found to possess. The occurrence of on-shell ghosts is thus seen not to be a shortcoming of pure fourth order theories per se, but rather to be one which only arises when fourth and second order theories are coupled to each other. (shrink)

È cosa nota che la nozione di relazione sia uno dei pilastri teorici della dottrina metafisica e della teologia di molti autori Scolastici medievali e moderni e sia alla base della loro visione cosmologica del mondo. Questo saggio intende ricostruire la nozione di relazione reale nel pensiero di Francisco Suárez, esplorando la sua articolazione interna in concetti inferiori e affrontando alcuni nuclei problematici tipici del dibattito scolastico. La prima sezione dell’articolo prende in considerazione il concetto estensivo di relazione reale, tracciando (...) la distinzione fondamentale tra relazioni categoriali e relazioni trascendentali: mentre le prime sono degli accidenti che devono soddisfare tre condizioni per esistere (l’esistenza di un soggetto, di un fondamento e di un termine), le seconde non sono accidenti e fanno direttamente parte dell’essenza della cosa a cui si riferiscono. La seconda parte si concentra invece sull’analisi del concetto intensivo di relazione, giungendo alla definizione di relazione reale come una referenza reale fondata sul primo elemento della relazione (il fondamento) e diretta verso il secondo (il termine) come qualcosa di diverso da sé. Infine, l’ultima sezione del saggio si sofferma sul problema della natura della distinzione tra la relazione e il suo fondamento. Dopo aver esaminato l’opinione di eminenti autori, ossia Tommaso d’Aquino, Duns Scoto, Durando da San Porciano e Pedro da Fonseca, Suárez assume la posizione nominalistica che riduce lo statuto ontologico della relazione a quello del suo fondamento. Su questo punto la dottrina di Suárez si discosta da quella di Ockham solo per l’aggiunta della tesi della distinzione di ragione tra la relazione e il suo fondamento, una posizione inammissibile per i nominalisti. _ It is commonly known that the notion of relation is one of the theoretical pillars of the metaphysical and theological doctrine of many medieval and modern scholastic authors, determining their cosmological world view. This essay aims to reconstruct the notion of real relation in Francisco Suárez's thought, exploring its internal articulation in lower concepts and addressing some problematic cores peculiar to the scholastic debate. The first section of the paper considers the extension of the concept of real relations, drawing the fundamental distinction between categorical and transcendental relations: while the former are accidents that must fulfil three conditions in order to exist (the existence of a subject, a foundation and a term), the latter are not accidents and are thus part of the essence of the thing they refer to. The second part focuses on the intension of the concept of real relation, concluding by defining it as a real reference based on the first element of the relation (the foundation) and directed towards the second (the term) as something else. Finally, the last section of the essay addresses the problem of the nature of the distinction between the relation and its foundation. After examining some eminent authors’ position, namely Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain and Pedro da Fonseca, Suárez assumes the Nominalist position which reduces the ontological status of the relation to that of its foundation. In this regard, Suárez's doctrine differs from Ockham's only by adding the thesis of the distinction of reason between the relation and its foundation, a position unacceptable for Nominalists _. (shrink)

The problems divulged, analyzed and allegedly solved in Science, Order & Creativity are not scientific problems. They attest to a fundamental failure of science but not to scientific failure per se. Bohm and Peat's meta-scientific undertaking cannot afford, therefore, to remain negative. However, neither science itself nor current professional philosophy are capable of the radical positive rethinking required, in their view, in order to restore and ensure scientific creativity.

It can be confusing to define the object of an action because it may be unclear if there is a per se or a per accidens order to the end. Three common difficulties in distinguishing between these are that the per se ordering must be either in the nature of the end or in the act, that this ordering to an end is a real and not merely a logical one, and that technology has a tendency to ignore (...) the teleology of natures by breaking things down to their parts for manipulation. Having drawn these distinctions, craniotomy is then compared to lethal self-defense. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.4 : 611–616. (shrink)

Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that sets cognitive, emotional and material conditions for ordinary human interactions. Religion involves extraordinary use of ordinary cognitive processes to passionately display costly devotion to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents. The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task-specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folkmechanics, folkbiology, folkpsychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary notions about how the world is, with all of its (...) inescapable problems, thus enabling people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve existential problems, including death and deception. Here the focus is on folkpsychology and agency. A key feature of the supernatural agent concepts common to all religions is the triggering of an "Innate Releasing Mechanism," or “agency detector,” whose proper domain encompasses animate objects relevant to hominid survival - such as predators, protectors and prey - but which actually extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in wind, faces on clouds. Folkpsychology also crucially involves metarepresentation, which makes deception possible and threatens any social order; however, these same metacognitive capacities provide the hope and promise of open-ended solutions through representations of counterfactual supernatural worlds that cannot be logically or empirically verified or falsified. Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion. Cross-cultural experimental evidence encourages these claims. (shrink)

A growing body of research has shown that symbolic number processing relates to individual differences in mathematics. However, it remains unclear which mechanisms of symbolic number processing are crucial—accessing underlying magnitude representation of symbols (i.e., symbol‐magnitude associations), processing relative order of symbols (i.e., symbol‐symbol associations), or processing of symbols per se. To address this question, in this study adult participants performed a dots‐number word matching task—thought to be a measure of symbol‐magnitude associations (numerical magnitude processing)—a numeral‐ordering task that focuses (...) on symbol‐symbol associations (numerical order processing), and a digit‐number word matching task targeting symbolic processing per se. Results showed that both numerical magnitude and order processing were uniquely related to arithmetic achievement, beyond the effects of domain‐general factors (intellectual ability, working memory, inhibitory control, and non‐numerical ordering). Importantly, results were different when a general measure of mathematics achievement was considered. Those mechanisms of symbolic number processing did not contribute to math achievement. Furthermore, a path analysis revealed that numerical magnitude and order processing might draw on a common mechanism. Each process explained a portion of the relation of the other with arithmetic (but not with a general measure of math achievement). These findings are consistent with the notion that adults’ arithmetic skills build upon symbol‐magnitude associations, and they highlight the effects that different math measures have in the study of numerical cognition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cartesian CompositesPaul HoffmanTowards the end of a paper in which I argued that Descartes thinks a human being is a genuine unity, I invited other commentators to come to Descartes’s defense by accounting for his apparently contradictory claims that a human being is an ens per se and that it is an ens per accidens.1 These claims seem to be contradictory, because in saying that a human being is (...) an ens per se, Descartes appears to be asserting that a human being is genuinely one, and in saying that a human being is an ens per accidens, he appears to assert that a human being is not genuinely one, but instead is a mere heap or aggregate. In the ensuing eleven years no one has taken up my invitation, except to argue that I was mistaken in claiming that Descartes thinks a human being has per se unity in any robust sense.2In this paper I will take up the challenge myself, having noticed a similarity between Descartes’s account of the unity of composite substances and his account of composite figures having true and immutable natures. After showing how he can consistently maintain that a human being is both an ens per se and ens per accidens in roughly the same way he can consistently maintain that composite figures both do and do not have true and immutable natures, I will try to respond to criticisms of my claim that he thinks of a human being as a substance or an ens per se.Let me begin with an analysis and comparison of two passages from the Objections and Replies. In the first, from the Replies to the First Objections, Descartes [End Page 251] discusses composite figures. In the second, from the Replies to the Fourth Objections, Descartes discusses composite substances.Next, to remove the other part of the difficulty, it should be noted that those ideas which do not contain true and immutable natures, but contain only ones which are fictitious and composed by the intellect, can be divided by the same intellect, not only through abstraction, but through a clear and distinct operation, so that any ideas which the intellect cannot so divide were undoubtedly not composed by it. As, for example, when I think of a winged horse, or an actually existing lion, or a triangle inscribed in a square, I easily understand that I can also in opposition think of a horse without wings, a non-existing lion, a triangle without a square, and so on; from which it follows that these do not have true and immutable natures. But if I think of a triangle or a square (I do not speak here of a lion or horse because their natures are not clearly evident to us), then certainly whatever I apprehend as contained in the idea of a triangle, as that its three angles are equal to two right angles, etc., I will truly affirm of the triangle, and of the square whatever is found in the idea of the square. For even if I can understand a triangle, abstracting from the fact that its angles should equal two right angles, I cannot nevertheless deny that of it by a clear and distinct operation, that is, correctly understanding this is what I say. Furthermore, if I consider a triangle inscribed in a square, not in order to attribute to the square those things which pertain only to the triangle or to the triangle those things which pertain to the square, but in order to examine only those things which arise from the conjunction of the two, then its nature will be no less true and immutable than the square or triangle alone, and it will be permitted to affirm that the square is not less than twice the triangle inscribed in it and similar things which pertain to the nature of this composite figure. (AT VII 117–8; CSM II 83–4)3I am not unaware that some substances are commonly called ‘incomplete.’ But if they are said to be incomplete because they cannot exist per se alone, I confess that it seems contradictory to me that... (shrink)

I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...) that parsimony per se favors neither a mentalist nor a behavior-reading account. Finally, I argue that early SCAs do not develop continuously into four-year-olds' belief attribution abilities. Accordingly, the argument from developmental continuity is empirically inadequate. Careful analysis of both the empirical data and the theoretical assumptions leading to the epistemic mentalist view is needed in order to improve our understanding of SCAs in earl.. (shrink)

Moral rationalism has long been an attractive position within moral philosophy. However, among empirical-minded philosophers, it is widely dismissed as scientifically untenable. In this essay, I argue that moral rationalism’s lack of uptake in the empirical domain is due to the widespread supposition that moral rationalists must hold that moral judgments and actions are produced by rational capacities. But this construal is mistaken: moral rationalism’s primary concern is not with the relationship between moral judgments and rational capacities per se, but (...) rather with developing a conception objectivity normativity that avoids Platonism. In light of this, I develop an alternative approach to translating moral rationalism into the empirical domain that builds on the common rationalist view that normative requirements are explained by the relationship between agents and the social structures and practices in which they are embedded. I propose that this social conception of normativity can be translated into a scientific framework by interpreting it as a claim about the importance of constraint-based explanation when accounting for norm-governed behavior. In order to develop this point more concretely and show that it is empirically tractable, I turn to research on macaque social organization that highlights the ways in which normative standards are generated by empirically observable social structures. The insights garnered from the macaque case allow me to then locate moral rationalism’s core claims about the relationship between morality and the standards of practical rationality within an empirically plausible framework. (shrink)

In this issue ofJME, Watsonet alcall for research evaluation of government health programmes and identify ethical guidance, including the Ottawa Statement on the ethical design and conduct of cluster randomised trials, as a hindrance. While cluster randomised trials of health programmes as a whole should be evaluated by research ethics committees (RECs), Watsonet alargue that the health programme per se is not within the researcher’s control or responsibility and, thus, is out of scope for ethics review. We argue that this (...) view is wrong. The scope of research ethics review is not defined by researcher control or responsibility, but rather by the protection of research participants. And the randomised evaluation of health programmes impacts the liberty and welfare interests of participants insofar as they may be exposed to a harmful programme or denied access to a beneficial one. Further, Watsonet al’s claim that ‘study programmes … would occur whether or not there were any … research activities’ is incorrect in the case of cluster randomised designs. In a cluster randomised trial, the government does not implement a programme as usual. Rather, researchers collaborate with the government to randomise clusters to intervention or control conditions in order to rigorously evaluate the programme. As a result, equipoise issues are triggered that must be addressed by the REC. (shrink)

This article critically examines the structure and implications of the argument in ST 1, Q2, A3, associated with Aquinas’ First Way. Our central endeavor is to discern whether a certain disambiguation of point 6 (“There is something that is not moving/changing that moves/changes other things”) can be logically inferred from points 1-5. Through a three-part proof, the article establishes that under specific conditions, it can indeed be inferred. However, this interpretation notably diverges from Aquinas’ intended conclusion and subsequent stronger interpretations (...) of the claim. The paper also engages in discussions surrounding the soundness of the argument, assessing the plausibility of its premises in light of physics and logical analysis. The contribution does not seek to speculate on Aquinas’ understanding or to dismiss his perspective but rather to delineate what follows from his First Way premises, highlighting discrepancies with contemporary views on the nature of existence, particularly the notion of God. (shrink)

This paper argues for the superiority of international law’s existing ban on unilateral secession over its reform to include either a primary or remedial right to secession. I begin by defending the claim that secession is an inherently institutional concept, and that therefore we ought to employ institutional moral reasoning to defend or criticize specific proposals regarding a right to secede. I then respond to the objection that at present we lack the empirical evidence necessary to sustain any specific conclusion (...) regarding an international legal right to secession. Specifically, I argue that we ought to adopt a precautionary approach, and that such an approach justifies giving no weight to promoting political self-determination per se when considering whether to reform international law governing secession. I conclude with several reasons to think that even a remedial right to unilateral secession will detract from, not enhance, the international legal order’s ability to promote peace and human rights. (shrink)

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve (...) these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor). (shrink)

The present study investigates whether quantifier scope is computed incrementally during online sentence processing. We exploited the free word order in German to manipulate whether the verbal predicate preceded or followed the second quantifier in doubly quantified sentences that required the computation of inverse scope. A possessive pronoun in the first quantifier that had to be bound by the second quantifier was used to enforce scope inversion. We tested whether scope inversion causes difficulty and whether this difficulty emerges even at (...) a point before comprehenders have encountered the main verb. We report three pretests and two reading time experiments. The first two pretests were offline tests that established (1) that the sentences exhibited the assumed scope preferences and (2) that variable binding forced scope inversion. The third pretest employed self-paced reading to show that interpreting a bound variable is not difficult per se and that difficulty in the critical construction must thus be due to inverting scope. Incremental processing of quantifier scope was investigated in a self-paced reading experiment. We observed difficulty right after the second quantifier, but only if it appeared after the main verb, that is, after the predication was complete. Further evidence for late scope inversion comes from an eyetracking experiment. Again, a scope inversion effect could only be observed at the end of the sentence. Taken together, our study demonstrates that in German inverse scope is only computed at the sentence boundary. (shrink)

The dissertation's primary task is to discern to what extent the investigations contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics conform to the model of science developed in the Posterior Analytics. It concludes that the Metaphysics substantially follows the model of the Analytics in studying the causes and attributes of a specific nature, although it makes significant departures especially in its conception of the principles of being and substance. ;Two introductory chapters discuss respectively Aristotle's conception of science in the Analytics and the problems one (...) is likely to face in attempting to apply this conception to the Metaphysics . Chapter 3 clarifies the meaning of the phrase "science of being qua being" by reference to the Posterior Analytics, and introduces the concept of pro&d13;v 3&d3;n equivocity. Chapter 4 considers the role of dialectic in metaphysics with particular reference to the principle of noncontradiction. Chapter 5 argues that the second part of Meta. 4.2 introduces a demonstrative science of the per se attributes of being and unity. ;Chapter 6 introduces the investigation into the principles and causes of being and reviews the aporias about the principles . Chapter 7 offers a hypothesis to explain Aristotle's identification of the science of being with first philosophy. The last two chapters argue that Aristotle is pursuing this investigation in the central books of Melaphysics, but his pursuit of the investigation there is incomplete. ;This interpretation provides an alternative to those of T. H. Irwin and Walter Leszl, who argue that metaphysics is a second-order discipline and not a science after the model of the Analytics. It finds explicit support in recent work by Robert Bolton and Alan Code, while widening the range of issues to include the attributes of being and the importance of first philosophy for understanding the nature of being. It supports many of the conclusions of Joseph Owens's, Urbain Dhondt's, and Frede and Patzig's work on the object of metaphysics. There are also substantial discussions of the contributions of G. E. L. Owen, J. G. Stevenson, Theodore Scaltsas, and John Thorp. (shrink)

The phenomenon of distributed knowledge is well-known in epistemic logic. In this paper, a similar phenomenon in ethics, somewhat neglected so far, is investigated, namely distributed morality. The article explains the nature of distributed morality, as a feature of moral agency, and explores the implications of its occurrence in advanced information societies. In the course of the analysis, the concept of infraethics is introduced, in order to refer to the ensemble of moral enablers, which, although morally neutral per se, can (...) significantly facilitate or hinder both positive and negative moral behaviours. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge has recently argued that the way in which research and development of essential medicines is incentivized, under existing World Trade Organization rules, should be supplemented with an additional incentivizing mechanism. One might hold a stronger view than the one that Pogge currently holds, namely that patent rights for essential medicines are morally unjustified per se. Throughout this paper, ‘the strong view’ refers to this view. The strong view is one that enjoys considerable support both within and outside the (...) academic community. This paper critically discusses one specific argument in favor of the strong view. This argument is named the ‘Poggean argument’. This denominator is appropriate because a number of the essential premises of the argument are constituted by propositions that Pogge at some point has defended. The Poggean argument is valid, and defenders of the strong view also have some grounds for believing that the argument is sound. This belief comes, however, with what is arguably a too high cost, namely that the global institutional order becomes very demanding on taxpaying citizens of high-income countries if it is to be just. One may find acceptance of this cost relatively unproblematic, but this cost is, it is argued, unacceptable to anyone who has views on distributive justice that are sympathetic to the core tenets of libertarianism. (shrink)

It is an old idea, lately out of fashion but now experiencing a revival, that quantum mechanics may best be understood, not as a physical theory with a problematic probabilistic interpretation, but as something closer to a probability calculus per se. However, from this angle, the rather special C *-algebraic apparatus of quantum probability theory stands in need of further motivation. One would like to find additional principles, having clear physical and/or probabilistic content, on the basis of which this apparatus (...) can be reconstructed. In this paper, I explore one route to such a derivation of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics, by means of a set of strong, but probabilistically intelligible, axioms. Stated very informally, these require that systems appear completely classical as restricted to a single measurement, that different measurements, and likewise different pure states, be equivalent (up to the action of a compact group of symmetries), and that every state be the marginal of a bipartite non-signaling state perfectly correlating two measurements. This much yields a mathematical representation of (basic, discrete) measurements as orthonormal subsets of, and states, by vectors in, an ordered real Hilbert space – in the quantum case, the space of Hermitian operators, with its usual tracial inner product. One final postulate (a simple minimization principle, still in need of a clear interpretation) forces the positive cone of this space to be homogeneous and self-dual and hence, to be the state space of a formally real Jordan algebra. From here, the route to the standard framework of finite-dimensional quantum mechanics is quite short. (shrink)

Findings suggest a positive impact of bilingualism on cognition, including the later onset of dementia. However, it is not clear to what extent these effects are influenced by variations in attentional control demands in response to specific task requirements. In this study, 20 bilingual and 20 monolingual older adults performed a task-switching task under explicit task-cuing vs. memory-based switching conditions. In the cued condition, task switches occurred in random order and a visual cue signaled the next task to be performed. (...) In the memory-based condition, the task alternated after every second trial in a predictable sequence without presenting a cue. The performance of bilinguals did not vary across experimental conditions, whereas monolinguals experienced a pronounced increase in response latencies and error rates in the cued condition. Both groups produced similar switch costs and mixing costs, but bilinguals produced them with lower response latencies. The cognitive benefits of bilingualism seem not to apply to executive functions per se but to affect specific cognitive processes that involve task-relevant context processing. The present results suggest that lifelong bilingualism could promote in older adults a flexible adjustment to environmental cues, but only with increased task demands. However, due to the small sample size, the results should be interpreted with caution. (shrink)

Wie soll die Unsterlichkeitshoffnung gedeutet werden, um überhaupt konsistent sein zu können? Um die Frage zu klären, bezieht sich der Artikel auf den Substanzdualismus von R. Swinburne, die Constitution Theory von L. R. Baker, die christlichen Materialisten, den aristotelischen Hylemorphismus sowie die Seelen-Lehre von Thomas v. Aquin. Die thomanischen Prämissen legen nahe, Unsterblichkeit weder präsentistisch - als ständige Gegenwart - noch äternalistisch - als unendliche Erstreckung in der Zeit - zu verstehen, sondern als endgültige participatio an der Ewigkeit Gottes, die (...) totum simul - zeitlos alles zugleich - ist. Da für Thomas das vom Körper trennbare intellektuell-geistige Prinzip der menschlichen Seele Garant der personalen Identität ist, muss er weder eine Unterbrechung der diachronen Identität noch eine per se Koinzidenz zwischen dem biologischen Tod und der individuellen Auferstehung annehmen.How should we account for the hope of immortality in order to make it consistent? The article refers to R. Swinburne's substance dualism, L. R. Baker's Constitution Theory, views of Christian materialists, Aristotelian hylemorphism, and Thomas Aquinas' teachings. The Thomistic premises suggest that we understand immortality neither presentistic nor eternalistic but rather as definite participatio in God's eternity that is timeless and totum simul, all at once. According to Thomas Aquinas, the intellectual principle of the human soul, separable from the body, guarantees diachronic personal identity. Therefore, he neither has to assume that biological death entails an interruption of the diachronic identity, nor does he have to assume that the resurrection of the individual coincides per se with biological death. (shrink)

A variety of ethical positions consider that the ability of an individual to be awareof what befalls him or her —in a more o less complex manner— is the indispensableattribute for that being to be per se morally considered. Nowadays, nevertheless,we lack a direct method to identify the ability of an individual to be consciousand, therefore, to corroborate the belief that certain beings —many nonhumananimals included— are conscious. Throughout this article I will analyze thequestions related to this issue, and in (...) particular the different scientific tools thatwe have in order to construct hypothesis about the probability of individuals ofbeing conscious. As we shall see, at present we can come to the conclusion that a great number of nonhuman animals are probably conscious and that, therefore,they deserve to be morally considered. (shrink)

Statistical evidence is pervasive in medicine. In this chapter we will focus on the reliability of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) conducted to test the safety and efficacy of medical treatments. RCTs are scientific experiments and, as such, we expect them to be replicable: if we repeat the same experiment time and again, we should obtain the same outcome (Norton 2015). The statistical design of the test should guarantee that the observed outcome is not a random event, but rather a real (...) effect of the treatments administered. However, for more than a decade now, we have been discussing a replicability crisis across different experimental disciplines including medicine: the outcomes of trials published in very prestigious journals often disappear when the experiment is repeated (see, e.g., Lehrer 2010, Begley and Ellis 2012, Horton 2015). -/- There are different accounts of the reason for this replicability crisis, ranging from scientific fraud to lack of institutional incentives to double-check someone else’s results. In this chapter we will use the replicability crisis as a thread to introduce some central issues in the design of scientific experiments in medicine. First, in section 1, we will see how replicability and statistical significance are connected: we can only make sense of the p-value of a trial outcome within a series of replications of the test. But in order to conduct these replications properly, we need to agree on the proper design of the experiment we are going to repeat. In particular, we need to prevent the preferences of the experimenters from biasing the outcome of the experiment. If there is such a bias, when the experiment is replicated by a third party, the observed outcome will vanish. In section 2, we will argue that trialists need to agree on the debiasing procedures and the statistical quality controls that feature in the trial protocol, if they want the outcome to be replicable. In section 3, we will make two complementary points. On the one hand, replicability per se is not everything: we need trial outcomes that are not only statistically significant but also clinically relevant. On the other hand, trials are not everything: the experts analyzing the evidence can improve the reliability of statistical evidence, although they sometimes fail; we need to further study how they make their decisions. In section 4, we will use a controversy about the overprescription of statins to show how non-replicable effects are obtained in trials and how experts may fail at detecting such flaws, if the commercial interests are big enough. (shrink)

Governments are increasingly inviting patient organizations to participate in healthcare policymaking. By inviting POs that claim to represent patients, representation comes into being. However, little is known about the circumstances under which governments accept POs as patient representatives. Based on the analysis of relevant legislation, this article investigates the criteria that self-help organizations, a special type of PO, must fulfil in order to be accepted as patient representatives by governments in Austria and Germany. Thereby, it aims to contribute to the (...) discussion on the role of governments in steering SHOs. There are different degrees of regulation. Governments in both countries not only formulate explicit criteria for SHOs with respect to patient representation but also guide SHOs representing patients through implicit criteria for associations. We discuss the findings against concepts of responsiveness, authorization, and accountability. Our findings indicate that governmental steering is not negative per se as indicated by previous research but—depending on legislative criteria—can promote transparency and democratic quality in patient representation. (shrink)

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We (...) argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system—quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system. (shrink)

Governments are increasingly inviting patient organizations to participate in healthcare policymaking. By inviting POs that claim to represent patients, representation comes into being. However, little is known about the circumstances under which governments accept POs as patient representatives. Based on the analysis of relevant legislation, this article investigates the criteria that self-help organizations, a special type of PO, must fulfil in order to be accepted as patient representatives by governments in Austria and Germany. Thereby, it aims to contribute to the (...) discussion on the role of governments in steering SHOs. There are different degrees of regulation. Governments in both countries not only formulate explicit criteria for SHOs with respect to patient representation but also guide SHOs representing patients through implicit criteria for associations. We discuss the findings against concepts of responsiveness, authorization, and accountability. Our findings indicate that governmental steering is not negative per se as indicated by previous research but—depending on legislative criteria—can promote transparency and democratic quality in patient representation. (shrink)

The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology." In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.” This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an (...) easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated. (shrink)

This article focuses on Alexei Losev’s literary texts that embrace his mythology of music: “I was 19 years old,” “A meteor,” “A woman-thinker,” “The Tchaikovsky trio,” and “An encounter.” It is shown that Losev’s musical mythology developed from his early musical-critical works—through the artistic-mythological episodes of his philosophical works per se —to his fiction of the 1930s. Losev’s intentionally abstract philosophy of music required to be complemented by the artistic, emotional, socially and historically specific expression. The main idea of Losev’s (...) musical myth in its historical-cultural aspect is to reflect the relevant self-consciousness of an individual. The epoch of religious super-individualism and “prayerful delight” is replaced by the epoch of “musical delight” and professed idealization of an individual. This change was a reason of the extreme ambivalence of music, which, on the one hand, expresses the highest order and harmony and, on the other, is a continuous evolvement and chaos, a substantive uncertainty. The novelty of the article consists, firstly, in the analysis of correspondence between musical ambivalence and drama in the lives of the heroes, especially heroines symbolizing music itself; and secondly, in identifying the constant features of Losev’s musical myth, as well as its specific features that emerge at different stages. (shrink)

Before going further, it will be helpful to consider briefly the notion that novelty per se is a fundamental human need. Experiments with human beings, as well as with animals, indicate that the maintenance of normal, successful behavior depends upon an adequate level of incoming stimulation—or, as some have put it, of novelty.2 But lumping all novelty together is misleading. At least three kinds of novelty need to be distinguished. Some novel patterns arise out of, or represent, changes in the (...) fundamental rules governing the organization of musical processes and structures. By significantly weakening our comprehension of the musical relationships presented—undermining not only our understanding of what is past but our ability to envisage what is to come—such systemic change seriously threatens our sense of psychic security and competent control. Far from being welcome, the insecurity and uncertainty thus engendered is at least as antipathetic, disturbing, and unpleasant as stimulus privation. Novel patterns may also result from the invention of a new strategy that accords with prevalent stylistic rules. Though they may initially seem to threaten existing competencies, the function and significance of novel strategies within the larger set of stylistic constraints can usually be grasped without too much delay or difficulty. For a while the tensions produced by strategic innovation may seem disturbing. But in the end, when our grasp of the principles ordering events is confirmed and our sense of competency is reestablished and control is reinforced, tension is resolved into an elation that is both stimulating and enjoyable. Most novel patterns—original themes, rhythms, harmonic progressions, and so forth—involve the innovative instantiation or realization of an existing strategy or schema .3 Novelties of this kind not only enhance our sense of control—a feeling that we know how things really “work”—but provide both the pleasure of recognition and the joy of skillfully exercising some competency. We enjoy novelty—the stimulation of surprise, the tension of uncertainty—as long as it can be accommodated within a known and understandable set of constraints. When the rules governing the game are abrogated or in doubt—when comprehension and control are threatened—the result is usually anger, anguish, and desperation.These responses to novelty are consequences of fundamental and poignant verities of the human condition: the centrality of choice in human behavior. Because only a minute fraction of human behavior seems to be genetically specified, choice is inescapable.While in lower organisms, behavior is strictly determined by the genetic program, in complex metazoa the genetic program becomes less constraining, more “open” as Ernst Mayr puts it, in the sense that it does not lay down behavioral instructions in great detail but rather permits some choice and allows for a certain freedom of response. Instead of imposing rigid prescriptions, it provides the organism with potentialities and capacities. This openness of the genetic program increases with evolution and culminates in mankind.4The price of freedom is the imperative of choice. Human beings must choose were to sow and when to reap, when to work and where to live, when to play and what to build. Intelligent, successful choices are possible only if alternative courses of action can be imagined and their consequences envisaged with reasonable accuracy. 2. For further discussion, see my Music, the Arts, and Ideas , p. 50.3. Rules are transpersonal but intracultural constraints—for instance, the pitch/time entities established in some style, as well as grammatical and syntactic regularities. Strategies are general means for actualizing some of the possibilities that are potential in the rules of the style. The rules of a style are relatively few, while the number of possible strategies may, depending upon the nature of the rules, be very large indeed. The ways of instantiating a particular strategy are, if not infinite, at least beyond reckoning.4. François Jacob, The Possible and the Actual , p. 61. See also Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin , p. 257. (shrink)

The Bologna Framework for higher education has agreed on three “cycle descriptors”—knowledge, skill and general competence—which are to constitute the learning outcomes and credit ranges for the three cycles of higher education: The Bachelor, the Master and the PhD. In connection with the implementations of the national qualification framework these descriptors initiated a new debate on the possibility of Bildung within higher education in Norway. Pursuing this question of whether the triad knowledge, skill and general competences makes possible or prevents (...) Bildung within higher education I argue that regardless of how one conceptualizes Bildung, one must say something about the kind of thinking that initiates a process transforming knowledge to become internalised so as to influence one’s choices and actions. A vital aim for the initiative of the Bologna process as envisioned in the Bologna Declaration 1999 was to develop a “Europe of Knowledge”. Underpinning this and other educational documents it appears that lack of knowledge is seen as an important explanation to todays many challenges. A confidence in knowledge per se as having a transformative power in itself seems to be a belief supporting the knowledge policy that dominates official documents. Following Kierkegaard and his critique of becoming objective as nurturing disinterestedness, I am critical to an understanding of knowledge as transformative in itself if knowledge primarily is understood as objective knowledge. In this paper I argue that in order to take responsibility for the knowledge one holds, a thinking which Kierkegaard calls subjective is an important contribution to one kind of thinking involved if knowledge shall initiate a transformation of one’s life and thus foster responsibility. (shrink)

Priority setting of scarce resources in healthcare is high on the agenda of most healthcare systems implying a need to develop robust foundations for making fair allocation decisions. One central factor for such decisions in needs-based systems, following both empirical studies and theoretical analyses, is severity. However, it has been noted that severity is an under-theorized concept. One such aspect is how severity should relate to temporality. There is a rich discussion on temporality and distributive justice, however, this discussion needs (...) to be adapted to the practical and ethical requirements of healthcare priority setting principles at mid-level. In this article, we analyze how temporal aspects should be taken into account when assessing severity as a modifier for cost-effectiveness. We argue that when assessing the severity of a condition, we have reason to look at complete conditions from a time-neutral perspective, meaning that we take the full affectable stretch of the condition into account without modifying severity as patients move through the temporal stretch and without discounting the future. We do not find support for taking the ‘shape’ of a condition into account per se, e.g. whether the severity has a declining or inclining curve, or that severity is intermittent rather than continuous. In order to take severity seriously, we argue that we have reason to apply a quantified approach where every difference in severity should impact on priority setting. In conclusion, we find that this approach is practically useful in actual priority setting. (shrink)

The Creative Citizenship project was founded to promote critical, ethical, and creative thinking in early childhood, and to recognize and encourage children as social actors and peacebuilders. In concert with the methodology of North American philosopher Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children (P4C), Creative Citizenship seeks to promote in children the ability to think critically, ethically, and creatively in and from their own realities, and to exercise multidimensional thinking skills in the various areas of their daily lives. The research documented here (...) adopted a qualitative approach in so far as it sought to inquire about the character of those relationships, particularly among boys and girls, that promote their identity as social agents. As such, it examined training processes and generated theoretical perspectives in the interest of promoting social transformation through the empowerment of multidimensional thinking. The article begins with a review of the concept of Creative Citizenship and ends with that of Peacebuilding. Three theoretical categories have been applied in order to situate the inquiry within the framework of the realities of childhood, and to chart the pedagogical interventions by adults that occurred throughout the implementation of the project. The first focuses on the development of children’s thinking per se, the second on children's capacities for creative problem-solving in social environments, and the third on the concept of peacebuilding as a commitment to practicing philosophical dialogue among children, which is understood as a form of discourse that builds the capacities of citizens to undertake individual and collective actions that allow them, in turn, to create and re-create scenarios of peaceful coexistence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:FROM CAIN AND ABEL TO ESAU AND JACOB Angel Barahona UniversidadComplutense, Madrid The theme of twins or of enemy brothers is one which fascinates anthropologists owing to its frequency, the beauty of its mythopoetic settings, and its social significance. The theme always appears in relation to fratricidal violence, and is always linked to myths offoundation or origin. Clyde Kluckhohn in his book about brothers "born in immediate sequence" reminds (...) us that the death of one of them brings with it a momentary peace, the foundation ofa new social order. Thus it is not the fact ofbeing twins, or antagonistic brotherhood per se which is the key to the stories, but violence: Twins are impure in the same way that a warrior steeped in carnage is impure, or an incestuous couple, or a menstruating woman. All forms of violence lead back to violence. We overlook this fact because the primitive concept of a link between the loss ofdistinctions and violence is strange to us; butwe need only consider the calamities primitive people associate with twins to perceive the logic of this concept. Deadly epidemics can result from contact with twins, as can mysterious illnesses mat cause sterility in women and animals. Even more significant to us is the role oftwins in provoking discord among neighbors, a fatal collapse of ritual, the transgression of interdictions—in sort, their part in instigating asacrificial crisis....Behindthe image oftwins lurks the baleful aspectofthesacred, perceived as a disparate but formidableunified force. (Girard 1977, 58) All the mythological, literaryand historical accounts oftwinswhichwe have involve bloody conflict: Eteocles and Polyneices, Romulus and Remus, Richard the Lion Heart and John Lackland, and so on. To a 2 Angel Barahona surprising extent even the development of the different stories is similar. When Polynices departs from Thebes leaving his sister there, hoping to reign through her, he takes with him his fraternal conflict as if it were an attribute of his being. Wherever he goes his brother appears to him, and will oppose him to the death. When an oracle announced to Adrastrus that his two daughters would marry, respectively, a lion and a wild boar, animals which are different in their appearance but identical in their violence, it was presaging fraternal conflict. In Euripides' The Suppliant Women, the king tells how he came upon his sons-in-law. At his door, one night, Polynices and Tideus, both reduced to poverty, were quarreling furiously over possession ofa camp bed. Their brotherhood by virtue ofmarriage with two sisters brings them within the fraternalcategory, likeOedipus and Creon, orDionysus and Pentheus, rival cousins. A plot of land or a kingdom, a woman or an object, the status of firstborn or an unjust inheritance, all give pretexts for conflict. We cannot avoid conflict when desires converge on the same object. It is difficult for the brothers to be aware of their symmetry, their reciprocity, the intense violence which is hidden behind their brotherhood,—an awareness which might spare them their confrontations—because they never occupy the same positions atthe same time. The reciprocity is real, but it is the sum of non-reciprocal moments. The antagonists occupy the same positions in time, but successively, not simultaneously. The same acts and the same sentiments appear in cyclical alternation, but the brothers cannot directly observe their own reciprocity, and thus their identical nature, because they seem to be differentiated by the role which each one plays. Cain and Abel There are many stories ofconfrontations between brothers in Scripture, including those related to the rights of the first born. From Genesis 4,5 onwards we see how these are an interminable source ofconflicts. The first example, Cain and Abel: "And the LORD had regard for Abel and his offering, but for Cain and his offering he had no regard. So Cain was very angry, and his countenance fell" anticipates the themes ofthe blessing and the looking at the face. And we can observe the games of symmetry with the language: "the LORD had regard for Abel and his offering, but forCain and his offering he had no regard." Cain and Abel are presented as an agriculturalist and as a shepherd respectively, two forms ofsocial life. In this quarrel... (shrink)

Kant’s criticism is based on the idea that all possible knowledge of facts is determined by the immanent structure of our apparatus of cognition, and that therefore we have no access to reality as it is per se (“Ding an sich”). In modern analytical philosophy some elements of this view survived, namely, the distinction between framework construction and actual data of experience, supposition or voluntary setting. The conditio humana is characterised by our capacity of acting. Acting is defined as behaviour (...) determined and controlled by information processes. The structure of these processes defines the semantics and logical principles of practical philosophy. From this view follows the conception of value judgments, the logic of preferences, formal teleology, the analysis of utility and norm logic. The framework theories should be open in order to be able to express all possible theoretical views, namely, subjectivism as well as objectivism. The paper gives a concise account of the systems of practical thought (formal axiology, formal teleology, preference logic and norm logic) and their gnoseological problems. (shrink)

At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central reason, (...) on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less ‘precisely defined’ than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design. (shrink)

Both Nietzsche and Lawrence have been identified as important fore- runners and progenitors in the development of an ecocentric, “posthumanist” worldview. Nietzsche suggested, and Lawrence developed, the notion of an anti-mechanistic “gay science”. Both writers rejected the Christian denigration of nature, the Romantic notion of a “return to nature” and the instrumentalisation of nature by industrial rationality in favour of a conception of the good life founded in the body and an almost utopian “ascent to nature”. However, since the ascent (...) to nature required an overcoming of existing humanity, both Nietzsche and Lawrence faced the task of articulating a conception of the Over-man – or post-human, as contemporary theory would put it – that is not merely a figure of authoritarian brutality. Deep ecologist Del Ivan Janik has claimed that Lawrence “saw man as part of an organic universe, living best by acknowledging its wonder and rejecting the temptation to force his will upon it. In this sense he stands at the beginning of the modern posthumanist tradition and of the literature of environmental consciousness.” 1 Accurate as this assessment is, however, the struggle with questions of power, gender, sexuality and religion that early posthu- manism involved has tended to be airbrushed out of the dark green reading of Lawrence. And Lawrence's personal spiritual and intellectual struggle was also a creative conflict with Nietzsche. A useful point of departure is Anna Bramwell's comment in Ecology in the Twentieth Century on the somewhat surprising ubiquity of Nietzsche in ecophilosophical works, as it might be applied with equal force to Lawrence: Nietzsche ... is frequently described as an important figure. Why should this be? In reality, he does not conform at all to the model ecologist ... Yet Nietzsche still hovers, worrying but relevant. I will get on to the worries in due course; for the moment, a few words on the relevance of Nietzsche might be in order. For one thing, Nietzsche was not much interested in nature per se; unlike Lawrence, he never concerned himself with either natural beauty or the threat posed to it by late 19th century industrialisation. This may be due in part to his actual environment, which was largely congenial, as Robert Solomon reminds us: From snatches of prose, one might well conclude that Nietzsche wants nothing more fervently than the life of Conan the Barbarian, a role for which he, in particular, was notoriously ill-suited. "Live dan- gerously" he tells us, from the posher resorts in Southern Europe. It seems reasonable to suggest that if Nietzsche was more fascinated by the Provencal art of the troubadours than by the resistable rise of the capi- talist machine economy, his convalescent exile by the Med, away from the industrial heartlands of Northern Europe, may be partly responsible. His chief concern is the overcoming of the Christian and moral misreading of nature – especially human nature – and the corresponding articulation of what HM Robinson calls a “somatic conception of the good life” to replace it. However, Nietzsche only calls for such a conception, rather than fully elaborating it – let alone living it – so he has “little to say about how human intelligence could be so immanent in our physical being as to make our articulation of our physical will to power something expressive of a properly human nature and not of brute strength.” 4 In short, the problem is how to distinguish the ideal, noble Overman from the mere thug. We should not expect to find the close and often reverent attention to the non-human world as such that is an attractive and central feature of Lawrence's writing; Nietzsche's interest is lively but essentially abstract. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:166, FLAGE ON HUME'S ACCOUNT OF MEMORY In the Treatise Hume writes that an impression which "has been present with the mind" may "make its appearance there as an idea," and that it can appear either through the faculty of memory or the faculty of the imagination. Memory and imagination each produces its own species of idea. In "Hume on Memory and 2 Causation" Daniel Flage addresses Hume's carving (...) out of these two species. Flage's main purpose is to show that Hume has a criterion for distinguishing memory ideas from others. I will argue that Flage has not located necessary and sufficient conditions for memory in Hume's discussion of memory. I will show that if Hume intended to provide a criterion at all, it is not the criterion Flage attributes to him, and that the criterion Flage has formulated is not an improvement over what appears to be Hume's criterion. Before looking at the details of Flage's interpretation I want to mention briefly an underlying assumption of the paper. The assumption is that Hume believes that there must be a clear distinction between memories and other perceptions. The assumption is supported by the fact that Hume speaks of the species of memory. However, there is textual evidence against this assumption. In the Treatise Hume emphasizes the ways in which memories are like other perceptions. For example, Hume calls memories impressions, while in distinguishing impressions from ideas he introduces 3 memories as paradigm examples of ideas. The reason Hume calls memories impressions, I believe, is that for the purpose of inference, he takes memories to be equivalent to impressions of sense. Since Hume is willing to put memories in two seemingly incompatible categories, perhaps his primary concern is with the role they play in belief; we make causal inferences 167. from memory and sense, not from the imagination. That Hume's primary concern is with inference, and not with memory per se, is supported by the fact that both Treatise sections devoted to memory are followed by 4 sections which deal with causal inference. Hume thinks that we cannot always distinguish memories from other perceptions "in their operation." It is not clear that he thinks that there must be a sharp distinction at all, since the traditional epistemological purpose for such a distinction, to partition the veridical from the non-veridical, is not obviously Hume's purpose. However, Flage claims that there is a clear criterion of memory in the Treatise. Let's take a look at what he has found. Flage maintains that Hume has both a phenomenal criterion based on vivacity which allows us in a rough and ready way to distinguish memories from imaginings "in their operation," and a formal criterion which "provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of memory." (p. 169) The phenomenal criterion does not distinguish memory ideas from others, since, as Hume himself allows, non-memories (e.g. beliefs, delusions, even ideas of the imagination) can have the same vivacity as memories. (Cf. T86) The marking off of memory as a distinct species is accomplished, on Flage's view, by the formal criterion. Hume writes "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position." (T9) This is what Flage calls Hume's formal criterion, and Flage takes it as both necessary and sufficient for being a memory idea. Flage takes memory ideas to be what he calls relative ideas, ideas which pick out or refer to a unique item. A memory idea, on this view, is a complex idea which uniquely picks out the antecedent complex 168, impression which resembles and is the cause of the idea. Flage writes: The formal criterion is basically a causal thesis: if a particular positive idea (mental image) is a genuine idea of the memory, then at some point in the past there was a complex impression that was the cause (or the original cause) of and exactly (or closely) resembles that positive idea as an idea. (p. 172) In this formulation the criterion is a necessary condition of memory. In a subsequent formulation Flage claims its sufficiency as... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Introduction to the Mystery of the Church by Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P.David OlsonIntroduction to the Mystery of the Church. By Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P. Trans. by Michael J. Miller. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014. Pp. xxviii + 640. $75.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-2607-1.La Soujeole intends his work to be a textbook in an introductory course in ecclesiology. While this is a review of (...) the English translation, the book was first published in French in 2007, and the preface to the original edition stated, “The present volume is a course in ecclesiology that has been taught regularly at the Dominican House of Studies in Toulouse” (xxv). As a textbook, it is well structured and should be accessible to a wide variety of students. The writing style in translation is clear and straightforward, with explanations given for any terms of art which are used, making it accessible to an audience with some theological training.The tone of the book is theological, that is to say, it is focused on an ordered view of the Catholic faith. It is not apologetic or polemical as is sometimes the case with books on ecclesiology, particularly those preceding the Second Vatican Council. On the other hand, it is certainly not a relativistic, blandly Christian study of various notions of church. Each of the topics within the book is situated within Scripture, and the author provides ample bibliography, though—not surprisingly, considering his religious order and background—the work leans heavily upon St. Thomas Aquinas. The book gives a very balanced view of the teachings of Vatican II.The author begins his work with a general introduction that provides a brief historical overview of important moments and trends in the theology of the Church, as well as a review of ecclesiology as a separate theological subject. One point is that the study of ecclesiology per se is relatively new, beginning only in the fourteenth century, but that questions concerning the ecclesia are found within all major areas of theological study. Ecclesiology cannot neatly be divorced from the study of the doctrine of God, Christology, or the sacraments. Issues regarding sacramental theology and Christology are prominent in the second portion of the book.Explanations are full and show a certain rigor. Some might consider them at times pedantic. For example, the distinction of belief in God from belief in the Church in the Nicene Creed is more than four pages in length, rehearsing difficulties of translation (296-301). More substantially on this point, over these four plus pages the author does not manage to make what would be to many theologians the obvious distinction between the absolute God and the created reality referred to as the Church. In fact, it is not clear that this is a distinction the author would want to make, as the second part of the book, containing his speculative theology, eschews a distinction between a visible and invisible church, the body of the Church and the grace of Jesus Christ. A [End Page 324] too-cursory reading of the second part could tend toward conflating the Church and the inner life of God.The book is divided into three parts. The first part is subdivided into thematic descriptions of the Church. The several themes explored are “Images of the Church and the Kingdom of God,” “the Church [as] the Body of Christ,” “the Church [as] the Temple of the Spirit,” and “the Church [as] the People of God.” The discussion on the Kingdom of God is the most limited. The first part of the book concludes with a section entitled “Recapitulation: The Church Is a Mystery.”The presentations on the Body of Christ, the Temple of the Spirit, and the People of God are done thoroughly. They follow a standard pattern of reviewing Scripture, patristic developments, the medieval period (mostly St. Thomas), and developments from Vatican II, which the author characterizes as the council on the Church. Following a thematic approach, particularly in teaching ecclesiology, seems most appropriate since the typical student may lack the needed... (shrink)

The general slogan in the title of this paper gives a general, but nevertheless accurate, expression of Strawson’s view concerning the nature of formal logic per se in relation to natural language. What is at stake here is the extent to which the formal methods and the formal semantics of contemporary symbolic logic can render the meanings of natural language expressions. Strawson sets up an agenda for logical theory which, although rather dated for a logic text, is what one naturally (...) expects from an introduction to elementary formal logic and a systematic analysis of certain crucial metalogical concepts, most notably entailment. However, my own reading is that Strawson’s approach to logic makes a lasting contribution to understanding the inner workings of natural language through his critical discussion of the limits of the formal renderings of the semantics of natural language expressions via canonical first-order notations. One can recognize in this critical attitude towards the limits of formal methods a consistent generalization of Strawson’s own strategy from his critical response to Russell’s theory of descriptions.In my paper I shall focus on certain examples which illustrate the general slogan that characterizes Strawson’s views on the nature of logic in connection with ordinary language and talk. (shrink)

The foundations of systematics lie in ontology, not in subjective epistemology. Systems and their elements should be distinguished from classes; only the latter are constructed from similarities. The term classification should be restricted to ordering into classes; ordering according to systematic relations may be called systematization.The theory of organization levels portrays the real world as a hierarchy of open systems, from energy quanta to ecosystems; followingHartmann these systems as extended in time are considered the primary units of reality. (...) Organization levels should be distinguished from levels of differentiation within each organization level.Certain biological systems, such as species, continue to be misinterpreted as classes, particularly by logicians unfamiliar with modern biological theory. Replacement of Aristotelian definitions of species by “polytypic” definitions achieves nothing, because species are individual systems which can be defined from an ontological viewpoint only as wholes. The dispute whether classes are real per se or only in individuals is of no scientific importance; irrespective of which view is taken, any ordering of physical objects into classes constitutes an hypothesis about the structure of the real world.The distinction between essential and contingent characters is relevant only to classification. There are no universal rules for evaluating characters for purposes of systematization. Character statements do not form separate linear sequences. The search for “unit characters” in an absolute sense is futile. All real characters are reducible to relations and are in principle measurable, although there are limitations on the extent to which this can be presently achieved.The concept of the sexual species is fundamental to theories of biosystematics. Sexual species may be defined as lineages consisting at any given time of series of populations between which genetic exchange can occur and delimited in time by two successive processes of speciation. Linnaean nomenclature needs modification; in its traditional form it is appropriate only to non-truncated hierarchies, whereas real phylogenies form truncated hierarchies. In consequence of the distinction between systematization and classification it is concluded that, while taxa may be classified into age classes or evolutionary grades, their limits as taxa can be no different in either case. Classification into evolutionary grades remains an imprecise endeavour, since no general measure of evolutionary differentiation has been devised.The spatial and temporal extent of ecosystems, the postulated basic units of ecosystematics, remains unclarified. Nevertheless there are grounds for expecting progress in this field as the energetic relations between organisms become better understood. Biotic communities are not “abstract” classes, but systematic units. Physiognomic classification should not be confused with systematization of plant communities; both approaches contribute to an understanding of vegetational structure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Girardian Event and the Literary EventThe Scapegoat and Revelation in Alice Munro's "Runaway"Joakim Wrethed (bio)My critics constantly accuse me of switching back and forth between the representation and the reality of what is being represented. Readers who have been following the text attentively will understand that I do not deserve the reproach or, if I do, we all deserve it equally because we affirm the existence of real (...) victims behind the almost mythological texts of medieval persecutors.—René Girard, The Scapegoat, 57Girardian philosophical and theological thinking is founded on events: mainly the two generic events of mimetic desire and the purifying sacrifice. However, in addition, there is more nuanced cognition of evental structures that becomes highlighted, particularly when engaging with literary texts through Girardian concepts. It is my intent here to probe deeply into Girard's evental layers through the analytic encounter with Alice Munro's short story "Runaway," which clearly indicates the existence of "real victims" in the sense Girard describes it in the epigraph just shown, even though obviously Munro's victims are moved into the context of our times through the use of [End Page 53] literature as a form of myth-making. We shall more closely examine the literary event as such and what it may mean in Munro's work, but then also bring relevant insights back into Girard's evental framework to ponder some conceptual timbres in his thinking about the scapegoat and revelation. In the Canadian author's short story we therefore focus on these interrelated topics of revelation and scapegoating in order to analyze them in close connection with Girard. The central claim is that Girard uses founding events to ground the generic aspects of the theory, but in addition the argument suggests that the engagement with Munro's short story reveals that the literary event "overflows" any theoretical appropriation of evental structures. Thus, the cognition of the event displays a hermeneutical circle that moves events back into narrativity, myth, and religion, out of which Girard once derived his central ideas.There are mainly three different aspects that need to be outlined here from the beginning, which constitute an organizing structure that is useful when exposing Munro's fiction to close analysis, namely, Christian revelation, anthropological revelation, and the capacity of events to generate new meaning through the underlying phenomenon of eventfulness. According to Bernard Perret, Girard has two central principles attached to his usage of the concept of "revelation":When he speaks of "Christian revelation," he gives this term its usual theological meaning: that of a self-revelation by God giving access to truths that human reason is unable to discover through its own forces. In addition to this first meaning, Girard on many occasions uses the word "revelation"—or "unveiling," which is almost synonymous—in the sense of a discovery giving access to a rational understanding of anthropological facts.1This seemingly incompatible usage will be an important distinction when we move into the realm of contemporary fiction. Moreover, Girard also adds yet another aspect of the event that needs to be taken into consideration as well, and this is the third characteristic referred to above. Perret stresses that Girard and Christianity as a whole state "that all human existence is characterized by events creative of new meanings."2 This last claim fits the dominion of creative fiction in a fertile way. As we shall see when we approach Munro's rather complex short story, we will have to engage with issues that are in line with Girard's theological thinking, but also with elements that problematize certain aspects of these phenomena. It should be mentioned that the Girard scholar Perret is mainly used in this analysis, since he provides a clear focus on aspects [End Page 54] of Girardian thinking that are particularly relevant. There are references directly to Girard's writing mainly in the notes.In order to set up a meaningful dialogue, we need to first ponder the literary event per se, partly since it is such a broad term but also since not all literary events can be seen as revelatory in the theological sense. I here outline a set... (shrink)

The animal agriculture industry causes animals a tremendous amount of pain and suffering. Many ethical vegans argue that we therefore have an obligation to abstain from animal products in order to reduce this suffering. But this argument faces a challenge: thanks to the size and structure of the animal agriculture industry, any individual’s dietary choices are overwhelmingly unlikely to make a difference. In this paper, we criticize common replies to this challenge and develop an alternative argument for ethical veganism. Specifically, (...) we argue that individuals should abstain from animal products because vegans, as a group, successfully reduce animal suffering, and individuals are obligated to participate in, rather than free ride on, this collective endeavor. Or, at the very least, individuals have strong reasons to purchase fewer inhumanely raised animal products—even if they are not obligated to go vegan per se. (shrink)

The present-day arena of Chinese political culture features glocalizational considerations with regard to the exploration of renzheng as humane governance that is somewhat corresponding to shanzhi as good governance. Both forms of governance seem to share such similar principles as accountability, efficiency, equity, honesty and transparency, among others. However, humane governance places more emphasis on humanity, fairness, competence, correctness and morality with its ultimate goal to build up a harmonious society per se. It is claimed to consist in at least (...) two most important dimensions in the social setting of China at the current stage. One is fazhi as rule of law drawn from the Western democracy, and the other is xianming as wise leadership originated from the Chinese Confucianism. This pair of compasses can be employed to draw proper circles so long as they are synthesized into an organic whole by virtue of shiyong lixing as pragmatic reason. Such kind of reason is primarily characteristic of the Chinese mode of thought in one sense, and largely manifesting the ethos of Chinese culture in the other sense. In practice it is often conceived as general as “a creative principle in a dynamic process” of historical accumulation, cultural formation and psychological sedimentation as well. It was first formulated in early Confucianism but stays open to further modification along the passage of time. With respect to the preoccupation with humane governance in the given description, the pragmatic reason comprises at least four essential aspects ranging from usefulness (you yong xing), ethicalness (lun li xing), affective-cum-reasonable synthesis (qing li bu fen) to historical awareness (li shi yi shi). All this helps in varied ways rediscover the traditional sources and transform the conception of humane governance into a relevant strategy in order to upgrade the level of governmental efficiency and social management. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Crushing Pressures and Radical IdeasJohn Z. Sadler, MD (bio)Back in 2011, I wrote a paper for the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, an Australian journal, for a special issue dedicated to ethical issues associated with psychiatric genetics research. The editor was particularly excited by the recent findings of the 5-HTT allele in psychiatric illness. I had different ideas about what I wanted to write about, and the editor, Michael Robertson, (...) graciously considered them and ultimately published the paper. At the time I was interested in the colossal investment of National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) research dollars in psychiatric genetic research; at the time I was troubled at the lack of on-the-ground clinical implications of this research investment, and figured an Australian journal and referees would be more generous to a critical paper on U.S. funding priorities. I dug into the National Institutes of Health (NIH), NIMH, and National Science Foundation websites and found some crude dollar evidence of respective expenditures for research funding in various disorders and focus areas, and compared these investments to psychiatric genetic research funding commitments. I will not go into details (Sadler, 2011), but the gist was that the psychiatric genetics research enterprise was and had been an extraordinarily expensive enterprise, when other research questions that could be immediately implementable into clinical care improvements remained marginally funded at best. The paper was not read widely and other than a couple of annoyed responses from psychiatric genetic researchers, not much came of it.This concern about funding priorities was one of the reasons why I was pleased to see this paper by Turkheimer and Greer which explores the long term results of the Spit for Science (S4S) initiative, which was launched grandly the same year as my paper’s whisper from down under. I hope this Philosophical Case Conference explores the many dimensions of interest for this paper, which is extraordinarily careful and even handed in its attitude, while at the same time being incisive in its analysis.My focus here is not in the science per se, which is beyond my competence. I’m interested in Turkheimer and Greer’s (T&G) conceptual overview of this research program. More specifically, I focus on T&G’s highlighting of the extraordinary willingness of the S4S authors to interpret prevailingly negative results in the most generous, even misleading, degree possible. I try to provide some possible ways of understanding this kind of research rhetoric exhibited by a cohort of highly respected, very successful scientists.I acknowledge the well-described varieties of interpretive bias that all of us are subject to. First on the list must be confirmation bias, our tendency to interpret situations in terms consistent [End Page 447] with our preconceived notions—in this case, the idea that genetics has something important to do with addictive disorders. Another might be epistemic overconfidence—the tendency to fail at interpretive skepticism in favor of one’s preferred conclusion. Related to this may also be interpretive momentum, the tendency to maintain a conviction about the correctness of one’s expectations and disregard inconsistent findings over the course of a research program—in this case, the multiple S4S studies (O’Sullivan & Schofeld, 2018). However, these kinds of biases tend to “blame” the individual authors’ thinking styles. I opine, though, that other vectors shaping the declaring-success rhetoric are more important.These sources have to do with the state of practice in doing biomedical science research in universities and particularly academic medical centers (AMCs) today. I identify several causal vectors that compel, however subtly, researchers to declare success in the face of failure. I have only picked three, and in no order of importance: 1) funding caps for NIH grants, 2) the overleveraging of university budgets and ballooning dependence on soft money, and 3) the incentivizing of intellectual property development within AMCs.Funding Caps for NIH GrantsIf you are a university or AMC, one way you hold onto your most productive scientists (e.g., grants, publications, discoveries, and status) is by paying them well. Single NIH grants today commonly amount to millions of dollars, and often tens of millions. These bring... (shrink)

A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that are independent of self-locating beliefs per se. In light of this, I propose a division of labor: we should address each of these issues separately before we try to provide a comprehensive account of belief updating. By way of example, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order (...) to accommodate these issues. Then, putting these other issues aside, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order to accommodate self-locating beliefs. Finally, I propose a constraint on updating rules, the "Learning Principle", which rules out certain kinds of troubling belief changes, and I use this principle to assess some of the available options. (shrink)

This article focusses on the function of poetry in Logos. Four positions can be ob- served: 1) a rationalistic integration of poetry in the realm of culture, as Cassirer shows it in the case of Hölderlin, which is connected to his intellectual and philosophical environment; 2) an esthetician view of poetry as an absolute world per se, in the continuation of the ideas of the George’s circle, a position that cannot avoid an ambiguous politization; 3) an attempt to read poetry (...) as a way of »seeing the world« (Weltanschauung) in the tradition of Dilthey, integrating it into a complex ideal of culture, as Anna Tumarkin did in a most interesting way, who was one of the first women to become a professor of philosophy (in Bern); 4) the time-condi- tioned attempt to link poetry and mysticism in order to challenge a rationalistic view of culture, reading for instance Rilke as a »Mystiker« like August Faust did, searching a solution to the crisis of civilization beyond the realm of reason. In all these features, it appears that poetry—though not a central topic of the journal Logos—built a very controversial place, a modern »Kampfplatz« where central phil- osophical—and political!—questions were at stake. Therefore, it reveals the inner tensions of the Logos. (shrink)