This article deals with science content “in the making” and in particular the role of the body in producing scientific phenomena. While accounts of scientists’ work have repeatedly demonstrated, how producing phenomena requires immense amounts of time and effort, involving tinkering and manual labor, this is a little empirically studied content in science education. Seeking to shed light on how the body is involved with materiality to produce physics phenomena, and in what terms this is learning physics content, the article (...) first examines how bodily tinkering is a necessary part of knowing physics through reviewing major accounts of science studies and research in science education. Secondly, drawing on phenomenology and pragmatist ideas, the article examines how students’ bodies need to be educated in the transactional process with material and artifacts to produce phenomena in the context of science learning in lower secondary physics education. Demonstrating that embodied phenomena production is an inescapable part of learning scientific inquiry, and that bodies are just as much a part of the subject physics as conceptual knowledge, we suggest that the education of students’ bodies needs to be made an explicit content. This is important not only for making tacit content accessible to all, but also for addressing epistemological understandings of what science and technology is about. (shrink)

Meanings of living at home on a ventilator Nine adults were interviewed in order to illuminate the meanings of being dependent on a ventilator and living at home. The data were analysed using a phenomenological‐hermeneutic method inspired by the philosophy of Ricoeur. Five main themes emerged through the analysis: experiencing home as a safe and comfortable space from which to reach out, experiencing the body as being frail, brave and resilient, striving to live in the present, surrendering oneself to and (...) trusting others, and experiencing technology as a burden and a relief to the lived body. Meanings of being home on a ventilator were interpreted as maintaining autonomy and persistence in interaction with the ventilator and other human beings and being able to rise above yourself and your personal boundaries in order to live a good life. These meanings indicate that aesthetic and ethical values impact on the lived body. They are bound up with experiencing a vital force and interdependency, bringing safety and courage into daily life. (shrink)

La Vita di Filareto il Misericordioso, un testo agiografico di grande interesse storico e letterario, oggetto di riscritture e traduzioni, fu edita per la prima volta nel 1900 da Vasiliev, dal Paris. gr. 1510 (V). Nonostante la maggiore antichità del codice (X secolo), quella di V risultò in seguito una versione secondaria rispetto alla versione edita nel 1934 da Fourmy e Leroy, tratta dai codici Genuensis Urbanus 34 (G) dell'XI secolo e Paris. gr. 1608 (P) del XIV secolo, e riedita (...) ora da Lennart Rydén, recentemente scomparso. Le altre versioni dell'opera sono oggetto di uno studio, di cui è annunciata la pubblicazione, da parte di Jan Olof Rosenqvist. (shrink)

Realists about corporate agency, according to whom corporate agents may have aims above and beyond those of the individuals who make them up, think that individual agents may switch between participating in individual and corporate agency. My aim is, however, to argue that the inescapability of individual agency spells out a difficulty for this kind of switching – and, therefore, for realism about corporate agency. To do so, I develop Korsgaard’s notion of plight inescapability, which on my take suggests that (...) individual agents are continuously faced with fully exercising their individual agency (absent external limits at the time of its exercise). But then individual agents may not switch to acting as members of corporate agents if the aims of the corporation differ from their own, in the sense that they have different mental state tokens. But as it is possible to participate fully in the action of a corporate entity, this incompatibility between individual and corporate aims suggests that we ought to think of corporate agents as in some sense reducible to individual aims. (shrink)

This five-volume edition of Aristotle's works in Greek is (with the exception of Vol. III) a photomechanical copy of the standard edition of Aristotle's works from 1831-1870. Vols. I And II contain Aristotle's works. VOlume III presents O. GIgon's revision and supplementation of Aristotle's fragments. VOl. IV Presents a selection of the most important sections of Classical commentaries on Aristotle, together with a concordance with the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. VOl. V Contains a copy of H. BOnitz' Index Aristotelicus.

Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...) norms that allegedly have independent value to be underdetermined by that value. I consider three different kinds of constitutivist theories of the normativity of rationality: first-person-authority views, single-mental-state views, and systems-of-mental-states views. None of the three are able to deal with either of these shmagency objections. There are sophisticated shmagents who escape all these types of constitutivist principles of rationality, so they are modally escapable, and the value of rationality underdetermines all the views. Upshot: constitutivists about structural rationality ought to worry about shmagency. (shrink)

Constitutivists often argue that agency is inescapable. This is supposed to, among other things, explain why norms that are constitutive of agency are forceful. But can some form of inescapability do that? I consider four types of inescapability—psychological, further factor, standpoint, and plight—and evaluate whether they manage to explain four necessary features of normative force: that it does not vary with desire change, that ought-implies-can and can-fail, and that we are criticizable for failing to live up to forceful norms. The (...) former three all fail to explain some of these features, but a version of plight inescapability does, in fact, appear able to explain them all. This is good news for constitutivists. The catch? The plight inescapability explanation generates relativism. This leaves constitutivists at a choice point: accept the plight inescapability explanation of normative force and relativism—or give up the plight inescapability explanation. (shrink)

Personalism is understood today as the name of an important current in twentieth-century thought which, inspired by the Christian and humanistic traditions of the West, has sought to deepen our understanding of the meaning and value of human personhood. Opposing both individualism and collectivism, personalism has stressed the uniqueness of each person, the meaning and value of interpersonal relations, and the unity that holds persons together and is, ultimately, also personal in itself: the person of God. Personalism's insights into the (...) nature of personhood have broad implications for our view of ethics, politics, education, and religion. The history of personalism has, however, been poorly understood. Jan Olof Bengtsson shows that personalism began as early as the eighteenth century and was a central, international current of thought throughout the nineteenth century - that it was, in fact, more characteristic of the nineteenth century than of the twentieth. (shrink)

This paper treats the problem of which type of units, individuals or whole societies, should be used when explaining societal phenomena. It is argued that factors operating at the individual level in principle form societies, and that societal phenomena therefore should ideally be explained at this level. However, it is also argued that many societal phenomena cannot in practice be analyzed at the individual level in a clear and strict way, but rather must be analyzed holistically, because it is not (...) known how they are related to individual factors due to the complexity of societies. For societies to be described and analyzed in a clear and strict way, they must as a rule be much simplified, and such simplification is often made easier by abandoning the individualistic perspective. If researchers still wish to describe a connection between individual factors and a societal phenomenon, they often must do so in vague terms. There are also other problems with the individualistic perspective that make it difficult to use. However, using the holistic perspective may be risky, as shown by two hypothetical examples. (shrink)

I present a dilemma for the market failures approach to business ethics. On an orthodox interpretation, it takes moral requirements for businesses to require them not to profit from market failures to approximate Pareto efficiency. On a moralized interpretation, it also incorporates other considerations. However, the orthodox approach is extensionally inadequate, for it is legitimate to profit from many of the allegedly ruled-out market failures. The moralized approach does better but fails to be sufficiently comprehensive. First, it has not been (...) shown why we ought to adhere to any particular limited subset of norms of and for the market. Second, we have a very general reason to mitigate the moral horror of the world, which indicates that the market failures approach is too arbitrarily restricted. (shrink)

Résumé Cette étude basée sur une expérience concrète et pratique mais trop sommaire peut être résumée ainsi. 1:o En parlant d'une »prévention générale» sans y donner des qualifications précises, l'on pose le Problème de manière à rendre impossible toute réponse, affirmative ou négative. Si l'influence anticriminelle du code était universelle il n'existerait pas de crimes. D'autre part, nier toute influence anticriminelle du code et de son application serait absurde. Puisque le terme de prévention générale est erroné et entretient des malentendus, (...) il doit être supprimé dans le langage scientifique. 2:o Lorsque le code a une influence anticriminelle diffuse, c'est par le risque de sanction subjectif. 3:o Son influence anticriminelle diffuse est limitée à certains groupes de citoyens. 4:o Elle est plus grande parmi les hommes mentalement normaux et sains et bien adaptés à la vie sociale, c'est à dire là où elle est le moins utile. Elle est plus faible parmi les anormaux, les malades d'esprit et les mal adaptés, c'est à dire là oú elle serait le plus nécéssaire. 5:o Pour que les hommes disposés à commettre un certain genre de crimes soient influencés par les sanctions appliquées à d'autres personnes qui ont commis les mêmes crimes, il faut qu'ils s'identifient avec elles à certains égards. 6:o L'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code, exercée par moyen d'une création ou raffermissement des fonctions morales chez les citoyens, n'est possible qu'à mesure que les opinions morales exprimées par le code ne soient pas neutralisées par des opinions morales antagonistes répandues parmi les citoyens. 7:o L'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code s'exerce surtout à mesure que les autorités auxquelles incombent la législation et les décisions concernant les moyens budgetaires nécessaires aux fonctions de la politique criminelle, montrent par leur activité qu'elles prennent la criminalité au sérieux et qu'elles font leur mieux pour la supprimer. 8:o En dehors des fonctions utiles du code et de ses agents pratiques, la législation et son application peuvent produire des effets nuisibles à la moralité du peuple et à l'obéissance aux lois, en statuant des sanctions contre des comportements neutres ou même méritoires ou en permettant aux tribunaux de rendre des arrêts mal fondés pour favoriser des personnes agréables au pouvoir exécutif ou pour rendre inoffensifs ceux qui lui déplaisent. 9:o A l'exception de quelques cas très rares l'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code est soutenue par un traitement des délinquants à la fois rationnel, effectif et humanitaire. Cela peut se faire de plusieurs manières. a. En appliquant, chaque fois qu'un crime est commis et le criminel poursuivi, la meilleure reaction individuelle et sociale qui soit à portée. b. En améliorant successivement le système de réactions vers le plus haut degré d'utilité. c. En augmentant les ressources personnelles et techniques de la police afin de renforcer son activité anticriminelle, préventive et réparative. d. En améliorant les moyens curatifs et éducateurs des établissements de politique criminelle ainsi que les expédients et les mesures de traitement préventif ambulant et en éliminant autant que possible les conditions sociales favorisant la criminalité. e. En ne permettant pas que des criminels connus aux autorités judicères continuent pendant des mois ou des années leur activité criminelle, sans qu'aucune mesure sérieuse ne soit prise à leur égard. f. En évitant autant que possible d'adopter des mesures législatives qui peuvent faire croire au public que la société ne prend pas aus sérieux la criminalité. En appliquant ainsi aux criminels des mesures pratiques suffisantes et rationnelles du point de vue prévention individuelle on renforce aussi l'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code sauf dans des cas tout à fait exceptionnels. (shrink)

Transcendental Meditation (TM) holds that the essence of reality is “pure consciousness.” This piece contrasts three interpretations of their meditative trance: (i) TM doctrine, and (ii) scientific physicalism, (iii) with my own meditative experience. Pure consciousness events, defined as wakeful contentless consciousness, are known to occur, but what ontological basis do they have? While cosmic consciousness may be the only ontological ultimate there is, my meditative introspection does not neatly align with TM dogma. In search of the right metaphor, this (...) piece journeys over mystical notions of divine darkness, contemplates evidence regimes, and proposes “mystic doubt” or ontological skepticism as an alternative to ontological relativism. (shrink)

El artículo explora la posible relación analítica entre la idea de ser un miembro de una comunidad democrática y tener derechos civiles, políticos y de bienestar. Llamo a esta relación la tesis analítica. Después de distinguir una interpretación trivial y una no-trivial de dicha tesis, ofrezco algunas razones a favor de esta última.

Resumen Al menos desde la publicación del clásico Ética en el Congreso. De la corrupción individual a la institucional de Dennis F. Thompson, el concepto de corrupción institucional ha recibido gran atención. Este tipo de corrupción se diferencia de la corrupción personal en que, entre otras cosas, la última requiere de la existencia de motivos morales personales. En este artículo exploro esta distinción y hago algunas observaciones críticas a la manera en la que Thompson la ha recientemente elaborado.At least from (...) the publication of Dennis F. Thompson’s classic Ethics in Congress. From Individual to Institutional Corruption the concept of institutional corruption has received great attention. This type of corruption is different from personal corruption in that, among other things, the latter requires the existence of personal moral motives. In this article I explore this distinction and raise some critical observations to the way in which Thompson has recently elaborated it. (shrink)

Together with the Sophist, Plato’s Statesman is often taken to introduce and develop a new scientific form of theoretical inquiry, represented by the Eleatic visitor. This paper draws on recent scholarship on the Sophist and evaluates the reliability of this scientific approach when applied to political matters in the Statesman. It analyzes how the Eleatic visitor identifies and tries to mend two central mistakes in his own initial definition of the statesman and argues that the visitor’s treatment of three related (...) topics – eugenics, tyranny and law – makes his line of reasoning inconsistent. Relying on Plato’s dramatic use of similar forms of argumentation elsewhere, it suggests that the Statesman is not designed to defend the political significance of the visitor’s new form of scientific philosophy, but that its purpose instead is to test and to critically examine the consequences of this line of inquiry. (shrink)

Student behavioural disengagement is a problem in many schools. This paper aims to explain why students’ behavioural disengagement occurs and reoccurs in Swedish classrooms in terms of two mechanisms. Mechanisms that explain student disengagement are tested quantitatively and illustrated qualitatively with primary data consisting of 74 video-recorded classroom lessons from three compulsory schools in Sweden. The regressions suggest that peer encouragement and the school subject curriculum are central for explaining student behavioural disengagement. Qualitative analysis decomposes how the mechanisms of peer (...) encouragement and school subject curriculum increase the risk of behavioural disengagement in real time using transcripts and images. In conclusion, this study shows how both mechanisms provide complementary explanations for students’ behavioural disengagement. (shrink)

In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas’ alleged aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples. More importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is most likely false, as it requires our values to do work (...) that they are too fickle to do. Second, I take issue with the Nietzschean drive psychology underlying the second agential aim, viz. power. I argue that ordinary desires better describe a number of phenomena that Katsafanas uses drives to explain, and that some actions can aim in the opposite direction. As only drive-motivated actions aim at power, action does not, therefore, constitutively aim at power. Finally, I sketch a Humean approach to constitutivism, and argue that it both explains the desiderata that Katsafanas posits as well as solves the problems for his view. The Humean view is preferable, and should be developed further. (shrink)