The classic, influential essay in 'descriptive metaphysics' by the distinguished English philosopher.

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world's scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a ‘10 second survey’, where the participant is presented with a single statement (...) to consider, and a standard five point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement 'Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus'. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. (shrink)

Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses “phenomenal evidence” as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument “The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.” Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg’s argument (Sect. 2 ). A key premise has it that, (...) necessarily, for items with a function, fulfillment of the function (the good case) is explanatorily and metaphysically prior to function failure (the bad case). We suggest that the etiological theory of functions renders this key premise plausible (Sect. 3 ). However, Schellenberg rejects the etiological theory of functions (Sect. 4 ) and likewise the idea that the epistemic or warranting force of perceptual states is grounded in their being reliably linked to veridical perception (Sect. 5 ). But then what supports the key premise? Schellenberg argues that accurate perception is a part of the _nature_ of perceptual capacities because the nature of perceptual capacities is explained in terms of their function, and their function is to represent accurately (Sect. 6 ). We suggest that Schellenberg is committed to an understanding of priority which doesn’t require any _actual_ good cases—just possible ones (Sect. 7 ). This reading, we argue, is too weak to support the key premise (Sect. 8 ). Given Schellenberg’s commitments, it is not necessarily the case that perceptual states are evidence for a corresponding perceptual belief. Before concluding we discuss an overgeneralization objection to Schellenberg’s argument (Sect. 9 ). (shrink)

This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor ...

There has been a flurry of recent work on the cognitive neuroscience of curiosity. But everyone in the field offers definitions of curiosity that are meta-cognitive in nature. Curiosity is said to be a desire for knowledge, or a motivation to learn about something, and so on. This appears problematic. It either makes it difficult to see how curiosity can properly be attributed to cats and rats (let alone birds and bees), or it commits us to attributing capacities for self-awareness (...) in these creatures for which we lack evidence. The goal of the present article is to offer a re-interpretation of the main findings in the literature: showing how it is possible for creatures to be curious while lacking any conception of their own or others’ minds, while at the same time arguing that there is something that a meta-cognitive conception of curiosity gets right. (shrink)

For more than thirty years, in most of the world, the irreversible cessation of all brain function, more commonly known as brain death, has been accepted as a criterion of death. Yet the philosophical basis on which this understanding of death was originally grounded has been undermined by the long-term maintenance of bodily functions in brain dead patients. More recently, the American case of Jahi McMath has cast doubt on whether the standard tests for diagnosing brain death exclude a condition (...) in which the patient is not dead, but in a minimally conscious state. I argue that the evidence now clearly shows that brain death is not equivalent to the death of the human organism. We therefore face a choice: either we stop removing vital organs from brain dead patients, or we accept that it is not wrong to kill an innocent human who has irreversibly lost consciousness. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

An enigma for human languages is that children learn to understand words in their mother tongue extremely fast. The cognitive sciences have not been able to fully understand the mechanisms behind this highly efficient learning process. In order to provide at least a partial answer to this problem, I have developed a cognitive model of the semantics of natural language in terms of conceptual spaces. I present a background to conceptual spaces and provide a brief summary of their main features, (...) in particular how it handles learning of concepts. I then apply the model to give a geometric account of the semantics of different word classes. In particular, I propose a “single-domain hypotheses” for the semantics of all word classes except nouns. These hypotheses provide a partial answer to the enigma of how words are learned. Next, a dynamic cognitive model of events is introduced that replaces and extends the function of thematic roles. I apply it to analyze the meanings of different kinds of verbs. I argue that the model also explains some aspects of syntactic structure. In particular, I propose that a sentence typically refers to an event. Some further applications of conceptual spaces are briefly presented. (shrink)

The impossibility theorem of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini has been thought to demonstrate that standard state-space models cannot be used to represent unawareness. We first show that Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini do not establish this claim. We then distinguish three notions of awareness, and argue that although one of them may not be adequately modeled using standard state spaces, there is no reason to think that standard state spaces cannot provide models of the other two notions. In fact, standard space (...) models of these forms of awareness are attractively simple. They allow us to prove completeness and decidability results with ease, to carry over standard techniques from decision theory, and to add propositional quantifiers straightforwardly. (shrink)

The critical theory of the Frankfurt School starts with an explanatory-diagnostic analysis of the social pathologies of the present followed by anticipatory-utopian reflection on possible treatments for these disorders. This approach draws extensively on parallels to medicine. I argue that the ideas of social pathology and crisis that pervade the methodological writings of the Frankfurt School help to explain critical theory’s contention that the object of critique identifies itself when social institutions cease to function smoothly. However, in reflecting on the (...) role that reason and self-awareness play in the second stage of social criticism, I contend that this model is actually better conceptualized through the lens of the psychoanalyst rather than the physician. Although the first generation’s explicit commitment to psychoanalysis has dissipated in recent critical theory, faith in a rationalized ‘talking cure’ leading to greater self-awareness of existing pathologies remains at the core of the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

With the intensifying shortage of care-providers and mounting financial burden of an aging population in Japan, artificial intelligence (AI) offers a potential solution through AI-driven robots, chatbots, smartphone apps, and other AI medical services. Yet Japanese acceptance of medical AI, especially patient care, largely depends on the degree of ‘humanness’ that can be integrated into intelligent technologies. As empathy is considered a core value in the practice of healthcare workers, artificially intelligent agents must have the ability to perceive human emotions (...) and respond in an affective, human-like manner. This paper presents the results of a nationwide survey in Japan 2023 about the public perception of the use of emotionalized AI (EAI) in healthcare. The sample included 2000 Japanese citizens from 20 to 69 years old with an average age of 45 years. The questionnaire included 65 items in six categories: demographic, perception of the existing healthcare system, attitude towards the use of AI, and EAI in healthcare, trust and privacy concerns and fear of AI, and seeking literacy on new technologies. The analysis of the responses demonstrates that overall, the Japanese population has a limited knowledge of AI, EAI, and smart technologies but trusts the healthcare system, physicians, and staff to use it properly, with little worries over the potential pitfalls related to data security and safety. However, they prefer the use of more human resources and are concerned about privacy and the high cost of new technology, and believe little information is being provided to them through government and media. (shrink)

Despite attempts to apply causal modeling techniques to quantum systems, Wood and Spekkens argue that any causal model purporting to explain quantum correlations must be fine tuned; it must violate the assumption of faithfulness. This paper is an attempt to undermine the reasonableness of the assumption of faithfulness in the quantum context. Employing a symmetry relation between an entangled quantum system and a “sideways” quantum system consisting of a single photon passing sequentially through two polarizers, I argue that Wood and (...) Spekkens’s analysis applies equally to this sideways system also. As a result, we must either reject a causal explanation in this single photon system, or the sideways system must be fine tuned. If the latter, a violation of faithfulness in the ordinary entangled system may be more tolerable than first thought. Thus, extending the classical “no fine-tuning” principle of parsimony to the quantum realm may be too hasty. (shrink)

Academic integrity is becoming increasingly important to managing academic institutions. Accordingly there are efforts to uniformly assess campus attitudes to such issues as cheating in assessments along with the policies and procedures in place to address them. This paper seeks to summarize and understand the attitude of the students and academic staff at an Australian university towards academic integrity, as reflected in the results of a campus-wide survey, using both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The main finding of the quantitative results (...) was the disconnect between academic staff and students belief’s about academic honesty and the reactions of students and academics to dishonest behaviour. Four key themes of academic honesty were identified through qualitative analysis, being those of cheating, student, solutions to cheating and general concerns. (shrink)

I argue first that some propositions are obligatory without being obligatory for anyone (i.e., they are _impersonally_ obligatory): if each of us has promised to vote and thus has an obligation to vote, then it is obligatory (i.e., morally required) that we all vote, but it is not obligatory _for anyone_ that we all vote (because, for example, what is obligatory for you is that _you _vote, not that we _all_ vote). I argue next that “ought-implies-can” fails for_ impersonal _obligatoriness: (...) if each of us has promised to (and can) finish first in a given race, and thus it is impersonally obligatory that we all finish first (i.e., that we all finish at the same time), it does not follow that anyone (or we) can make it the case that we all finish first (we may be unable to coordinate). I defend instead the following principle: if a proposition is (impersonally) obligatory—or forbidden—at time _t_, then it is _historically contingent _at _t_ (i.e., both the proposition and its negation are logically compatible with the history of the world up to and including _t_). (shrink)

: Most of us tend to be Aristotelians when it comes to anger. While admitting that uncontrolled anger is harmful and ought to be avoided, we reject as undesirable a state of being that would not allow us to express legitimate outrage. Hence, we seem to find a compelling moral attitude in Aristotle’s belief that we should get angry at the right time and for the right reasons and in the right way. Buddhism and Stoicism, however, carve out a position (...) on the issue of anger that stands in marked contrast to the Aristotelian conception. This article considers the similarities between these two views of anger, contrasts the Buddhist with the much more common (at least in the West) Aristotelian one, and, finally, considers the objections of a prominent Western scholar to this shared Buddhist/Stoic conception. (shrink)

The antirealist position on temporal passage is that time exists but does not pass. Antirealists either claim that experiences of passage represent something that does not exist or that these experiences do not represent passage. This paper reconstructs and defends an argument for the reality of passage by Milič Čapek that is based on the idea of mental passage, the passage of experience itself. The belief that mental passage exists is introspectively justified. This justification is not undermined by perceptual illusions (...) and is also compatible with antirealist explanations of why the belief arises. Both physicalism and psychophysical dualism justify the premise that mental passage implies physical passage. Arguments by Huw Price and Simon Prosser purport to show that experiences do not represent physical passage. However, these arguments rely on thought experiments that presuppose the non-existence of mental passage, and therefore miss the fact that mental passage enables the representation of physical passage. (shrink)

By giving consent, we sometimes give permission or make it the case that we are not wronged. What does it take for an act to be an act of consent? This is the question this paper deals with. The question does not presuppose the view that consent is a communicative act. For those who take it as a mental state, the question is what does it take to express consent? It will be argued that an act is an act of (...) consent if and only if the consent-giver believes she gives someone permission to do or omit something by performing the act. A normative intention is not required for consent. It is further argued that this view also bears on the question of what falls within the scope of consent and shows how it differs from the evidential account advocated by Tom Dougherty. I also argue that the view defended in this paper does not imply – as some think – that the consent-receiver could wrong the consent-giver without being able to know that this is the case. (shrink)

Widespread tax evasion and avoidance have recently led to both significant reforms of international tax governance and increased attention from theorists of global tax justice. Against the background of an analysis of the double challenge of effectiveness and distribution facing the taxation of multinational enterprises, this paper puts forward a taxonomy of recent contributions of the tax justice literature. This taxonomy not only opens up an original angle of interpretation on global tax justice, but also provides a vantage point from (...) which to evaluate recent reforms by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (shrink)

This article aims to bridge quantum physics, human cognition, and Kitarō Nishida's logic of basho. The primary claim is that the indeterminacy underlying both quantum and cognitive phenomena is synonymous with Nishida’s “absolute nothingness”, the ontological basis of the logic. By interpreting Nishida’s soku hi dialectic in terms of phenomenal appearances in awareness, Nishida’s term “basho” is equated with this place where awareness actualises thereby allowing Nishida’s three basho to be framed in terms of the degree of subjectivity present within (...) awareness. Connections between logic of basho and the theory of enactive cognition are set out with emphasis on how cognitive representation can be placed in the human’s enactive engagement with reality. As the logic of basho accounts for the dialectical nature of both quantum reality and cognitive reality, the article concludes that his logic can be seen as encompassing physical reality as well as the reality of (non-)subjective awareness. (shrink)

On many occasions between the early 1950s and her death in 1976, Hannah Arendt argued that modern Western thought exhibited a recurring desire to “escape from politics into history.” What did she mean by this claim, and how valid was it, particularly in her own lifetime? This article explores these questions in two parts. The first part reconstructs her critique of the turn toward “the philosophy of history” in the modern age, and argues that her own project, in contrast, was (...) an attempt to fulfill the hope for what she called “a new political philosophy.” That hope grew especially pronounced in the 1960s, when she monumentalized the American Revolution as a model of republican action while criticizing Marxism, Third Worldism, and the New Left. The second part asks whether this transformative decade witnessed a resurgence of the philosophy of history or fulfilled her hope for a new political philosophy. In doing so, it turns to Michel Foucault, who arguably emerged from this period as the most influential thinker in Western Europe and the United States. A kindred theorist in some respects, he did more than Arendt herself to fulfill the hope for a new kind of political thought, while developing a mode of critical genealogy that remains one of the most powerful alternatives to historical teleology today. (shrink)

Volume 32, Issue 6, December 2024, Page 1498-1502.

This article concerns challenges arising from the development of economic globalization as the so-called “creator of a new world order“ and its tendency to deteriorate the foundation of a global order in terms of social justice, solidarity, and human dignity. As main point of referral functions, the report of the “Commission Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi cs“ on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress that refers to the European Commission's strategy of development, acknowledges the need for these values. On (...) behalf of this reflection, this article is based on the recent outcomes of the exploration of these social quality issues in a recent published book by the Foundation on Social Quality. The article argues that indicators are needed in order to understand the effects of societal changes in response to the current economic globalization, which increases inequality and the fragmentation of the labor market. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the dialogue on spirituality in mental health care. Spirituality is still an uncomfortable theme in mental health care despite a burgeoning literature and research. We will introduce a conceptual model on spiritual and interpersonal relationships based on love in relatedness. The model will enable the therapist to assess the interconnectedness of spiritual and interpersonal relationships, to analyse positive or negative effects of spirituality on interpersonal functioning and vice versa, and to look (...) for possibilities for spiritual and therapeutic change. Based on the model, the next step is to reflect on the relationship between psychiatry and spirituality with a view to dialogue instead of unfruitful discussion and controversy. We will propose a dialogue about the alternative DSM-5™ model for personality disorders. Although preliminary, we will show the usefulness of such an interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

Drawing on developmental psychopathology and thinking about the we-mode of social cognition, we propose that historical myths – be they on the scale of the family, the nation, or an ethnic group – are an expression and function of our need to join with other minds. As such, historical myths are one cognitive technology used to facilitate social learning, the transmission of culture and the relational mentalizing that underpins social and emotional functioning.

When mental suffering and distress are diagnosed as so-called “mental illnesses” it locates the cause as within the afflicted person. A close examination of the life situation of the distressed person will most times show the cause as originating external to the sufferer. Mental distress can arise with any number of troubling life situations such as financial or relationship problems, illness or death in the family, ethical dilemmas and so on. But diagnosing the person as having a biological brain problem (...) allows the prescription of psychotropic medications that can cost thousands of dollars over their lifetime. Of course, this adds to the profit margins of the corporations that produce them. These medications not only cause harmful side-effects, they add to the suffering of the person taking them. Philosophical counselling doesn’t cause any side effects, and is often much more effective at mitigating mental distress. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline Dorothy Emmet's (1904–2000) account of perception in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (published in 1945). Emmet's account of perception is part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics in the face of logical positivism and verificationism (of the kind espoused most famously by A. J. Ayer). It is thus part of an attempt to stem the tide of anti-metaphysical thought that had become widespread in British philosophy by the middle of the twentieth (...) century. Emmet does not fit neatly into the traditional story of twentieth-century British philosophy. She draws on figures like A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson much more extensively than figures like Russell or Moore – and thus straddles the so-called ‘analytic-continental divide.’ My aim in this paper is to put Emmet on the map of twentieth-century British thought by outlining her philosophy of perception, highlighting her proposals for a way forward for metaphysics in a time of crisis, and identifying the ways she preempts movements in contemporary philosophy of perception. (shrink)

The present study explores the contribution of the Slovak philosophical school, which uniquely grasped the European and Czechoslovak heritage of phenomenology and existential philosophy. In the text, the authors present a congenial and undeniably up-to-date concept of syncriticism as developed by Jozef Piaček and analyse its contribution to Slovak philosophical discourse and more broadly, in the dialogue of phenomenology and existential philosophy in Slovakia. In the study, the authors also examine the cultural-philosophical starting points and specifics of Slovak modern philosophy (...) and postmodern thinking as phenomena of the Central European intellectual space in the context of thinking about the unique and inspiring project of perichronosophy as a thematic invariant developed at philosophical workplaces in Central Europe (Comenius University Bratislava, Trnava University Trnava, Charles University Prague, Masaryk University Brno). Jozef Piaček has been affiliated with the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University for many years, studied under Jan Patočka and is an expert on Husserl’s phenomenology. He has continuously developed a unique philosophical approach involving syncriticism and perichronosophy, which continues to resonate with his students at academic institutions in Slovakia and abroad. Piaček published several monographs and papers on the subject of syncriticism. The platform of living philosophy is his concept of a digital philosophical encyclopaedia, where he archives all publication outputs on the subject of the philosophy of syncriticism. This text will present Piaček’s concept of perichronosophy and concordance in Slovak philosophy, more broadly in phenomenology, as well as in the context of Patočka’s themes (philosophy as care for the soul in the village) with implications for the philosophy of education and philosophical therapy (dasein-analysis). (shrink)

El concepto moderno de solidaridad destaca por su carácter dinámico que se asienta sobre una tensión dialéctica entre la individualización de una sociedad pluralista por un lado y la funcionalidad integradora de una comunidad delimitada por otro. Pero la inmersión de los sujetos en instituciones que remedian los intereses individuales a través de una “confiabilidad abstracta” nos exige revisar la relación entre Estado moderno e identidad nacional desde una perspectiva crítica inspirada en la teoría de Nicos Poulantzas. Esto nos lleva (...) a un nuevo concepto de solidaridad que sustituye la homogeneización nacional por otra forma de igualdad razonada sobre individuos autónomos e independientes. Un modelo de solidaridad así reconstruido resuelve las deficiencias de la teoría sociológica acerca del fundamento normativo del Estado de bienestar. (shrink)

Susanne K. Langer (1895—1985) Susanne Langer was an American philosopher working across the analytic and continental divide in the fields of logic, aesthetics, and theory of mind. Her work connects in various ways to her central concerns of feeling and meaning. Feeling, in Langer’s philosophy, encompasses the qualitative, sensory, and emotional aspects of human experience. … Continue reading Susanne K. Langer →.

This short book defends the respectable thesis that British romantic poet and philosopher S.T. Coleridge pursued a phenomenology, incipient though comparable to Edmund Husserl’s, that led to his “t...

This book is a collection of materials concerned not only with the law of evidence, but also with the logical and rhetorical aspects of proof; the epistemology of evidence as a basis for the proof of disputed facts; and scientific aspects of the subject. The editor also raises issues such as the philosophical basis for the use of evidence.

During the four decades of my professional career, manufacturing has been subdued to a radical change from objectifying to subjectifying work. The evolution of the originally prevailing Taylor model with its functionally divided and highly mechanised work processes culminated in the 1980s in the rise and fall of computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) contested by the alternative approach of human-centred production systems. The change process then went through phases of confusion and experimentation, in which competence-based manufacturing strategies and structures have been (...) crystallising in sharp contrast to the majority of less sustainable forms of organisational renewal. The paper reflects on main features of this transformation process as it has been mirrored in my own research work and relates major findings to the work of others. (shrink)

Des lecteurs dune récente livraison de Monist, The Relevance of Charles Peirce, pourraient chercher l'actualité de Peirce chez des philosophes contemporains influencés par lui. J'essaie de montrer que Peirce est actuel parce que son apport principal, le pragmatisme, se rattache profondément à des sujets qui nous sont familiers. Formé dans la tradition cartésienne et kantienne de l'epistemologie, l'oeuvre de Peirce intéresse les héritiers de cette tradition.Cependant, son pragmatisme fait apparaître les hésitations de cette tradition qui offre à ses héritiers une (...) incertitude epistemologic ue générale dont l'effet est de les engager vers un fondationalisme égocentrique qui isole plusieurs philosophes de l'actualité. Readers of the recent Monist publication, The Relevance of Charles Peirce (La Salle, Illinois, 1983) may seek to locate Peirce's « relevance » in the number of contemporary philosophers influenced by any aspect of his work.I argue, instead, that Peirce is relevant because his central work, pragmatism, relates deeply to matters immediately at hand. Since he is trained in Cartesian-Kantian tradition of epistemology, Peirce's work interests disciples of that tradition. In the end, however, his pragmatism discloses the errent tendency of that tradition : to offer its disciples over-generalized epistemological uncertainty and, therefore, the compensatory need to engage in egocentric foundationalisms. These foundationalisms isolate many contemporary philosophers from « mutters immediately at hand ». (shrink)

Organismal death has long been considered the irreversible ending of an organism's integrated functioning as a whole. However, the persistence of functionality in organs, tissues, and cells postmortem, as seen in organ donation, raises questions about the mechanisms underlying this resilience. Recent research reveals that various factors, such as environmental conditions, metabolic activity, and inherent survival mechanisms, influence postmortem cellular functionality and transformation. These findings challenge our understanding of life and death, highlighting the potential for certain cells to grow and (...) form new multicellular entities. This opens new avenues in biology and medicine, expanding our comprehension of life's complexity. (shrink)

Many attempts have been made to define the precise philosophical outlook of Ovid's account of cosmogony from the beginning of the Metamorphoses, while numerous different and interconnected influences have been identified including Homer, Hesiod, Empedocles, Apollonius Rhodius, Lucretius and Virgil. This has led some scholars to conclude that Ovid's cosmogony is simply eclectic, a magpie collection of various poetic and philosophical snippets haphazardly jumbled together, and with no significant philosophical dimension whatsoever. A more constructive approach could see Ovid's synthesis of (...) many of the major cosmogonic works in the Graeco-Roman tradition as an attempt to match textually his all-encompassing history of the universe that purports to stretch from the first beginnings of the world up to the present day. Furthermore, if the beginning of the Metamorphoses is designed to be both cosmologically and intertextually all-encompassing, it is surprising that the influence of arguably the major philosophical work on cosmogony from the ancient world, Plato's Timaeus, remains to be evaluated. (shrink)