'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

This book with an introduction by Witold Marciszewski, views the history of philosophy and logic from 1837 to 1939 from the perspective of the cradle of modern exact philosophy - Central Europe. In a series of case studies, it illuminates the developments in this region, most notably in Austria and Poland, examining thinkers such as Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Twardowski, Lesniewski, and Tarski, as well as the logicians like Frege and Russell with whom they bore a close (...) resemblance. The book challenges established views about the history of philosophy and logic in Europe, and shows the vitality of the Central European tradition. (shrink)

In this tutorial, the meaning of natural language is analysed along the lines proposed by Gottlob Frege and Richard Montague. In building meaning representations, we assume that the meaning of a complex expression derives from the meanings of its components. Typed logic is a convenient tool to make this process of composition explicit. Typed logic allows for the building of semantic representations for formal languages and fragments of natural language in a compositional way. The tutorial ends with the (...) discussion of an example fragment, implemented in the functional programming language Haskell Haskell Team; Jones.. (shrink)

The article discusses on Hegel's philosophy in the study of logic, nature, and spirit. According to the author, Hegel's Logic is a theory of all basic categories not in the forms of propositional thought in concept from the material or content. Hegel classifies logic in different doctrines which includes the doctrine of being, essence, and notion. The author reveals that on Hegel's philosophy of nature, he states that it is the study of the idea in (...) its disaffection from self and a dialectical process in which disaffection progressively sets aside. In the philosophy of mind or spirit, Hegel tells that mind or spirit represents the truth of nature and it has the self-externality as its presupposition and arises out of such externality. (shrink)

SummaryMethodological questions are discussed from a point of view which the author calls open transcendentalism. In the first paragraphs the importance of normative practices is stressed and the application of the method to philosophical problems concerning ontology, analyticity and necessity is illustrated. Against Quine's holism a truely pluralistic view is defended according to which various logical or linguistic systems may be used with regard to the needs in different human activities.In the second part, arguments in favor of a instrumentalistic conception (...) of logic are advanced. Several objections against possible‐worlds‐semantics and proposals for an adequate treatment of counterfactuals suggest that contexts must be taken into account and that a distinction must be made between a descriptive and a fictional use of languages. Accordingly, fictitious entities have to be introduced in the ontology. A notion of counterpart is developped which, in contrast to D. Lewis'one, creates no difficulties with regard to identity.RésuméL'auteur traite de quelques questions de méthode d'un point de vue qu'il nomme transcen‐dantalisme ouvert. Dans les premiers paragraphes, il met en évidence l'importance de certaines activités normatives et il illustre l'application de sa méthode à des problèmes de philosophie en donnant quelques exemples tirés des domaines de l'ontologie, de la sémantique et de la métaphysique . Contre l'holisme de Quine il défend une position authentiquement pluraliste qui nous permet d'investir, selon les besoins du moment, des systèmes linguistiques ou logiques très divers.Dans les parties ultérieures, il avance des arguments en faveur d'une conception instrumentaliste de la logique. Plusieurs objections envers la sémantique des mondes possibles et un traite‐ment approprié des propositions conditionnelles suggèrent qu'il est indispensable de tenir compte du contexte tout en faisant une distinction marquée entre un usage des‐criptif et fictif de la langue. Nous sommes ainsi obligés d'accepter des entités fictives dans notre univers. Une notion de pendant est introduite qui, contrairement à celle proposée par D. Lewis, ne crée aucune difficulté quant au critere d'identityé.ZusammenfassungMethodische Fragen werden von einem Standpunkt angegangen, den der Verfasser offenen Transzendentalismus nennt. In den ersten Abschnitten wird die Wichtigkeit normativer Prakti‐ken hervorgehoben, um dann die Anwendung der Methode an philosophischen Fragen, die dieOntologie, die Analytizität und den Begriff der Notwendigkeit betreffen, zu illustrieren. Gegen Quines Holismus wird eine echt pluralistische Auffassung vertreten, wonach je nach Bedarf sehr verschiedenartige logische oder linguistische Systeme für das Fortkommen auf alien Gebieten menschlicher Tätigkeit eingesetzt werden können.Im zweiten Teil werden Argumente zugunsten einer instrumentalistischen Konzeption der Logik angeführt. Einwände gegen die Mögliche‐Welten‐Semantik und Vorschläge für eine adäquate Behandlung von irrealen Konditionalsätzen legen die beiden zentralen Anliegen der Berücksichtigung von Kontexten sowie der Unterscheidung von deskriptiven und fiktionalen Sprachverwendungen nahe, wobei entsprechend in der Ontologie die Annahme von fiktiven Entitäten erforderlich wird. Es wird ein Begriff des Gegenstücks oder Duplikats eingeführt, der im Gegensatz zu D. Lewis'Aufsatz bezüglich des Identitätskriteriums keine Schwierigkeiten bereitet. (shrink)

This article is concerned to say something about what the study of logic meant to wittgenstein. It is concerned to bring out why the kind of questions wittgenstein raised about logic and mathematics cannot be pursued in a purely formal and abstract manner-As russell pursued them to a very large extent. It tries to understand the prominence wittgenstein gave to a study of these questions in his philosophical investigations and to appreciate the sense in which he regarded a (...) study of logic to be fundamental in philosophy. Part I is largely about the sense in which russell's study of logic is philosophical in character though it differs very considerably, In both style and conception, From wittgenstein's study of it. Part ii is concerned to indicate wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with russell's view that mathematics are indistinguishable from logic and to say something about why he thought that russell's formal proof, Even if valid, Did not establish the philosophical thesis for which he argued. Part iii is concerned to indicate wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with russell's approach to the contradictions in the foundations of mathematics and to say something about his very different treatment of this question. (shrink)

To better understand what information is and to explain information-related issues has become an essential philosophical task. General concepts from science, ethics and sociology are insufficient. As noted by Floridi, a new philosophy, a Philosophy of Information (PI), is needed. In the 80’s, Wu Kun proposed a “The Basic Theory of the Philosophy of Information”, which became available in English only in 2010. Wu and Joseph Brenner then found that the latter’s non-standard “Logic in Reality” provided (...) critical logical support for Wu’s theory. In Part I of our paper, we outline the two basic theories as a metaphilosophy and metalogic for information. We offer our two theories as a further contribution to an informational paradigm. In Part II [WuB14], we develop the relation between information and social value as a basis for the ethical development of the emerging Information Society. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that social psychologism is the most philosophically appealing form of psychologism. I present two arguments in support of social psychologism. The first is that this form of psychologism allows philosophers to justify normative claims about human reasoning. In the second part of this paper I argue that social psychologism ameliorates historical concerns with psychologism in general. The conclusion I draw from this discussion is that a need to outline and justify a normative system for deductive (...) reasoning requires some discussion of how formal systems and human minds connect to one another. (shrink)

Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new and surprising facts (...) are proved; for instance, that weak dis- cernibility corresponds to discernibility in a language with constants for every object, and that weak discernibility is the most discerning nontrivial discernibility relation. (shrink)

In Part I of our joint paper [WuB13], we outlined our respective theories, The Basic Theory of the Philosophy of Information and Logic in Reality and showed their synergy for the understanding of complex informational processes. In this part, we develop Wu’s fundamental philosophical insight of the origin of the values of information in the interactions of complex information processing. A key concept in our work is that of a logical isomorphism between human individual and social value and (...) the natural laws of the physical world. On the basis of Wu’s concept of Informational Thinking, we propose an Informational Stance, a philosophical stance that is most appropriate for, and not separated nor isolated from, the emerging unified theory of information. We propose our metaphilosophy and metalogic of information as further support for the ethical development of the Information Society. (shrink)

Book Information Modal Logic and Philosophy. Modal Logic and Philosophy Roderic Girle Teddington Acumen 2000 198 Hardback 40 Paperback 16.95 By Roderic Girle. Acumen. Teddington. Pp. 198. Hardback: 40; Paperback: 16.95.

A threat to humanity portending the end of our species lurks in the cold recesses of space. Our only hope is an eleven-year-old boy. Celebrating the long-awaited release of the movie adaptation of Orson Scott Card’s novel about highly trained child geniuses fighting a race of invading aliens, this collection of original essays probes key philosophical questions raised in the narrative, including the ethics of child soldiers, politics on the internet, and the morality of war and genocide. Original essays dissect (...) the diverse philosophical questions raised in Card’s best-selling sci-fi classic, winner of the Nebula and Hugo Awards and which has been translated in 29 languages Publication coincides with planned release of major motion picture adaptation of _Ender’s Game_ starring Asa Butterfield and Harrison Ford Treats a wealth of core contemporary issues in morality and ethics, including child soldiers, the best kind of education and the use and misuse of global communications for political purposes A stand-out addition to the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture series. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy, neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers, especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and because he (...) mounted a critique of analytical philosophy in the years of its emergence. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to (...) understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”. (shrink)

Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ is often used by philosophers as a synonym for ‘metaphysics’ (literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term which was used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. The term ‘ontology’ (or ontologia) was itself coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, (...) Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius), in his Lexicon philosophicum and Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus), in his Theatrum philosophicum. The first occurrence in English recorded by the OED appears in Bailey’s dictionary of 1721, which defines ontology as ‘an Account of being in the Abstract’. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to shed some light on two questions: In what sense is logic philosophical? And what is philosophical logic? I take these two questions as co-extensive: an answer to one of them is also (or can easily be converted into) an answer to the other. I approach the problem from three perspectives: a conceptual, a descriptive and a prescriptive perspective. In other words, I try to answer the following questions: (i) In what sense (...) can logic be taken as philosophical? (ii) In what sense has logic been taken as philosophical? (iii) In what sense should logic be taken as philosophical? To this end, I analyze excerpts from five works in which meanings are attributed to the expression “philosophical logic”. The meanings are then object of critical analysis: I try to assess which of these semantical alternatives do not hold up as satisfactory answers to (iii). The result of this analysis is then used as a starting point for my own answer to question (iii). (shrink)

Logic diagrams have seen a resurgence in their application in a range of fields, including logic, biology, media science, computer science and philosophy. Consequently, understanding the history and philosophy of these diagrams has become crucial. As many current diagrammatic systems in logic are based on ideas that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, it is important to consider what motivated the use of logic diagrams in the past and whether these reasons are still (...) valid today. This paper proposes that transcendental philosophy was a key inspiration for the development of logic diagrams and that such diagrams can be employed in transcendental arguments, even after the linguistic turn. (shrink)

The first edition, published by Acumen in 2000, became a prescribed textbook on modal logic courses. The second edition has been fully revised in response to readers' suggestions, including two new chapters on conditional logic, which was not covered in the first edition. "Modal Logics and Philosophy" is a fully comprehensive introduction to modal logics and their application suitable for course use. Unlike most modal logic textbooks, which are both forbidding mathematically and short on philosophical discussion, (...) "Modal Logics and Philosophy" places its emphasis firmly on showing how useful modal logic can be as a tool for formal philosophical analysis. In part 1 of the book, the reader is introduced to some standard systems of modal logic and encouraged through a series of exercises to become proficient in manipulating these logics. The emphasis is on possible world semantics for modal logics and the semantic emphasis is carried into the formal method, Jeffrey-style truth-trees. Standard truth-trees are extended in a simple and transparent way to take possible worlds into account. Part 2 systematically explores the applications of modal logic to philosophical issues such as truth, time, processes, knowledge and belief, obligation and permission. (shrink)

In the Western philosophical tradition logical investigation and philosophical advance have been inextricably linked, each having stimulated and shaped the other. In Logic and Philosophy William H. Brenner examines a broad range of logical concepts and methods as they relate to the larger context of philosophical investigation and thus bring to light the philosophical depth of logic and its relevance to philosophy in general.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I will single out three salient moments of trans philosophy, drawing on both my own experience as a trans person and the various attempts to theorize transness as laid out by Talia Mae Bettcher's "Trapped in the Wrong Theory". From there, I will extrapolate three ways to see the relationship between logic and trans philosophy, and provide for each some examples of both current and possible future work. Finally, in analogy (...) with the literature on feminist logic, I will attempt to address the further question of what trans logic could be, as a discipline and a system. (shrink)

The focus of this article is the manner in which Thomas Ebendorfer of Hasselbach, a Viennese theologian lecturing on Book I of the Sentences in 1421, deals with the topic of virtus sermonis and the relation between theology, philosophy, and logic in his Prologue from the autograph MS Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4369 (ff. 7r–8v). By combining a double classification of each science (into acquisita vs. infusa) with a double perspective of their relation (temporal vs. natural), and by making (...) a strong claim for theology’s role in advancing new logical theories, Ebendorfer’s view reflects a progressive awareness of the distinction between theology and philosophy which, in turn, entails very different applications of virtus sermonis in the two sciences. An edition of the Prologue is provided in the Appendix. (shrink)

This book argues that a basic grasp of philosophy and logic can produce written and spoken material that is both grammatically correct and powerful. The author analyses errors in grammar, word choice, phrasing and sentences that even the finest writers can fail to notice; concentrating on subtle missteps and errors that can make the difference between good and excellent prose. Each chapter addresses how common words and long-established grammatical rules are often misused or ignored altogether – including such (...) common words as ‘interesting’, ‘possible’, and ‘apparent’. By tackling language in this way, the author provides an illuminating and practical stylistic guide that will interest students and scholars of grammar and philosophy, as well as readers looking to improve their technical writing skills. (shrink)

Volume 41, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 97-100.

The Entretiens of the Institut International de Philosophie for 1978 were held in connection with the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, from August 27 to September 1. The theme of the Entretiens was Logic and Philosophy. The undersigned, then President of LI.P., was responsible for the planning of the programme. The programme was designed to consist of four sections with the headings Classical and Intuitionist Logic, Modal Logic and its Applications, Inductive Logic and (...) its Applications, and Logic and Epistemology. The aim was also to convey to philosophers who are not experts in logic an informative and representative impression of some of the main sectors of the vast and rapidly expanding field of philosophical logic. At the same time it was thought that this impression should not be conveyed in the form of a series of survey papers but through presentations and discussions of specific topics falling under the main headings men tioned above. For each section a rapporteur was nominated to read a paper and an interlocuteur to comment on it. The programme chairman is grateful that he was able to engage a representative selection of front rank philosophi cal logicians to perform the various tasks. The papers and the comments are printed in this volume in the order in which they appeared in the Programme of the Entretiens. (shrink)

This book examines a widespread, and often misunderstood, doctrine within the medieval Aristotelian tradition, namely the inclusion of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics within the scope of the Organon. It studies this doctrine, as presented by the Islamic philosophers Al- Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, from a purely philosophical perspective, and argues that the logical construal of the arts of rhetoric and poetics is both interesting and illuminating. The book begins by examining some prevalent misconceptions regarding the logical interpretation of the Rhetoric (...) and Poetics. Chapter two considers the Greek background of the doctrine, first through an examination of the Aristotelian divisions of the sciences, and then through an examination of the beginnings of the logical classification of the Rhetoric and Poetics among the Greek commentators from the school of Alexandria. The remainder of the work is devoted to a detailed consideration of the Arabic philosophers' development of the doctrine, both their understanding of its general epistemological and logical underpinnings, and their elaboration of the specific logical structures upon which poetical and rhetorical discourse is based. Consideration is also given to the relationship between contemporary philosophical views of rhetoric and poetics, and the views of these medieval authors. (shrink)

Can the humanities survive in an age of science? Yes, if analytic philosophers will only stop picking on traditional philosophy and recognize the latter's proper and legitimate role in society. That role according to Veatch, is one that enables man to grasp the nontechnical meaning of our everyday world where we learn to know and understand the nature of things. Such knowledge serves as the necessary ground for not only our common sense attitudes, but also for establishing values and (...) norms for a moral life. What is more, Veatch contends, this knowledge of man, his nature, and his values is not merely emotive or psychological; rather, it is factual. Using traditional logic as its organon, knowledge of a more humanistic variety can establish itself as factual in spite of analytical claims to the contrary. Thus Veatch proceeds from the general problem of the humanities versus science to the more specific area of the two logics: traditional Aristotelian logic and modern symbolic logic. The former is the proper tool of the humanities, the latter serves the method of the physical sciences. Both logics deal with facts in their respective areas. Traditional logic lays bare the facts that make human life meaningful, while symbolic logic operates with formal structures that make technological progression possible. One logic does not cancel out the other. Veatch prefers to view the two logics as a "both... and" structure rather than as an "either... or" situation. To effect this he launches a counterattack against analytic philosophy's repudiation of traditional logic. He charges certain analysts with committing a fallacy that makes necessities and impossibilities a mere function of our language rules. Veatch, however, sees our rules of language as determined by real necessities in the world. He claims that Wittgenstein's celebrated attack on the doctrine of essences never really denies Aristotle's notion of substance as the formal or intelligible aspect of individual entities. Although his justification of traditional logic as a grammar for discourse in the humanities presupposes certain metaphysical commitments, on the whole his plea for traditional philosophy is persuasive.--J. J. R. (shrink)

The present study proposes a valorization of the work of professor and philosopher Ioan Biriş. The statistics of his books and studies, their distribution by areas of interest, and especially the ideas in his work confirm the need for philosophy in the Romanian cultural life. As a whole, his philosophical endeavor is based on the concept of totality. Thus in the Hegelian spirit, Ioan Biriş successfully convinces us that the logical may exceed the limits of formal exercise and become (...) the organon of philosophy. In this capacity, the logical may operate on the real and valorize the multiple relationships between identity and difference. His books Filosofia și logica științelor sociale, Totalitate, sistem, holon, Rolul imaginarului în cunoașterea științifică, Istorie şi cultură, as well as a series of studies among which let me mention: “L’identité symbolique et la logique partitive des valeurs spirituelles”, “On the logic of religious terms”, “Le rapport identite-difference et la conjonction collective. Aspects logiques”, clearly prove the author’s capacity to integrate existential, religious, cognitive and axiological issues into a unitary vision. As Noica would say, he succeeded to enter the spirit’s life thorough the intellect’s gate. (shrink)

Predication is a central theme in Arabic logic that has undergone significant semantic transformation throughout history. This article explores the evolution of predication's scope and meaning across four successive stages. Rather than pinpointing specific historical moments—given that these transitions lack clearly defined beginnings or endings—the focus is on key propositions that enrich our understanding of predication, drawing on the classifications of thinkers such as Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1262-65), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635), and Muhammad (...) Ḥusayn Ṭabātabāʾī (d. 1981). The transition from the first to the second stage is characterized by the acceptance of natural propositions (ṭabīʿīya), while subsequent stages involve essential primary (dhātī awwalī) and stronger/weaker (ḥaqīqa-raqīqa) propositions. This progression illustrates a shift from expressing the properties of external objects to articulating the properties of concepts, ultimately culminating in the expression of identity between concepts and external entities. The four stages can be summarized as follows: (1) First-order predication; (2) Second-order predication; (3) Second-order identity; (4) First-order identity. (shrink)