This volumes aim is to provide an introduction to Carnaps book from a historical and philosophical perspective, each chapter focusing on one specific issue. The book will be of interest not only to Carnap scholars but to all those interested in the history of analytical philosophy.

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

Health Care professionals working in disaster situations have to face urgent choices which diverge from their normal deontological ethos and are more utilitarian. Such is the triage system used to choose whom to treat. Instead of entering a crisis these professionals should be thought that ethics is not harmonizable to all situations and that there are situations in which saving as many lives as possible mean sacrificing others. This calls for defining a perimeter zone in which such choices occur, and (...) a time frame (a space–time niche) in which it ought to be considered ethical and legitimate to use such value laden choices. (shrink)

In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...) far. Moreover Burge has been one of the leading philosophers of mind of the past 40 years and some of his writings on the objectivity of perception display a deep understanding of the relevance of science for sharpening our understanding of the mind. After taking a close look at the developmental evidence, in particular at false-belief studies, I argue that Burge’s, 409–434, 2018) account faces severe obstacles. To give one telling example: if young children can only attribute to others sensory registrations, then it is hard to explain the evidence showing that they respond differently to an agent’s ignorance and to her false belief. (shrink)

This paper reviews Deleuze’s theory of language in Logic of Sense, and Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language in A Thousand Plateaus. In the ontology informed by the Stoics described in those books, human being and language do not exist separately but in a mixture of words and things. The author argues that this flattened ontology of surfaces is incommensurable with the ontology of depth used in conventional humanist qualitative methodology and recommends beginning new empirical inquiry with a concept instead (...) of with method and methodology. (shrink)

This volume analyzes welfare policies by looking at the making of their target publics. It examines how these populations are identified and constructed by policy making. The contributors apply the classic theoretical question about who gets what, when, and how, but also suggest the revisiting of policy-feedback analysis. Coverage includes empirical case studies in different geographical areas. It looks at Europe, the United States and also considers Mayotte, set in a post-colonial context. The chapters also examine different aspects of welfare, (...) including the bureaucratic treatment of marginalized populations as well as the middle class. The authors draw on diverse conceptual approaches and investigative methodologies. They conduct participant observation in public or nonprofit organizations, explore administrative records, and interview actors at various stages of policymaking. This qualitative material is then combined with relevant quantitative data. Readers are guided through a multilevel approach of welfare policies, from their definition to their implementation. They gain insight into the targeting of publics, from the higher reaches of government to the most underprivileged groups of the social world. Overall, the book compares different national contexts and social policy fields. This approach unearths regularities, enabling the authors to reassess major contemporary transformations of the welfare State. (shrink)

In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models to suggest that prototypes, exemplars and theories (...) are ‘Type 1’ concepts (automatic, implicit) and definitions ‘Type 2’ concepts (controlled, explicit). In the context of this argument, we suggest that one must better distinguish between Type 1 theories (e.g., Bayesian causal nets) and Type 2 theories (e.g., scientific) that explicitly control definitions. (shrink)

Cet article propose une interprétation de la métaphysique de Jankélévitch telle qu’elle se présente dans Philosophie première (1953). L’élaboration d’une déontologie métaphysique conduit Jankélévitch, par-delà le destin onto-théologique des métaphysiques classiques, à déployer une théologie « désontologisée », c’est-à-dire un discours sur Dieu dépouillé de l’être et de l’existence. Une telle détermination théologique de la métaphysique met alors nécessairement le métaphysicien à l’épreuve de l’expression de ce qui n’existe pas et qui pourtant fait exister. Ce que nous comprenons ainsi comme (...) un échec du discours métaphysique sur son objet théologique, dans l’ordre de la métaphysique, possède toutefois une fonction dans l’œuvre de Jankélévitch : fournir son modèle à l’action morale humaine. Dans un double mouvement, cette lecture achemine donc la métaphysique vers la théologie, avant de redéployer la morale depuis cette théologie. (shrink)

How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we (...) detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds. (shrink)

Le mal est une notion qui s’étend au moins sur trois champs disciplinaires : la théologie, la philosophie et l’art. Il connaît un même traitement dans chacun de ces trois champs, motivé par des systèmes différents : le mal n’est jamais pris comme objet causa sui mais toujours considéré dans sa relativité à un objet premier dont il contribue à définir la limite. Nous proposons un rapide tour d’horizon de cette situation afin d’ouvrir les pistes de réflexion d’une intelligibilité du (...) comportement de cette notion dans l’histoire des idées. Nous suivons un ouvrage de Paul Ricœur et saisissons certains textes clefs de l’histoire de la pensée au travers de l’objet problématique qu’est le mal, évoquant notamment les travaux plus récits avec la méthode herméneutique proposée par Hans Blumenberg afin de percevoir la figure du diable comme l’objet pratique d’une telle observation dans le fil de l’histoire des idées. (shrink)

Besides the application of the notion of complementarity to psychological and physical descriptions of the individual, this paper explores the possibility of defining complementary observables in the same phenomenal domain. Complementary emotional observables are defined from experimental data on experienced emotions reported by subjects who have been prepared in a state of induced emotion. Complementary physiological observables are defined in correspondence with conjugate, physiological quantities that can be measured. -/- Keywords: Complementarity, Psychophysics, Emotional observables, Induced emotion, Physiological observables, Conjugate physiological (...) quantities. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo examina el consuelo como una cuestión filosófica en cuanto que concreción de la solicitud, y muestra los recursos que aporta para comprender al ser humano como sujeto sufriente y respondiente. Se analiza el consuelo en cuanto que fenómeno de acceso a otras dimensiones constitutivas del ser humano, como la afectividad, la apelación y el cuidado. ABSTRACT The article examines consolation as a philosophical issue insofar as it is a materialization of attentiveness, and explains the resources it offers (...) to understand human beings as suffering and caring subjects. It analyzes consolation as a phenomenon that provides access to other constitutive dimensions of the human being, such as affectivity, appeal, and care. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que penser? Qu'est-ce que la pensée? À quelles conditions un être est-il conscient? Une douleur, une expérience olfactive, une perception visuelle, une intention, une croyance et un remords ont-ils une nature mentale commune? Si oui, la science peut-elle la découvrir? Le concept d'intentionnalité a été introduit en philosophie afin de clarifier le contenu de ces questions. Il désigne la capacité de viser mentalement des objets et de se représenter mentalement des états de choses. Ce livre analyse les problèmes soulevés (...) par l'introduction du concept d'intentionnalité dans la philosophie contemporaine. Il montre d'abord comment la philosophie du langage du XXe siècle a tenté de résoudre les énigmes logiques et ontologiques engendrées par la définition de l'intentionnalité. Il montre ensuite que la question centrale de la philosophie de l'esprit du XXe siècle a été de savoir si l'intentionnalité est la caractéristique distinctive des phénomènes mentaux : de tous les phénomènes mentaux et d'eux seuls. Remerciements Introduction Chapitre premier. L'ordre mental cartésien Chapitre 2. L'héritage ontologique de Brentano Chapitre 3. La logique et le défi des objets inexistants Chapitre 4. La référence directe Chapitre 5. L'intensionnalité est-elle un critère de l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 6. Les variétés de l'intentionnalité Chapitre 7. L'intentionnalité est-elle la propriété exclusive des phénomènes mentaux? Chapitre 8. Peut-on naturaliser l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 9. À quoi sert l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 10. Tous les phénomènes mentaux possèdent-ilsl'intentionnalité? Conclusion Bibliographie Index. (shrink)