La définition platonicienne du philosophe; la philosophie comme mode de vie; rupture et continuité, le Moyen Age et les temps modernes. [SDM].

In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...) far. Moreover Burge has been one of the leading philosophers of mind of the past 40 years and some of his writings on the objectivity of perception display a deep understanding of the relevance of science for sharpening our understanding of the mind. After taking a close look at the developmental evidence, in particular at false-belief studies, I argue that Burge’s, 409–434, 2018) account faces severe obstacles. To give one telling example: if young children can only attribute to others sensory registrations, then it is hard to explain the evidence showing that they respond differently to an agent’s ignorance and to her false belief. (shrink)

This paper reviews Deleuze’s theory of language in Logic of Sense, and Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language in A Thousand Plateaus. In the ontology informed by the Stoics described in those books, human being and language do not exist separately but in a mixture of words and things. The author argues that this flattened ontology of surfaces is incommensurable with the ontology of depth used in conventional humanist qualitative methodology and recommends beginning new empirical inquiry with a concept instead (...) of with method and methodology. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

As stressed by Perruchet & Vinter, the SOC model echoes Johnson-Laird's mental model theory. Indeed, the latter rejects rule-based processing and assumes that reasoning is achieved through the manipulation of conscious representations. However, the mental model theory as well as its modified versions resorts to the abstraction of complex schemas and some form of implicit logic that seems incompatible with the SOC approach.

How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we (...) detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds. (shrink)

According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, we raise a common (...) objection to the concept of innateness, not to mount an attack on GOFEP but to study how its proponents have attempted to meet that challenge. The aim of this move is to show that GOFEP cannot face the challenge without, as it were, losing its soul. There is, or so we will argue, something deep at the heart of GOFEP that prevents its proponents from meeting the challenge. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism was born with Man, and certain primitive tribes or ethnic groups considered themselves the center of the world. Their members assumed the generic name “the Men,” and all the rest, including other, tribes or ethnic groups, were part of a more or less hostile environment (to use the modern term).

Besides the application of the notion of complementarity to psychological and physical descriptions of the individual, this paper explores the possibility of defining complementary observables in the same phenomenal domain. Complementary emotional observables are defined from experimental data on experienced emotions reported by subjects who have been prepared in a state of induced emotion. Complementary physiological observables are defined in correspondence with conjugate, physiological quantities that can be measured. -/- Keywords: Complementarity, Psychophysics, Emotional observables, Induced emotion, Physiological observables, Conjugate physiological (...) quantities. (shrink)

Depuis la revolution scientifique du XVIIe siecle, la science est tourmentee par le sens a donner a sa propre entreprise. Plusieurs tentatives pour fonder l'intelligibilite de la nature sur les structures pretendument immuables de la raison ont echoue. Mais l'echec philosophique est a la mesure du succes aveuglant des connaissances scientifiques, qui n'ont plus que faire du scrupule de principe. Kant n'est-il pas un des avocats les plus eminents de ce scrupule tombe en desuetude? Face au divorce consomme entre physique (...) et metaphysique, il restait a se demander, avec Kant, ce que la raison a a gagner si chacune se force malgre tout a parler le langage de l'autre. Effort douloureux mais riche d'enseignement: si la physique est poussee dans cet horizon de la metaphysique qui lui est etranger, elle retrouve le moyen de s'aventurer dans une reflexion sur son propre point de depart. Reflexion qui hante encore la science aujourd'hui, meme si c'est a son insu. Dans ce premier geste il doit y avoir quelque chose de definitif: seule la philosophie kantienne de la nature nous met vraiment aux prises avec lui. Pierre Kerszberg est professeur de philosophie a l'universite d'Etat de Pennsylvannie. (shrink)