Because he introduces a nonplastic element in his definition of the plasticity of mental life—that is, elasticity—Freud ruins the possibility of thinking what he precisely wishes to think, the plastic coincidence between creation and destruction of form. The characterization of the death drive as “elastic” deprives it of its plastic power and of its capacity to resist the pleasure principle. If we are not able to prove that the destruction of form has and is a form, if form (...) is always on the side of Eros and of pleasure, it becomes impossible to prove that there is anything beyond the pleasure principle. (shrink)

Hyperplasia and hypertrophy are elements of phenotypic plasticity adjusting organ size and function. Because they are costly, we assume that they are beneficial. In this review, the authors discuss examples of tissue and organ systems that respond with plastic changes to osmotic stress to raise awareness that we do not always have sufficient experimental evidence to conclude that such processes provide fitness advantages. Changes in hydranth architecture in the hydroid Cordylophora caspia or variations in size in the anal papillae (...) of insect larvae upon changes in medium salinity may be adaptive or not. The restructuring of salt glands in ducklings upon salt‐loading is an example of phenotypic plasticity which indeed seems beneficial. As the genomes of model species are recently sequenced and the animals are easy to rear, these species are suitable study objects to investigate the biological significance of phenotypic plasticity and to study potential epigenetic and other mechanisms underlying phenotypic changes. (shrink)

Plasticity is a central concept in the philosophy of Catherine Malabou and the theory of animation. And yet, the temporal dimension of transformation and mutability that Malabou foregrounds in her philosophy is missing from recent theoretical accounts of plasticity in animation studies​. ​In these accounts, plasticity appears as a mode of spatial extension, conveying the elasticity of form across a Cartesian timeline, whereas Malabou aims to understand time’s own metamorphosis and self-differentiation. This article invokes Malabou’s theorization (...) of plasticity as the becoming of time itself rather than the becoming of things in time to rethink the perception of life-like movement in animation. Reviewing the techniques of animation that Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston describes in The Illusion of Life as “drawing in the fourth dimension”, I argue that Malabou’s characterization of plasticity as the capacity “to see (what is) coming” (voir venir) gets to the heart of animation as an art of subjective anticipation. Utilizing the human perceptual system’s tendency to invent new structures and relationships in response to changing inputs from the environment, animation prepares us to anticipate the unforeseeable and to perceive an order of movement typically concealed by the movement of objects in space. (shrink)

Theories are processes modelled by thought. When they evolve in time, they are transformed and become new theories. They may cross from one academic discipline to another, then open up to new areas of human knowledge, mixing together the humanities, art, science and even spirituality. The way they are modelled reveals their plasticity and their elasticity is tested in their potential for transfer from one field to another, while the different contacts they make and mergers they undergo generate (...) a certain hybridity. Plasticity, elasticity and hybridity are the triad which makes the transfer of theories possible. (shrink)

Theories are processes modelled by thought. When they evolve in time, they are transformed and become new theories. They may cross from one academic discipline to another, then open up to new areas of human knowledge, mixing together the humanities, art, science and even spirituality. The way they are modelled reveals their plasticity and their elasticity is tested in their potential for transfer from one domain to another, while the different contacts they make and mergers they undergo generate (...) a certain hybridity. Plasticity, elasticity and hybridity are the triad which make the transfer of theories possible. (shrink)

The Ascent of Man develops a comprehensive theory of human nature. James F. Harris sees human nature as an emergent property that supervenes a cluster of properties. Despite significant overlap between individuals that have human nature and those that are biologically human, the concept of human nature developed in this book is different. Whether biologically human or not, an individual may be said to possess human nature. This theory of human nature is called the"cluster theory." Harris takes as his point (...) of departurePlato's comment that in learning what a thing is we should look to the ways in which it acts upon or is acted upon by other things. He commits to a methodological naturalism and draws upon current views from the social and biological sciences. The cluster theory he develops represents one of the very few completely novel theories of human nature developed in the post-Darwin era. It will prove most useful in dealing with philosophical questions involving such contemporary issues as cloning, cybernetics, and the possibility of extraterrestrial life. The fundamental conceptual issue is how plastic and elastic is the nature of human nature. Just how different might we imagine human beings to be and still be human in the sense that they still possess whatever it is that accounts for a unique nature? The theory of human nature developed in this book is a descriptive, dynamic, bottom-up, non-essentialist, naturalist theory. Harris is well versed in classical philosophy and contemporary behavioral science. He writes in a graceful, open-ended way that both educates and illuminates renewed interest in what it means to be human. (shrink)

Undoubtedly the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR model may be considered as a good theory for describing information processing mechanisms and holistic phenomena in the human brain, but it doesn’t give us satisfactory explanation of human perception. In this work a new approach explaining our perception is introduced, which is in good agreement with Orch OR model and other mainstream science theories such as string theory, loop quantum gravity and holographic principle. It is shown that human perception cannot be explained in the (...) terms of elementary particles and we should introduce new indivisible holistic objects with geometry based on smooth infinitesimal analysis - elastic membranes. The example of such a membrane is our Universe which is an indivisible whole. It is shown that our perception may be considered as the result of elastic oscillations of two dimensional (2D) elastic membranes with closed topology embedded in our bodies. Only one elastic membrane responsible for its perceptions will correspond to the selected organism, but there may be other membranes, even at the cell level. In other words, reality may be considered as the process of time evolution of holistic energetically very weak macro objects - elastic membranes with the geometry based on smooth infinitesimal analysis. An embedded membrane in this multidimensional world will look different for the external and internal observers: from the outside it will look like a material object with smooth infinitesimal geometry, while from the inside our Universe-like space-time fabric. When interacting with elementary particles and other membranes, a membrane will transform their energy into its elastic energy (a new form of energy) - the energy of stretching of the infinitesimal segments. The theory postulates that these elastic deformations will not be observable from the point of view of the internal observer. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle will work in this physics only from the point of view of the internal observer. For the external observer each embedded elastic membrane may be stretched and even a very small region will become observable. For example, living organisms play the role of internal observers of the Universe, and at the same time they serve as external observers for 2D membranes embedded into our Universe. We can observe our 2D self-membranes through our perceptions, which are encoded in elastic oscillations of the elastic membrane. According to the theory, elastic membranes occupy energetically favorable positions around microtubules involved into Orch OR. The theory not only gives us a really multidimensional holistic picture of reality, but it also provides us with a new method for understanding such phenomena as perception, self-awareness and will. (shrink)

Ghosh introduces the term 'plastic turn' and gives a new direction for how we can interpret and experience the turn today. By what he calls the material-aesthetic, he opens up a fresh direction in our experience and understanding of plastic through the correspondence that plastic as a material brings with the aesthetic that it inspires and figures"-.

Probably colour is the best worked-out example of allegedly neurophysiologically innate response categories determining percepts and percepts determining concepts, and hence biology fixing the basic categories implicit in the use of language. In this paper I argue against this view and I take C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers [1988] as my main target. I start by undermining the view that four unique hues stand apart from all other colour shades (Section 2) and the confidence that the solar spectrum is (...) naturally divided into four categories (Section 3). For such categories to be truly universal, they have to be true for all peoples and in Section 4 I show that Berlin and Kay's [1969] widely quoted theory of basic colour categories is not sufficiently supported to lend it any credibility.Having disposed of the view that inspection of language or ‘pure’ perception unveils the universal colour categories. I turn to neurophysiological and psychophysical theories of colour vision to see whether they provide a more solid basis for deciding what the innate response categories are. In Section 5 I show that Hardin's account of the opponent-process theory neither supports his view that ‘colour-coding’takes place early in the visual neural pathway, nor his view that knowledge of colour vision science will help us solve many philosophical mysteries about colour.In Section 6 I give a more detailed review of what is known today about the neurophysiology of colour vision and I show that there's nothing in the brain which could be called a colour module, let alone a module with homunculi for particular basic colour categories. In Section 7 I show that psychophysical models do not support such rigid constraints on category formation either. Hence (Section 8), at least in the case of colour, current science supports a plasticity in the formation of categories that goes far beyond the requirements of those naturalistic philosophers who would like to ground primitive concepts in biology. (shrink)

A career-spanning collection of published and unpublished writings from one of today's leading French philosophers 25 essays showcase Malabou's rounded philosophical project: 17 previously published and 8 brand newDemonstrates the interdisciplinary range and expansive applicative scope of her concept of plasticity Presents a full portrait of Malabou's philosophy which shows her project as a coherent conceptual problem rather than a collection of disparate topics and themesIncludes a critical introduction by Malabou expert Ian JamesCatherine Malabou is one of the foremost, (...) most innovative intelligences working in contemporary French philosophy today. Her work articulates a coherent conceptualisation of 'plasticity' by merging recent neurobiology and medicinal sciences with the history of philosophy and political theory.Across the essays gathered in Plasticity: The Promise of Explosion, Malabou carves a philosophical space between structuralism, deconstruction, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis and speculative realism. By demonstrating the plastic transformability at the heart of these disciplines, a change that always promises future explosion, Malabou, as a female philosopher, also articulates the need to 'change difference' within patriarchal concepts of tradition itself.The collection is divided into four thematic parts, each of which showcases a major aspect of Malabou's conceptualisation of plasticity. In his introduction, Ian James situates Malabou's work within contemporary philosophy and navigates the contours of her unique work.--Back cover. (shrink)

After defining plasticity in terms of its active embodiments, Malabou applies the notion to the work of Hegel, Heidegger, Levinas, Levi-Strauss, Freud, and ...

Despite its uniform appearance, the cerebellar cortex is highly heterogeneous in terms of structure, genetics and physiology. Purkinje cells (PCs), the principal and sole output neurons of the cerebellar cortex, can be categorized into multiple populations that differentially express molecular markers and display distinctive physiological features. Such features include action potential rate, but also their propensity for synaptic and intrinsic plasticity. However, the precise molecular and genetic factors that correlate with the differential physiological properties of PCs remain elusive. In (...) this article, we provide a detailed overview of the cellular mechanisms that regulate PC activity and plasticity. We further perform a pathway analysis to highlight how molecular characteristics of specific PC populations may influence their physiology and plasticity mechanisms. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 8, Page 1140-1173, October 2022. This article explores the complexities of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology in light of Foucault’s criticisms of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. While Marcuse’s theory of human nature is grounded upon a dialectical conception of essential human potentialities striving for realization, it secretes a radically plastic conception of life that undermines all anthropological essentialism. This fundamental tension between essentialist and plastic conceptions of human nature has significant implications for rethinking Marcuse’s (...) project and legacy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Education appears to bear responsibility on the one hand to do justice to society’s need for reproduction and continuation, and on the other to do justice to the individual’s capacity for and need to express resistance, critique and political action. How we navigate this problem is tied to how we understand justice. ‘Plastic justice’ is the suggestion that questions concerning justice and education might find a materialist expression instead of the usual transcendental ideals of justice. In this perspective, ‘justice’ (...) appears not as an achievable ideal but as a philosophical void that allows us to identify and react to injustice. An example of this is the void that allows for social selection – in the form of admissions or exams – that must be kept open if we wish to avoid encouraging social conformism and reproduction. (shrink)

The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting bodies of evidence: evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I argue a developmentalist approach to emotion, which builds on Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, can help us dissolve this puzzle.

Drawing on Catherine Malabou’s notion of plasticity, this article argues for a conception of resilience as plastic. Resilience has proven an important concept in health care, describing how we manage life-changing illnesses. Yet, resilience is not without its critics, who suggest it neglects a political, social, or personal dimension in illness. In this article, I propose that a concept of plastic resilience can address these criticisms. On this account, success should not be based on a return to function, but (...) rather on how actively we are involved in the formation of a new self after illness. I address some approaches that can benefit from “plastic resilience,” namely, art therapy, expert companionship, and shared decision-making. In each case, I underline how we should help patients thematize and engage with their new selves, while also being constantly vigilant for how these changes might impact our current assumptions around their preferences for treatment. (shrink)

The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach (...) to perception as a way of accounting for a significant form of perceptual change. (shrink)

Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...) is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, one that is independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. (shrink)

The study of phenotypic plasticity has progressed significantly over the past few decades. We have moved from variation for plasticity being considered as a nuisance in evolutionary studies to it being the primary target of investigations that use an array of methods, including quantitative and molecular genetics, as well as of several approaches that model the evolution of plastic responses. Here, I consider some of the major aspects of research on phenotypic plasticity, assessing where progress has been (...) made and where additional effort is required. I suggest that some areas of research, such the study of the quantitative genetic underpinning of plasticity, have been either settled in broad outline or superseded by new approaches and questions. Other issues, such as the costs of plasticity are currently at the forefront of research in this field, and are likely to be areas of major future development. (shrink)

Sensation is a concept with a conflicted philosophical history. It has found as many allies as enemies in nearly every camp from empiricism to poststructuralism. Polyvalent, with an uncertain referent, and often overshadowed by intuition, perception, or cognition, sensation invites as much metaphysical speculation as it does dismissive criticism. -/- The promise of sensation has certainly not been lost on the phenomenologists who have sought to ‘rehabilitate’ the concept. In Plastic Bodies, Tom Sparrow argues that the phenomenologists have not gone (...) far enough, however. Alongside close readings of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, he digs into an array of ancient, modern, and contemporary texts in search of the resources needed to rebuild the concept of sensation after phenomenology. He begins to assemble a speculative aesthetics that is at once a realist theory of sensation and a philosophy of embodiment that breaks the form of the ‘lived’ body. Maintaining that the body is fundamentally plastic and that corporeal identity is constituted by a conspiracy of sensations, he pursues the question of how the body fits into/fails to fit into its aesthetic environment and what must be done to increase the body’s power to act and exist. (shrink)

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw’s model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity” the ability of a phenotype to be modified by (...) the environment should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw’s hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via’s conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman’s view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw’s definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. (shrink)

Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...) is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. (shrink)

Enzyme directed genetic mechanisms causing random DNA sequence alterations are ubiquitous in both eukaryotes and prokaryotes. A number of molecular geneticist have invoked adaptation through natural selection to account for this fact, however, alternative explanations have also flourished. The population geneticist G.C. Williams has dismissed the possibility of selection for mutator activity on a priori grounds. In this paper, I attempt a refutation of Williams' argument. In addition, I discuss some conceptual problems related to recent claims made by microbiologists on (...) the adaptiveness of molecular variety generators in the evolution of prokaryotes. A distinction is proposed between selection for mutations caused by a mutator activity and selection for the mutator activity proper. The latter requires a concept of fitness different from the one commonly used in microbiology. (shrink)

Several lines of evidence have underscored the remarkable neuroplasticity of the primate sensorimotor cortex, characterizing these cortical areas as dynamic constructs that are modelled in a use-dependent manner by behaviourally significant experiences. Their plasticity likely provides a neural substrate that may contribute to the dynamic systems paradigm argued by Shanker & King (S&K) as crucial for development of communication skills.

The convincing argument that Brette makes for the neural coding metaphor as imposing one view of brain behavior can be further explained through discourse analysis. Instead of a unified view, we argue, the coding metaphor's plasticity, versatility, and robustness throughout time explain its success and conventionalization to the point that its rhetoric became overlooked.

A response to Via about the existence (or not) and role of plasticity genes in evolution.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Plastic Turn by Ghosh, RanjanMaria MargaroniGhosh, Ranjan. The Plastic Turn. Cornell University Press, 2022. 224pp.In Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction (2005; 2010), Catherine Malabou argues that “the concept of plasticity is becoming both the dominant formal motif of interpretation and the most productive exegetical and heuristic tool of our time,” supplanting older theoretical paradigms such as “writing” and “the trace” (57). (...) Almost twenty years later, the truth of this statement is certainly confirmed not only by Malabou’s own developing elaboration of this concept and the growing body of works inspired by her creative adaptation of neurological theory in the realm of philosophy, but also by the proliferation of studies that seek to reflect on the ecological, anthropological, ethical, or political consequences of what has been termed the “Plasticene.”1 There is no doubt, then, that we are witnessing yet another “turn” in the Humanities and Social Sciences, the plastic turn coming to displace or supplement a host of currently competing theoretical tendencies: i.e., the material turn, the affective turn, the cognitive turn, and the mimetic turn, among others.2Ranjan Ghosh’s The Plastic Turn is the first in a trilogy intended to theorize the aims, scope and effects of a “plastic Humanities.”3 Interestingly, Ghosh does not locate the “turn” in the 1990s when plastic “gained widespread public acceptance” (Mah 31) and when (with the development of the neurosciences) brain plasticity was increasingly adopted as “the most effective sensor of energy and meaning” of our contemporary era (Malabou, Plasticity 31-32). Instead, he goes back to the turn of the twentieth century when plastic as a new material and plasticity as a scheme of thought were still in the realm of potentiality, triggering, countering, and reshaping many of our political, cultural, and aesthetic modern imaginaries.Much has been written about the promise of plastic as a “magical” substance, capable of sublimating matter into what Roland Barthes describes as the trace of a metamorphic movement that produces an abundance of forms out of the singularity of its origin (104-105). In “The Material Consciousness of Plastics,” Russell Gagg notes that “in the early part of the twentieth century, plastics were seen as leading a new utopian vision for economic growth after the depression of the pre-war and austerity of the post-war years” (32). In the interwar period, plastics were [End Page 149] promoted for their democratic, egalitarian potential in making “designed consumer goods […] commercially viable,” thus introducing an aesthetics of the popular and the banal (Gagg 44-45; Ghosh 9, 20). One of the many strengths of Ghosh’s book is that it takes inspiration not merely from plastic as the stuff of fantasy but also from the very materiality of plastic, namely, its polymeric structure, malleability of form, sensitivity to the change of temperature, crystalline-amorphous texture, diverse modes of esterification, and resistance to biodegradability. In his first chapter, Ghosh acknowledges the influence of Goethe’s Elective Affinities and Primo Levi’s The Periodic Table which, as he argues, bring “the chemical metaphor to bear on human relationships” (20). He points to the development of a body of contemporary works that elaborate a “chemo-poetics,” aiming to “connect life and its undulations with molecular formations” (21).4 In subsequent chapters, the author succeeds in re-molding the chemical metaphor exploited in these works into a full-blown “material-aesthetic” that enables him to produce new readings of the forces behind literary modernism; the possibilities, limits, and stakes of world literature; the emergence of uncanny forms of plastic nature and art; and the distinct affective modalities caused by our petro-modernity.In analyzing side-by-side the diverse histories of, on the one hand, plastic as an increasingly disgraced material and, on the other hand, our literary, aesthetic, and critical production from the early 20th century to the present, Ghosh is dependent on an analogical process that permits him to think across multiple disciplines and subjects, connecting terms, ideas, and practices that resonate but remain asymmetrical (1). As he emphasizes, it is the “asymmetrically analogous (metaphors)” that “deepens the framework of my arguments” (3). Indeed... (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the notion of human nature and the concept of inner nature from the perspective of developmental systems theory. It explores the folkbiology of human nature and looks at three features associated with traits that are expressions of the inner nature that organisms inherit from their parents: fixity, typicality, teleology.

Some scientists and philosophers claimed that there is a converse to multiple realizability. While a given higher-level property can be realized by different lower-level properties (multiple realizability), a given lower-level property can in turn serve to realize different higher-level properties (this converse I dubbed the unfortunately obscure "constructival plasticity" to emphasize the constructive metaphysics involved in this converse to multiple realizability). I began by defining multiple realizabilty in a formal way. (Looking back, one point of interest is that I (...) defined modally weak and strong versions of realization, which is relevant to later views about contingent versus necessitarian grounding.) I then turned to the relation in question. By my analysis, for the converse claim to be true, a lower-level property G1 that realizes a higher-level F must be taken in conjunction with some other base condition G2 so that a difference in G2 allows G1 to determine some other higher-level property E but not F (otherwise there would be violations of supervenience). The realization law thus has the form: (G1 & G2) => F. As such, the base property G1 is insufficient by itself to produce F. It is an insufficient but necessary part of a sufficient condition. I also point out that this makes the realization base property an INUS condition, if combined with multiple realizability. Specifically, if F is multiply realized by properties other than the pair G1 and G2, then G1 is an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. This is just the first clear and explicit INUS condition view of realization in the literature. Looking back, this converse is also relevant to later views, such as Robert Wilson's view about metaphysically contextual realization. (shrink)