This volume presents a collection of refereed papers reflecting the state of the art in the area of over-constrained systems. Besides 11 revised full papers, selected from the 24 submissions to the OCS workshop held in conjunction with the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, CP '95, held in Marseilles in September 1995, the book includes three comprehensive background papers of central importance for the workshop papers and the whole field. Also included is an introduction (...) by one of the volume editors together with a bibliography listing 243 entries. All in all this is a very useful reference book relevant for all researchers and practitioners interested in hierarchical, partial, and over-constrained systems. (shrink)

While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

In order to maximize human performance, defence forces continue to explore, develop, and apply human performance enhancement (HPE) methods, ranging from pharmaceuticals to (bio)technological enhancement. This raises ethical, legal, and societal concerns and requires organizing a careful reflection and deliberation process, with relevant stakeholders. We discuss a range of ethical, legal, and societal aspects (ELSA), which people involved in the development and deployment of HPE can use for such reflection and deliberation. A realistic military scenario with proposed HPE application can (...) serve as a starting point for such an iterative and participatory process. Stakeholders can discuss this application, modify its features, and design appropriate processes around it – for instance, procedures for informed consent. We propose that organizing aspects into these three categories – ethical, legal, and societal – can help involve appropriate interlocutors at different moments: legal aspects with people in strategy or management roles, from the start of a project; ethical aspects with people in operations and medical roles, during development; and societal aspects with people in communication and personnel roles, during deployment. Notably, we developed and discussed this framework and the three aspects in close collaboration with personnel from the military. (shrink)

_The Practice of Ethics_ is an outstanding guide to the burgeoning field of applied ethics, and offers a coherent narrative that is both theoretically and pragmatically grounded for framing practical issues. Discusses a broad range of contemporary issues such as racism, euthanasia, animal rights, and gun control. Argues that ethics must be put into practice in order to be effective. Draws upon relevant insights from history, psychology, sociology, law and biology, as well as philosophy. An excellent companion to (...) LaFollette's authoritative anthology, _Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Third Edition_. (shrink)

This book provides a look at philosophical practice from the viewpoint of the practitioner or prospective practitioner. It answers the questions: What is philosophical practice? What are its aims and methods? How does philosophical counseling differ from psychological counseling and other forms of psychotherapy. How are philosophical practitioners educated and trained? How do philosophical practitioners relate to other professions? What are the politics of philosophical practice? How does one become a practitioner? What is APPA Certification? What are (...) the prospects for philosophical practice in the USA and elsewhere? Handbook of Philosophical Practice provides an account of philosophy's current renaissance as a discipline of applied practice while critiquing the historical, social, and cultural forces which have contributed to its earlier descent into obscurity. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the present debate about business ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that the Journal of Business Ethics is hosting. Numerous contributions argued theoretical frameworks and taxonomies of CSR practices. The authors want to ground in this knowledge and provide further evidence about how companies adopt CSR practices to address stakeholders’ claims and consolidate their trust. Evidence was provided by a longitudinal case study about an Italian food company that is one of the largest producers (...) of baby food. This company reshaped its corporate strategy along three decades through the adoption of CSR practices in order to win stakeholders’ trust about food safety and supply chain behaviour. The empirical exercise was informed by a literature review of the relevant contributions in terms of CSR business practices and levels of efforts to adopt them. In light of this review, the authors adopted for the research framework the taxonomy of business practices proposed by Spiller (2000, “Ethical Business and Investment: A Model for Business and Society”, Journal of Business Ethics 27, 149-160) and the levels of commitment towards CSR proposed by Stahl and Grigsby (1997, Strategic Management; Total Quality & Global Competition (Blackwell, Oxford)). The main findings are discussed in order to argue theoretical implications and identify further areas of research and debate. (shrink)

This article discusses practice-near research in human services, a cluster of methodologies that may include thick description, intensive reflexivity, and the study of emotional and relational processes. Such methods aim to get as near as possible to experiences at the relational interface between institutions and the practice field. Psychoanalytically informed approaches to research are particularly fruitful here. In this article these are discussed in relation to the reflective practice and critical reflection traditions which have been widely discussed (...) within social work, healthcare, education, and allied fields. Drawing on Clifford Geertz's distinction between experience-near and experience-distant inquiry, this article also discusses the relationship between practice-near and practice-distant approaches. These may be used in parallel to investigate different but related objects of interest and can be used to triangulate different data when focussing on the same object; finally practice-near and practice-distant methods can be combined in interpretive procedures which depend on an oscillation between immersion within and distancing from the field. It is within such interpretive activity that habits of attention and interpretation developed in clinical settings, and described in the work of Wilfred Bion, can be brought to bear usefully on data analysis. (shrink)

Might practical reason be a species of theoretical reason? Can we make sense of practical deliberation as a special kind of theoretical cogitation over what you will do? The prospects of such a reduction may appear dim: it seems like it is one thing to be weighing up what you should (intend to) do, in light of your various reasons for action, and quite another thing altogether to be figuring out what you should believe you will do, in light of (...) your evidence. Here I aim to show how this reduction of our powers of practical reason to a branch of theoretical reason might be defensibly pulled off. On the view to be defended, your intentions to act are really beliefs about what you are will do, practical reasoning is nothing over and above the enterprise of predicting what you are going to do in light of evidence alone, and the constitutive aim of action turns out to be the same as the constitutive object of theoretical reason – namely, to believe the truth. (shrink)

A case is made here for a secular interpretation of spirituality to place against more orthodox religious versions which are currently gaining ground in English education as part of the government policy designed to encourage schools to apply for ‘academy’ status independent of local authority control. Given the rise of faith-based ‘free’ schools, it is important to provide a secular alternative as a foundation for morality and spirituality in the interests of maintaining state-funded institutions characterised by rationality and autonomy rather (...) than a commitment to nurturing specific religious beliefs. After considering arguments against faith-based education, I go on to suggest a secular approach to spirituality founded on mindfulness theory and practice originating in Buddhist traditions. (shrink)

Steven Keeva's "Transforming Practices" Is Changing Lives "Every lawyer and law student in America [should] read this book, study it, savor it, and make it a ...

This article analyses the dynamics of the use of institutional categories in institutional encounters. The focus is on documenting how categories are invoked to index what is relevant to situated knowing in interactional sequences where there is a need to bridge the gap between action and expectation. This general problem has been studied in the context of interactions between job applicants and vocational guidance officers in a public employment agency. Institutional categories are inference-rich, and they work as flexible tools that (...) allow participants to recontextualize and negotiate the issues at stake. In this sense, categories serve as constitutive tools that can be crafted to fit into a broad range of circumstances. However, in order to produce a relevant account, participants’ ways of reasoning need to fit into the institutionally specific traditions of argumentation and the practical outcomes which need to be produced. In this sense, the focus on accounting practices is illuminating when attempting to understand the situated knowing that maintains institutional practices. (shrink)

Douglas Walton has done extensive and valuable work on the concepts of presumption and practical reasoning. However, Walton’s attempt to model practical reasoning as presumptive is misguided. The notions of “inference” and of the burden of proof shifting back and forth between proponent and respondent are misleading and lead to counterintuitive consequences. Because the issue in practical reasoning is a proposal, not a proposition, there are, in the standard case, several perfectly good reasons on both sides simultaneously, which implies that (...) argument appraisal necessarily contains a subjective element—a fact argumentation theory needs to conceptualize. (shrink)

The Practice of Value is an exploration of a pervasive but puzzling aspect of our world: value. The starting-point is the Berkeley Tanner Lectures delivered in 2001 by the leading moral theorist Joseph Raz. His aim is to make sense of the dependence of value on social practice, without falling back on cultural relativism. The lectures are followed by discussions from three eminent philosophers, Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin, and Bernard Williams, and a response from Raz. The result is (...) a fascinating debate, accessible to readers throughout and beyond philosophy, about the relations between human values and human life. (shrink)

Recent reflection on the professional knowledge of teachers has been marked by a shift away from more reductive competence and skill-focused models of teaching towards a view of teacher expertise as involving complex context-sensitive deliberation and judgement. Much of this shift has been inspired by an Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom (phronesis) also linked by Aristotle to the development of virtue and character. This has in turn led recent educational philosophers and theorists – inspired by latter-day developments in virtue ethics (...) and virtue epistemology – to investigate the contribution of various forms of virtue to the effective practice of teaching. In this light, the present paper undertakes further exploration of the logical geography of virtue, character and practical deliberation in teaching. (shrink)

Terrence Kelly argues for a theory of practical rationality to explain and handle the issue of residential segregation in the United States. Kelly claims that theories of "racism as irrational" and rational choice are not explanatorily adequate in this regard. I argue that the theory of practical rationality is also not adequate because by allowing agents to offer accounts of their calculated behaviour, it allows little appraisal of the behaviour itself. I argue instead that better explanations could be offered by (...) appeal to ethical theory. Key Words: residential segregation • trust • practical rationality • ethical theory. (shrink)

This paper outlines Susan James’s analysis of Spinoza’s conception of practical imagination. It argues that there are three problems with her account. 1) The historical location James gives for the supposed shift away from rhetorical communication to egalitarian reasoning is problematic. 2) James uses the term ‘persuasion’ to describe both rational argumentation and rhetorical appeal to emotion as their genus or common denominator. 3) She relies on the traditional opposition between rhetorical capture of the mind through emotionally charged images and (...) empowerment of the mind through reasoning. (shrink)

Background: Practical wisdom, understood as knowing how to be or act in any present situation with clients, is believed to be an essential part of the knowledge needed to be a professional mental health worker. Exploring processes of adapting, extending knowledge and refining tacit knowledge grounded in mental health workers’ experiences with being in practice may bring awareness of how mental health workers reflect, learn and practice professional ‘artistry’. Research question: The aim of the article was to explore (...) mental health workers’ processes of development and learning as they appeared in focus groups intended to develop practical wisdom. The main research question was ‘How might the processes of development and learning contribute to developing practical wisdom in the individual as well as in the practice culture?’ Research design: The design was multi-stage focus groups, and the same participants met four times. A phenomenological hermeneutical method for researching lived experience guided the analysis. Participants and context: Eight experienced mental health workers representing four Norwegian municipalities participated. The research context was community-based mental health services. Ethical considerations: The study was reported to Norwegian Social Data Services, and procedures for informed consent were followed. Findings: Two examples of processes of re-evaluation of experience (Association, Integration, Validation, Appropriation and Outcomes and action) were explored. The health workers had developed knowledge in previous encounters with clients. In sharing practice experiences, this knowledge was expressed and developed, and also tested and validated against the aims of practice. Discussions led to adapted and extended knowledge, and as tacit knowledge was expressed it could be used actively. Discussion: Learning to reflect, being ready to be provoked and learning to endure indecisiveness may be foundational in developing practical wisdom. Openness is demanding, and changing habits of mind is difficult. Conclusion: Reflection on, and confrontation with, set practices are essential to building practice cultures in line with the aims of mental health services. (shrink)

Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis and outline a defense of its picture of practical reasoning against common objections. On such a picture, (...) practical reasoning provides a principle not externally imposed upon an action but rather constitutive of it. (shrink)

I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined by the (...) practical reasoning situations she is then in to which that particular proposition is relevant. According to the Unity Approach, the threshold for a subject to know any proposition whatsoever at a time is determined by a privileged practical reasoning situation she then faces, most plausibly the highest stakes practical reasoning situation she is then in. I argue that neither way of implementing the impurist strategy succeeds and so impurism does not offer a satisfactory response to the threshold problem. (shrink)

Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...) and an exclusionary reason not to follow some competing reasons. Exclusionary reasons are explained, and used to unlock the secrets of orders, promises, and decisions as well as rules. Games are used to exemplify normative systems. Inevitably, the analysis extends to some aspects of normative discourse, which is truth-apt, but with a diminished assertoric force. (shrink)

The "Practice Turn" in the Contemporary Socio-Human Sciences The paper provides an overview of the current situation in the socio-human sciences, which is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives. One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn". It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotelian phronesis. The author gives an account of (...) three main tenets of this turn with reference to both ancient Greek and modern conceptions of practice. (shrink)

In Thinking like a Mall Steven Vogel argues that there is no authoritative nature independent of human standards to which one can appeal to correct damaging environmental practices. Human practices are the only basis for interpreting the environment and our ecologically destructive practices have made our environment into the degraded thing that it is. Revising these flawed practices requires becoming alienated from them; only then can we be responsible for them. Alienation is overcome by a democratic community who chooses the (...) practices that correct deficient ones and that we can recognise as expressions of ourselves and be at home in. This paper argues that there is a key step missing in this process, which is how we become alienated from our practices. It is only by appreciating the broader social and institutional horizon, ‘Ethical Life’, by which norms receive their authority and lose it, that we can understand alienation and the normative change necessary to correct it. (shrink)

Practitioners’ ethical orientation and responses vary between practice settings. Yet, currently, the ethics for midwifery practice that is explicit in the literature and which provides the ideals of socialization into practice, is that of bio(medical)ethics. Traditional bioethics, developed because of World War II atrocities and increased scientific research, is based on moral philosophy, normative theory, abstract universal principles and objective problem solving, all of which focus on right and wrong ‘action’ for resolving dilemmas. They exclude context and (...) relationship. Personal narratives of mothers and midwives contest the appropriateness of these accepted values and systems for childbirth because they induce conflict between work-place/service provider ethics and personal/professional midwifery ethics. In contrast to the disembedded and disembodied approach of biomedical ethics, an ethically adequate response in midwifery practice resonates more with the ethics of intimates, such as feminist virtue ethics. (shrink)

Presenting the most comprehensive and lucid account of the topic currently available, Robert Audi's "Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision" is essential reading for anyone interested in the role of reason in ethics or the nature of human action. The first part of the book is a detailed critical overview of the influential theories of practical reasoning found in Aristotle, Hume and Kant, whilst the second part examines practical reasoning in the light of important topics in moral psychology - weakness of (...) will, self-deception, rationalization and others. In the third part, Audi describes the role of moral principles in practical reasoning and clarifies the way practical reasoning underlies ethical decisions. He formulates a comprehensive set of concrete ethical principles, explains how they apply to reasoning about what to do, and shows how practical reasoning guides moral conduct. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...) (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)

The practice-dependent approach to justice has received a lot of attention in post-millennium political philosophy. It has been developed in different directions and its normative implications have been criticized, but little attention has been directed to the very distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence and the question of what theoretically differentiates a practice-dependent account from mainstream practice-independent accounts. The core premises of the practice-dependent approach, proponents argue, are meta-normative and methodological. A key feature is the (...) presumption that a concept of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the social practices to which it is supposed to be applied. Closely related to this meta-normative thesis is an interpretive methodology for deriving principles of justice from facts about existing practices, in particular regarding their point and purpose. These two premises, practice-dependent theorists claim, differentiate their account since they are not accepted by practice-independent accounts and they justify different principles of justice than practice-independent accounts. Our aim in this article is to refute both and, demonstrating that practice-independent accounts may indeed accept the meta-normative and methodological premises of the practice-dependent accounts, and that we are given no theoretical reason to think that practice-dependent accounts justify other principles of justice for a practice than do practice-independent accounts. In other words, practice-dependent theorists have not substantiated their claim that practice-dependence is theoretically differentiated from mainstream accounts. When practice-dependent proponents argue for other principles of justice than mainstream theorists, it will be for the usual reason in normative theory: their first-order normative arguments differ. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that physicians’ restrictive attitudes in offering abortions during 1946–1965 in Sweden were due to their private values. The values, however, were rarely presented openly. Instead physicians’ values influenced their assessment of the facts presented—that is, the women's’ trustworthiness. In this manner the physicians were able to conceal their private values and impede the women from getting what they wanted and needed. The practice was concealed from both patients and physicians and never publicly discussed. (...) It is also argued that a similar tacit practice could currently be applied by palliative care physicians. Such practice might allow palliative care physicians to be restrictive when offering sedation therapy without appearing paternalistic or declaring conscientious objections. However, the practice runs counter to patients’ right to participate in making decisions. The women seeking abortion began to oppose the situation and eventually a new abortion law was introduced 1975. Patients at the end of life will never be able to protest against palliative care physicians’ restrictive attitudes. This is a vulnerable and weak group, unable to lodge complaints after the treatment. In order to respect patients’ autonomy, even suffering patients at the end of their lives, it is suggested that physicians should openly declare their values when it comes to providing treatments that might shorten life. Such transparency might facilitate more genuine shared decision-making and accordingly less suboptimal end-of-life care. (shrink)

This target article is concerned with the implications of the surprisingly different experimental practices in economics and in areas of psychology relevant to both economists and psychologists, such as behavioral decision making. We consider four features of experimentation in economics, namely, script enactment, repeated trials, performance-based monetary payments, and the proscription against deception, and compare them to experimental practices in psychology, primarily in the area of behavioral decision making. Whereas economists bring a precisely defined “script” to experiments for participants to (...) enact, psychologists often do not provide such a script, leaving participants to infer what choices the situation affords. By often using repeated experimental trials, economists allow participants to learn about the task and the environment; psychologists typically do not. Economists generally pay participants on the basis of clearly defined performance criteria; psychologists usually pay a flat fee or grant a fixed amount of course credit. Economists virtually never deceive participants; psychologists, especially in some areas of inquiry, often do. We argue that experimental standards in economics are regulatory in that they allow for little variation between the experimental practices of individual researchers. The experimental standards in psychology, by contrast, are comparatively laissez-faire. We believe that the wider range of experimental practices in psychology reflects a lack of procedural regularity that may contribute to the variability of empirical findings in the research fields under consideration. We conclude with a call for more research on the consequences of methodological preferences, such as the use on monetary payments, and propose a “do-it-both-ways” rule regarding the enactment of scripts, repetition of trials, and performance-based monetary payments. We also argue, on pragmatic grounds, that the default practice should be not to deceive participants. Key Words: behavioral decision making; cognitive illusions; deception; experimental design; experimental economics; experimental practices; financial incentives; learning; role playing. (shrink)

In philosophy, the last thirty years or so has seen a split between 'simulation theorists' and 'theory-theorists', with a number of variations on each side. In general, simulation theorists favour the idea that our knowledge of others is based on using ourselves as a working model of what complex psychological creatures are like. Theory-theorists claim that our knowledge of complex psychological creatures, including ourselves, is theoretical in character and so more like our knowledge of the world in general. The body (...) of this paper is divided into three parts. In Part I, I introduce the 'contrastive case' of autism. Autism is a developmental disorder that has recently become the focus of sustained philosophical and psychological attention because of the selective way in which it affects individuals' social capacities. Theory-theorists argue that autistic children's unique profile of assets and deficits is most fruitfully explained by their inability to develop and deploy a theory of mind. After considering the strengths of this hypothesis, I claim theory-theorists face two unresolved difficulties: explaining why high-functioning autistics who develop some theory of mind capacities still fail to engage in normal psychological knowing; and explaining why autistics are generally as unknowable to us in the privileged sense of normal psychological knowing as we are to them. In Part II, I provide the theoretical framework for addressing these challenges by developing an account of normal psychological knowing as psycho-practical expertise. In Part III, I return to the problem of autism, showing how this psycho-practical approach to normal psychological knowing may further suggest how to encompass various aspects of the disorder that tend to be ignored under the prevailing theory-theory approach. (shrink)

Moral behaviour, and more recently wisdom and prudence, are emerging as areas of interest in the study of business ethics and management. The purpose of this article is to illustrate that Cicero—lawyer, politician, orator and prolific writer, and one of the earliest experts in the field recognised the significance of moral behaviour in his society. Cicero wrote ‘Moral Duties’ (De Officiis) about 44 BC. He addressed the four cardinal virtues wisdom, justice, courage and temperance, illustrating how practical wisdom, theoretical/conceptual wisdom (...) and justice were viewed in Rome of the first century BC. ‘Moral Duties’ is a letter admonishing his son, Marcus. It refers to personal behaviour, business practice and analyses terms such as good faith and criminal fraud. In addition, it contains material which would be suitable for tutorials/seminars and discussions, particularly in the areas of critical thinking in business ethics and general management. A study of De Officiis in respect to present day management and business practice could give a wider perspective to business ethics and management students. If concepts such as moral virtue, moral propriety and moral goodness, many of which seem to be ignored in business situations today, are to be embedded in business leaders of the future, it is reasonable to expect that these qualities will be analysed and discussed by business students today. Further, a study of Cicero’s six-step approach, when preparing an address/speech, could be useful and productive for practitioners and students in this area. (shrink)

In this paper, I make three points. The first is that there is indeed a distinctive approach to moral methodology, different from standard moral reasoning, that can be described as “practice-dependence”. I argue that its distinctness lies in recommending an aptness claim , namely that moral principles for regulating social practices must be principles for better fulfilling the point of those practices, a point discoverable in shared understandings of the practice. Participants treat domestic political societies as having a (...) different point to the practice of international relations. On this approach, then, different moral principles apply in each case: principles of distributive justice between citizens in the former and principles of cooperative fairness between states in the latter. My second point is that this approach fails, however, an important test which I call the justifiability constraint . Any formulation of a moral principle assigning rights and duties, benefits and burdens, to people should be justifiable to those persons by reference to a moral value. Yet, as I show, the practice-dependence view cannot offer any justification based on moral value for the aptness claim. My last point is that both endorsers and critics of practice-dependence have mistakenly attributed this approach to theorists who restrict the scope of justice on the basis of moral justification. Such views are, in fact, incompatible with the aptness claim given that they offer plausible independently derived moral grounds for restricting the scope of justice. They are also compatible with the justifiability constraint. For these reasons, I conclude that practice-dependence is a red herring for debates on global justice. (shrink)

Working within an Archerian morphogenetic framework, I suggest that we need to pay more attention to practices. Instead of the mainstream focus on practice as action, I argue that we should pay attention to practices as a key structural and cultural element of analysis. Practices cannot be simply read-off from beliefs, that is, they are not an inevitable practical counterpart to belief. Although belief is relevant, it does not provide the full explanation for the presence of practices. Therefore, the (...) same or similar beliefs can result in significantly different practices depending on factors such as advances in technology and changes in modes of dissemination of theological doctrine. To illustrate my argument, I consider historical work on comparative religious practices, specifically the distinction between rituals and routines. A focus on the latter, as the conditions of possibility for the former, leads to some implications for the thesis of the morphogenesis of contemporary society. An analysis of the relationship between religious rituals and routines stresses the importance of placing both in their wider cultural and structural context. (shrink)

Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is the self-conscious will and that practical cognition is self-conscious volition. This essay addresses two puzzles for practical cognitivism. In akratic action, I act as I understand is illegitimate and not as I understand is legitimate. In permissible action, I act as I understand is legitimate and also do not act as I understand is legitimate. In both types of action, practical cognition seems to come apart from volition. How, then, can practical (...) reason be our will and practical cognition be volition? Practical cognitivists can solve these puzzles because the claims that practical reason is our will and that practical cognition is volition are about the nature of a capacity, and the nature of a capacity establishes standards of correctness for its exercises. Akratic action is a type of erroneous exercise of practical reason as tripping is an erroneous exercise our capacity to walk. Permissible action is a successful exercise of practical reason as stepping first with my right foot rather than my left is a successful exercise of my capacity to walk. The puzzles of akratic and permissible action do not refute practical cognitivism. (shrink)

The adoption of halal practices in the food and beverage industry is crucial for ensuring compliance with Islamic principles and meeting the growing demand for halal products. This qualitative study explores the perspectives of food and beverage producers and halal authorities on the implementation of halal practices in supply chain management. Focus group discussions were conducted with nine industry participants under the auspices of the Indonesian Institute for the Study of Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics (LPPOM). The discussions aimed to identify (...) behaviors and actions in adopting halal practices based on personal perceptions. The focus group discussions were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed to identify patterns and classify ideas into categories. The findings reveal nine key indicators of halal practice adoption behavior, including purchasing halal raw materials, managing warehouse storage areas, maintaining personal hygiene, managing the cleanliness of facilities and equipment, controlling the sourcing of halal materials, controlling the production process, disseminating halal information, conducting internal audits, and managing financial transactions. The study highlights the importance of these practices in preventing contamination, ensuring strict production processes, promoting effective communication, and maintaining financial transparency. The insights gained from this exploratory research contribute to a deeper understanding of halal practice adoption behavior and support the development of conceptual models for halal supply chain management in the food and beverage industry. (shrink)

Mainstream psychologists have not only ignored the unique and radical character of practice; they have generally misunderstood it. A major reason for this ignorance and misunderstanding is mainstream psychology's assumption of a particular ontology--abstractionism. With abstractionism, psychologists have generally assumed that abstractions, such as theories, techniques, and principles, capture and embody the fundamentally real. Most pertinently, abstractions are believed to precede and lay the foundation for good and thoughtful practice. Indeed, practices do not exist, in an important ontological (...) sense, except in relation to the concrete and particular situations and cultures that give rise to them, implying what we might call a relational ontology. The purpose of this article is to explore the possible meanings and implications of a relational ontology for psychology. I first attempt to clarify the important features of relational conceptions in general, distinguishing most importantly between their weak and strong forms. Then, I situate strong or ontological relationality historically by describing its initial embrace and eventual rejection by early scientists. To bring these historical lessons into the present, ontological relationality is next compared to the abstractionist understandings of the real and fundamental in mainstream psychology. These two forms of ontology are then illustrated by exploring their contrasting implications for individual and community identity. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)