A clock-transport method of synchronization employing proper time is described that yields in any given inertial system the same result as slow transport, but that imposes no limit on transport proper speed. It is argued that because the method involves only the empirically validated kinematic invariant proper time, on which all observers must agree, there exists an option to synchronize clocks in such a way that thesimultaneity of spatially separated events is agreed upon by all observers, (...) hence is “absolute.” Such agreement refers only to phase equality of members (present at the events judged simultaneous) of comoving clock sets, not to clock rates or clock phase numerical values in different inertial systems. The demonstration employs only the on-worldline assertions of Einstein's kinematics. It thus depends on a limited subset of his ideas and allows a different identification of the spacelike invariant. (shrink)

We describe our explicit Lorentz-invariant solution of the Einstein and null geodesic equations for the deflection experiment of 2002 September 8 when a massive moving body, Jupiter, passed within 3.7’ of a line-of-sight to a distant quasar. We develop a general relativistic framework which shows that our measurement of the retarded position of a moving light-ray deflecting body (Jupiter) by making use of the gravitational time delay of quasar’s radio wave is equivalent to comparison of the relativistic laws of the (...) Lorentz transformation for gravity and light. Because, according to Einstein, the Lorentz transformation of gravity field variables must depend on a fundamental speed c, its measurement through the retarded position of Jupiter in the gravitational time delay allows us to study the causal nature of gravity and to set an upper limit on the speed of propagation of gravity in the near zone of the solar system as contrasted to the speed of the radio waves. In particular, the v/c term beyond of the standard Einstein’s deflection, which we measured to 20% accuracy, is associated with the aberration of the null direction of the gravity force (“aberration of gravity”) caused by the Lorentz transformation of the Christoffel symbols from the static frame of Jupiter to the moving frame of observer. General relativistic formulation of the experiment identifies the aberration of gravity with the retardation of gravity because the speed of gravitational waves in Einstein’s theory is equal to the speed of propagation of the gravity force. We discuss the misconceptions which have inhibited the acceptance of this interpretation of the experiment. We also comment on other interpretations of this experiment by Asada, Will, Samuel, Pascual–Sánchez, and Carlip and show that their “speed of light” interpretations confuse the Lorentz transformation for gravity with that for light, and the fundamental speed of gravity with the physical speed of light from the quasar. For this reason, the “speed of light” interpretations are not entirely consistent with a retarded Liénard–Wiechert solution of the Einstein equations, and do not properly incorporate how the phase of the radio waves from the quasar is perturbed by the retarded gravitational field of Jupiter. Although all of the formulations predict the same deflection to the order of v/c, our formulation shows that the underlying cause of this deflection term is associated with the aberration of gravity and not of light, and that the interpretations predict different deflections at higher orders of v/c beyond the Shapiro delay, thus, making their measurement highly desirable for deeper testing of general relativity in future astrometric experiments like Gaia, SIM, and SKA. (shrink)

The Robertson–Walker (RW) metric allows us to apply general relativity to model the behavior of the Universe as a whole (i.e., cosmology). We can properly interpret various cosmological observations, like the cosmological redshift, the Hubble parameter, geometrical distances, and so on, if we identify fundamental observers with individual galaxies. That is to say that the interpretation of observations of modern cosmology relies on the RW metric. The RW model satisfies the cosmological principle in which the 3-space always remains isotropic and (...) homogeneous. One can derive the cosmological redshift relation from this condition. We show that it is still possible for us to obtain consistent results in a specific time-varying speed-of-light model without spoiling the success of the standard model. The validity of this model needs to be determined by observations. (shrink)

This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...) explanatory tool in order to account for the continuous and unfolding aspect of our experiences. In this article, I will raise some points of dissatisfaction with the very notion of the specious present, and while I shall not reject the specious present theories, I will argue that more is needed in order to have a proper understanding and explanation of our temporal experience. I will then discuss and defend a view of temporal experience whose basis can be found in Locke's Essay, and which, given some amendments and further development within a contemporary framework, provides us with a very good analysis of our experience of movement, change, and time – a view that helps us to avoid some burdensome commitments incurred by specious present theories and that can be fruitfully combined with these theories in order to yield a complete and more informative picture of the phenomenon of temporal experience. (shrink)

Prolepsis is a rhetorical device in which an expected future event is presented as though it was already an accomplished fact. In the speed and instantaneity of current experience, our time is structured like a prolepsis. Through an analysis of the proleptic structure of some contemporary practices, I raise questions concerning the political nature of time's interval. In the proleptic organization of time, the interval between present and future is devalued as an obstacle to an anticipated event. However, with (...) the help of Kant and Heidegger, I argue that time's interval consists of an act of temporalization which at once dissolves what has already presented itself and generates an absolutely new and singular event of time and being. The interval is an event in the process of being accomplished, and it is this properly political dimension of experience that is foreclosed in our contemporary organization of time. (shrink)

In the transition to Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity (SR), certain concepts that had previously been thought to be univocal or absolute properties of systems turn out not to be. For instance, mass bifurcates into (i) the relativistically invariant proper mass m0, and (ii) the mass relative to an inertial frame in which it is moving at a speed v = βc, its relative mass m, whose quantity is a factor γ = (1 – β2) -1/2 times the (...) proper mass, m = γm0. (shrink)

Language planning comprises a number of different though related aspects of linguistic activity, its proper realm ranging from the 'improvement' of existing ...

An operational approach to quantum mechanics has been developed in the past decades in our group in Brussels. A similar approach is taken in this work, making use of the extra operational depth offered by this approach, to show that the construction of spacetime is specific to each observer. What is usually referred to as the block universe then emerges by noting that parts of the past and future are also contained in the present, but without the limitations that a (...) four-dimensional block universe usually implies, of a reality in which change would be impossible. In our operational approach, reality remains dynamic, with free choice playing a central role in its conceptualization. We also show that, when operationally analyzed, the theory implies that objects move not only in space, but also and especially in time, and more generally in spacetime, with their rest mass being a measure of their kinetic time energy. We therefore claim that Einstein’s relativity revolution has not been fully realized, since most physicists are not ready to accept these consequences of the theory although the formula’s showing them, when operationally analyzed, are in every relativity textbook. In particular, when relativistic motion is revisited as a genuine four-dimensional motion, it becomes possible to reinterpret the parameter c associated with the coordinate speed of light, which becomes the magnitude of the four-velocity of all material entities. We observe that this four-dimensional motion in Minkowski space can also be better understood if placed in the broader perspective of quantum mechanics, provided that non-locality is interpreted as non-spatiality, thus indicating the existence of an underlying non-spatial reality, the nature of which could be conceptual, consistent with the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics. This hypothesis is reinforced by noting that when observers, or experiencers, as they will be referred to in this article, are described by acknowledging their cognitive nature of entities moving in a semantic space, Minkowski metric emerges in a natural way. (shrink)

Usually the Lorentz transformations are derived from the conservation of the spacetime interval. We propose here a way of obtaining spacetime transformations between two inertial frames directly from symmetry, the isotropy of the space and principle of relativity. The transformation is uniquely defined except for a constant e, that depends only on the process of synchronization of clocks inside each system. Relativistic velocity addition is obtained, and it is shown that the set of velocities is a bounded symmetric domain. If (...) e=0, Galilean transformations are obtained. If e>0, the speed 1/√e and a spacetime interval are conserved. By assuming constancy of the speed of light, we get e=1/c 2 and the transformation between the frames becomes the Lorentz transformation. If e<0, a proper speed and a Hilbertian norm are conserved. (shrink)

This paper is a review of the canonical proper-time approach to relativistic mechanics and classical electrodynamics. The purpose is to provide a physically complete classical background for a new approach to relativistic quantum theory. Here, we first show that there are two versions of Maxwell’s equations. The new version fixes the clock of the field source for all inertial observers. However now, the (natural definition of the effective) speed of light is no longer an invariant for all observers, (...) but depends on the motion of the source. This approach allows us to account for radiation reaction without the Lorentz-Dirac equation, self-energy (divergence), advanced potentials or any assumptions about the structure of the source. The theory provides a new invariance group which, in general, is a nonlinear and nonlocal representation of the Lorentz group. This approach also provides a natural (and unique) definition of simultaneity for all observers.The corresponding particle theory is independent of particle number, noninvariant under time reversal (arrow of time), compatible with quantum mechanics and has a corresponding positive definite canonical Hamiltonian associated with the clock of the source.We also provide a brief review of our work on the foundational aspects of the corresponding relativistic quantum theory. Here, we show that the standard square-root and Dirac equations are actually two distinct spin- $\frac{1}{2}$ particle equations. (shrink)

Increasingly, epistemologists are becoming interested in social structures and their effect on epistemic enterprises, but little attention has been paid to the proper distribution of experimental results among scientists. This paper will analyze a model first suggested by two economists, which nicely captures one type of learning situation faced by scientists. The results of a computer simulation study of this model provide two interesting conclusions. First, in some contexts, a community of scientists is, as a whole, more reliable when (...) its members are less aware of their colleagues' experimental results. Second, there is a robust tradeoff between the reliability of a community and the speed with which it reaches a correct conclusion. ‡The author would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Kyle Stanford, Jeffrey Barrett, Bruce Glymour, and the participants in the Social Dynamics Seminar at University of California–Irvine for their helpful comments. Generous financial support was provided by the School of Social Science and Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at UCI. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 135, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Some theorists, ranging from W. James to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies (...) on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds. (shrink)

Conventional rockets are not a suitable technology for interstellar missions. Chemical rockets require a very large weight of propellant, travel very slowly compared to light speed, and require significant energy to maintain operation over periods of years. For example, the 722 kg Voyager spacecraft required 13,600 kg of propellant to launch and would take about 80,000 years to reach the nearest star, Proxima Centauri, about 4.3 light years away. There have been various attempts at developing ideas on which one (...) might base a spacecraft that would permit interstellar travel, such as spacewarps. In this paper we consider another suggestion from science fiction and explore how the quantum vacuum might be utilized in the creation of a novel spacecraft. The spacecraft is based on the dynamic Casimir effect, in which electromagnetic radiation is emitted when an uncharged mirror is properly accelerated in vacuum. The radiative reaction produces a dissipative force on the mirror that tends to resist the acceleration of the mirror. This force can be used to accelerate a spacecraft attached to the mirror. We also show that, in principle, one could obtain the power to operate the accelerated mirror in such a spacecraft using energy extracted from the quantum vacuum using the standard Casimir effect with a parallel plate geometry. Unfortunately the method as currently conceived generates a miniscule thrust, and is no more practical than a spacewarp, yet it does provide an interesting demonstration of our current understanding of the physics of the quantized electromagnetic field in vacuum. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 64–65 Notes on Notes on Sound, July 18, 8:34pm Isaac Linder Paul de Man begins his landmark text, Allegories of Reading , with a cheeky epigraph from the philosopher Blaise Pascal. It reads, 'Quand on lit trop vite ou trop doucement on n’entend rien' (When you read too quickly or too slowly you hear nothing). The epigraph is cheeky because in the course of de Man's work he avoids elucidating at what speed one would one would (...) be able to properly hear the texts to which they are attending. For de Man the force of literary tropes—the way they seduce and structure their multiple readings—relies on the intimate proximity of figures and properties in the relational linkages of a text. Textual spatialization trumps and belies the importance of the tempo and temporality. Enter the "site"-specific text videos by the Korean-American writer and improvising musician, Bonnie Jones. In these works, unique to the venues that have solicited them, the time of writing is captured and stored in a complex digital apparatus in the first instance, along with all of the hesitations, repetitions, and sudden keystrokes attending its production. Speed is pro-scribed— written in advance—and the time (five minutes and sixteen seconds) of Notes on Sound is spatialized into an affective mesh that ensnares the viewer in a doppler effect created between the speed of writing and the speed of reading. We're caught in the tempo of Jones' decisions (that is, unless we fast forward, pause, or rewind the text; unless it freezes or takes too long to load). We find ourselves subvocalizing along to a deceptively simple prompt ("please now together count back from one hundred") as the phonetic units that comprise the video permute into polyphony and warp like the minimalist pixelations of a concrete poem into the grammar of the Notes (that is, unless we are reading along out loud). We are forced to feel our form of reading as it unfolds, in a manner arguably more proliferate and protocolized than would have been known in Pascal's time. Would he have been able to hear anything? With its understated use of syntax and short-circuiting Notes on Sound is without a soundtrack, but by no means silent: Meditation on counting, on the sound of counting, and what counts as sounding; on the way we count on sound as a pre-text for things to ring true, as they do in the famously less calculable arenas of, say, emotion and poetry. Notes on Sound is a record of these. If I become more emotional about this it is only because it forces us to hear her.  . (shrink)

In relativistic theories, the assumption of proper mass constancy generally holds. We study gravitational relativistic mechanics of point particle in the novel approach of proper mass varying under Minkowski force action. The motivation and objective of this work are twofold: first, to show how the gravitational force can be included in the Special Relativity Mechanics framework, and, second, to investigate possible consequences of the revision of conventional proper mass concept (in particular, to clarify a proper mass (...) role in the divergence problem). It is shown that photon motion in the gravitational field can be treated in terms of massless refracting medium, what makes the gravity phenomenon compatible with SR Mechanics framework in the variable proper mass approach.Specifically, the problem of point particle in the spherical symmetric stationary gravitational field is studied in SR-based Mechanics, and equations of motion in the Lorentz covariant form are obtained in the relativistic Lagrangean problem formulation. The dependence of proper mass on potential field strength is derived from the Euler-Lagrange equations as well. One of new results is the elimination of conventional 1/r divergence, which is known to be not removable in Schwarzschild gravitomechanics. Predictions of particle and photon gravitational properties are in agreement with GR classical tests under weak-field conditions; however, deviations rise with potential field strength. The conclusion is made that the approach of field-dependent proper mass is perspective for development of SR gravitational mechanics and further studies of gravitational problems. (shrink)

The concept of an objective spatial direction in special relativity is investigated and theories assuming light-speed isotropy while accepting the existence of a privileged spatial direction are classified, including so-called very special relativity. A natural generalization of the proper time principle is introduced which makes it possible to devise non-optical experimental tests of spatial isotropy. Several common misunderstandings in the relativistic literature concerning the role of spatial isotropy are clarified.

With Wind Wizard, Siobhan Roberts brings us the story of Alan Davenport, the father of modern wind engineering, who investigated how wind navigates the obstacle course of the earth's natural and built environments--and how, when not properly heeded, wind causes buildings and bridges to teeter unduly, sway with abandon, and even collapse. In 1964, Davenport received a confidential telephone call from two engineers requesting tests on a pair of towers that promised to be the tallest in the world. His resulting (...) wind studies on New York's World Trade Center advanced the art and science of wind engineering with one pioneering innovation after another. Establishing the first dedicated "boundary layer" wind tunnel laboratory for civil engineering structures, Davenport enabled the study of the atmospheric region from the earth's surface to three thousand feet, where the air churns with turbulent eddies, the average wind speed increasing with height. The boundary layer wind tunnel mimics these windy marbled striations in order to test models of buildings and bridges that inevitably face the wind when built. Over the years, Davenport's revolutionary lab investigated and improved the wind-worthiness of the world's greatest structures, including the Sears Tower, the John Hancock Tower, Shanghai's World Financial Center, the CN Tower, the iconic Golden Gate Bridge, the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, the Sunshine Skyway, and the proposed crossing for the Strait of Messina, linking Sicily with mainland Italy. Chronicling Davenport's innovations by analyzing select projects, this popular-science book gives an illuminating behind-the-scenes view into the practice of wind engineering, and insight into Davenport's steadfast belief that there is neither a structure too tall nor too long, as long as it is supported by sound wind science. (shrink)

In recent articles, Zangari (1994) and Karakostas (1997) observe that while an &unknown;-extended version of the proper orthochronous Lorentz group O + (1,3) exists for values of &unknown; not equal to zero, no similar &unknown;-extended version of its double covering group SL(2, C) exists (where &unknown;=1-2&unknown; R , with &unknown; R the non-standard simultaneity parameter of Reichenbach). Thus, they maintain, since SL(2, C) is essential in describing the rotational behaviour of half-integer spin fields, and since there is empirical evidence (...) for such behaviour, &unknown;-coordinate transformations for any value of &unknown;<>0 are ruled out empirically. In this article, I make two observations:(a)There is an isomorphism between even-indexed 2-spinor fields and Minkowski world-tensors which can be exploited to obtain generally covariant expressions of such spinor fields.(b)There is a 2-1 isomorphism between odd-indexed 2-spinor fields and Minkowski world-tensors which can be exploited to obtain generally covariant expressions for such spinor fields up to a sign. Evidence that the components of such fields do take unique values is not decisive in favour of the realist in the debate over the conventionality of simultaneity in so far as such fields do not play a role in clock synchrony experiments in general, and determinations of the one-way speed of light in particular.I claim that these observations are made clear when one considers the coordinate-independent 2-spinor formalism. They are less evident if one restricts oneself to earlier coordinate-dependent formalisms. I end by distinguishing these conclusions from those drawn by the critique of Zangari given by Gunn and Vetharaniam (1995). (shrink)

The pace of technological change continues to outstrip the evolution of democratic institutions, creating an urgent need for innovative approaches to democratic reform. However, the experimentation bottleneck - characterized by slow speed, high costs, limited scalability, and ethical risks - has long hindered progress in democracy research. This paper proposes a novel solution: employing generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to create synthetic data through the simulation of digital homunculi, GenAI-powered entities designed to mimic human behavior in social contexts. By enabling (...) rapid, low-risk experimentation with alternative institutional designs, this approach could significantly accelerate democratic innovation. I examine the potential of GenAI-assisted research to mitigate current limitations in democratic experimentation, including the ability to simulate large-scale societal interactions and test complex institutional mechanisms. While acknowledging potential risks such as algorithmic bias, reproducibility challenges, and AI alignment issues, I argue that the benefits of synthetic data are likely to outweigh their drawbacks if implemented with proper caution. To address existing challenges, I propose a range of technical, methodological, and institutional adaptations. The paper concludes with a call for interdisciplinary collaboration in the development and implementation of GenAI-assisted methods in democracy research, highlighting their potential to bridge the gap between democratic theory and practice in an era of rapid technological change. (shrink)

This article investigates the impacts of proper modeling of the wake effects and wind speed delays, between different wind turbines' rows, on the dynamic performance accuracy of the wind farms models. Three different modeling scenarios were compared to highlight the impacts of wake effects and wind speed time-delay models. In the first scenario, wind wake effect and time delay are ignored. Consequently, all wind turbines are assumed subjected to the same wind speed profile. The second scenario (...) considers the wind wake effect, and it was modeled by reducing the incident wind speed values by 0.5 m/s from one row to the next row facing the wind. The last scenario, the proposed model, used the wind wake effect model developed for wind turbines micrositting applications and considered the effect of the delay time between the wind speed profiles incident on the different wind turbines' rows. (shrink)

Sound propagation within certain non-relativistic condensed matter models obeys a relativistic wave equation despite such systems admitting entirely non-relativistic descriptions. A natural question that arises upon consideration of this is, “do devices exist that will experience the relativity in these systems?” We describe a thought experiment in which ‘acoustic observers’ possess devices called sound clocks that can be connected to form chains. Careful investigation shows that appropriately constructed chains of stationary and moving sound clocks are perceived by observers on the (...) other chain as undergoing the relativistic phenomena of length contraction and time dilation by the Lorentz factor, \, with \ the speed of sound. Sound clocks within moving chains actually tick less frequently than stationary ones and must be separated by a shorter distance than when stationary to satisfy simultaneity conditions. Stationary sound clocks appear to be length contracted and time dilated to moving observers due to their misunderstanding of their own state of motion with respect to the laboratory. Observers restricted to using sound clocks describe a universe kinematically consistent with the theory of special relativity, despite the preferred frame of their universe in the laboratory. Such devices show promise in further probing analogue relativity models, for example in investigating phenomena that require careful consideration of the proper time elapsed for observers. (shrink)

When we humans receive uncertain information, we interpret it properly, so we can expand the conversation, and take the proper actions. This is possible because we have “common sense” concerning the basic word concept, which is built up from long time experience storing knowledge of our language. Of the common sense we use in our every day lives we think that there are; common sense concerning quantity such as size, weight, speed, time, or place; common sense concerning sense (...) or feeling such as hot, beautiful, or loud; and moreover common sense concerning emotion such as happy or sad. In order to make computers closer to human beings, we think that the construction of a “Common Sense Judgment System” which deals with these kinds of common sense is necessary. When aiming to realize this “Common Sense Judgment System” and trying to make a computer have the same common sense knowledge and judgment ability as human beings, a very important factor is the handling of unknown words. Judgment concerning words which were given to the computer as knowledge before hand, it can refer to that knowledge, and the process will have no problem at all. But when an unknown word, which is not registered as knowledge, is inputted, how to process that word is a very difficult problem. In this paper, by using a concept base, which is made from several electric dictionaries; the degree of association, which is done based on the concept base; neural network, putting the closeness of meaning in consideration, we propose a method of unknown word processing, which connects an inputted unknown word to a representing word that is registered in the judgment knowledge base, and we will verify its effectiveness by experiment applied to the emotional judgment subsystem. (shrink)

Specialized Justice addresses the question of the desirability of specialization in the administration of justice. Should there be more, rather than less, sub-division of the judiciary into specialized tribunals? What is most desirable in terms of efficiency, speed, true justice, and cost? The author attempts to answer these questions both by examining theoretical paradigms and also by describing the results of an empirical study which he has undertaken. He concludes by examining variables that apply in different jurisdictions and which (...) should, if accounted for properly, allow generalized lessons to be extracted from the individual studies. (shrink)

ArgumentIn theAlmagest, Ptolemy finds that the apogee of Mercury moves progressively at a speed equal to his value for the rate of precession, namely one degree per century, in the tropical reference system of the ecliptic coordinates. He generalizes this to the other planets, so that the motions of the apogees of all five planets are assumed to be equal, while the solar apsidal line is taken to be fixed. In medieval Islamic astronomy, one change in this general proposition (...) took place because of the discovery of the motion of the solar apogee in the ninth century, which gave rise to lengthy discussions on the speed of its motion. Initially Bīrūnī and later Ibn al-Zarqālluh assigned a proper motion to it, although at different rates. Nevertheless, appealing to the Ptolemaic generalization and interpreting it as a methodological axiom, the dominant idea became to extend it in order to include the motion of the solar apogee as well. Another change occurred after correctly making a distinction between the motion of the apogees and the rate of precession. Some Western Islamic astronomers generalized Ibn al-Zarqālluh's proper motion of the solar apogee to the apogees of the planets. Analogously, Ibn al-Shāṭir maintained that the motion of the apogees is faster than precession. Nevertheless, the Ptolemaic generalization in the case of the equality of the motions of the apogees remained untouchable, despite the notable development of planetary astronomy, in both theoretical and observational aspects, in the late Islamic period. (shrink)

In the approximation that every inertial observer experiences a homogeneous, uniform flow of time and sees a space that is Euclidean, the arena of physics is Minkowskian and one speed is the same in all intertial frames. If a given intertial observer finds an infinitesimal source or particle traveling faster than this fundamental speed near a given event, the source must appear in some inertial frame spread over neighboring positions at a given time as a spacelike structure. If (...) this structure persists over a period of proper time, it can be interpreted as a wave group. If it is conserved, it can be interpreted as a line or tube of force. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem posed by the current split between the two opposed hypotheses in the growing literature on the fallacy of begging the question the epistemic hypothesis, based on knowledge and belief, and the dialectical one, based on formal dialogue systems. In the first section, the nature of split is explained, and it is shown how each hypothesis has developed. To get the beginning reader up to speed in the literature, a number of key problematic examples are (...) analyzed illustrating how both approaches can be applied. Useful tools are brought to bear on them, including the automated argument diagramming system Araucaria, and profiles of dialogue used to represent circular argumentation in a dialogue tableau format. These tools are used to both to model circular reasoning and to provide the contextual evidence needed to properly determine whether the circular reasoning in a given case is better judged fallacious or not. A number of technical problems that have impeded the development of both hypotheses are studied. One central problem is the distinction between argument and explanation. It is concluded that the best way to move forward and solve these problems is to reformulate the two hypotheses in such a way that they might be able to co-exist. On this basis, a unified methodology is proposed that allows each hypothesis to move forward as a legitimate avenue for research using the same tools. (shrink)

Plagiarism among university students is an important issue that affects their preparation and undermines the universities’ efforts to prepare skilled graduates. Universities try to fight this problem back with strict ethics policies, but they require the proper plagiarism detection tools, at affordable costs, to implement these policies. In this paper, we present PlagZap, a cost-efficient, high-volume and high-speed plagiarism detection system built using open-source software and designed to be used on textual student assignments. We discuss the advantages of (...) this design, plagiarism obfuscation methods and empirical results from using PlagZap. (shrink)

In this work, we focus on the philosophical aspects and technical challenges that underlie the axiomatization of the non-Kolmogorovian probability framework, in connection with the problem of quantum contextuality. This fundamental feature of quantum theory has received a lot of attention recently, given that it might be connected to the speed-up of quantum computers—a phenomenon that is not fully understood. Although this problem has been extensively studied in the physics community, there are still many philosophical questions that should be (...) properly formulated. We analyzed different problems from a conceptual standpoint using the non-Kolmogorovian probability approach as a technical tool. (shrink)

In sum, flashbacks and foreflashes are commonplace in narrative, and such rearrangements in the telling of a story seem to leave us not only with a story but with very much the same story.1... Will no disparity between the order of telling and the order of occurrence destroy either the basic identity or the narrative status of any story? An exception seems ready at hand: suppose we simply run our film...backwards. The result, though indeed a story, seems hardly to be (...) the same story in any usual sense... Does cinematic narrative actually differ this sharply from narrative in a series of snapshots or in words? I think not. Our first impulse with any tale when the order of telling is clear is to take the order of occurrence to be the same as the order of telling; we then make any needed corrections in accord with temporal indications given in the narrative and with our antecedent knowledge both of what happened and of causal processes in general. But discrepancy between order of telling and order of occurrence cannot always be discovered instantaneously—or at all. If our series of snapshots is shown in reverse order at normal speed, we readily detect the reversal; for we know that a race begins at the starting gate, ends at the finish line, and so on. Even if the pictures do not show the starting gate or finish line or other identifiable parts of the track, we are not deceived, for we know that horses do not run backward. But when the film is run backward, such clues and considerations usually cannot be brought to bear soon enough, and we momentarily mistake the direction of the actions filmed. A little time is needed to make the correction. What seemed like a drastic difference between film and other forms of narrative amounts to nothing more than this lag. · 1. In an obvious and important sense. Of course, whether two version are properly said to be of the same story—or of the same world—depends upon which of many permissible interpretations of sameness is understood; but that need not trouble us here. Nelson Goodman is emeritus professor of philosophy at Harvard and the founder of both Project Zero and the Harvard Dance Center. His works include The Structure of Appearance; Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, and Ways of Worldmaking. His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Status of Style", "Metaphor as Moonlighting", and "The Telling and the Told". (shrink)

How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and (...) distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas. (shrink)

It was shown in Dirac A117, 610; A118, 351, 1928) that the ultra-violet divergence in quantum electrodynamics is caused by a violation of the time-energy uncertainly relationship, due to the implicit assumption of infinitesimal time information. In Wheeler et al. it was shown that Einstein’s special theory of relativity and Maxwell’s field theory have mathematically equivalent dual versions. The dual versions arise from an identity relating observer time to proper time as a contact transformation on configuration space, which leaves (...) phase space invariant. The special theory has a dual version in the sense that, for any set of n particles, every observer has two unique sets of global variables \\) and \\) to describe the dynamics, where \ is the canonical center of mass. In the \\) variables, time is relative and the speed of light is unique, while in the \\) variables, time is unique and the speed of light is relative with no upper bound. In the Maxwell case, the two sets of particle wave equations are not equivalent. The dual version contains an additional longitudinal radiation term that appears instantaneously with acceleration, leading to the prediction that radiation from a cyclotron will not produce photoelectrons. A major outcome is the dual unification of Newtonian mechanics and classical electrodynamics with Einstein’s special theory of relativity, without the need for point particles, without a self-energy divergency and, without need for the problematic Lorentz–Dirac equation. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the dual theory of relativistic quantum mechanics. In our approach, we obtain three distinct dual relativistic wave equations that reduce to the Schrödinger equation when minimal coupling is turned off. We show that the dual Dirac equation provides a new formula for the anomalous magnetic moment of a charged particle. We can obtain the exact value for the electron g-factor and phenomenological values for the muon and proton g-factors. (shrink)

The stage of the formation and establishment of a market economy in Georgia raises the necessity for economic science to solve fundamentally different problems concerning the improvement of the investment environment and investment climate in national economy. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the replacement with new relationships has been quite difficult and painful in which foreign investments should play a crucial role. Issues to be discussed include the questions that explore some of the categories and the constraints (...) of the investment climate. All this leads to the relevance of the article and, therefore, determines the purpose of the article. The research process uses general dialectical methods of socio-economic research as well as modern methods of research of economic theory. The scientific aim of the research is to highlight the current issues of the investment environment and investment climate in economy, to study the transformation processes taking place in Georgia during the last two decades, to conduct analysis using proper methods, to show the current social and political as well as other important processes, to generalize them and to form proper opinions. Findings based on research suggest that it is possible to speed up the process of economic development of Georgia. However, the situation will remain difficult in the region and the factors causing the recession _ instability in oil prices and the weakening of the national currency against the US dollar will still be present. In conclusion, the opinion can be formed that a stable and predictable legislative process is important for the investment environment. Therefore, all the parties that may undergo the changes should be informed and involved in every project planned by the government; At present, it becomes necessary to further extend the deregulation policy, which should include the development of financial and investment sectors and support of the establishment of appropriate infrastructure, promotion of the further development of microfinance institutions, investment companies and funds, designing the system of investment insurance and stimulation, elimination of unnecessary bureaucracy and artificial barriers, etc. (shrink)

'His mind and hand went together' said Hemings and Condell of the speed of Shakespeare. But the conceptual language of literary criticism, be it moralistic or political, has long been too slow to the properly responsive to Shakespeare's meaning. With the help of both Renaissance philosophers and present-day actors, Sudden Shakepeare seeks to locate the underlying secrets of Shakespeare's dynamic power. It offers a technical language wihch, close to Shakespeare's own, is capable of responding suddenly to the speed, (...) transforming shape, and power of Shakespeare's way of thinking as it comes into meaning. (shrink)

Knowledge before belief ascription? Yes and no (depending on the type of “knowledge” under consideration). In an influential paper, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have recently presented a fascinating and provocative big picture that challenges foundational assumptions of traditional Theory of Mind research (Phillips et al., 2020). Conceptually, this big picture is built around the main claim that ascription of knowledge is primary relative to ascription of belief. The primary form of Theory of Mind (ToM) thus is so-called factive ToM that (...) centres around knowledge-related mental states that are true rather than meta-representational ToM that centres around subjective epistemic states like belief that may or may not be true (Nagel, 2017; Phillips & Norby, 2019). Empirically, Phillips and colleagues build on converging findings from different areas: Ample research in developmental psychology shows that children track who has had informational access to events (and thus knows about the events) before they keep track of others’ potentially false beliefs (e.g., Perner & Roessler, 2012). Many studies from comparative psychology have found evidence that non-human great apes keep track of others’ perceptual and informational access while there is no convincing evidence that they keep track of others’ beliefs (Horschler et al., 2020; Martin & Santos, 2016; Call & Tomasello, 2008). And, work from cognitive psychology and experimental philosophy suggests that adults are faster, for example, to judge what others know than to judge what they believe (Phillips et al., 2018).In this commentary, we would like to critically evaluate and friendly amend the claims put forward by Phillips and colleagues. Conceptually, while we agree that some form of factive Theory of Mind is primary, we would like to raise doubts whether this primary factive ToM already involves full-fledged knowledge ascription. Empirically, we will point to potential test cases that are suitable to test Phillips and colleagues’ account against the friendly amendment proposed here. Is knowledge ascription really primary relative to belief ascription?We agree that the empirical findings reviewed by Phillips and colleagues do make a strong case for the conjecture that some form of factive ToM is indeed (phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and cognitively) primary. But we suspect that this claim, in unqualified form, may be somewhat incomplete and misleading. There is not necessarily one unitary form of factive ToM, and one notion of “knowledge“ in play across development and evolution, and perhaps not even in adults‘ Theory of Mind. This suspicion builds on several foundations: First, from an empirical point of view there have been, as highlighted by the authors, characteristic U-shaped developmental curves in some tasks of factive ToM – often a reliable indicator that different underlying processes are in play (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Second, from a theoretical point of view, conceptual change and dual process approaches to ToM and other forms of social cognition have highlighted the possibility of more complex developmental trajectories such that earlier and more basic forms of a conceptual competence may be supplemented and superseded by later and more sophisticated refinements (e.g. Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner, 1991). For the case of factive ToM, it may be that there is a basic and primitive notion of “knowledge“ in place early in ontogeny (and perhaps phylogenetically more ancient) that shares some of the essential features of our mature “knowledge” concept: “knowledge” in this broad sense, as emphasized by the authors, is factive, not modality-specific, and allows for representations of egocentric ignorance. For this basic concept, the slogan “knowledge before belief“ may well be true. However, this basic concept need not yet be our mature notion of knowledge proper and thus this basic form of factive ToM may fall crucially short of our adult form of factive ToM. Why? Because essential elements of our mature concept of knowledge are still missing: First of all, while so-called Gettier cases and other considerations make clear that knowledge does not reduce to justified true belief (one can have justified true beliefs that still do not amount to knowledge; Gettier, 1963), according to many accounts knowledge at least presupposes justified true belief. Correspondingly, ascription of knowledge would thus presuppose ascription of belief. Now, we understand that this is one of the very traditional assumptions that Phillips and colleagues challenge, and given space restrictions we will not focus on it here any further (see, e.g, Rose & Schaffer, 2013). But there is a second crucial aspect of knowledge proper that is missing from the basic notion: knowledge proper is aspectual, and consequently reports of knowledge proper are intensional, while neither seems to be the case of basic knowledge and reports of it. Knowledge proper is aspectual in the following sense: whether or not someone knows something depends on how, under which aspects, she has had informational access to a given scene. Suppose Eve has seen Clark Kent enter the house. Does she know that Superman is in the house? It depends. If she knows about the identity Clark Kent = Superman, she does, otherwise she does not. Consequently, knowledge ascription is intensional in the sense that the substitution of co-referential terms is not necessarily truth-value preserving: “Eve knows that Clark Kent is in the house“ does not imply “Eve knows that Superman is in the house”.Now, from the point of view of cognitive development, much research suggests that children’s appreciation of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes (and the intensionality of propositional attitude reports) develops in protracted ways not before the age of four (e.g., Apperly & Robinson, 1998; Rakoczy et al., 2015; Proft et al., 2019). In fact, recent studies suggest that around age four children undergo a fundamental and coherent cognitive revolution: they acquire a solid meta-representational notion of propositional attitudes that allows them to ascribe subjective aspectual representations that may or may not be accurate: Children come to solve false belief tasks that require belief ascription at the same time as tasks that require an understanding of aspectuality, and there is strong convergence/correlation between these different tasks (Rakoczy, 2017; Rakoczy et al., 2015). These considerations thus evoke a somewhat modified picture of the developmental course of factive Theory of Mind: Some form of factive ToM, indeed, comes first (developmentally and phylogenetically). In this primary stage, subjects track agents‘ cognitive relations to the world that display some of the essential signatures of knowledge proper (factive; not modality-specific; allow for representations of egocentric ignorance). Various approaches in ToM research over the last years have aimed at describing this basic form of knowledge-like relations, for example in terms of “cognitive connections“ (Flavell, 1988), “registration“ (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), “experiential records“ (Perner & Roessler, 2012) or “awareness relations“ (Martin & Santos, 2016). While differing in focus and details, all these accounts converge in stressing one crucial point: this early form of factive ToM allows observer to keep track of what others have or have not witnessed and, in this sense, what they do or do not know. It allows, in other words, so-called “Level I” perspective-taking (Flavell, 1977): understanding what others see. But this early form of factive ToM still falls short of knowledge ascription proper because it lacks an appreciation of the essential aspectuality of propositional attitudes in general and of knowledge in particular. In other words, it does not yet allow for “Level II” perspective-taking: understanding how different agents may represent a given scene (Fizke et al., 2017; Low & Watts, 2013; Oktay-Gür et al., 2018). Only later, around age 4, do children then develop the new meta-representational framework of propositional attitudes that goes beyond basic factive ToM. Once they have this framework and thus an understanding of aspectuality at hand, they can extend their initial and primary factive ToM to acquire the mature concept of knowledge (as at least presupposing true, justified belief, where belief is necessarily aspectual). So, while basic knowledge ascription indeed precedes belief ascription, full-blown attribution of aspectual knowledge develops in tandem with belief attribution. Or in other words: basic factive ToM precedes full-blown meta-representational ToM but full-blown factive ToM does not (since it is itself a part of full-blown meta-representational ToM). Empirical outlookThis slightly modified picture raises many interesting new empirical questions, and makes competing predictions relative to the picture put forward by Phillips and colleagues: From developmental and comparative perspectives, the modified picture would predict that “knowledge before belief” only applies for a circumscribed set of knowledge-related situations: those in which knowledge ascription does not require sensitivity to the aspectuality of knowledge (does not require distinguishing, for example, “Does she know that Clark Kent is in the house?” vs. “Does she know that Superman is in the house?”) and is limited to Level I perspective-taking. Young children before the age of four and non-human primates should be able to solve such non-aspectual knowledge ascription problems. But only older children from around age four, once they have acquired the full-fledged conceptual apparatus of meta-representation, should be able to handle aspectual knowledge ascription. Regarding adult functioning, the most fundamental question is: Do adults operate with one unitary factive ToM, as Phillips and colleagues assume? Or are there two kinds of factive ToM throughout the lifespan, as our modified picture suggests? In particular, does the more basic version remain in operation in adulthood, perhaps even as the default mode, that reveals itself under conditions of speeded responses, limited cognitive resources etc.? If the latter were true, specific performance patterns should be found. First, results such that adults are faster at knowledge ascription than at belief ascription (as found in Phillips et al., 2018) should be restricted to designs where knowledge ascription does not require any considerations of aspectuality. In such designs (as they were used in Phillips et al., 2018), subjects can make use of their primordial (non-aspectual) factive ToM in knowledge ascription, but have to use their full-fledged (aspectual) ToM in belief ascription. However, in new cases in which knowledge ascription is potentially aspectual (“Does Eve know that Superman is in the house?”), the speed difference between knowledge and belief ascription should vanish since both now require full-fledged (aspectual) ToM. Second, and relatedly, fast factive ToM should have characteristic signature limits to do with the lacking appreciation of aspectuality (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low et al., 2016): Subjects under speeded conditions (or in dual task formats in which their central cognitive resources are taxed) should be unable to systematically distinguish between “Eve knows that Clark Kent is the house” (true) and “Eve knows that Superman is in the house” (possibly true). No such signature limits should be expected, in contrast, under reflective conditions in which subjects can use their full-fledged and mature factive ToM. Interestingly, these hypothetical developmental and adult performance patterns would correspond to similar patterns found in the domain of modal judgments. Adults, it seems, have two notions of modality at their disposal: a more primitive (ontogenetically old) default notion that does not differentiate between descriptive and normative modals and thus yield characteristic signature limits; and more differentiated and nuanced notions (ontogenetically more recent) that do sharply distinguish between different forms of modality. What works fast and gets addressed in speeded tasks is the primitive default notion (in speeded tasks, adults tend to confuse what is possible with what is permitted, for example, in the way very young children do) whereas the more nuanced notions reveal themselves in reflective task settings in which adults are not subject to such confusions (Phillips & Cushman, 2017). Modality judgments and factive ToM may thus reveal striking analogies. Just like in the area of modality, then, there may be basic and default factive ToM, present from early on and in operation throughout the lifespan in speeded responses (and under other conditions of limited cognitive resources), and more sophisticated factive Theory of Mind that develops later on the basis of full-fledged meta-representation and that reveals itself in more reflective judgements. (shrink)

Numerous studies have focused on the understanding of rapid automatized naming, which can be applied to predict reading abilities and developmental dyslexia in children. Eye tracking technique, characterizing the essential ocular activities, might have the feasibility to reveal the visual and cognitive features of RAN. However, traditional measures of eye movements ignore many dynamical details about the visual and cognitive processing of RAN, and are usually associated with the duration of time spent on some particular areas of interest, fixation counts, (...) revisited fixation counts, saccadic velocities, or saccadic amplitudes. To cope with this drawback, we suggested an entropy-based method to measure eye movements for the first time, which first mapped eye movements during RAN in a time-series and then analyzed the time-series by a proper definition of entropy from the perspective of information theory. Our findings showed that the entropy was more sensitive to reflect small perturbation of eye movements, and thus gained better performance than traditional measures. We also verified that the entropy of eye movements significantly deceased with the age and the task complexity of RAN, and significantly correlated with traditional eye-movement measures [e.g., total time of naming ] and the RAN-related skills [e.g., selective attention, cognitive speed, and visual-motor integration]. Our findings may bring some new insights into the understanding of both RAN and eye tracking technique itself. (shrink)

In this article I am going to reconstruct Stephen Toulmin’s procedural theory of concepts and explanations in order to develop two overlooked ideas from his philosophy of science: methods of representations and inferential techniques. I argue that these notions, when properly articulated, could be useful for shedding some light on how scientific reasoning is related to representational structures, concepts, and explanation within scientific practices. I will explore and illustrate these ideas by studying the development of the notion of instantaneous (...) class='Hi'>speed during the passage from Galileo’s geometrical physics to analytical mechanics. At the end, I will argue that methods of representations could be considered as constitutive of scientific inference; and I will show how these notions could connect with other similar ideas from contemporary philosophy of science like those of models and model-based reasoning. (shrink)

En esta ponencia nos proponemos mostrar que ciertas tesis o consensos recibidos sobre pseudoprocesos causales , procesos cuya característica prominente parece ser superar la velocidad de la luz, deben ser cuestionados o seriamente modificados. Dos de dichos consensos son, primero, que los PSP deberían ser tratados simplemente como "basura espacio-temporal" y, segundo, que ellos no cumplen, aparte de permitir aislar procesos causales genuinos, ninguna función epistémica o metodológica en la descripción de cualquier estado físico, en particular, al interior de la (...) relatividad especial . Para ello, apelaremos a procedimientos de medición física bien conocidos tanto en física clásica como en RE. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, argumentamos que, una vez que los PSP son integrados en toda la escena física, se revela que ellos juegan un rol fundamental y más complejo en la física experimental de lo que hasta ahora se ha pensado. In this paper we show that some received contentions about causal pseudo processes , processes of which the most salient aspect seems to be travelling faster than the speed of light, must be rejected o seriously modified. Two of such contentions are, first, that PSPs should be considered just "spatiotemporal junk" and, second, that they do not meet, besides allowing us to isolate proper genuine causal processes, any other epistemic or methodological role in the description of a physical state of affair, in particular, in a special relativity setting. In order to do that, we are going to appeal to physical measure procedures, well known both in classic and relativistic physics. As a consequence of that, we contend that, once PSPs are integrated into the whole physical scenario, a fundamental and more complex role for them in experimental physics is revealed. (shrink)

Experiments with the simple pendulum are easy, but its motion is nevertheless confounded with simple harmonic motion. However, refined theoretical models of the pendulum can, today, be easily taught using software like CALCODE. Similarly, the cycloidal pendulum is isochronous only in simplified theory. But what are theoretically equal intervals of time? Newton accepted Barrow’s even tenor hypothesis, but conceded that ‘equal motions’ did not exist – the refutability of Newtonian physics is independent of time measurement. However, time measurement was the (...) key difficulty in reconciling Newtonian physics with electrodynamics. On Poincaré’s criterion of convenience, equal intervals of time ought be so defined as to make the enunciation of physics simple. Hence he postulated constancy of the speed of light. (The Michelson–Morley experiment was not critical.) The theory of relativity followed. But does there exist a proper clock? (shrink)

In order to deal with high-dimensional distributed data, this article develops a novel and communication-efficient approach for sparse and high-dimensional data with the penalized quantile regression. In each round, the proposed method only requires the master machine to deal with a sparse penalized quantile regression which could be realized fastly by proximal alternating direction method of multipliers algorithm and the other worker machines to compute the subgradient on local data. The advantage of the proximal ADMM algorithm is that it could (...) make every parameter of iteration to have closed formula even in high-dimensional case, which greatly improves the speed of calculation. As for the communication efficiency, the proposed method does not sacrifice any statistical accuracy and provably improves the estimation error obtained by centralized method, provided the penalty levels are chosen properly. Moreover, the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimation and the convergence of the algorithm are convincible. Especially, it presents extensive experiments on both the numerical simulations and the HIV drug resistance data analysis, which all confirm the significant efficiency of our proposed method in quantile regression for distributed data by comparative and empirical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper the classical topic of “conventionality” in defining the simultaneity (or synchrony) of distant events is tackled again, and the validity of Reichenbach's view is carefully circumscribed. In particular, the role of “one-way” assumptions in the foundations of special relativity is emphasized. The restriction by the round-trip isotropy condition on the admissible distance functions in inertial frames is studied, and its relevance to several issues (absolute simultaneity, the interpretation of Michelson–Morley type experiments, the self-measured speed of a (...) clock) is shown. Two “clock transport” synchronizations in an inertial frame, using self-measured speed and “proper distance,” are presented in detail, and the agreement of the synchronies so established with standard synchrony is proven to be non- circular. By assuming a reasonable concept of “convention” this result is shown to dissolve several objections by supporters of a strong version of conventionalism. Throughout, a number of common misapprehensions in the literature are pointed out. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits by Rocco PezzimentiAdam CarringtonPEZZIMENTI, Rocco. The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits. Herefordshire, U.K.: Gracewing, 2021. 207 pp. Paper, $22.00Rocco Pezzimenti's The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits is an ambitious book. A professor at LUMSA, Rome, he seeks to consider anew the (...) nature, structure, and purposes of democracy as well as the society in which this form of government best operates. He sees this task as needed because, he argues, contemporary democracies face new challenges that threaten their legitimacy and their capacity to fulfill their just and needed purposes. He notes that democracies are not "infallible," either morally or in their ability to maintain themselves, and thus need conscious understanding and prudent maintenance.The subtitle establishes the three main themes by which he diagnoses and addresses democracy's trials. Pezzimenti orders his argument most through the lens of limits. While present in all spheres and regimes, popular government in particular partakes of limitation, since "mutual limitation... is the basis of our democracies." Limits for Pezzimenti stem from distinct elements of a society competing for finite power ordered toward action. Many of our political and social problems, both past and present, stem from denying limitations or misordering their interactions. The presentism that tempts democracy must be tempered by the limits the past places on it. Institutions are one helpful means for this interaction, which helps guard against a "utopianism which wants to solve everything immediately, deceiving itself that it can perform miracles." Law itself involves limits, placing boundaries on the action of private persons and public entities. So does pluralism and "polyarchy," whereby we recognize the limits particular persons and communities place on politics' universalism as well as how politics restrains these other elements from descending into intolerant, selfish particularity. Important to this point is Pezzimenti's discussion of sovereignty, which must not be reduced to a mere question of who rules and where but to the question of rightly pursuing a common good respectful of individual rights. True freedom inheres in the proper cohering of these elements.Pezzimenti turns to the distribution of powers within a community as part of the discussion of limits. He argues that "the traditional tripartition, theorized by Polybius and on to Montesquieu, today appears certainly insufficient." To define all political power as legislative, executive, and judicial, then to distribute them among competing institutions, does not fully account for the contemporary political landscape. Moreover, those [End Page 361] "classic" powers themselves need to be rethought to meet today's concerns. Legislative power must account for claims that its representative systems either are oligarchic in practice or lead to crass populism, and that they fail to account for group identities as opposed to class ones. The executive must evolve in pursuit of a better "efficiency and efficacy"—including speed of response to problems—that requires a better relationship with the modern bureaucracy, which he describes as "the other face of the executive." The judicial power must focus on a renewed impartiality, especially in relation to the additional powers Pezzimenti thinks need to be named and then tamed. The new powers that he says we must recognize include the press, mass media, technology, and more. Here, Pezzimenti categorizes as powers the functions of government (making, enforcing, and adjudication of the law) alongside avenues or means for exercising political influence, if not outright control. These other forces have distorted democracy's needed limits partly because law and custom have not adequately accounted for their evolving role in power.These issues lead to the last challenge, that of representation. The problem of representation threatens democracy's legitimacy, since this form of government is grounded more than any other in the idea that "power must be the expression of the community." Yet even here the issue of limits orders the discussion. The unaccounted-for new powers described above remove too many limitations either on crass populism or encroaching rule of elites. The former can abuse individual rights, which he says "are not negotiable," based on oppressive whims... (shrink)

When we humans receive uncertain information, we interpret it properly, so we can expand the conversation, and take proper actions. This is possible because we have "commonsense" concerning the word, which is built up from knowledge that is stored through long time experience. Among the commonsense we use in our every day lives it is thought that there are the commonsense concerning; quantity such as size, weight, speed, time, or place; sense or feeling such as hot, beautiful, or (...) loud; and moreover emotion such as happy or sad. In order for computers to understand the meaning and become closer to human beings, it is thought that the construction of a "Commonsense Judgment System" which deals with these "commonsense" is necessary. A subsystem needed for the "Commonsense Judgment System" is the system that judges the commonsense concerning the characteristics of words, namely the "Commonsense Feeling Judgment System." This paper proposes a mechanism to associate the characteristics of a word based on our five senses, such as an apple is red, with a knowledge base consisting of basic words. When aiming to realize this "Commonsense Feeling Judgment System" and trying to make a computer have the same commonsense and judgment ability as human beings, a very important factor is the handling of unknown words. Judgment concerning words, which are given to the computer as knowledge before hand, is not a problem since it can refer to that knowledge. But when an unknown word, non-registered knowledge, is inputted, how to process that word is a very difficult problem. In this paper, a method of unknown word processing, which connects an inputted unknown word to a word that is registered in the judgment knowledge base, is proposed. By using a concept base, which is made from several electric dictionaries, the closeness of meaning is put into consideration. With this process, it is possible to understand a word that does not exist in the knowledge base. This study aims to retrieve the meaning concerning sense, and deepen semantic understanding. (shrink)

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

A well-known relativistic action at a distance interaction of two unequal masses is altered so as to yield purely Newtonian radial forces with fixed particle rest masses in the system center-of-momentum inertial frame. Although particle masses experience no kinematic mass increase in this frame, speeds are naturally restricted to less than the speed of light. We derive a relation between the center-of-momentum frame total Newtonian energy and the composite rest mass. In a new proper time quantum formalism, we (...) obtain an L2(R4 ⊗ R4, C) Hilbert space by varying individual particle rest masses. We propose the use of density operators, recognizing that the auxiliary proper time parameter is not an observable. The quantum formalism is applied to our altered version of the relativistic harmonic oscillator. Our generalized coherent states yield four-dimensional wave packets which follow the correct classical world lines. Appendices contain reviews of classical Hamiltonian reparametrization (incorporating our notion of manifest covariance), and a comparison of this work with the literature. (shrink)

The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in (...) which we have neurological occurrences just like any normal situation in which we actually perceive spatio-temporal objects, but where we are deceived in some sense as a result of the manipulation of our brains from some outside source. In this work I attempt to address the problem of philosophical skepticism by claiming that most of us are able to come to know plenty about external reality, since we can come to realize that a certain philosophical theory of perception is correct. The theory I have in mind is what I call a non-cognitive theory of perception. According to this view, perceptual experience is defined by continuous, sensitive behavioral interaction with spatio-temporal objects of the appropriate size, shape, hardness, speed, etc. Knowing that this theory of perception is correct is equivalent to knowing that we know plenty about external reality. This is ultimately because by knowing that a non-cognitive theory of perception is true, we know that any skeptical scenario must fail to obtain. The structure of the work proceeds by first discussing the significance of the problem of philosophical skepticism in some detail. Chapter 1 lays out how the problem does indeed forcefully arise if it is conceded that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. Chapter 2 develops the sort of view of our epistemological situation that falls out of accepting without qualification that the problem exists. Chapter 3 examines and criticizes certain popular responses to the skeptical problem. The main goal of these first three preliminary chapters is to indicate that once it is admitted that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain, the problem of philosophical skepticism forcefully presents itself. Chapter 4, however, attacks the idea that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. In this chapter I argue that this idea is wedded to the position that a certain theory of perception is correct. The theory in question is what I call a conjunctive theory of veridical experience. According to this view, normal experience of spatio-temporal objects occurs when a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that experience also happens to match up with and/or be satisfied by what is really the case. Only when a theory of this sort is assumed, I argue, is the claim that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain found to be obvious. In chapter 5 I argue that, in fact, a non-cognitive theory, rather than a conjunctive theory, is the correct view to maintain. In the final chapter 6 I develop the epistemological position that falls out of accepting a non-cognitive theory. (shrink)

This study combines the discovery methods and training of innovative talents, China’s requirements for improving talent training capabilities, and analyses the relationship between the number of professional enrollments in colleges and universities and the demand for skills in specific places. The research learns the characteristics and training models of innovative talents, deep learning, neural networks, and related concepts of the seasonal difference Autoregressive Moving Average Model. These concepts are used to propose seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average back propagation. Firstly, the (...) SARIMA-BP artificially sets the weight parameter values and analyzes the model’s convergence speed, superiority, and versatility. Then, particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to pre-process the model and test its independence. The accuracy of the model is checked to ensure its proper performance. Secondly, the model analyzes and predicts the relationship between the number of professional enrollments of 10 colleges and universities in a specific place and the talent demand of local related enterprises. Moreover, the established model is optimized and tested by wavelet denoising. Independent testing is done to ensure the best possible performance of the model. Finally, the weight value will not significantly affect the model’s versatility obtained by experiments. The prediction results of professional settings and corporate needs reveal that: there is a moderate correlation between professional locations and corporate needs; colleges and universities should train professional talents for local enterprises and eliminate the practical education concepts. (shrink)

In this work, a neo-classical relativistic mechanics theory is presented where the spin of an electron is an inherent part of its world space-time path as a point particle. The fourth-order equation of motion corresponds to the same covariant Lagrangian function in proper time as in special relativity except for an additional spin energy term. The theory provides a hidden-variable model of the electron where the dynamic variables give a complete description of its motion, giving a classical mechanics explanation (...) of the electron’s spin, its dipole moments, and Schrödinger’s zitterbewegung, These features are also described mathematically by quantum mechanics theory, of course, but without any physical picture of an underlying reality. The total motion of the electron can be decomposed into a sum of a local spin motion about a point and a global motion of this point, called here the spin center. The global motion is sub-luminal and described by Newton’s Second Law in proper time, the time for a clock fixed at the spin center, while the total motion occurs at the speed of light c, consistent with the eigenvalues of Dirac’s velocity operators having magnitude c. The local spin motion is an inherent perpetual motion, which for a free electron is periodic at the ultra-high zitterbewegung frequency and its path is circular in a spin-center reference frame. In an electro-magnetic field, this spin motion generates magnetic and electric dipole energies through the Lorentz force on the electron’s point charge. The electric dipole energy corresponds to the spin-orbit coupling term involving the electric field that appears in the corrected Pauli non-relativistic Hamiltonian, which has long been used to explain the doublet structure of the spectral lines of the excited hydrogen atom. Pauli’s spin-orbit term is usually derived, however, from his magnetic dipole energy term, including also the effect of Thomas precession, which halves this energy. The magnetic dipole energy from Pauli’s and Dirac’s theory is twice that in the neo-classical theory, a discrepancy that has not been resolved. By defining a spin tensor as the angular momentum of the electron’s total motion about its spin center, the fundamental equations of motion can be re-written in an identical form to those of the Barut–Zanghi electron theory. This allows the equations of motion to be expressed in an equivalent form involving operators applied to a state function of proper time satisfying a neo-classical Dirac–Schrödinger spinor equation. This state function produces the dynamic variables from the same operators as in Dirac’s theory for the electron but without any probability implications. It leads to a neo-classical wave function that satisfies Dirac’s relativistic wave equation for the free electron by applying the Lorentz transformation to express proper time in the state function in terms of an observer’s space-time coordinates, showing that there is a close connection between the neo-classical theory and quantum mechanics theory for the electron’s dynamics. (shrink)

This work presents a distributed generation system that combines system of a wind turbine and photovoltaic using a unified power quality conditioner. Along with providing active power to the utility grid, Wind-PV-UPQC improves PQ indicators, for example, voltage drops/surges, harmonics of grid voltages, and PF. Since Wind-PV-UPQC depends on dual compensation scheme, the parallel converter works as a sinusoidal voltage source, while the series converter works as a sinusoidal current source. In this way, a smooth transition from grid operation to (...) island operation and vice versa can be achieved without load voltage transitions. In addition, in order to overcome the problems through abrupt solar radiation or wind speed variations, a faster power balance is achieved between the wind turbines, the PV array, and the grid, as FFCL pursue the production of the current references of series converter. Consequently, the dynamic reactions of the converter currents and the voltage of dc bus are enhanced. A comprehensive analysis of flow of the AP through the converters is done to ensure a proper understanding of how Wind-PV-UPQC works. Finally, the simulation results are shown to estimate the dynamic and static performance of Wind-PV-UPQC in conjunction with the power distribution system. (shrink)

The spread of epidemics, especially COVID-19, is having a significant impact on the world. If an epidemic is not properly controlled at the beginning, it is likely to spread rapidly and widely through the coexistence relationship between natural and social systems. A university community is a special, micro-self-organized social system that is densely populated. However, university authorities in such an environment seem to be less cautious in the defence of an epidemic. Currently, there is almost no quantitative research on epidemic (...) spreading and response strategies in universities. In this paper, a case study of a university community is considered for a simulation of an infection evolving after an epidemic outbreak based on the method of system dynamics of the three stages. The results show the following: By improving the speed of the initial emergency response, the total number of patients can be effectively controlled. A quarantine policy helps to slow down the evolution of infection. The higher the isolation ratio, the higher the cost; therefore, the isolation ratio should be optimized. It is important to make emergency plans for controlling epidemic spreading and carry out emergency drills and assessments regularly. According to the results of this study, we suggest an emergency management framework for public health events in university communities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Euthanasia in Utopian LiteratureLyman Tower Sargent (bio)The word euthanasia, meaning a peaceful, gentle, or easy death, has been traced back to Roman times. But the "good" in a good death is obviously open to interpretation. Good for whom? The individual? The family of the individual? The society? And, who decides? The individual? The doctor? The family of the individual? The legal system? These questions are constantly raised throughout the (...) literature with diametrically opposed answers given from the earliest times to the present. And, unfortunately, one word is used for all the positions, with two subcategories, voluntary and involuntary, both of which are perceived as good for someone.Death is universal but whether or not a person should have a choice about when to die or voluntary euthanasia is deeply controversial.1 Inducing such a death, primarily in cases of a painful terminal disease, appears to be largely a nineteenth-century invention while, of course, existing as a concept well before that.2 Also, discussions of voluntary euthanasia raise related issues, suicide, involuntary euthanasia, and how eugenics has determined the criteria for involuntary euthanasia. Also, the fear of someone [End Page 238] being putting to death for the convenience or advantage of the living has been the most prominent issue, and one must wonder if involuntary euthanasia, at least when consent was possible but not given, ever constitutes a "good" death. As simply a peaceful and painless death, the earliest use of the word was by Suetonius in the early first century, where in his life of Augustus he reports Augustus's position on death as that "on hearing that anyone had died swiftly and painlessly, he prayed that he and his might have a like euthanasia, for that was the term he was wont to use."3 In his De Augmentis Scientiarum [Advancement of Learning], Francis Bacon refers to this statement, commenting, "For it is no small fidelity which Augustus Caesar was wont so earnestly to pray for, that same Euthanasia … was not so much like death as like falling into a deep and pleasant sleep." And Bacon continued: "In our times the physicians make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after he is given up, whereas in my judgment, if they would be wanting in their office, and indeed to humanity, they ought to acquire the skill and to bestow the attention whereby the dying may pass more easily out of life. This part I call the inquiry concerning outward Euthanasia, or the easy dying of the body (to distinguish from that Euthanasia which regards the preparation of the soul)."4The most explicit statement, generally ignored for sixty years, was that made in an 1870 speech to the Birmingham Speculative Club by Samuel D. Williams Jr., about whom little is known. Williams proposed:That in all cases of hopeless and painful illness, it should be the recognized duty of the medical attendant, whenever so desired by the patient, to administer chloroform or such other anæsthetic as may by-and-bye supersede chloroform—as to destroy consciousness at once, and put the sufferer to a quick and painless death; all needful precautions being adopted to prevent any possible abuse of such duty; and means being taken to establish, beyond the possibility of doubt or question, that the remedy was applied at the express wish of the patient.5This was not, though, the usual practice and many doctors saw no need to act. In an 1887 book one doctor contended that "as long as there was proper medical care, there was no need to speed up death to relieve suffering."6 Still, Williams's position is in almost all respects the position taken by advocates [End Page 239] of voluntary euthanasia since then, although it did not get much of an airing again until C. Killick Millard, the Medical Officer of Health of Leicester, gave the Presidential address to the Society of Medical Officers of Health in late 1931. There he said, referring to Bacon, thatthe proposition merely is that individuals, who have attained to years of discretion, and who are suffering from an incurable and fatal disease which usually... (shrink)