Within the context of psychological measurement, realist commitments pervade methodology. Further, there are instances where particular scientific practices and decisions are explicable most plausibly against a background assumption of epistemic realism. That psychometrics is a realist enterprise provides a possible toehold for Stephen Jay Gould’s objections to psychometrics in The Mismeasure of Man and Joel Michell’s charges that psychometrics is a “pathological science.” These objections do not withstand scrutiny. There are no fewer than three activities in ongoing psychometric (...) research which presuppose a commitment to a minimal epistemic realism. Those activities include selecting between different models for representing data, estimating ability in the context of item response theory, and the move to make the individual the fundamental unit of analysis in psychometrics thereby calling for a shift in what sorts of data are evidentially relevant. In none of these activities are the commitments and disregard for evidence that Gould and Michell find objectionable or “pathological.”. (shrink)

In his Contributions to Philosophy, Martin Heidegger introduces "acceleration" as one of the three symptoms--along with "calculation" and the "outbreak of massiveness"--of our technological way of "being-in-the-world." In this article, I unpack the relationship between these symptoms and draw a twofold conclusion. First, interpreting acceleration in terms of time pathologies, I suggest the self is becoming increasingly fragmented and emotionally overwhelmed from chronic sensory arousal and time pressure. This experience makes it difficult for us to qualitatively distinguish what matters to (...) us in our everyday lives, resulting in a pervasive cultural mood of indifference, what Heidegger calls "profound boredom." Second, by drawing on Heidegger's hermeneutic method, I argue that the practice of mainstream psychology, by adopting the reductive methodology of the empirical sciences, largely ignores our accelerated socio-historical situation, resulting in therapeutic models that have a tendency to construct and perpetuate the very pathologies the psychologist is seeking to treat. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has been instrumental in advancing the work of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists, rebuilding their effort to combine radical social and political analysis with rigorous philosophical inquiry. These eleven essays published over the past five years reclaim the relevant themes of the Frankfurt School, which counted Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas, Franz Neumann, and Albrecht Wellmer as members. They also engage with Kant, Freud, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Michael Walzer, whose work on morality, history, (...) democracy, and individuality intersects with the Frankfurt School's core concerns. Collected here for the first time in English, Honneth's essays pursue the unifying themes and theses that support the methodologies and thematics of critical social theory, and they address the possibilities of continuing this tradition through radically changed theoretical and social conditions. According to Honneth, there is a unity that underlies critical theory's multiple approaches: the way in which reason is both distorted and furthered in contemporary capitalist society. And while much is dead in the social and psychological doctrines of critical social theory, its central inquiries remain vitally relevant. Is social progress still possible after the horrors of the twentieth century? Does capitalism deform reason and, if so, in what respects? Can we justify the relationship between law and violence in secular terms, or is it inextricably bound to divine justice? How can we be free when we're subject to socialization in a highly complex and in many respects unfree society? For Honneth, suffering and moral struggle are departure points for a new "reconstructive" form of social criticism, one that is based solidly in the empirically grounded, interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

Cognitive therapies are often biased in their assessment of clinical problems by their emphasis on the role of verbally-mediated thought in shaping our emotions, and in stressing the influence of thought upon feeling. Alternatively, a more phenomenological appraisal of psychological dysfunction suggests that emotion and thinking are complementary processes which influence each other. Cognitive psychology developed out of information-processing models, whereas phenomenological psychology is rooted in a philosophical perspective which avoids the assumptions of positivist methodology. But, despite their different (...) origins, the two disciplines overlap and complement each other. This book, originally published in 1995, illustrates how feeling states are a crucial component of mental health problems and, if adequately differentiated, can result in a greater understanding of mental health. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has been instrumental in advancing the work of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists, rebuilding their effort to combine radical social and political analysis with rigorous philosophical inquiry. These eleven essays published over the past five years reclaim the relevant themes of the Frankfurt School, which counted Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas, Franz Neumann, and Albrecht Wellmer as members. They also engage with Kant, Freud, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Michael Walzer, whose work on morality, history, (...) democracy, and individuality intersects with the Frankfurt School's core concerns. Collected here for the first time in English, Honneth's essays pursue the unifying themes and theses that support the methodologies and thematics of critical social theory, and they address the possibilities of continuing this tradition through radically changed theoretical and social conditions. According to Honneth, there is a unity that underlies critical theory's multiple approaches: the way in which reason is both distorted and furthered in contemporary capitalist society. And while much is dead in the social and psychological doctrines of critical social theory, its central inquiries remain vitally relevant. Is social progress still possible after the horrors of the twentieth century? Does capitalism deform reason and, if so, in what respects? Can we justify the relationship between law and violence in secular terms, or is it inextricably bound to divine justice? How can we be free when we're subject to socialization in a highly complex and in many respects unfree society? For Honneth, suffering and moral struggle are departure points for a new "reconstructive" form of social criticism, one that is based solidly in the empirically grounded, interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 313-316 [Access article in PDF] Normativity and Pathology Mike Gane Keywords: positivism, sociology, pathology, normativity. THE STRENGTH OF VICTORIA MARGREE'S contribution to the examination of the thematic of pathology and its Nietzschean/Canguilhemian variation is that it reveals the challenging complexity of this theme. My comments on this contribution are developed from an interest in the ways that the concern with pathology was part (...) of the initial program of the social sciences, particularly sociology, as it was inaugurated by Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim in its formative period. Margree touches on the importance of social analysis at the end of her paper; my comments work to some extent in the opposite direction—from the social to the psychological. My concerns lead me to contest a number of her epistemological positions, particularly those concerning the notion of positivism and "objective" analysis.For the first positivist philosophers, positivism was primarily a method; in fact it embraced the set of methods developed by the sciences to obtain the highest degree of objectivity. It was explicitly opposed to methodological reductionism, arguing that each science had specific methods applicable to its own domain. Canguilhem was certainly against methodological reductionism (Renard 1996, 127), but Margree's conception of positivism in psychology as biological reductionism is quite a different and is a later-derived variation of positivism. As such perhaps it should not be conflated with early notions of pathology. Sociological positivism as developed in Durkheim's methodology, although different in many aspects from that of Comte, retained the idea that scientific objectivity was to be the result of epistemological procedures, not what might be called ontological reduction to a physical level of the object. Durkheim tries to clarify the rules governing the analysis of abnormal forms and to define social dysfunction and teratology. The general field of abnormal forms or pathology in the analysis of social life fell into decline after Durkheim and was abandoned in favor of the study of social deviance. The very idea of a study of social pathology itself was critiqued by Szasz and Foucault in particular as a new form of power, which came into existence at the end of the eighteenth century as an essential component of the disciplinary society. Foucault was himself clearly indebted to Canguilhem, and he made this evident on several occasions, such as his lectures at the Collège de France Les Anormaux given in 1974 and 1975 (Foucault 1999). Thus, although the field of pathology and abnormal forms continues in psychology it has been abandoned in sociology, leaving only traces (such as the concept of anomie) in the works of some thinkers such as Baudrillard, whose usage may be ironic more than an attempt to revive the terrain. Could it be that Canguilhem and Foucault [End Page 313] have then more or less swept the field clear of such scientism, even though the reconceptualization in terms of normativity suggested by Canguilhem has not been widely taken on? Indeed there may be important differences between the conceptualization of Canguilhem and Foucault (after all, as Margree points out, Canguilhem can be read as attempting to invert the relation between normativity and normative, not to withdraw from the terrain altogether). Foucault seems to approach a position elaborated in sociology earlier by Max Weber in his rejection of the attempt to use the field of pathology as a way of evading moral choices. Canguilhem discusses responsibility in "Thérapeutique, expérimentation, responsibilité" (1983, 391), noting the importance of professionalization and legal controls on professional practice.The fundamental issues posed by the project of social science continue to be haunted by the same set of problems as established in analysis of pathological phenomena, whether it be conceived in terms of order and disorder (chaos), social breakdown, radical evil, "failed states," even deviation or noncompliance with "correct" forms of language or behavior (harassment, racism, child abuse) and so on, or pathology (perversion, dysfunction, disease, illness, abnormalities). The question in part is: is there anything lost by replacing pathology with more political, religious, moral, and legal terminologies? From Foucault's point... (shrink)

This paper sets out from the hypothesis that the embodied competences and expertise which characterise dance and sports activities have the potential to constructively challenge and inform phenomenological thinking. While pathological cases present experiences connected to tangible bodily deviations, the specialised movement practices of dancers and athletes present experiences which put our everyday experiences of being a moving body into perspective in a slightly different sense. These specialised experiences present factual variations of how moving, sensing and interacting can be (...) like for us as body-subjects. To use of these sources inevitably demands that qualitative research methodologies – especially short-term ethnographical fieldwork – form part of the research strategy and qualify the way the researcher involves a second-person perspective when interviewing dancers and athletes about their experiences. In the subsequent phases analysing the data generated, I argue that researchers first strive to achieve internal consistency of empirical themes identified in the case of movement practices in question thus keeping to a contextualised and lived perspective, also denoted as an emic perspective. In subsequent phases phenomenological insights are then actively engaged in the exploration and discussion of the possible transcendental structures making the described subjective experiences possible. The specialised and context-defined experiences of ‘what a moving body can be like’ are accordingly involved as factual variations to constructively add to and potentially challenge phenomenological descriptions. Lastly, I exemplify how actual research strategies have been enacted in a variety of projects involving professional dancers’, golfers’ and sports dancers’ practices and experiences, respectively. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Methodological Naturalism to Interpretive Exclusivism About Religious PsychopathologyJosé Eduardo Porcher, PhDA particularly deep form of hermeneutical injustice arises when clinicians undermine a patient’s meaningful interpretation of their alleged psychotic symptoms within a religious framework. Cases like Femi’s (Rashed, 2010) illustrate how diagnosing and treating psychotic symptoms with religious content can perpetuate this injustice. Femi’s symptoms, which were very real, were interpreted solely as indicative of a psychotic episode, (...) without considering the possibility of a religious experience. Although hermeneutical injustice is often caused by negative stereotypes, lack of conceptual resources, implicit biases, practices of epistemic privileging, patronizing attitudes, and wrongful pathologization, I propose that interpretive exclusivism about religious psychopathology plays a pivotal role in causing hermeneutical injustice when attributing psychotic symptoms with religious content—that is, the view that an experience is either psychopathological or religious (Scrutton, 2023). Routinely, on attributing psychosis, the potential for the patient to have a genuine religious experience is disregarded and excluded from the therapeutic process and from the very realm of possibility. Why?In their thoughtful commentary, Rosa Ritunnano and Ian James Kidd do me the favor of not only giving careful attention to my argument, but also elucidating my position and providing avenues for further clarification. Although I have not gone much into what is behind interpretive exclusivism, they are right to point to unquestioning adherence to some form of naturalism. Contrary to what they intimate, however, I do not think we are speaking of different kinds of hermeneutical injustice. As I see it, we are speaking about the same kind of injustice, only at different levels of explanation. In my article, I rhetorically ask why [End Page 241] it is assumed that psychotic and religious experiences cannot coexist, and why it is assumed that the same experience cannot be both a genuine religious experience and an instance of psycho-pathology. Ritunnano and Kidd point in the right direction when they say, “Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism” (2024, p. 235).Naturalism can be divided into two components: metaphysical and methodological (Papineau, 2020). The metaphysical component concerns the contents of reality, affirming the absence of “supernatural” or other metaphysically elusive entities. In contrast, the methodological component focuses on approaches to investigating reality and attributes a general authority to the scientific method. Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is the more comprehensive view, as it outright denies the existence of the supernatural. Meanwhile, methodological (or scientific) naturalism refers to a pragmatic approach within scientific inquiry, stating that the right methodology to investigate and research something (where this something might not be immediately obvious to be a scientific topic) is that of science, often particular of natural sciences.Although a commitment to metaphysical naturalism may at times be what lies behind interpretive exclusivism, we do not need to go that far, since a commitment to methodological naturalism is enough to breed unwarranted ontological exclusion in practice (Plantinga, 1997; Ratcliffe, 2003). This in turn leads to interpretive exclusivism which is, I argue, the main theoretical flaw behind the kind of hermeneutical injustice I am trying to flesh out. As Ritunnano and Kidd observe, either tacit or explicit adherence to such ontological exclusion causes individuals to struggle to view another person’s spiritual or religious interpretive framework as coherent or even intelligible. Note, however, that the opposite of interpretive exclusivism—that is, interpretive inclusivism—does not need to affirm that the experience is exclusively or even genuinely religious but rather keeps that question open while considering significant epistemic and meaning-making possibilities.Finally, in his commentary, Alasdair Coles (2024) proposes that I overlook the fact that some individuals undergo psychoses featuring deeply distressing and dark religious imagery, the dismissal of which can be therapeutically beneficial. He also contends that therapists often default to considering all religious content as inauthentic, contrasting this with my alleged stance, which he believes assumes the opposite extreme and may be equally or more harmful. In making these assertions, he misrepresents my argument on two counts. I took care to avoid implying that all religious experiences should be uncritically accepted and that all religious content is inherently... (shrink)

Sante De Sanctis (1862—1935), a pioneer of psychology in Rome at the end of the 19th century, applied methods from the expanding field of experimental psychology to the study of dreams, which was considered one of the leading ways to gain an understanding of normal and pathological psychic life. Taking inspiration from several traditions, De Sanctis proposed a study that anticipated a scientific program that also differentiated between contemporary psychoanalytical interpretations according to which previous dream psychology was considered a (...) 'dark forest'. On the contrary, the multi-faceted methodology that he adopted for the study of an, until then, marginal phenomenon of the 'new' psychology, represented an element of originality that also included the elaboration of a psycho-physiological theory of dreams. Although the Italian psychologist's work on dreams was characterized by these important methodological changes, it disappeared from the references of those who contributed to the foundation of modern dreaming psychology after the Second World War. The present article places De Sanctis' psychology of dreams in its scientific context and singles out its originality while also analyzing the reasons for its marginalization. (shrink)

In the 1950s, long before his ascent to international renown, Michel Foucault published a scant few works. His early writings on psychology, psychopathology, and anthropology have been dismissed as immature. However, recently discovered manuscripts from the mid-1950s, when Foucault was a lecturer at the University of Lille, testify to the significance of the work that the philosopher produced in the years leading up to the “archaeological” project he launched with History of Madness. Elisabetta Basso offers a groundbreaking and in-depth analysis (...) of Foucault’s Lille manuscripts that sheds new light on the origins of his philosophical project. She considers the epistemological style and methodology of these writings as well as their philosophical context and the scholarly networks in which Foucault was active, foregrounding his relationship to existential psychiatry. Young Foucault blurs the boundaries between biography and theory, exploring the transformations—and, at times, contradictions—that characterize the intellectual trajectory of a philosopher who, as Foucault himself put it, “turned to psychology, and from psychology to history.” Retracing the first steps of the philosopher’s intellectual journey, Basso shows how Foucault’s early writings provide key insights into his archaeological work of the 1960s. Assembling a vast array of archival sources—including manuscripts, reading notes, notes for lectures and conferences, and correspondence—this book develops a new and deeper understanding of Foucault’s body of work. (shrink)

Hertwig and Ortmann suggest methodological practices from economics (script enactment, repeated measures, performance based payments, and absence of deception) for psychology. Such prescriptive methodologies may be unrepresentative of real world behaviors because people are not: always behaving with complete information, monetarily rewarded for important activities, repeating tasks to perfection, aware of all contributing variables. These proscriptions, while useful in economics, may obfuscate important psychological phenomena.

Summary The importance of the problem of how to integrate psychology and methodology was rediscovered by Oswald Külpe. He noted that Wundt's psychology was inadequate and that a new methodology was needed to construct an alternative. Külpe made real progress but his program turned out to be quite difficult: he had no appropriate method for integrating the two fields. August Messer tried to fill the gap but failed. The problem was largely dropped due to poor methods at hand (...) for studying it but remained important due to Popper's methodology and de Groot's psychology at least. We may now more effectively return to it by using a bootstrap method. (shrink)

Teaching research methods is especially challenging because we not only wish to convey formal knowledge and encourage critical thinking, as with any course, but also to enable our students dream up meaningful research projects, translate them into logical steps, conduct the research in a professional manner, analyze the data, and write up the project in APA style. We also wish to spark interest in the topics of research papers, and in the intellectual challenge of creating a research report, but we (...) have learned just how difficult these goals can be from teaching undergraduates and from serving as journal reviewers: many submissions contain flaws such as elementary errors of logic (e.g., using a null control condition instead of a placebo or dummy treatment), tangled statistics, a lack of graphs, and ungrammatical, unclear writing that violates APA rules. Yet these manuscripts are written by university faculty, often with doctorates and years of experience. Even published papers may contain egregious faults (Standing & McKelvie, 1986). And although we have both published widely, we still hone our skills. It requires optimism to expect that a typical undergraduate will do better, on the basis of just a year or two of studies in psychology. In this paper, we describe a systematic set of methodology courses and two specific practices that we think can help. Methodology Courses as the Backbone of our Psychology Program How can methodology courses promote undergraduate involvem... (shrink)

This is a review of the literature in the philosophy of medicine published in China from 1930 to 1980. The topics dealt with include the relationship between medicine and philosophy, the basic concepts of medicine, etiology and causality, the bearing of psychology on physiology and pathology, epistemology in diagnostics, methodology of medical sciences, philosophical and methological problems in traditional Chinese medicine, philosophical problems in health policy, and medical ethics.

Volume 21 of _The Annual of Psychoanalysis_ is especially welcome for bringing to English-language readers timely contributions from abroad in an opening section on "Psychoanalysis in Europe." The section begins with a translation of Helmut Thomae's substantial critique of the current state of psychoanalytic education; Thomae's proposal for comprehensive reform revolves around a redefinition of the status of the training analysis in analytic training. Diane L'Heureux-Le Beuf's clinical diary of an analysis focusing on the narcissistic elements of oedipal conflict probes (...) the degree to which the analytic method can be applied to "nonstructured" analysands. And Nella Guidi shows the clinical value of supplementing Freud's notion of unobjectionable positive transference with the complementary notion of unobjectionable negative transference. Section II, on "Psychoanalysis and Hysteria," offers original contributions to Freud scholarship in the form of Jules Glenn's reconsideration of Dora's "Dynamics, Diagnosis, and Treatment"; William McGrath's analysis of the way Freud's hostility to religious superstition gained expression in his early work on hysteria; and Marian Tolpin's self-psychological reprise on the case of Anne O. The section concludes with Elisabeth Young-Bruehl and Sarah Cummin's provocative "What Happened to 'Anorexie Hysterique'?" which questions the contemporary separation of anorexia from hysteria and explore the sociohistorical reasons the separation came about. Section III, "Clinical and Theoretical Studies," begins with Nancy Kobrin's discussion of Freud's ideas about autonomy, including the terms Freud used and the way Strachey translated them into English. Her goal is to deepen our understanding of how Freud spoke and thought about an individual's sense of self. Frank Summers shows how object relations principles, which are shared by various object relations theories, can inform the conduct of analysis at all levels of pathology, including neurosis. And Henry Smith examines the meaning and value of the "analytic surface," a metaphor that highlights the relationship between the analyst's attention and the patient's attention. A final section on "Applied Psychoanalysis" offers contemporary examples of applied analytic inquiry in anthropology, art, and literature. Roy Grinker, III and Roy Grinker, Jr., in a methodological contribution to psychoanalytic anthropology, examine what is revealed when a native people are asked to retell a story introduced by them by their Western observers. Danielle Knafo explores the art and life of the Mexican surrealist Frida Kahlo through the concepts of the mirror, the mask, and the masquerade. And David Werman closes the volume with a comparative study of Edgar Allan Poe's and James Ensor's obsession with revenge, and the role it played in Poe's writing and Ensor's etchings, respectively. Bringing readers the influential reform proposals of Thomae, a rich sampling of recent Freud scholarship, applied contributions traversing three disciplines, and original clinical contributions reflecting American and European sensibilities, Volume 21 of _The Annual_ is true to the spirit of this distinguished series. It testifies to the scope of analytic inquiry, and it exemplifies the yield of such inquiry in the hands of gifted scholars and clinicians. (shrink)

The purpose is to identify common and distinctive features of concepts and methodology of the problem of subject within different discourses, implicitly or explicitly relevant to the definition of "clinical" mode of human existence. The research methodology combines techniques of discourse analysis and basic principles of historical and philosophical studies. Scientific novelty of the research lies in definition of the clinical philosophical discourse as a special communicative process, where utterances not only focus on disease syndromes, and reveal phenomenology (...) of inner experience of a pathological self, but also structure a certain type of sociality. Clinical discourse represents the space where the patient is treated not as a subject but as an object of disease. Ontology of clinical discourse prevails over ontology of disease, since its structures determine the notion of disease as such. Categorization of the disease, the idea of disease as a phenomenon subdued to professional authority leads to the idea of the need for patient's isolation from the natural environment and removing him to special social institutions. A great while authenticity of the individual had been determined through the testimony of others and manifestation of one's connection to others; then authenticity begun to establish trough the discourse, which individual was able or obliged to deliver about himself/herself. The clinicist doctrines share the intention to reduce the patient's self to its bodily dimension, while ignoring social determinants of psychological deviations. Conclusions of the study are summarized in the following positions: the current clinical discourse is based on the positivist-biological trend in humanitarian knowledge and it is the basis for the production and reproduction of medical and pharmaceutical repressive ideology; philosophical clinical discourse opens the possibility of overcoming the dominance of purely clinicist discourse; such a transformation is possible only after a paradigm shift in understanding the category of subject. (shrink)

The purpose is to identify common and distinctive features of concepts and methodology of the problem of subject within different discourses, implicitly or explicitly relevant to the definition of "clinical" mode of human existence. The research methodology combines techniques of discourse analysis and basic principles of historical and philosophical studies. Originality of the research lies in definition of the clinical philosophical discourse as a special communicative process, where utterances not only focus on disease syndromes, and reveal phenomenology of (...) inner experience of a pathological self, but also structure a certain type of sociality. Clinical discourse represents the space where the patient is treated not as a subject but as an object of disease. Ontology of clinical discourse prevails over ontology of disease, since its structures determine the notion of disease as such. Categorization of the disease, the idea of disease as a phenomenon subdued to professional authority leads to the idea of the need for patient’s isolation from the natural environment and removing him to special social institutions. The clinicist doctrines share the intention to reduce the patient’s self to its bodily dimension, while ignoring social determinants of psychological deviations. Conclusions of the study are summarized in the following positions: the current clinical discourse is based on the positivist-biological trend in humanitarian knowledge and it is the basis for the production and reproduction of medical and pharmaceutical repressive ideology; criticism of philosophical clinical discourse opens the possibility of overcoming the dominance of purely clinicist discourse; such a transformation is possible only after a paradigm shift in understanding the category of subject. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOHN PASSMORE AND HUME'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY1 A quarter century ago, the message undergraduates absorbed about David Hume was as an extremely favourable one. He was the great precursor of logical empiricism and so his philosophy, at least in its main lines, must be nearer the mark than that of any other of the great names. Hume had discovered the right view of causation. He had exposed and banished school (...) metaphysics. He had rightly drawn attention to the problem of induction. He had discovered the isought gap and revealed the practical impotence of reason in the face of the passions. But for his weight problem, he could have walked on water. Those were the circumstances in which I first read John Passmore's book on Hume. Because he was plainly not, like many of Hume's critics, an apologist for Thomism or any of Hegel's offspring, his work could not be dismissed on the grounds of parti pris. It was 2 a shock, therefore, to find him, in Hume's Intentions, presenting an image of Hume a considerable distance this side of idolatry. Passmore's critical and, for its time, boldly unfashionable appraisal is to be admired, taken to heart, and extended. Hume's Intentions concentrates on Hume's philosophy of the understanding. It takes up strands of that philosophy and points to their inherent implausibility and mutual incompatibility. Yet these problems also vitiate other parts of Hume's position. In this paper I attempt to introduce the Passmorian method of reasoning into what are nowadays the moral subjects. Let me remind you of the structure of Passmore's book: it does not mount a consecutive argument so much as take up, tease out, and display one or other leading element in the Humean philosophy. Thus we have chapters on Hume as an enthusiast for the 110. moral (that is, human, or social) sciences, as a critic of traditional Aristotelian logic, as a developer of more suitable methods for scientific advance, as a positivist, a phenomenalist, an associationist theoretician in psychology, and a sceptic. We learn as we read that in these respects Hume is not consistent. Principles which he espouses, principally negative and sceptical principles, lead to conclusions too extreme to suit his major purposes. Accordingly, they must not be pressed to their proper conclusions. Hume's philosophy of the study must be abandoned rather than actually taken seriously. Thus, for example: in methodology, Hume insists that reason cannot yield results in the contingent and fallible natural and human sciences. This should lead him to the view that any scientific hypothesis which goes beyond immediate experience is, so far as reason goes, as good, or as bad, as any other. But he recoils from this, distinguishing sensible men from the foolish and superstitious on the basis of the regularity and consistency of the experiences on which the wise rely. Yet as Passmore points out, on Hume's principles, the preference for regularity and consistency cannot be more than a prejudice. Prejudices do not admit of any genuinely rational defence. There is real substance to the superiority claimed for the wise. Again, consider Hume's positivism. He offers a beguilingly short way with nonsense, especially learned and theological nonsense. School metaphysics and superstition (i.e. Christianity) are to be banished by the use of the impressions and ideas test: When you come upon a word whose meaning you would discover, ask if it refers to an impression or an idea. If to an impression, well and good, its meaning is to be found in present experience. If to an idea, ask from which impression (or impressions) the idea did (or could) Ill, derive. If you cannot find any suitable impressions, the idea is chimerical, and is to be excised from thought as a pathological intruder. This procedure produces most satisfactorily negative results when it comes to the Trinity and the sacraments, or essence, inherence, substantial form, and such metaphysical extravagances. Unhappily the very same procedure, the impressions and ideas test, also wrecks the foundations of Hume's own thought. As Passmore makes sure we remember, the test robs Hume of the resources with which to account for substance and... (shrink)

Autism is typically framed as stemming from empathy deficits as well as more general cognitive and sensory issues. In turn it is further associated with other purported harms: ranging from psychological suffering to diminished moral agency. Given such associations, in the philosophical literature, autism is widely taken to hinder the possibility of both thriving and attaining personhood. Indeed, this purported stifling of thriving personhood can be taken as the core harm associated with autism as such. In direct contrast to this (...) dominant view, the key aim of this thesis is to raise reasonable doubt as to the validity of this exclusion, by establishing that there is no decisive reason to accept the notion that autism is inherently harmful. This builds on arguments made by autistic self-advocates who argue in favour of de-medicalising and instead politicising autistic disablement and distress. However, the originality of this thesis lies in three key factors. First: it focuses more specifically on the purported impossibility of thriving autistic personhood, since I take this more fundamental matter to underlie all the other issues relating to these wider debates. Second: I use a negativist methodology. That is, instead of, say, arguing that autistic individuals can be useful to society or have positive attributes, my aim is to raise reasonable doubt regarding the core assumption underlying the dominant framing of autism as a pathology: namely, that autism and thriving personhood are inherently at odds. Third, I draw on methodologies developed by feminist philosophers and critical theorists in order to further our understanding of autism and the ethical issues surrounding it with more nuance than I have found in the existing literature. In sum: after a critical analysis of the concept of autism, and then further analysis of the relationship between autism and the harms it is associated with, I conclude that we have no decisive reason to think that being autistic, in and of itself, is at odds with either thriving or personhood. This chimes with the notion that autism is best framed as a difference, disabled by society rather than medical pathology, raises important problems for both ethical and psychiatric theory, and has significant implications for autism policy and practice. (shrink)

In recent decades, social and behavioral scientists have begun to explore how and why human beings thrive or flourish and to consider whether traits indicative of thriving or flourishing may themselves influence physical well-being. This stands in contrast to the historical tendency in these fields to focus on pathology: mental illness, psychological dysfunction, deviant behavior, social problems, and so on. In epidemiology, too, the influence of pathology is seen in a tacit emphasis on risk factors for disease outcomes and for (...) rates of morbidity and mortality, as opposed to, say, protective factors promotive of good health. Methodologically, there is nothing substantial that would prohibit looking at the world... (shrink)

The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...) “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes toitself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful. (shrink)

There is a conceptual crisis in the biomedical sciences that is particularly salient in psychopathology research. Underlying the crisis is a controversy that pertains to the current medical model of disease that largely draws from causal-mechanistic explanations. The bedrock of this model is the analysis of biological part-dysfunctions that aims at unequivocally defining a pathological condition and demarcating it from its neighboring entities. This endeavor has led to a quest for physiological, biochemical, and genetic signatures. Yet, so far there (...) is little evidence for reliable biomarkers for any mental disorder. The contemporary biomedical paradigm largely ignores historical, dynamic, and system-level aspects—a view that has contributed much to the conceptual disjunction of the patient as a person from his/her disease. Notwithstanding the impressive progress in the biomedical sciences, increasingly more critics question whether the constituting framework is sufficient to convey a comprehensive understanding of illnesses, especially mental illnesses. Thus, the medical model urgently requires an update. But rather than revamping it by methodological advancements, it will be necessary to critically review its philosophical roots. The most problematic issues that require reworking are: the preponderance of the biostatistical theory; the undue decoupling of physiological from evolutionary explanations of function; the clinging to the Modern Synthesis ; and the neglect of dynamic and system-level properties. The proposed overhaul requires the heeding of historical explanations that draw from the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis as well as systems biology approaches for tackling multilevel and dynamic phenomena of complex systems. (shrink)

Chronic kidney failure is a serious somatic disease. Addressing the issue of living with a chronic disease means fully considering the patients’ entourage, their families, and those close to them, especially their children and spouses.Objectives: The present paper focuses on the couple’s psychological experience when one of them suffers from a chronic disease, in this instance kidney disease. In particular, how is the spouse affected by the treatment provided? The aim is not only to see how care for sick people (...) can be improved, but also, more specifically, how relatives and especially partners can receive attention.Methodology: A qualitative approach is not only adopted, being based on the psychotherapeutic follow-up of the partners of patients with chronic kidney disease, but also of the patients themselves, addressing the matter of their life as a couple. Three couples were considered, and two case studies are presented here. The issues that cut across these different situations are examined.Results and Discussion: Some couples show considerable resourcefulness. However, over the years, that capacity for adaptation and inventiveness can also be interrupted by the periods of greater suffering and even despair, especially when the somatic pathology becomes chronic. Many spouses talk about how living with a sick partner weighs down on them, causing severe fatigue. Some aspects of the illness can also become traumatic. The disease regularly disrupts the daily life of the couple and the family. This leads to a reworking of family relations. Each couple has its own history with the condition. As it emerges, it can disrupt the bonds of filiation, especially when the illness is hereditary. Making psychological care more accessible to the partners involved constitutes a major challenge for our hospital care systems. (shrink)

This article examines the role of time as a methodological tool and pathological focus of clinical psychiatry and psychology in the first half of the 20th century. Contextualizing ‘psychopathologies of time’ developed by practitioners in Europe and North America with reference to the temporal theories implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis and Henri Bergson’s philosophy of durée, it illuminates how depression, schizophrenia, and other mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive behaviours and aphasia were understood to be symptomatic of an altered or disturbed (...) ‘time-sense’. Drawing upon a model of temporal synthesis whereby in healthy individuals, a subjective temporal sense ( Ichzeit, durée, or personal lifetime) was perceived and understood in relation to objective time frameworks ( Weltzeit, clock-time, or quantitative time models like historical chronology), clinicians argued that mentally ill patients were unable to synthesize Ichzeit and Weltzeit, using variations in this disturbance to define specific pathological conditions. (shrink)

Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology (...) as an associational science. It is suggested that that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies. The possibility that in psychology there is a connection between the issue of measurement and the unsolved consciousness/brain problem is discussed. (shrink)

The impact of stress and other psychological variables on Inflammatory Bowel Disease prognosis, treatment response, and functional level is well-established; however, typical IBD treatment focuses on the physiological pathology of the disease and neglects complementary stress-reducing interventions. Recent pilot studies report the benefits of mindfulness-based interventions in people living with IBD, but are limited by small sample sizes. Recruitment challenges to in-person studies may be in part due to the difficulty IBD patients often have adhering to fixed schedules and travel (...) as a result of IBD symptoms such as pain, fatigue, and incontinence. The current study aimed to address this barrier by offering participants access to online mindfulness training, allowing individuals to engage with intervention materials to fit their own schedule. Online mindfulness programs have gained popularity in recent years, as they increase access and flexibility and decrease cost to the user; however, the dropout rate tends to be high. The current study compared the rate of adherence and efficacy of mindfulness training as a function of level of support: self-guided versus supported. Analysis revealed no significant difference in the benefits received between participants in the two groups; however, a significant difference group was found in terms of rate of completion, with 44.1% of the supportive group completing the protocol compared to 11.7% of the self-guided. Common challenges to meditation were measured, but did not significantly predict adherence to the intervention, and experience of these challenges did not significantly change over the duration of the study. Implications of the current research, future directions for the use of MBI for IBD patients, and a discussion of methodological considerations are provided. (shrink)

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION The present volume of "Poznari Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities", entitled "Consciousness: methodological ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 91-92 [Access article in PDF] Jaspers and Defining Phenomenology John McMillan IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH a number of positions that you might take on the importance of phenomenology for the study of the mind. The strongest position is to think that phenomenology is sufficient for understanding the mind. This is a position that would be very hard to defend and it is (...) unlikely that Gupta and Kay want to endorse such a view. It is clear that Jaspers did not believe this; although he thought that first-person experience was undervalued, his project was an attempt to make sense of different kinds of explanation, all of which contribute to our understanding of the mind.A second position is to deny that phenomenology gives us anything that is of use in understanding the mind and psychopathology. Philosophers have developed a number of such positions, from the eliminativism of Churchland (1981) to the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett (1989, 1991).A third position is to hold that phenomenology is one of the methods that are useful for understanding the mind and psychopathology. Along with neuroscience and other more behavioral approaches to behavior, phenomenology is an important component of an adequate understanding of the mind. This position appears to be that endorsed by Jaspers, Gupta, Kay, and the authors they discuss. It is also the position that Grant Gillett and I defend in Consciousness and Intentionality (2001). Gupta and Kay's paper presents an argument about where the boundaries between phenomenology and other approaches to the mind and psychopathology ought to be drawn. Gupta and Kay, following Jaspers, think that the boundaries of the phenomenological ought to be drawn around those approaches that employ empathy and the presuppositionless stance and do not include objective phenomena.Given that the paper is primarily about what phenomenology means and that it endorses the way that Jaspers used the term, it is fairly important that we have a definition from Jaspers. Gupta and Kay give a description of some of Jaspers's methods for getting at subjective phenomena, but do not give an account of what Jaspers thinks the aim of phenomenology is. In other words, one way to classify something as phenomenological is its methods and another is by what the point of the exercise is. In General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1997) says that phenomenology is an empirical method for investigating "individual psychic experience" (p. 55). We can think of this as a claim about the objective of phenomenology and then consider the merits of different phenomenological methodologies in terms of their success in achieving this objective. This opens up the possibility that a theory may be genuinely phenomenological because it has a plausible method for getting at psychic lived experience but does not use all of the methods advocated by Jaspers.Gupta and Kay are correct that Jaspers does stress the importance of the presuppositionless [End Page 91] stance, the importance of empathy and the importance of not simply relying on objective phenomena. However, it is not obvious why an approach to understanding the mind or psycho- pathology must satisfy these conditions to be phenomenological. Imagine the following kind of situation: when I am observed to hit my big toe against a brick and give a yelp, it is possible to infer something about my psychic lived experience. There is not much is room for doubt about my first-person experience and, although you might ask me questions about my pain, they are unlikely to add much to what you can simply read from my behavior. This example may appear a little crude because the first-person experience in this case is not especially complex and is not that interesting as a entrance to the inner workings of an individual's mental life. It is not hard to come up with other examples where we can read the first-person experience from behavior in a fairly accurate and informative way. A father gazing at his young child while she is sleeping in his arms may be having a number of thoughts that we would not know about... (shrink)

This paper, a version of which was presented at the ‘Feminist Futures’ twentieth Anniversary conference of the British and Irish Feminist Theology Summer School in July 2012, is, in one sense, a misnomer. Through the lived experience of one remarkable woman with whom I have the privilege of working as a mental health chaplain and companion, I recount her past of pervasive patriarchal abuse, pain, and psychic ‘storms’ but also her present that contains her songs of survival and her language (...) of liberation. It is one woman’s life, a life that could be replicated in many women’s lives, not only in the past, but in the present and throughout the world. But it is only by being acutely reminded of the unique, personal narratives of women, and men, whose past continues to invade our presents by their unbearable witness to the actual violence of the patriarchal landscapes in which their ‘voices’ have been seemingly silenced and their language pathologized, that we shall be able together to conceive of futures. These are futures where, whilst, acknowledging the continuing severe and enduring psychological damage to the abused and the violated and enabling appropriate treatment to be available, we shall also empower the bearing of the witness, the resolute and hard won language of the remaining, the bursting forth from the deadness of tombs of terror, of resurrected lives in the dance of the garden. This will require a sea-change in the way we imagine and establish mental health services and it will require an applied feminist theological methodology to be at the heart, not only of the theoretical models, but of the witnessing to the theology-making that such hidden, ‘anonymous’ lives intrinsically reveal. To imagine such mental health services is a subject for another paper. For now I want to introduce one such life I have been describing and with whom I have the privilege of travelling, consciously and shamefully aware of my gender in a way which seems OK, which seems re-imagined through the eyes of a woman who has absolutely no reason to love men but who has invited me to tread tenderly towards the sights and seasons of her pain and abuse. (shrink)

In the introduction to hisAllgemeine Psychopathologie, published in 1913, Karl Jaspers stated that psychology has little value for the psychopathologist because it focuses on all kinds of interesting matters, but not on normal psychic life. In this article we argue that today, in the year 2013, little has changed in this respect. During the past century, normal psychic life (non-pathological psychic life) has rarely been a topic of research. Clinical psychology has focused primarily on studying three other topics: the (...) mind-body problem (does the mind actually exist, or are we exclusively the result of brain function?), the methodological debate (should psychology use quantitative or qualitative research results as a basis for its expertise?) and the psychotherapy debate (Is psychotherapy effective? If so, which form is the most effective?). Due to this focus, our knowledge in the above-mentioned areas has increased significantly, but the issue raised by Karl Jaspers about normal psychic life has still not been addressed. In this article, we propose that normal psychic life should indeed become the new focus of clinical psychology. We illustrate the importance of this new focus with three examples from clinical psychology: the Global Assessment of Functioning scale, empathy and the emergence of positive psychology during the past decade. We then explore the efficacy of phenomenology for studying this normal psychic life, thereby discovering a useful epistemological basis in Husserl’s systematic phenomenology. Various phenomenological research methods are evaluated in the light of this systematic phenomenology. (shrink)

Based on a psychobiographical approach, this study addresses magical thinking across the life span of Paulo Coelho. Paulo Coelho, who was born in Brazil in the 1940s, has become one of the most sold and famous contemporary authors in the world. In his life, as well as in his books, which are mainly autobiographical accounts, magic and magical thinking, spirituality, meaningfulness, and the living of one’s dream, are key themes. The aim of this study was to explore magic and magical (...) thinking in Paulo Coelho’s life and creative works. The study uses a psychobiographical single case study approach within the methodological frame of Husserl’s phenomenology. The author, Paulo Coelho, was chosen as the subject of research. Documents providing both first person and third person perspectives were subjected to content analysis. The findings show that magical thinking played an important role in Coelho’s creative works and in his life, in the form, for example, of ascriptions of magic to key situations in his life, the performance of daily rituals, mystic interpretations of life events, and his deep religious faith. Magical thinking is usually regarded as indicative of pathological and inappropriate cognitive and psychological behaviour, especially when found in adults in a westernised culture. However, the analysis of Coelho’s life and works shows that magical thinking can be utilised creatively and be integrated into one’s life to enable personal development and growth while simultaneously providing fertile ground for creative production. In Paulo Coelho’s case, the intertwining of religion and magical thinking provided deep meaning that guided his personal development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIMETIC SADISM IN THE FICTION OF YUKIO MISHIMA Jerry Piven New York University Mishima Yukio (1925-1970) was one ofthe mostenigmatic authors of the 20th century. Novelist, playwright, actor, exhibiionist —his novels are rife with homoerotic and violent imagery, while his fanatical and nihilistic philosophy calls for a return to a Samurai ethos. Mishima thus attained infamy in Japan and in the West, as his shocking novels inspired hordes ofyoung (...) Japanese into a cult ofMishima worship, while critics who acknowledge his genius are still nervous about his sadistic homosexuality and his suicide. Mishima's works are suffused with erotic bloodshed and misogyny, and Mishima finally ended his life by ritually disemboweling himself. I will make the case that Mishima was incessantly plagued by torturous mimetic frustrations, and that his final act of spilling his blood and intestines can be interpreted as the result of mimetic hatred against his rivals. I also argue that Mishima was fundamentally schizoidal; in Girardian terms, a man whose hypocrisy for the sakeofdesire rendered him an exhibitionistic maskdisguisingmimetic rage and fear. Having previously written about Mishima from a psychoanalytic perspective, I believe that a Girardian approach would often yield drastically different interpretations of identical biographical and literary materials. ' 1I initially wrote on Mishima for several diagnostic assignments at my psychoanalytic institute, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP). After considering the psychoanalytic and Girardian approaches, I expanded these original essays using identical material to determine whetherthe interpretations orconclusions would differ; I was struck by the way the same details could provide both remarkable congruences and vast divergences ofperspective. Read side by side, one can find compatible conclusions, but one also finds perceptions ofthe same details that would be difficultto conceive or articulate 70Jeremy Piven Mimesis, misogyny, and maculacy Kimitake Hiraoka was a frail, sickly child before he became the muscular and exhibitionistic novelist Yukio Mishima. His brutal and helpless childhood inaugurated his mimetic complexes: his need to escape the suffocating and diseased environment of his grandmother, his rivalry with her, and his mimetic ideal ofbeauty and muscular invulnerability. Mishima was an unhealthy youth, taken from the arms of his mother before he was two months old, and confined to the sickroom of his grandmother for the first twelve years ofhis life. Under the auspices ofhis tyrannical and ostensively psychotic grandmother, Mishima lived in the dark, could play only female friends (becausetheywere deemed harmless), and could eat only gentle foods. He thus lived an imprisoned life away from his parents, amid the excrescences of his sick and hysterical grandmother until adolescence, when his father "reclaimed him." Mishima later rebelled against this sickly nature, sculpting himself into a statuesque ideal of masculine beauty. He became obsessed with martial arts and the eroticism ofhis own engraved body. His fiction and philosophy were permeated by misogyny, glorification ofGrecian male sexuality and aesthetics, and the repudiation ofanything weak or feminine. He finally killed himselfbefore age could wither his masculine beauty. Mishima's fiction prominently features protagonists who mirror his sickly youth. The autobiographical Confessions of a Mask (Kamen no Kokuhaku) describes the homoerotic development ofthis frail child. Such fraiIcharacters inMishima'sfiction arealwaysdrawneroticallytobeautiful males as both mimetic rivals and models. The narrator of Confessions describes his sexual attraction to a sewage collector, a "ladler of excrement"(8). Thehandsomemanwith "ruddycheeks" and "shiningeyes" fascinates the narrator, and he is filled with desire lookingathistightjeans. using psychoanalytic perspectives andjargon. Two ofthe original essays will be published inthePsychoanalyticReview in comingmonths: "PhallicNarcissism, Anal Sadism, and Oral Discord: The Case ofYukio Mishima (part I)," and "Narcissistic Revenge and Suicide: The Case ofYukio Mishima (part H)." I am currently translating these articles for publication in Japan. I included a brief discussion of Mishima in the introduction to Psychological Undercurrents ofHistory (Piven and Lawton, eds.), to explore the complex methodological and psychological dynamics of the field of psychohistory. A commentary on Mishima's traumaticchildhood entitled "The Pathology ofGenius," will appearin aforthcomingedition ofTapestry: TheJournalofHistoricalMotivations andtheSocialFabric, and afinal article, "Voyeurism and Rage in The Sailor Who Fellfrom Grace with the Sea," will appear in Psychological Undercurrents ofHistory, Volume II (2002). Mimetic Sadism in the Fiction ofYukio Mishima71 The narrator thus emerges into a burgeoning homosexuality, but he also fantasizes about dying dramatically. His... (shrink)

The Pathology of Man is the first comprehensive study of the psychology and epistemology of human evil, long urged by leading psychiatrists and psychologists, including Freud, Jung, Menninger, Fromm, and Peck. The book breaks new ground by offering a clear, empirically based, and theoretically sound understanding of human evil as a widespread, real, non-metaphorical pathology. With deliberate and thorough scholarship the author proposes a new framework-relative theory of disease and justifies the provocative thesis that human evil should be classified as (...) a pathology which is not a deviation from an accepted norm, but rather is a normal state. This break with tradition provides the necessary psychological foundation for the familiar concept of the banality of human evil, a foundation which in the past it has lacked. (shrink)

The article attempts to consider the phenomenon of madness from the point of view of the problem of intersubjectivity. Ludwig Binswanger’s phenomenological approach to work with schizophrenia, which is a synthesis of phenomenology, ontology and psychoanalysis, was used as a methodological basis. The trend in philosophy and psychological sciences of the 20th – 21st centuries of the transition from intrapsychic to intersubjective study of psychopathology is outlined. The concept of L. Binswanger’s pathological world-project is presented and L. Binswanger’s concept (...) of intersubjectivity is formulated. Madness is defined as the loss of the ability, to a greater or lesser extent, to realize ontological intentionality in intersubjective contact, where the Other appears not as an object, but as a subject. The We-space of intersubjective interaction, is the third entity, constantly formed by the subject and the Other, and also influencing them. This approach forms the basis of L. Binswanger’s psychiatric method, where the possibility of healing madness can arise precisely through the restoration of the ability to subject-subject relationships in intersubjective contact with a therapist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.2 (2004) 102-125 [Access article in PDF] Towards an Ecology of Music Education June Boyce-Tillman King Alfred's College, England Western culture has developed a concept of knowledge as divided into discrete categories, which are reflected in the disconnected subjects of our school curricula and the titles of our university faculties. However, music should be intimately bound up with the wider curriculum, particularly in the (...) areas of personal, social, cultural, moral, and spiritual education. From an examination of the values that are implicit in the musical traditions that dominate music education in Western culture, in this paper I will set out some pointers towards a more ecological understanding of music education, drawing on experiences I have had with music and music education in a variety of settings. I will examine how musicology has concentrated only on certain aspects of the musical experience, ignoring areas such as expressive character, value systems, and spirituality, which are the areas that link the musical experience to the fabric of life as lived beyond the confines of the classroom and academe. This paper seeks to re-establish a notion of connectedness both within the musical experience and also beyond it and through it to other areas of knowledge and understanding. For this I have adopted the term "ecology." To explicate this notion of ecology, I have developed a model which incorporates the values that are both usually associated with Western culture and are subjugated by it, drawing on the experience of music itself. [End Page 102] Ways of Knowing The first of these models deals with the social construction of knowledge. Stan Gooch defines two systems of thought embodied in various cultures in the world. He identifies the favored characteristics of one system (Type A) as activity leading to products; objectivity; impersonal logic; thinking and thought; detachment; and discrete categories of knowledge that are based on proof and scientific evidence. The other system (Type B) favors being; subjectivity; personal feeling; emotion; magic; involvement; associative ways of knowing; and belief and non-causal knowledge.1Gooch suggests that the Western world has chosen to value the first of these systems and neglect the other. This is done by a process of devaluation that can be carried out in various ways. In the Western media this devaluation can be manifested as public ridicule or by simply ignoring those events that reflect Type B values. Community-building activities based on associative ways of knowing and acknowledgement of people's feelings and sensibilities are not reported, while a considerable amount of space is given to the essentially dehumanizing practices of warfare and the dissociative practices of violence and crime. For example, reports and articles on holistic, associative approaches to health based on belief systems that defy rational explanation often end with throw-away comments like "If you believe that, then you will believe anything!" Public figures sometimes indulge in similar practices in their pronouncements by initiating policies to outlaw health practices that cannot be supported by scientific methodologies and appealing to the grounds of public safety. People who wish to embrace the values of Type B can easily be pathologized or criminalized as the dominant culture seeks to reinforce the validity of its Type A values. Academic, medical, psychological, and even sociological research concentrates on so-called objective methodologies associated with scientific ways of knowing and the use of numbers in some shape or form. Qualitative methodologies that collect people's stories are often regarded with suspicion because of the alleged subjectivity of the approach.So the values of Type B have become hidden or repressed by Western culture. I have therefore called the ways of knowing that characterize Type B "subjugated ways of knowing,"2 following the work of Michel Foucault and his notion of subjugated knowledges.3 This paper will concentrate on how the ideas of the subjugated ways of knowing can be used to understand where we are in music education, drawing on my experience in the UK. I shall look at ways of bringing the two ways of knowing-Type A and... (shrink)

Ce livre propose une réflexion théorico-clinique sur un outil psychanalytique encore trop méconnu, que l'auteur intitule: Cet autre divan. Il traite d'une autre façon d'utiliser la méthode psychanalytique de Freud pour les pathologies non névrotiques actuelles. Cet autre divan peut éveiller la curiosité, car ici le divan lui-même est un outil de la cure. Ce concept de la Psychothérapie Psychanalytique Corporelle (PPC) est issu de la rencontre des travaux de Julian de Ajuriaguerra et des recherches post-freudiennes sur les pathologies des (...) limites. Avec de nombreuses illustrations, l'auteur montre que la PPC permet le dégagement de l'archaïque traumatique à l'aide de la médiation corporelle. L'originalité de cet abord psychanalytique est de faire travailler les paramètres oubliés parce que silencieux dans le cadre psychanalytique classique, qui est mis en difficulté par les patients non névrotiques. Ce livre, qui donne au corps toute son importance organisatrice pour la psyché, montre que nous pouvons innover à partir de Freud pour aider psychanalytiquement ces personnes qui présentent des souffrances identitaires et narcissiques et qui s'adressent à nous. (shrink)

'Folk psychology' is a term that refers to the way that ordinary people think and talk about minds. But over roughly the last four decades the term has come to be used in rather different ways by philosophers and psychologists engaged in technical projects in analytic philosophy of mind and empirical psychology, many of which are only indirectly related to the question of how ordinary people actually think about minds. The result is a sometimes puzzling body of academic literature, cobbled (...) together loosely under that single heading, that contains a number of terminological inconsistencies, the clarification of which seems to reveal conceptual problems. This paper is an attempt to approach folk psychology more directly, to clarify the phenomenon of interest, and to examine the methods used to investigate it. Having identified some conceptual problems in the literature, I argue that those problems have occluded a particular methodological confound involved in the study of folk psychology, one associated with psychological language, that may well be intractable. Rather than attempt to solve that methodological problem, then, I suggest that we use the opportunity to rethink the relationship between folk psychology and its scientific counterpart. A careful look at the study of folk psychology may prove surprisingly helpful for clarifying the nature of psychological science and addressing the contentious question of its status as a potentially autonomous special science. (shrink)

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding (...) anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms. (shrink)

According to Newton, the goals of natural philosophy comprise quantitative generalizations and causal knowledge, the latter being paramount. Quantitative generalizations are sometimes explanatory, in psychology as elsewhere . However, in psychology, they are not explanatory when the human subject is considered qua bearer of psychological states , but only when she is considered qua physical system. In the former case quantitative generalizations are, rather, to be causally explained. In this sense, psychology may be closer to the Newtonian methodological mark than (...) contemporary physics. (shrink)

Eugen Bleuler, in 1911, renamed the group of mental disorders with poor prognosis which Emil Kraepel in had called ``dementia praecox'' ``group of schizophrenias'',because for him the splitting of personality was the main symptom.Biographical, scientific and methodological influences on Bleuler's concept of schizophrenia are shown with special reference to Kraepelin and Freud.Bleuler was a passionate and very experienced clinician. He lived with his patients, taking care of them and writing down his observations. Methodologically he was an empiricist and an eclecticist (...) with a wide reading knowledge.In an impaired association of ideas, in disordered affectivity, in marked ambivalence and autism Bleuler saw the main symptoms of schizophrenia. For him these so-called pathological phenomena actually seemed to be only exaggerations of normal psychic functions. So there were only a quantitative, not a qualitative difference between schizophrenia and normal psychic processes and studies on schizophrenic ``pathology'' –seen as a disturbance, not as a disease – might analogously illustrate normal psychic reactions and vice versa.In etiology as well as in therapy Bleuler took into account psychological and (neuro)physiological(somatic) mechanisms – thus combining organicism and dynamic psychiatry and coming very close to modern concepts, e.g. the one of stress and vulnerability. Bleuler's main merit is the stressing of an idiographic ``understanding'' of the patient and a plausible and subtle explanation of schizophrenia which helped to reduce the alienation of the affected persons. (shrink)

Between 1960 and 1999, it was quite common for philosophers to rely almost completely on a priori methods to advance their arguments ; in a recent study by Knobe, the majority of papers sampled from this period used strictly a priori methods. In contrast, in the last decade and a half, many philosophers' strategy for making progress on philosophical questions has changed. Philosophers are now relying more heavily on empirical data—including running their own observational and experimental studies—in order to support (...) their arguments. Without a doubt, part of this shift was due to the rise of experimental philosophy – roughly a methodological approach to addressing philosophical questions wherein the researcher uses psychological methods to investigate the parameters that affect the deployment of philosophically significant concepts. This dissertation raises methodological problems with work in experimental philosophy and then proposes solutions to these problems. My focus in this dissertation is on two subfields in philosophy – epistemology and moral psychology – both of which have witnessed increased uses of psychological methods to investigate philosophical questions. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology, the self-proclaimed scientific theory of human nature, owes much of its controversial notoriety to reports in public media. In part this is because of its bold claims that human psychological characteristics are adaptations to the Pleistocene environment in which they evolved and these inherited characteristics we exhibit now constitute our human nature. Proponents maintain that evolutionary psychology is a scientific account of human nature that explains what this much abused concept means. Critics counter that some evolutionary psychological hypotheses (...) threaten to undermine other intuitive concepts of human nature and well-being, specifically, by emphasizing purported scientific evidence of natural inequalities based on sex, gender, or race. They argue that this “gene machine” view entails consequences endorsing or at least seeming to give scientific aid and comfort to politically conservative, “right-wing” social agendas. Proponents deny that the theory has such unwelcome implications. Such objections, they reply, stem from “left-wing” egalitarian ideologies that presuppose the cogency of the disputed tabula rasa concept of mind intrinsic to the standard social science model of behavior explanations. Philip Kitcher’s initial scathing analysis of sociobiology, now called evolutionary psychology, as the science of human nature went basically unchallenged. Bioethicist Janet Radcliffe Richards has given a detailed critique of Kitcher’s arguments; she finds them to be “leftward-leaning,” and wanting. Here I examine her arguments and find them wanting though not “rightward-leaning.”. (shrink)

This paper addresses a recent argument of the Churchlands against the "linguistic-rationalist" tradition exemplified by current cognitive-computational psychology. Because of its commitment to methodological solipsism--the argument goes--computational psychology cannot provide an account of how organisms are able to represent and "hook up to" the world. First I attempt to determine the exact nature of this charge and its relation to the Churchlands' long-standing polemic against 'folk psychology' and the linguistic-rationalist methodology. I then turn my attention to the Churchlands' account (...) of what it is for computational psychology to be methodologically solipsistic. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that methodological solipsism commits one to a purely syntactic theory of the mind (of the kind that Stephen Stich has recently advocated): the formality constraints that methodological solipsism imposes on psychological explanation do not exclude 'essential' reference to the representational content of mental states, as long as this content is construed in the 'narrow' sense. I conclude by raising a problem for computational psychology that may provide some real cause for concern. (shrink)

After an overview of the phenomenology of numinous experience in mysticism, conversion, and related states in psychosis, the intersection and distinction between contemporary transpersonal psychologies of spiritual development and psychodynamic/clinical perspectives on pathological states is addressed from cognitive&endash;developmental, psycho-physiological, personality, and socio-cultural perspectives. Debates about the nature of mystical and conversion experiences have a long history in the psychology of religious experience and raise fundamental methodological issues concerning the potential inclusiveness or narrowness of the human sciences. A genuine psychology (...) of numinous experience and its impact on life histories must find its way between the twin dangers of "over-belief" and false reductionism. (shrink)

The paper is an overview of the connections between scientific psychology and religion. The thesis that scientific psychology, which deals with empirical research of all manifestations of spirituality and religiousness within the different principles and contexts of culture, cannot refer to the doctrine of religion, but it should take into account in its research the cultural aspects of the religion without valuing them at the individual human level and their influence on the "fate" of the world, is being discussed. Conclusion: (...) Against the background of the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon psychology, based on the positivist paradigm, there is no place on the basis of valid methodological canons for building a direct relationship between scientific psychology and religion. (shrink)

Psychological research has generally suffered from methodological fundamentalism, which is an overly strict interpretation of what is considered “scientific” and has created a psychology of triviality. Methodological fundamentalism often constricts the study of a complex dynamic psychology that encompasses both observed and unobserved reality with interacting and interdependent variables. In Against Method, Feyerabend (1993) posits there could be no set scientific method and that great scientists are methodological opportunists who use any methodology that helps with discovery. As opposed to (...) Fisher’s (1925) arbitrary, categorical standard of p<.05, I suggest as a strength of a scientific finding the review of confidence levels of across various populations, methods, measures and forms of analyses. Eventually, I hope that an unbiased computer analysis of studies can guide researchers as to what theories show high confidence levels across various populations, methods, measures and forms of analyses and suggest the next step to advance the science. (shrink)

This paper argues that although moral intuitions are insufficient for making judgments on new technological innovations, they maintain great utility for informing responsible innovation. To do this, this paper employs the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology as an illustrative example of how stakeholder values can be better distilled to inform responsible innovation. Further, it is argued that moral intuitions are necessary for determining stakeholder values required for the design of responsible technologies. This argument is supported by the claim that (...) the moral intuitions of stakeholders allow designers to conceptualize stakeholder values and incorporate them into the early phases of design. It is concluded that design-for-values (DFV) frameworks like the VSD methodology can remain potent if developers adopt heuristic tools to diminish the influence of cognitive biases thus strengthening the reliability of moral intuitions. (shrink)