In end-of-life care discussions, I contend that the distinction between “having a life” vs. “being alive” is an underutilized distinction. This distinction is significant in separating different states of existence conflated by patients, families, and clinicians. In the clinical setting, applying this distinction in end-of-life care discussions aids patients’ and family members’ decision-making by helping them understand that being alive can differ from having a life. Moreover, this distinction helps them decide which state may be the most important to them. (...) After applying this distinction to three complex cases, I respond to the likely objection that “having a life” vs. “being alive” is less accurate and more controversial than other distinctions. I conclude by arguing that “having a life” vs. “being alive” is more accurate and less controversial than distinctions between medically indicated vs. medically inappropriate treatments, personhood, and quantity vs. quality of life. (shrink)

Psychobiological responses to music have been examined previously in various naturalistic settings in adults. Choir singing seems to be associated with positive psychobiological outcomes in adults. However, evidence on the effectiveness of singing in children and adolescents is sparse. The COVID-19 outbreak is significantly affecting society now and in the future, including how individuals engage with music. The COVID-19 pandemic is occurring at a time when virtual participation in musical experiences such as singing in a virtual choir has become more (...) prevalent. However, it remains unclear whether virtual singing leads to different responses in comparison with in-person singing. We evaluated the psychobiological effects of in-person choral singing in comparison with the effects of virtual choral singing in a naturalistic pilot within-subject study. A group of children and young adolescents from a school in Salzburg, Austria were recruited to take part in the study. Subjective measures were taken pre- and post-singing sessions once a week. Additionally, salivary biomarkers and quantity of social contacts were assessed pre- and post-singing sessions every second week. Psychological stability, self-esteem, emotional competences, and chronic stress levels were measured at the beginning of in-person singing as well as at the beginning and the end of the virtual singing. We observed a positive impact on mood after both in-person and virtual singing. Over time, in-person singing showed a pre-post decrease in salivary cortisol, while virtual singing showed a moderate increase. Moreover, a greater reduction in stress, positive change in calmness, and higher values of social contacts could be observed for the in-person setting compared to the virtual one. In addition, we observed positive changes in psychological stability, maladaptive emotional competences, chronic stress levels, hair cortisol, self-contingency and quality of life. Our preliminary findings suggest that group singing may provide benefits for children and adolescents. In-person singing in particular seems to have a stronger psychobiological effect. (shrink)

Background: The ability to save the life of an extremely premature baby has increased substantially over the last decade. This survival, however, can be associated with unfavourable outcomes for both baby and family. Questions are now being asked about quality of life for survivors of extreme prematurity. Quality of life is rightly deemed to be an important consideration in high technology neonatal care; yet, it is notoriously difficult to determine or predict. How does one define and operationalise what (...) is considered to be in the best interest of a surviving extremely premature baby, especially when the full extent of the outcomes might not be known for several years? Research question: The research investigates the caregiving dilemmas often faced by neonatal nurses when caring for extremely premature babies. This article explores the issues arising for neonatal nurses when they considered the philosophical and ethical questions about quality of life in babies ≤24 weeks gestation. Participants: Data were collected via a questionnaire to Australian neonatal nurses and semi-structured interviews with 24 neonatal nurses in New South Wales, Australia. Ethical considerations: Ethical processes and procedures have been adhered to by the researchers. Findings: A qualitative approach was used to analyse the data. The theme ‘difficult choices’ was generated which comprised three sub-themes: ‘damaged through survival’, ‘the importance of the brain’ and ‘families are important’. The results show that neonatal nurses believed that quality of life was an important consideration; yet they experienced significant inner conflict and uncertainty when asked to define or suggest specific elements of quality of life, or to suggest how it might be determined. It was even more difficult for the nurses to say when an extremely premature baby’s life possessed quality. Their previous clinical and personal experiences led the nurses to believe that the quality of the family’s life was important, and possibly more so than the quality of life of the surviving baby. This finding contrasts markedly with much of the existing literature in this field. Conclusion: Quality of life for extremely premature babies was an important consideration for neonatal nurses; however, they experienced difficulty deciding how to operationalise such considerations in their everyday clinical practice. (shrink)

This paper deals with problems that vagueness raises for choices involving evaluative tradeoffs. I focus on a species of such choices, which I call ‘qualitative barrier cases.’ These are cases in which a qualitatively significant tradeoff in one evaluative dimension for a given improvement in another dimension could not make an option better all things considered, but a merely quantitative tradeoff for the given improvement might. Trouble arises, however, when one of the options constitutes a borderline case of an evaluative (...) kind. I argue that in such cases we can neither affirm nor deny that trading off losses in one evaluative dimension for gains in another yields a better outcome. Theoretically, this result provides a way to defuse an argument that has been presented by both Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels that purports to show that the ‘better than’ relation is intransitive. Practically, it allows us to undermine the claim that rational agents are better off withholding their contribution to a public good in certain instances of the free-rider problem, and thus to take an important step towards solving these problems. (shrink)

The paper deals with credible and relevantinformation flow in dialogs: How useful is it for areceiver to get some information, how useful is it fora sender to give this information, and how much credibleinformation can we expect to flow between sender andreceiver? What is the relation between semantics andpragmatics? These Gricean questions will be addressedfrom a decision and game-theoretical point of view.

Does domination make us unfree? Republicans argue that it does. Thus, they contend that the liberal conception of freedom is inadequate as it is not (wholly) able to account for domination. I provide a new approach to this controversy. The liberal conception of freedom has the potential to account for domination, but we must adjust the scope of our analysis: claims about domination are best understood not as claims about quantities of liberal freedom, but as claims about the value of (...) liberal freedom. Even if the master is benevolent and indeed does not interfere much with the slave’s choices and actions, the relation of domination affects the quality of the slave’s liberal freedom. To argue for this point, I provide a taxonomy of the value of freedom and then, on this basis, point to several ways in which freedom under domination lacks value. (shrink)

A well known paragraph in Mill's 'Utilitarianism' has standardly been misread. Mill does not claim that if some pleasure is of 'higher quality', then it will be (or ought to be) chosen over the pleasure of lower quality regardless of their respective quantities. Instead he says that if some pleasure will be chosen over another available in larger quantity, then we are justified in saying that the pleasure so chosen is of higher quality than the other. (...) This assertion is unproblematic. (shrink)

Access to detailed, up-to-date and available bioinformatics databases has been identified by the Commission of the European Union as a pillar for the harvesting of the potential of life-sciences and biotechnology. Unconditional access to research data, however, is squarely at odds with the primary interest of every scientist to be the first to make a discovery. This classical dilemma is specifically pressing in the data-driven field of biomedical research, where data-quantity has become a quality on its own, where (...) speed matters and patients can't wait. The dilemma urges a consideration of the principle, the practice and the law regarding access for academic researchers to unpublished research data. The consideration will include the presentation of the outcome of a global and a national survey among biomedical researchers on the accessibility of 'their' research data. The principled arguments pro unconditional access and the laws and practical considerations contra unconditional access offer conflicting perspectives and the resulting situation is compounded by the uncertainty created by the European database-right as to who holds legal title to the databases. Therefore, it is explored whether the two opposing concerns - unconditional access vs. legitimate restrictions - can be accommodated by the adoption and implementation of a general policy for access to biomedical data that greases the wheels of (European) research. (shrink)

The shape of the Earth's surface, its topography, is a fundamental dimension of the environment, shaping or mediating many other environmental flows or functions. But there is a major divergence in the way that topography is conceptualized in different domains. Topographic cartographers, information scientists, geomorphologists and environmental modelers typically conceptualize topographic variability as a continuous field of elevations or as some discrete approximation to such a field. Pilots, explorers, anthropologists, ecologists, hikers, and archeologists, on the other hand, typically conceptualize this (...) same variability in terms of hills and valleys, mountains and plains, barrows and trenches, that is, as (special sorts of) objects, with locations, shapes, and often names of their own. In this chapter, we sketch an approach to bridging this fundamental gap in geographic information infrastructure. (shrink)

When does more data help and when does it not in the sciences? In the past decade, this question has become central because of the phenomenon of Big Data. While these discussions started as a result of somewhat naive ideas that have been closely analyzed and mostly rejected in the philosophy of data, the question about the epistemic difference that more or less data makes still matters, especially in light of the impressive performance of data science and machine learning tools, (...) which seem to improve their outcomes when they are trained on large volumes of data. In several areas of the sciences, having more data is also connected to methodological and epistemic benefits and more generally something that research should strive toward. More data is often equated to better science: this elicits crucial questions about the epistemic value of the quantity of data. In this chapter, we discuss this problem in light of current discussions in the life and health sciences and the philosophy of data. (shrink)

On which philosophical foundations is the attribution of numerical magnitudes to qualitative phenomena based? That is, what is the philosophical basis for attributing, through measurement operations, numbers to empirical qualities that our senses perceive in the outside world? This question, nowadays rarely addressed in such a way, actually refers to an old debate about the quantification of qualities. A historical analysis reveals that it was a major issue in the “context of discovery” of the first attempts to mathematize new fields (...) of knowledge, whereas the “context of justification” leading our contemporary perspective on such episodes often overlooks such problems. As a consequence, little attention has so far been given to tracing its emergence back to its original context, leaving in the shadows an important debate about measurement. In this respect, the work of William Stanley Jevons is worth analysis. As a preliminary step toward his ambitious project to mathematize economics, he first attempted to understand the mechanism underlying measurement in physics, through a very innovative approach. Its main merit consisted in trying to overcome the Aristotelian distinction between quantities and qualities. In this article, I will strive to highlight the significance of his work for the history of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Any discipline of human knowledge is characterized by three fundamental elements: the complexity of its content, the method used for its elaboration, and the language used for its expression. This article argues that any method for making knowledge is a particular combination of three main components that we can call (a) science, (b) art, and (c) revelation. The right combination depends on the complexity of the slice of reality that we wish to understand in each case. Is there a relationship (...) between the quantity and quality of a particular piece of knowledge and the quantity and quality of its eventual audience? Such a relationship serves, I believe, to avoid certain old misunderstandings. -/- . (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of three previous papers , which have discussed the issues of measure and measurement, as well as the views of K. Berka and B. Ellis on this issue. This paper gives a restatement of those views from the point of view of the unity of qualitative and quantitative determinations of measure. Further it deals with Ellis’ conventionalism in measurement theory. Finally it provides a differentiated typology of measurement.

McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.

A description is given of the quantitative-qualitative distinction for terms in theories of measurable attributes, and, adjoined to that account, a suggestion is made concerning the sense in which empirical relational systems have an empirical attribute as their topic or focus. Since this characterization of quantitative terms, relative to a partition, makes no explicit reference to numbers, concatenation operations, or ordering relations, we show how our results are related to some standard theorems in the literature. Analogs of representation and uniqueness (...) theorems are proved, and the notions of exact quantitative term and the underlying attribute of a quantitative term, are described and studied. (shrink)

Ever since David Lewis argued for the indispensibility of natural properties, they have become a staple of mainstream metaphysics. This dissertation is a critical examination of natural properties. What roles can natural properties play in metaphysics, and what structure do natural properties have? In the first half of the dissertation, I argue that natural properties cannot do all the work they are advertised to do. In the second half of the dissertation, I look at questions relating to the structure of (...) natural properties. I argue that the metric structure of fundamental quantitative properties cannot be reduced to mereological structure, and I argue that the simplistic picture of natural properties as monadic must be abandoned in light of theories of fundamental physics. (shrink)

Voluntary disclosures of sustainability information have recently received considerable attention by investors, regulators, and public companies in improving reliability and integrity of corporate reporting. We examine the association between the quantity and quality of sustainability disclosures and earnings quality in the context of corporate ethical value and culture. We posit that sustainability disclosures of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance reports are linked to earnings quality, because of the importance of both earnings quality and ESG (...) sustainability disclosures to investors and trustworthiness of corporate reporting. We collect our sample of 35,110 firm-year observations between 1999 and 2015. Using both difference-in-difference tests and OLS regression, we find that sustainability disclosure quantity is positively associated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality in mitigating managerial earnings manipulation and unethical opportunistic reporting behavior. Further tests illustrate that sustainability disclosure quality can strengthen the positive relation between innate earnings quality and sustainability disclosure quantity and mitigate the negative relation between discretionary earnings quality and sustainability disclosure quantity. Finally, additional tests suggest that the relation between earnings quality and sustainability disclosure quantity is moderated by corporate structure and prior-year sustainability performance. Our results provide policy, practical, and research implications as ESG sustainability reporting is being integrated into corporate culture and business models. (shrink)

According to Kant, the division of the categories “is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at haphazard,” but is derived from the “complete” classification of judgments developed by traditional logic. However, the sorts of judgments that he enumerates in his table of judgments are not all ones that traditional logic has dealt with; consequently, we must say that he chose the sorts of judgments in question with a certain intention. Besides, we know that his choice of (...) judgments and categories is strongly influenced by certain views of natural science that he fully accepts. For this reason, his argumentations are sometimes seriously inconsistent. As to Kant’s argumentations of categories, many problems have already been pointed out, but in this paper, I take up the categories of quantity and quality once more, and make clear his argumentations’ hidden logic and its distortion from the point of view of the history of logic and natural science. First, I confirm that there are non-negligible problems in his explanation to the effect that his derivation of the categories of quantity and quality is based on the quantity and quality of judgments. Next, I reconsider the meaning of his treating the categories of quantity and quality as pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, I conclude that by having recourse to the categories of quantity and quality Kant tried unjustly to apriorize the distinction between the “extensive magnitude” and “intensive magnitude” that has a long formational history since Aristotle. (shrink)

Any discipline of human knowledge is characterized by three fundamental elements: the complexity of its content, the method used for its elaboration, and the language used for its expression. This article argues that any method for making knowledge is a particular combination of three main components that we can call science, art, and revelation. The right combination depends on the complexity of the slice of reality that we wish to understand in each case. Is there a relationship between the (...) class='Hi'>quantity and quality of a particular piece of knowledge and the quantity and quality of its eventual audience? Such a relationship serves, I believe, to avoid certain old misunderstandings. (shrink)

In this essay I propose a new measure of social welfare. It captures the intuitive idea that quantity, quality, and equality of individual welfare all matter for social welfare. More precisely, it satisfies six conditions: Equivalence, Dominance, Quality, Strict Monotonicity, Equality and Asymmetry. These state that i) populations equivalent in individual welfare are equal in social welfare; ii) a population that dominates another in individual welfare is better; iii) a population that has a higher average welfare than (...) another population is better, other things being equal; iv) the addition of a well-faring individual makes a population better, whereas the addition of an ill-faring individual makes a population worse; v) a population that has a higher degree of equality than another population is better, other things being equal; and vi) individual illfare matters more for social welfare than individual welfare. By satisfying the six conditions, the measure improves on previously proposed measures, such as the utilitarian Total and Average measures, as well as different kinds of Prioritarian measures. (shrink)

In a sample of 615 Belgians a model for fair trade buying behaviour was developed. The impact of fair trade knowledge, general attitudes towards fair trade, attitudes towards fair trade products, and the perception of the quality and quantity of fair trade information on the reported amount of money spent on fair trade products were assessed. Fair trade knowledge, overall concern and scepticism towards fair trade, and the perception of the perceived quantity and quality of fair (...) trade information, influence buying behaviour directly and indirectly through product attitudes. Interest in fair trade products, price acceptability and product liking have a significant impact on fair trade buying behaviour. Product interest is the most important variable influencing buying behaviour. Implications for the campaigns of governments and for the marketing strategy of fair trade organisations are offered. (shrink)

We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey ( 2010 ) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding , rather than knowledge, (...) constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly. (shrink)

In a sample of 615 Belgians a model for fair trade buying behaviour was developed. The impact of fair trade knowledge, general attitudes towards fair trade, attitudes towards fair trade products, and the perception of the quality and quantity of fair trade information on the reported amount of money spent on fair trade products were assessed. Fair trade knowledge, overall concern and scepticism towards fair trade, and the perception of the perceived quantity and quality of fair (...) trade information, influence buying behaviour directly and indirectly through product attitudes. Interest in fair trade products, price acceptability and product liking have a significant impact on fair trade buying behaviour. Product interest is the most important variable influencing buying behaviour. Implications for the campaigns of governments and for the marketing strategy of fair trade organisations are offered. (shrink)

In his reexamination of the relationship between quality and quantity, Professor Plochmann has avoided the method of linguistic analysis in favor of a more traditional method of philosophizing. Since I agree with him that in general quality and quantity are irreducible one to the other, but may both be reducible to some category more fundamental than either, my comments are to be considered supplementary to his. In particular, I should like to see what clarifications, if any, (...) arise if one considers qualities and quantities from the purely linguistic point of view. (shrink)

In his Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, Porphyry debunks Ptolemy’s quantitative theory of pitches by demonstrating that pitches are qualitative attributes of sound. I argue that Porphyry’s main concern is to save the phenomenological dimension of sound while preserving the possibility of a quantitative analysis of music. I show how he draws on the Aristotelian tradition to develop a theory of pitches as emergent properties that covary with some underlying quantitative features without being reducible to them. Porphyry offers an original and (...) compelling solution to the classic problem of how to provide a quantitative analysis of a qualitative phenomenon. (shrink)

This paper locates Kierkegaard within the philosophical tradition and as the co-founder with Nietzsche of existential-postmodern philosophy. With his analysis of the quantitative build up of human motion Kierkegaard follows the pre-Socratics and their tradition in wanting to know the truth about the becoming of all things. But in his analysis of the qualitative leap with hints from Leibniz he founds postmodernphilosophy. His double movement leap as first quantitative and then qualitative is here explained in terms of sin and faith, (...) despair and truth, anxiety and freedom, offence and love, madness and earnestness. Finally, an explanation of his concept of repetition shows how there can be a new quality and more of that same quality.Cet article situe Kierkegaard à l’intérieur de la tradition philosophique et en tant que co-fondateur, avec Nietzsehe, de la philosophie existentielle-postmoderne. Par son analyse de l’accroissement quantitatif du mouvement humain, Kierkegaard suit I’ornière des présocratiques et de leur tradition en cherchant à connaitre la vérité du devenir de toutes choses. Or, dans son analyse du saut qualitatif, il fonde, à I’aided’indications de Leibniz, la philosophie postmoderne. Son double saut, en tant que quantitatif d’une part, qualitatif d’autre part, est expliqué ici en termes de: péché et foi, désespoir et vérité, anxiété et liberté, offense et amour, folie et sincérité. Enfin, une explication de son concept de répétition montrera comment il peut y avoir une nouvelle qualité et davantage de cette même qualité. (shrink)

In Ontology, quality determines beings. The quality-quantity bipolarity reveals that a conceptual logical comprehension that can include negation must be a dialectical logic. Quality is a precise characteristic of something capable of augmentation or diminution while remaining identical through differences or quantitative changes. Thus, quality and in opposition quantity are inextricably linked, giving definition to each other, so constituting a logical bipolarity. The theory is that a magnitude G is never separated from secondary qualities (...) α and β, and therefore, a measure depends on a concrete quality Gα or Gβ, that is to say on one pole of a logical bi-pole. However, the particular number, the unit, that expresses the result of a measure is the quality G alone. Examples drawn from physical and chemical experiments illustrate these ideas and elaborate the structure of the concept of opposition between the secondary qualities α and β of a magnitude G. (shrink)

In the First of the Three Dialogues, Berkeley’s Hylas, responding to Philonous’s question whether extension and motion are separable from secondary qualities, says: What! Is it not an easy matter, to consider extension and motion by themselves,... Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?