Quentin Skinner has enduringly insisted that a past text cannot be ‘understood’ without the reader knowing something about its historical and linguistic context. But since the 1970s he has been attacked on this central point of all his work by authors maintaining that the text itself is the fundamental guide to the author’s intention, and that a separate study of the context cannot tell the historian anything that the text itself could not. Mark Bevir has spent much of the last (...) 20 years repeating a similar counter-argument. Although ‘study the linguistic context’ might be a useful heuristic maxim, Bevir says, it does not express a necessary or sufficient condition for understanding. But Skinner is right, and one of the figures he has consistently identified as a formative inspiration, R. G. Collingwood, has already (in his work of the 1930s) shown why. What Collingwood calls his ‘logic of question and answer’ explains why the historian cannot answer his characteristic ‘intention’ question about past texts without knowing the context of problems to which authors think they are offering solutions. The study of context is neither ‘prior’ (as Bevir incorrectly supposes) nor ‘separate’ (as Skinner inaccurately says), but it is, as Skinner maintains, nevertheless impossible to grasp an author’s intention without it. This ‘logic of question and answer’ also explains why, in history, dismissing the study of context is in fact a pre-judgement of evidence yet unseen. (shrink)

In this dissertation I attempt to develop a better understanding of knowledge and belief. In Chapter 1 I offer an analysis of knowledge-wh . I argue that knowledge-wh ascriptions express that a subject stands in the knowledge relation to a question--where to stand in this knowledge relation to a question is to know an answer to the question. Additionally I adopt a contextualist picture of knowledge- wh . I raise some problems for invariantism about knowledge- wh and I argue that (...) contextualism about knowledge-wh fits nicely with a very natural understanding of the semantics of interrogatives, and the nature of questions. In Chapter 2 consider whether knowledge-how is importantly different from knowledge-wh . I argue that 'knows how' is ambiguous, but on one sense knowledge-how ascriptions should be treated just like the other knowledge ascriptions with interrogative complements. Hence this type of knowledge-how is not fundamentally distinct from knowledge-wh . In Chapter 3 I reconsider various theories about knowledge and knowledge- that ascriptions in light of our conclusions about knowledge- wh ascriptions. It seems that doing so can help adjudicate between contextualism and invariantism about knowledge-that and may help determine which form of contextualism about knowledge-that is the most plausible. In Chapter 4 I consider whether there is some fact about the nature of the attitudes that determines the verb's complement selection. Some have suggested that the embedding behavior of attitude verbs is correlated with the factivity of the attitude verb. I evaluate this suggestion and the possible explanations for the embedding behavior of the various attitude verbs. I attempt to determine the extent to which the factivity of verbs is correlated with their embedding behavior and I attempt to explain why factivity plays such an important role. I argue that these facts can provide important insights into the nature of the attitudes. In Chapter 5 I explore the way in which knowledge and action are related in an important way. I consider the claim that it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for action if and only if you know that p . I first present and explain the principle. Next I consider some objections to the proposal, and I argue that none of these objections is successful. I claim that the contrastivist, in particular, has several moves available in the face of the alleged problems with this Reason-Knowledge principle. (shrink)

Inside the Team: Questions and Answers Facing Teacher Leaders is a book for K-12 teachers and leaders who face dilemmas leading teams of peers. Using Q/A scenarios and building context for leadership in practice, the authors provide answers, useful, practical tools, resources, models and conversation starters that move teams forward.

This article analyses domestic and foreign reactions to a 2008 report in the British Medical Journal on the complementary and, as argued, synergistic relationship between palliative care and euthanasia in Belgium. The earliest initiators of palliative care in Belgium in the late 1970s held the view that access to proper palliative care was a precondition for euthanasia to be acceptable and that euthanasia and palliative care could, and should, develop together. Advocates of euthanasia including author Jan Bernheim, independent from but (...) together with British expatriates, were among the founders of what was probably the first palliative care service in Europe outside of the United Kingdom. In what has become known as the Belgian model of integral end-of-life care, euthanasia is an available option, also at the end of a palliative care pathway. This approach became the majority view among the wider Belgian public, palliative care workers, other health professionals, and legislators. The legal regulation of euthanasia in 2002 was preceded and followed by a considerable expansion of palliative care services. It is argued that this synergistic development was made possible by public confidence in the health care system and widespread progressive social attitudes that gave rise to a high level of community support for both palliative care and euthanasia. The Belgian model of so-called integral end-of-life care is continuing to evolve, with constant scrutiny of practice and improvements to procedures. It still exhibits several imperfections, for which some solutions are being developed. This article analyses this model by way of answers to a series of questions posed by Journal of Bioethical Inquiry consulting editor Michael Ashby to the Belgian authors. (shrink)

Taking the lead from orthodox quantum theory, I will introduce a handy generalization of the Boolean approach to propositions and questions: the orthoalgebraic framework. I will demonstrate that this formalism relates to a formal theory of questions (or ‘observables’ in the physicist’s jargon). This theory allows formulating attitude questions, which normally are non-commuting, i.e., the ordering of the questions affects the answer behavior of attitude questions. Further, it allows the expression of conditional questions such (...) as “If Mary reads the book, will she recommend it to Peter?”, and thus gives the framework the semantic power of raising issues and being informative at the same time. In the case of commuting observables, there are close similarities between the orthoalgebraic approach to questions and the Jäger/Hulstijn approach to question semantics. However, there are also differences between the two approaches even in case of commuting observables. The main difference is that the Jäger/Hulstijn approach relates to a partition theory of questions whereas the orthoalgebraic approach relates to a ‘decorated’ partition theory (i.e. the elements of the partition are decorated by certain semantic values). Surprisingly, the orthoalgebraic approach is able to overcome most of the difficulties of the Jäger/Hulstijn approach. Furthermore, the general approach is suitable to describe the different types of (non-commutative) attitude questions as investigated in modern survey research. Concluding, I will suggest that an active dialogue between the traditional model-theoretic approaches to semantics and the orthoalgebraic paradigm is mandatory. (shrink)

Linguists have realised for some time that predicates of the 'know' and 'wonder' classes behave differently in semantic terms with respect to their interrogative complements, but have not so far fully understood how or why. This book seeks to explore and to provide solutions to this and to related problems in explaining the meaning and grammar of embedded interrogatives and the predicates that take interrogative complements.

The aim of this paper is to understand the philosophical role of Collingwood’s proposed logic of question and answer. I shall consider its historical background as a response to Bradley, to the “realists” and to the logical positivists. I shall also consider the similarities and differences between it and modern developments in logics of question and answer and also in anti-realist philosophical logic. In analysing Collingwood’s proposed logic, and its potential for development, I shall attempt a sketch of how it (...) would work out in formal terms. To be sure Collingwood dismissed the symbolism of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica as “typographical jargon” and he thought the various artificial logical languages of his time to be “numerous and frightful offspring of propositional logic out of illiteracy”. Nevertheless he did recognise an important role for the logician in articulating his system, namely to identify what it is to be a proposition and what it is to be a question and in doing so to identify what constitutes an “absolute presupposition”. Moreover since Collingwood’s day there have been important developments in logic and semantics, which are expressed through typographical jargon, and yet which are highly relevant to Collingwood’s proposed logic and to its philosophical role. (shrink)

A logic of questions and answers exists within the logic of statements, if we make the following identifications (roughly): "Whether" questions are identified with true exclusive disjunctions, and "which" questions are identified with true existential quantifications. The question-and-answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game. The question mark is not needed except as a device of abbreviation. Complete and partial answers can be distinguished and various relations of relevance, independence, and resolution defined.

Ancient Egypt in 101 Questions and Answers. By Thomas SchneIder, translated by David Lorton. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. Pp. xiv + 282, illus. $26.

This chapter discusses some problems raised about sufficientarianism and offers some responses to them.

This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations (...) conceived in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality. (shrink)

Questions that arise in the doctor-patient relationship may be transforming. The discussion begins with a compelling example: When parents ask, “Doctor, if this were your child, what would you do?” it is always a “high-stakes” question. What the question means and how it is understood depends on how we understand, and how sensitive we are, to the context and the complexity of several different relationships, and what each uniquely asks or requires. -/- Working from the parents’ question, “What would (...) you do . . . ?” the present discussion will develop a broader understanding of questions within the doctor-patient relationship and the possibilities for finding meaning that they introduce. A clinical narrative is used to show that questions are most meaningful when they are understood in the context of a unique relationship--and a "potential space"--that is both interpersonal and ontological. (shrink)

A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter- native geometrical representations. In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation of assertoric (...) sentences in Aristotle's traditional logic. Following Abelard’s distinction between two alternative readings of the O-vertex: Non omnis and Quidam non, a logical difference is made between negation and denial by means of a more fine- grained modal analysis. A consistent treatment of assertoric oppositions is thus made possible by an underlying abstract theory of logical opposition, where the central concept is negation. A parallel is finally drawn between opposition and consequence, laying the ground for future works on an abstract operator of opposition that would characterize logical negation just as does Tarski’s operator of consequence for logical truth. (shrink)

3AM magazine follows up their 2014 publication Philosophy at 3AM: Questions and Answers with a new collection interviews, this time focused on ethics. Interviewer Richard Marhsall presents 26 interviews, balanced both in terms of specialty, gender, and seniority, so that the result is a balanced and engaging portrait of the state of the art in ethics today.

I examine a number of infinite regress arguments whose infinite regresses are presented or described in terms of recurring questions and answers in order to determine whether such recurring questions have any role in generating these infinite regresses, or in disqualifying the recurring answers. I argue that despite the existence of such infinite regress arguments and the suggestions of some philosophers, these recurring questions have no such roles. Some ways of handling these infinite regress arguments (...) are then proposed. (shrink)

Principles of Charity have become central features of any plausible theory of interpretation. The trick has been to explain how the truth of the text to appear without abandoning one’s critical resources in the process. I argue that Gadamer’s discussion of “the logic of question and answer,” when applied to textual interpretation, functions as a principle of charity provides the right balance between being too liberal and being too critical.

Reasoning is the iterative, path-dependent process of asking questions and answering them. Moral reasoning is a species of such reasoning, so it is a matter of asking and answering moral questions, which requires both creativity and curiosity. As such, interventions and practices that help people ask more and better moral questions promise to improve moral reasoning.

Generally, simulations are carried out to answer specific questions. The assessment of the reliability of an answer depends on the kind of question investigated. The answer to a 'why' question is an explanation. The premises of an explanation have to include invariant relationships, and thus the reliability of such answer depends on whether the domain of invariance of the relevant relationships covers the domain of the question. The answer to a 'how much' question is a measurement. A measurement is (...) reliable when it is an output of a calibrated measuring instrument. (shrink)

The question, R. M. Hare concedes, “has assumed great importance in the thought of some philosophers, for example Cook Wilson and Collingwood.” A concession, because after a couple of sentences Hare concludes: “we need say no more about questions.” The implication is that in contrast with his two Oxford predecessors the topic has little importance in his philosophy. This isn’t quite so, it will be seen. But it is in line with a tendency among philosophers to relegate the topic, (...) often quite literally, to a footnote. They would be wiser to take questions more seriously; not least because any theory of meaning which connects meaning in some way to the concept of truth—as most do—has to explain how interrogative sentences, which cannot sensibly be said to express what is true or false, can yet have a meaning. Questions also present a challenge to the easy assumption that all thought is either true or false. Even to think of something, it can be argued, is to think that certain descriptions are true of it: to think of a cat is to think of something as having four legs, fur, and so forth. Collingwood’s way of meeting the challenge isn’t immediately apparent. In An Autobiography he does seem to reject the assumption. (shrink)

Vasso Kindi examines, first, whether Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, which was to replace the symbolic logic of the logical positivists, does indeed bear similarities to Bacon’s and Kant’s use of questions, as Collingwood claims. She argues that Collingwood’s emphasis on questions is more similar to Kant’s concern with presuppositions that make knowledge possible than to Bacon’s interest in pursuing and questioning nature to divulge her secrets. She, then, explains how Collingwood’s emphasis on questions is tied (...) to his view that propositions are not abstract entities with intrinsic meaning in isolation from the network of presuppositions in which they are embedded. Finally, she suggests that the metaphysician’s task, according to Collingwood, is to ‘excavate’ different complexes of questions and answers until the absolute presuppositions which govern them are reached. It is this historical methodology that gives Collingwood’s metaphysics its distinctive character. (shrink)

To teach that being ethical requires knowing foundational ethical principles – or, as Socrates claimed, airtight definitions of ethical terms – is to invite cynicism among students, for students discover that no such principles can be found. Aristotle differs from Socrates in claiming that ethics is about virtues primarily, and that one can be virtuous without having the sort of knowledge that characterizes mathematics or natural science. Aristotle is able to demonstrate that ethics and self-interest may overlap, that ethics is (...) largely compatible with common sense, and that Aristotle’s virtuous person can make ethical decisions rationally. Case studies can help students improve their ethical perception and keep their values from being overwhelmed by corporate culture. (shrink)

This article critically examines the positions taken by Stephen E. Toulmin, Robert C. Coburn, and and Gordon D. Kaufman on existential experience and limiting questions and answers.

Fundamentals -- Beginning-of-life issues -- Reproductive technologies -- Contraception, sterilization, and natural family planning -- End-of-life issues -- Cooperation with evil -- Respect for the body -- The ten commandments for health care professionals and patients.

Being responsible is very important. But what does that mean? Readers will learn through examples in a fun question and answer format that doing the things you're supposed to do, even if it's not always what you want to do, is how you show responsibility.

Everyone has the ability to be tolerant. But what does that mean? Readers will learn through examples in a fun question and answer format that having respect for others whose beliefs, ideas, and backgrounds are different than yours shows tolerance.

The Ganadbharvad is a philosophical work in which there are profound discussions of eleven salient doctrines. In each of the discussions, one vital Tattva is taken up; and Lord Mahavir discusses it in great detail and clears the doubt of each Ganadhar with the result that each Ganadhar is fully convinced of the truth of the Lord`s argument and becomes his disciple. This book has been written so that people may read it and understand the meaning of the tattvas relating (...) to the soul, the karmas, the five elements, next birth, bondage, deliverance etc. and so that they may realise the true phenomenon of this Universe, may cultivate the trust and may make endeavours to attain the liberations from samsar. (shrink)