A new approach to the analysis of the neuroendocrine system (NES) is suggested. It is based on the fact of structural and metabolic determination of any effect on cell and cell aggregates. The principle of a common communication channel in the NES is formulated and a possible method of its formalization is proposed.

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

Through consideration of another practical case, this chapter opens the way to a generalization of the method of argument outlined previously. Multilateral cases raise the question of how the interests of all parties can be resolved into a determinate moral conclusion, which brings the discussion to a standpoint that has affinities with classical utilitarianism. Like the principle of universalizability, the form of the utilitarian principle espoused is purely logical. In both cases, the moral substance comes from fleshing out the parties’ (...) actual inclinations and interests. The chapter embarks on a short survey of the challenges faced by a utilitarian system of this kind, before considering the concept of happiness, act‐utilitarianism, and rule‐utilitarianism. (shrink)

We show that the c.e. Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degrees are not an upper semilattice. We prove that if M is an r-maximal set, A is an arbitrary set and M≡Q1,NA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M \equiv{}_ {Q_{1,N}}A}$$\end{document}, then M≤mA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M\leq{}_{m} A}$$\end{document}. Also, if M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets, A and B are major subsets of M1 and M2, respectively, and M1\A≡Q1,NM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus} A\equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}, then M1\A≡mM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus}A\equiv{}_{m}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}. If M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets and M10,M11\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0},\,M_{1}^{1}}$$\end{document} and M20,M21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{2}^{0},\,M_{2}^{1}}$$\end{document} are nontrivial splittings of M1 and M2, respectively, then M10≡Q1,NM20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document} if and only if M10≡1M20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{1}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document}. From this result follows that if A and B are Friedberg splitting of an r-maximal set, then the Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degree of A contains only one c.e. 1-degree. (shrink)

In the face of environmental crises such as climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss—which all adversely impact on health—Gils-Schmidt and Salloch explore whether physicians can be justified in taking climate issues into account in clinical care.1 While their approach centres on the ‘climate-sensitive’ decisions, physicians can carry out on the micro-level of clinical decision-making, they encourage further discussions on how climate-related issues can be included across different levels of decision-making in healthcare. We propose a list of tasks and a model (...) to assist with navigating the range of factors and structural elements an environmentally sensitive ethics must address. Stephen Gardiner’s notion of a perfect moral storm is central to understanding these issues.2 Gardiner describes how a perfect moral storm occurs in the centre of three overlapping conditions for human action and policymaking in the face of climate change. This storm is driven by: (1) a lack of interest among current generations to meet global needs and accommodate the well-being of future generations, (2) a lack of ecological concerns for other parts of nature than humans and (3) weak ethical and political theories and institutions shaping policy decisions on issues with severe implications across borders and generations. Moreover, these conditions are embedded in the existing, complex world of ethically unjustified power imbalances and social injustice. The growing awareness of healthcare’s climate footprint has amplified and accelerated global, grassroots action to make healthcare more environmentally friendly. This includes incorporating environmental impacts into quality improvement methodologies, building communities of practice to explore how to make …. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers now agree that human beings - and possibly the higher animals - have moral rights in some sense, both special rights against individuals to whom they stand in a special relation, and general rights, against everybody or against the government, just in virtue of their human nature. Some philosophers also think, however, that anyone who is a utilitarian ought not to share this view: there is a fundamental incompatibility between utilitarinism and human rights. Most utilitarians, of course, (...) have not thought there is such an incompatibility. John Stuart Mill, for instance, espoused utilitarianism at the same time that he defended rights to free speech and freedom of action except where it injures others. In what follows I wish to explore some reasons recently put forward to show that the utilitarian who wishes to affirm that there are moral rights faces a serious logical problem; and I shall argue that further analysis shows the alleged difficulty is unreal. (shrink)

Ḍırār b. ʿAmr ve ʿAbdullāh b. Yezīd el-Fezārī, dönemlerinin önde gelen kelâmcıları arası yer almışlardır. Onlara dair bilgilerimiz çok uzun bir süre sadece makâlât ve tarih kitaplarındaki anlatımlara dayanıyordu. Yakın tarihimizde bu eksikliği gideren gelişmeler oldu. Ḍırār’ın günümüze intikal eden ilk ve tek eseri olan Kitābu’t-Taḥrīş, 2014 yılında neşredildi. Bu eser, doğrudan kelâm alanıyla ilgili olmasa da mezheplerin dağılımı ve fikirleri hakkında bilgiler ihtiva eden en eski Muʿtezilî kaynaklar arasında yer almaktadır. Ḍırār bu kitabında farklı dinî grupların rivâyetleri birbirlerine karşı (...) nasıl kullanıp suistimal ettiklerini konu edinmiştir. Eserin özelliği sadece ihtiva ettiği rivâyetlerde değil, meseleyi ele alış ve anlatım tarzında da bulunuyor. Ḍırār bu çalışmasıyla sonraki nesilleri birçok yönden etkilemiştir. ʿAbdullāh b. Yezīd el-Fezārī, eserlerinin günümüze ulaşması bakımından daha şanslıdır. Bir proje kapsamında 2014 yılından itibaren onun tam on bir eseri yayımlanmıştır. Bunlar arasında kelâm ilmine hasredilmiş birçok neşir yer almaktadır. Böylece çağdaş İslâm araştırmacıları ʿAbdullāh’ın fikirlerini az sayıdaki makâlât referanslarından bağımsız olarak doğrudan kendi kaleminden öğrenme imkanı elde etmiş oldular. Bunun ötesinde bu çalışmalar erken dönem kelâm ilminin en eski kaynakları arasına girmiştir. Bu yayımlar arasında özellikle Kitābu’r-Rudūd dikkat çekmektedir. Sebebi ise Kitābu’t-Taḥrīş ile olan benzerliğinden dolayıdır. Neredeyse her iki kitabın tamamı birbirinin aynısıdır ve karşılıklı atıflar içermemektedirler. Bu tür bir yazım faaliyeti günümüzde tereddütsüz intihal olarak adlandırılırdı. İki mütekellim arasında kronolojik farklar olmadığından kimin kimden etkilendiğini söylemek ilk aşamada zordur. Ḍırār ve ʿAbdullāh’ın birbirlerinden haberdar oldukları anlaşılıyor: İkisi de Kûfe’de yaşamış, Abbâsî halifesi Hārūn er-Reşīd döneminde (786-809) Bağdat’a geçmişler ve orada Hişām b. el-Ḥakem’le (ö. 179/795) imâmete dair Yaḥyā b. Ḫālid el-Bermekī’nin (ö. 190/805) rehberlik ettiği aynı münazara ortamında bulunmuşlardır. Eserlerin özgünlüğü ve etkisi hasebiyle bu çağdaş hemşehrilerden kimin kime kaynaklık etmiş olabileceği sorusu merak uyandırıyor. İkisinin de hem rivâyetleri merkeze alan bir eser vermek için hem bu tür bir telifin fikir babası olmasına delalet eden gerekçeleri var. Bu makalede, öncelikle ikisinin biyografik benzerlikleri takdim edilmiş, akabinde iki eser arasında mukayeselere yer verilmiştir. Kıyaslama, eserlerin hayat öyküleriyle uyumlulukları ve eserlerin tertip ve düzeni üzerinden yapılmıştır. Yöntem olarak aralarındaki paralelliklerden çok farklılıklara odaklanılmıştır. Son olarak ikisinin dayandığı ortak bir kaynağın varlığı sorgulanmıştır. Bu emârelerden hareketle kimin kime öncülük etmiş olabileceğine açıklık getirilmek amaçlanmıştır. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “On Climate Change Research, the Crisis of Science and Second-order Science” by Philipp Aufenvenne, Heike Egner & Kirsten von Elverfeldt. Upshot: Bringing second-order understandings to the doing of climate science is to be welcomed. In taking a second-order turn, it is imperative to reflect on reflection, or report authentically our doings and thus move beyond sterile debates about what ought to be or what second-order doings are or are not. The field of doing second-order (...) R&D is not a terra nullius, so exploring the full range and domains of praxis is warranted. (shrink)

Some of the authors of the essays on Chinese philosophers prefer the pin yin system of romanization for Chinese names and words, while others prefer the Wade‐Giles system. Given that both systems are in wide use today, important names and words are given in both their pin yin and Wade‐Giles formulations. The author's preference is printed first, followed by the alternative romanization within brackets.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Public accounting services AICPA's code of professional conduct Enforcement of the Code of Conduct Illustrative disciplinary actions Controversial ethical issues in the accounting profession Conclusion.

New dimensions in different ethical scenarios following genetic information require new medical-ethical Action Guides for physician-patient interaction. This paper discusses the ambiguity in moral choice between a “right not to know” and “a duty to know”, regarding parental decisionmaking pro or contra selective abortion following prenatal screening for autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (Potter III) and related public policy issues.

In this paper we mainly deal with first-order languages without equality and introduce a weak form of equality predicate, the so-called Leibniz equality. This equality is characterized algebraically by means of a natural concept of congruence; in any structure, it turns out to be the maximum congruence of the structure. We show that first-order logic without equality has two distinct complete semantics (fll semantics and reduced semantics) related by the reduction operator. The last and main part of the paper contains (...) a series of Birkhoff-style theorems characterizing certain classes of structures defined without equality, not only full classes but also reduced ones. (shrink)

The ethics of belief involves an inquiry into what beliefs are legitimate to hold, including religious beliefs. Whatever the criteria determined in such an investigation, adopting a belief that does not meet this criterion is seen as illegitimate and it is considered an ethical violation. English mathematician W. K. Clifford (d. 1879) defines “sufficient evidence” as a criterion in his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief”. Clifford’s evidence-centered argument becomes one of the most frequent references in the evidentialist objection against (...) theism. It turns out that this argument is not functional in the face of the diversity of beliefs. In this context, different suggestions are presented about what the ethics of belief could be. American philosopher William James (d. 1810), one of the founding names of pragmatism, offers a new proposal. In his classic work, “The Will to Believe”, James claims that Clifford is wrong in seeking the requirement of evidence for all beliefs. Because it is not possible to prove beliefs from the passionate nature of human beings, especially religious beliefs. Following this distinction, James proposes a new criterion for religious beliefs: a religious belief can be vivid or dead, forced or avoidable; and momentous or trivial. If a religious belief is vivid, forced, and momentous, it is necessary to have the courage to believe in it instead of suspending it. James' proposal is often valued as a strong counter-challenge or defense of religious beliefs. However, this argument also has aspects that are open to criticism. One of them is that the will to believe argument concurrently accepts conflicting religious beliefs or, in other words, confronts the issue of religious diversity. According to J. Hick, for example, this argument inevitably results in religious pluralism, even though James does not want to. Contrary to Hick, S. F. Aikin claims that the will to believe does not result in religious pluralism. According to Aikin, who draws attention to the relationship of argument with pragmatism, James obscures religious beliefs and removes them from being claims about truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the classical sense. So, which of the objections is valid? Does the will-to-believe argument result in religious pluralism by legitimizing more than one religious belief at the same time, or does it make a purely pragmatic proposition by devaluing religious beliefs? Which religion do I have the right to believe in according to the will to believe? The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the mentioned question. In the article, unlike the current evaluations, it is argued that the argument is closely related to James's theory of knowledge, radical empiricism, not pragmatism as it is usually made. For this purpose, after showing the relationship between the arguments of Clifford and James, the argument will be re-examined in this context and it will be revealed that James has two steps regarding religious beliefs: to make religious beliefs independent from factual beliefs; leaving theism to accept a monistic vision of God and basing religion on mystical experience, which is an emotional experience. As details emerge, it will become clear that James defends a natural religion that excludes traditional religions in his philosophical system and that he defends the beliefs of a humanized religion. With an individual definition of religion based on emotion, James on the one hand ensures the commonality of religious feeling, on the other hand, he makes religion independent from the field of facts. Therefore, with this study, it will be seen that the argument of the will to believe does not aim to legitimize believing in traditional religions, and diversity is not a fundamental problem. (shrink)

In the ancient Arabic dictionaries, the root “ḍ-r-r” has three main meanings: “to harm”, “to gather” and “strength”. In the course of history, many words have been derived from these root meanings and have acquired various meanings. In the present article, the words derived from the root “ḍ-r-r” are semantically analyzed. First, the etymological origins of the root as well as its compounds and their meanings in early Arabic dictionaries are analyzed. In this context, it was aimed to determine the (...) literal and figurative meanings they acquired over time. In doing so, Arabic poetry of the Jahiliyyah period and hadiths were also utilized. Afterwards, in order to determine the semantic meaning pattern of the root “ḍ-r-r” and its compounds, words containing antonymous and proximate meaning relations with this root were included and their semantic relations were compared. While words have “essential meanings” that they always carry and do not lose no matter which system they enter, there are also “relative meanings” that do not originate from the root of words but arise from the system of relations they are in. For this reason, in the next stage, it was aimed to determine the relative meanings of the related words in the Qur’anic context by including the uses of the root “ḍ-r-r” and its derivatives in the Qur’an. Finally, various uses of words that have a semantically antonymous or proximate relationship with the root “ḍ-r-r” and its de-rivatives in the Qur’an were presented and their semantic pattern was tried to be determined. (shrink)

Claims about ‘the meaning of life’ have tended to be made and discussed in conjunction with bold metaphysical and theological affirmations. For life to have meaning, there must be a comprehensive divine plan to give it meaning, or there must be an intelligible cosmic process with a ‘telos’ that a man needs to know if his life is to be meaningfully orientated. Or, it is thought to be a condition of the meaningfulness of life, that values should be ultimately ‘conserved’ (...) in some way, that no evil should be unredeemable and irrational. And it may be claimed that if death were to end our experience, meaninglessness would triumph. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to consider one of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel, namely, that Hegel was a nominalist. Of the various criticisms of Hegel that Peirce offers, this has been little discussed, perhaps because it is puzzling to find Peirce making it at all. For, Peirce also criticises Hegel for his overzealous enthusiasm for Thirdness, where it is then hard to see how Hegel can have both faults: how can anyone who acknowledges the significance of Thirdness in Peirce's (...) sense also fail to be a realist? I will begin by setting out this difficulty and showing how it can be resolved, and will then consider the justice of Peirce's criticism once we have a clear idea of what it amounts to. I will suggest that this criticism is unwarranted, and that in some respects it is curious to find Peirce making it, when he could just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in the bmggle with nominalism. The issue therefore takes us to the heart of Peircean and Hegelian metaphysics, and in a way that relates to questions that are central to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of realism, idealism, and anti-realism. (shrink)