Research on the nature of science and science education enjoys a longhistory, with its origins in Ernst Mach's work in the late nineteenthcentury and John Dewey's at the beginning of the twentieth century.As early as 1909 the Central Association for Science and MathematicsTeachers published an article – ‘A Consideration of the Principles thatShould Determine the Courses in Biology in Secondary Schools’ – inSchool Science and Mathematics that reflected foundational concernsabout science and how school curricula should be informed by them. Sincethen (...) a large body of literature has developed related to the teaching andlearning about nature of science – see, for example, the Lederman and Meichtry reviews cited below. As well there has been intensephilosophical, historical and philosophical debate about the nature of scienceitself, culminating in the much-publicised ‘Science Wars’ of recent time. Thereferences listed here primarily focus on the empirical research related to thenature of science as an educational goal; along with a few influential philosophicalworks by such authors as Kuhn, Popper, Laudan, Lakatos, and others. Whilenot exhaustive, the list should prove useful to educators, and scholars in otherfields, interested in the nature of science and how its understanding can berealised as a goal of science instruction. The authors welcome correspondenceregarding omissions from the list, and on-going additions that can be made to it. (shrink)

Although nature of science and nature of scientific inquiry are related to each other, they are differentiated as NOS is being more related to the product of scientific inquiry which is scientific knowledge whereas NOSI is more related to the process of SI. Lederman et al. determined eight NOSI aspects for K-16 context. In this study, a science camp was conducted to teach scientific inquiry and NOSI to 24 6th and 7th graders. The core of the program was guided (...) inquiry in nature. The children working in small groups under guidance of science advisors conducted four guided-inquiries in the nature in morning sessions on nearby plants, animals, water, and soil. NOSI aspects were made explicit during and at the end of each inquiry session. Views about scientific inquiry questionnaire was applied as pre- and post-test. The results of the study showed that children developed in all eight NOSI aspects, but higher developments were observed in “scientific investigations all begin with a question” and “there is no single scientific method,” and “explanations are developed from data and what is already known” aspects. It was concluded that the science camp program was effective in teaching NOSI. (shrink)

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be (...) explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require onsciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims). (shrink)

I present a new puzzle about choice under uncertainty for agents whose preferences are sensitive to multiple dimensions of outcomes in such a way as to be incomplete. In response, I develop a new theory of choice under uncertainty for incomplete preferences. I connect the puzzle to central questions in epistemology about the nature of rational requirements, and ask whether it shows that preferences are rationally required to be complete.

This article presents a new interpretation of the great Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming’s celebrated doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action”. Wang held that action was not unified with all knowledge, but only with an elevated form of knowledge, which he sometimes called “genuine knowledge”. I argue for a new interpretation of this notion, according to which genuine knowledge requires freedom from a form of doxastic conflict. I propose that, in Wang’s view, a person is free from this (...) form of doxastic conflict if and only if they are acting virtuously. (shrink)

According to relationism, for Alice to believe that some rabbits can speak is for Alice to stand in a relation to a further entity, some rabbits can speak. But what could this further entity possibly be? Higher-order metaphysics seems to offer a simple, natural answer. On this view (roughly put), expressions in different syntactic categories (for instance: names, predicates, sentences) in general denote entities in correspondingly different ontological categories. Alice's belief can thus be understood to relate her to a sui (...) generis entity denoted by "some rabbits can speak", belonging to a different ontological category than Alice herself. This straightforward account of the attitudes has historically been deemed so attractive that it was seen as providing an important motivation for higher-order metaphysics itself (Prior [1971]). But I argue that it is not as straightforward as it might seem, and in fact that propositional attitudes present a foundational challenge for higher-order metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper introduces the axiom of Negative Dominance, stating that if a lottery f is strictly preferred to a lottery g, then some outcome in the support of f is strictly preferred to some outcome in the support of g. It is shown that if preferences are incomplete on a sufficiently rich domain, then this plausible axiom, which holds for complete preferences, is incompatible with an array of otherwise plausible axioms for choice under uncertainty. In particular, in this setting, Negative (...) Dominance conflicts with the standard Independence axiom. A novel theory, which includes Negative Dominance, and rejects Independence, is developed and shown to be consistent. (shrink)

AbstractThis essay argues for a new interpretation of the notion of “unity” in Yangming’s 王陽明 famous doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). I distinguish two parts of Wang’s doctrine: one concerning training (gong fu 工夫), and one concerning the “original natural condition” of knowledge and action (ben ti 本體). I focus on the latter aspect of the doctrine, and argue that Wang holds, roughly, that a person exhibits knowledge in its original natural condition (...) if and only if the person exhibits action in its original natural condition. Moreover, I argue that Wang denies that knowledge in its original natural condition is identical to action in its original natural condition. (shrink)

This paper studies one aspect of the great Ming dynasty philosopher Wang Yangming’s (王陽明 1472-1529) celebrated doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). Wang states that his doctrine does not apply to all knowledge, but only to an elevated form of knowledge, which he sometimes calls “genuine knowledge” (zhen zhi 真知). But what is “genuine knowledge”? I develop and compare four different interpretations of this notion: the perceptual, practical, normative and introspective models. The main (...) aim of the paper is to develop these models in more detail than has been done before. But at the end of the paper I argue that the introspective model is to be preferred over the alternatives. (shrink)

Robert Aumann presents his Agreement Theorem as the key conditional: “if two people have the same priors and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal” (Aumann, 1976, p. 1236). This paper focuses on four assumptions which are used in Aumann’s proof but are not explicit in the key conditional: (1) that agents commonly know, of some prior μ, that it is the common prior; (2) that agents commonly know that each of them updates (...) on the prior by conditionalization; (3) that agents commonly know that if an agent knows a proposition, she knows that she knows that proposition (the “K K” principle); (4) that agents commonly know that they each update only on true propositions. It is shown that natural weakenings of any one of these strong assumptions can lead to countermodels to Aumann’s key conditional. Examples are given in which agents who have a common prior and commonly know what probability they each assign to a proposition nevertheless assign that proposition unequal probabilities. To alter Aumann’s famous slogan: people can “agree to disagree”, even if they share a common prior. The epistemological significance of these examples is presented in terms of their role in a defense of the Uniqueness Thesis: If an agent whose total evidence is E is fully rational in taking doxastic attitude D to P, then necessarily, any subject with total evidence E who takes a different attitude to P is less than fully rational. (shrink)

This book centers on a relatively neglected theme in the scholarly literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought: her support for a new form of government in which citizen councils would replace contemporary representative democracy and allow citizens to participate directly in decision-making in the public sphere. The main argument of the book is that the council system, or more broadly the vision of participatory democracy was far more important to Arendt than is commonly understood. Seeking to demonstrate the close links (...) between the council system Arendt advocated and other major themes in her work, the book focuses particularly on her critique of the nation-state and her call for a new international order in which human dignity and “the right to have rights” will be guaranteed; her conception of “the political” and the conditions that can make this experience possible; the relationship between philosophy and politics; and the challenge of political judgement in the modern world. (shrink)

The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents will not coordinate in situations where it would be rational to coordinate. I argue that we should resolve this conflict between the models and facts about what it would be rational to do (...) by rejecting common knowledge assumptions implicit in the models. I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge that they are rational, and provide models to show that denying this assumption suffices for a resolution of the paradoxes. I describe how my resolution of the paradoxes fits into a general story about the relationship between rationality in situations involving a single agent and rationality in situations involving many agents. (shrink)

Loneliness is a major public health concern, particularly during pandemics such as Covid. It is extremely common, and it poses a major risk to human health. Technological solutions including social media, robots, and virtual reality have been advocated and implemented to relieve loneliness, and their use will undoubtedly increase in the near future. This paper explores the use of technological solutions from a normative perspective, asking whether and to what extent such measures should indeed be relied upon. The conclusion is (...) that technological solutions are unquestionably part of the solution to loneliness, but that they cannot and should not constitute the whole solution. It is important to note that this is not a straw‐man argument, as several organizations and scholars have strictly focused on such technological solutions for loneliness. (shrink)

I observe that the “concept-generator” theory of Percus and Sauerland (2003), Anand (2006), and Charlow and Sharvit (2014) does not predict an intuitive true interpretation of the sentence “Plato did not believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus”. In response, I present a simple theory of attitude reports which employs a fine-grained semantics for names, according to which names which intuitively name the same thing may have distinct compositional semantic values. This simple theory solves the problem with the concept-generator theory, but, as (...) I go on to show, it has problems of its own. I present three examples which the concept-generator theory can accommodate, but the simple fine-grained theory cannot. These examples motivate the full theory of the paper, which combines the basic ideas behind the concept-generator theory with a fine-grained semantics for names. The examples themselves are of interest independently of my theory: two of them constrain the original concept-generator theory more tightly than previously discussed examples had. (shrink)

This letter replies to the letter “Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa,” by Luís Cordeiro‐Rodrigues, in the same, May‐June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.

Among philosophers, Fregeanism and sententialism are widely considered two of the leading theories of the semantics of attitude reports. Among linguists, these approaches have received little recent sustained discussion. This paper aims to bridge this divide. I present a new formal implementation of Fregeanism and sententialism, with the goal of showing that these theories can be developed in sufficient detail and concreteness to be serious competitors to the theories which are more popular among semanticists. I develop a modern treatment of (...) quantifying in for Fregeanism and sententialism, in the style of Heim and Kratzer, and then show how these theories can—somewhat surprisingly—account for “third readings” on the model of the “Standard Solution” from possible-worlds semantics. The resulting Fregean/sententialist proposal has a distinctive attraction: it treats data related to counterfactual attitudes —which have proven challenging to accommodate in the setting of possible worlds semantics—straightforwardly as third readings. (shrink)

Loneliness has been a major concern for philosophers, poets and psychologists for centuries. In the past several decades, it has concerned clinicians and public health practitioners as well. The research on loneliness is urgent for several reasons. First, loneliness has been and still is extremely ubiquitous, potentially affecting people across multiple demographics and geographical areas. Second, it is philosophically intriguing, and its analysis delves into different branches of philosophy including phenomenology, existentialism, philosophy of mind, etc. Third, empirical research has shown (...) that loneliness is a significant health risk factor. Loneliness may thus be defined as a (negative) social determinant of health.Having that said, COVID-19 has demonstrated how little we as members of humanity have been prepared to face the loneliness resulting from the global response to the virus. As people worldwide are literally dying from loneliness, we still do not know what makes one feel lonely while making another feel being in solitude, or how is it that one feels lonely in the heart of London.In this essay, I first review loneliness in general and specifically in the context of COVID-19. I then argue that loneliness should be understood as a social determinant of health. Lastly, I argue that individuals have a right not to be lonely. Such right stems in turn from the right to healthcare or even a right to health. (shrink)

An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common knowledge.

This article poses an invitation for bioethicists to engage with loneliness as a bioethics and public health concern. I argue that loneliness is a relevant issue for bioethicists for three main reasons: it causes ill‐health; particularly in the age of Covid‐19, it is becoming prominent on the clinical and public health agenda, affecting millions worldwide; and it engenders several ethical and philosophical questions as a social determinant of health with a rich conceptual background. In what follows I first review the (...) link between loneliness and ill‐health and argue that it should concern bioethicists because of this link. I also demonstrate how pertinent the issue of loneliness is being considered nowadays, and mark this as another reason for bioethicists to become engaged. I then move on to define loneliness and its various forms, drawing from modern and contemporary philosophers. The way we choose to cope with the pandemic of loneliness depends in part on its theoretical underpinnings, as well as its empirical scope. Theory thus combines with empirical data in order to devise and implement a rational public health policy, necessitating the kind of interdisciplinary approach that is the bedrock of bioethics. I conclude by suggesting future areas of research and recommendations. (shrink)

One of most pertinent and acute risks that the world is now facing is emerging or re-emerging zoonotic diseases. This article focuses on culling as a measure for zoonotic disease control, specifically the culling of 11,000 badgers as part of the Randomized Badger Culling Trial in the UK and the culling exercises in Singapore. The independent expert panel that devised the UK study concluded that reactive culling was ineffective in reducing the cases of bovine tuberculosis in cattle. The panel also (...) concluded that proactive culling was not cost-effective. Behind the scarcity of empirical evidence to support culling, the resultant reduction in biodiversity can actually harm both animals and humans. Public health policies should be evidence-based, culturally adaptable and ethically justified; a novel biomedical and public health approach, named One Health, plausibly provides a reasonable ethical framework as well as research and interventional methods that square with that framework. OH recognizes that nonhuman animals and humans are interlinked in both sickness and health, since we all share the same ecosystem. OH could potentially replace standard public health strategies, as it provides alternative evidence-based methods for biomedical research and adds a non-anthropocentric component to an ethical decision-making process. (shrink)

How nature of scientific knowledge or nature of science and scientific inquiry are contextualized, or related to each other, significantly impacts both curriculum and classroom practice, specifically with respect to the teaching and learning of NOSK. NOS and NOSK are considered synonymous here, with NOSK more accurately conveying the meaning of the construct. Three US-based science education reform documents are used to illustrate the aforementioned impact. The USA has had three major reform documents released over a period of 20 years. (...) The Benchmarks for Science Literacy was the first in 1993, followed by the National Science Education Standards in 1996, and the newest, the Next Generation Science Standards, was released in 2013. NOS or NOSK was strongly emphasized and given a prominent position in the first two, while the NGSS has marginalized the construct. It is categorized as a set of connections that can be made to some of the Science Practices or Crosscutting Ideas. However, a careful conceptual analysis of how the NGSS positions NOSK/nos relative to the previous reform documents reveals a complex situation related to how NOSK/nos is contextualized and apparent assumptions about how NOSK/nos is best taught and learned. A historical review of how NOSK/nos is contextualized reveals a longstanding confusion concerning the relationship between NOSK/nos and SI as well as about how the reform documents seem to assume how it can be best taught to students. The assumptions often run contrary to the empirical research on the teaching and learning of NOSK as well as call into question the ability of the NGSS to promote the perennial science education goal of scientific literacy. (shrink)

Culling is used in traditional public health policies to control animal populations. These policies aim primarily to protect human interests but often fail to provide scientific evidence of effectiveness. In this article, we defend the need to move from a strictly anthropocentric approach to disease control towards a One Health ethics, using culling practices as an example. We focus on the recent badger culls in the UK, claiming that, based on data provided by the English Government, these culls may be (...) unjustified, all thing considered. We highlight the relevance of ethical reasoning rooted in One Health for this discussion, and make several suggestions including a moratorium on culling until data are provided to support the effectiveness of culling; to conduct a randomized trial to compare proactive culling with alternative methods; to apply deliberative democratic methods to assess public opinion towards the culls, and to find in Brexit an opportunity for aiming for more effective control measures. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of political judgement has been a source of much scholarly investigation and debate in recent decades. Underlying the debate is the assumption that at least in her early writings, Arendt had an actor’s theory of judgement. In this article I challenge this common assumption. As I attempt to demonstrate, it relies on a misunderstanding, not only of Arendt’s conception of judgement, but also of her conception of agents in the public realm. Once we discard the assumption of (...) an actor’s theory of judgement, I argue, some important issues in Arendt’s theory of judgement are resolved, enabling us to perceive it as a unified, rather than self-contradictory, theory of judgement. (shrink)

In 2015, the Israeli Knesset passed the force-feeding act that permits the director of the Israeli prison authority to appeal to the district court with a request to force-feed a prisoner against his expressed will. A recent position paper by top Israeli clinicians and bioethicists, published in Hebrew, advocates for force-feeding by medical professionals and presents several arguments that this would be appropriate. Here, we first posit three interrelated questions: 1. Do prisoners have a right to hunger-strike? 2. Should governing (...) institutions force-feed prisoners and/or is it ethical to force-feed prisoners? 3. Should healthcare professionals force-feed prisoners? We then focus on the first and third questions. We first briefly provide several arguments to support the right of prisoners to refuse treatment. Next, we critically review the arguments presented in the Israeli position paper, demonstrating that they are all misguided at best. Lastly, we briefly present arguments against force-feeding by medical professionals. We conclude that healthcare providers should not participate in the force-feeding of prisoners. (shrink)

Remarks on method in the history of Chinese philosophy for analytic philosophy. (Published in a Chinese Translation.).

In this essay we discuss an ethical dilemma that recently arose in our institution, involving healthcare workers who lamented the requirement to shave their facial hair as a condition to care for COVID-19 patients. The essay represents a genuine attempt to grapple with the dilemma sensibly and vigorously. We first provide a brief introduction, focusing on the tension between religious tolerance and the institutional obligation to optimize patient care and public health in the age of COVID-19. We then discuss the (...) complex relationship between facial hair and cultural as well as religious factors throughout history. Next, we make a case, based on several principles in Islam jurisprudence, that Muslim healthcare professionals in our institution should be expected to shave their facial hair so they could care for COVID patients. We end with considering two alternative solutions that were offered in the literature. (shrink)

I respond to the insightful comments of Liu Liangjian, Stephen Angle, and Trenton Wilson.

ABSTRACT: Social robots are increasingly being deployed to address social isolation and loneliness, particularly among older adults. Clips on social media attest that individuals availing themselves of this option are pleased with their robot companions. Yet, some people find the use of social robots to meet fundamental human emotional needs disturbing. This article clarifies and critically evaluates this response. It sets forth a framework for loneliness, which characterizes one kind of loneliness as involving an affective experience of lacking human relations (...) that provide certain social goods. Next, the article discusses social robots and critically reviews the literature on the ethics of using them in light of this loneliness characterization. Third, we present a normative argument connecting the philosophical critique of loneliness-as-absence with the design and deployment of social robots. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for public health and for interrogating the aims of commercial companies who make social robots. (shrink)

Johnson and Degeling have recently enquired whether one health requires a comprehensive normative framework, concluding that such a framework, while not necessary, may be helpful. In this commentary, we provide a context for this debate, and describe how pragmatism has been predominant in the OH literature. We nevertheless argue that articulating a comprehensive normative theory to ground OH practice might clear existing vagueness and provide stronger guidance in relevant health dilemmas. A comprehensive theory will also be needed eventually to ground (...) notions such as universal good. We, thus, call for the systematic articulation of a comprehensive, metaethical theory, concomitantly with already ongoing normative work. (shrink)

This study explores how therapists deal with ethical dilemmas in psychotherapy with older adults. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 therapists and analyzed using grounded theory methodology. Findings clustered around three themes: (i) respecting autonomy when interacting with family of vulnerable and dependent older patients; (ii) prioritizing respecting autonomy in risk situations and in suspected financial abuse without impaired judgment; and (iii) prioritizing protecting the patient in risk situations of patients with dementia and of suspected physical abuse or neglect. These (...) findings highlight several important issues regarding the management of ethical dilemmas in psychotherapy with vulnerable and dependent older adults. (shrink)

In this article, we describe in detail the health and general living conditions resulting from the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen, including the historical and geopolitical underpinnings. In addition to mere reporting, we use Yemen as a case study to examine the responsibility of bioethicists in general. We find it unacceptable that bioethics neglects the largest humanitarian crisis taking place in the world at the moment as well as the largest Cholera outbreak in history. We argue that bioethicists should do (...) more to address armed conflicts and their resulting basic human rights violations. We end with a few recommendations to prevent such neglect. (shrink)

I respond to the insightful comments of L iu Liangjian, Stephen Angle, and Trenton Wilson.

The difficult phrase ὅ ποτε ὄν ἐστι (hereafter ‘OPO’), which occurs in key passages in Aristotle’s discussions of blood and of time, has long vexed interpreters of Aristotle. This paper proposes a new interpretation of OPO, which resolves some textual and interpretative problems about Aristotle’s theories of blood and of time. My interpretation will also shed light on more general issues in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In the passages I will discuss, Aristotle takes both blood and time to be examples of his (...) peculiar ‘coupled entities’. He then uses OPO to provide explanations which differ from what we might call his ‘standard’ metaphysical explanations. On the ‘standard’ approach, Aristotle explains derivative entities—non-substances—by describing their relationship to substances. By contrast to this standard form of explanation, when Aristotle uses OPO he explains blood and time by describing their relationship to non-substances. This paper thus identifies a new species of metaphysical dependence in Aristotle. In addition, it provides detailed examination of evidence concerning whether Aristotle himself used coupled entities in his own physical and metaphysical theories. (shrink)

This essay discusses and weaves together three interrelated topics: loneliness as a neglected bioethics problem, solidarity as one potential solution to loneliness, and the Israeli‐Palestinian Conflict as a neglected bioethics problem in which loneliness is stark. I first present and define various kinds of loneliness, focusing on ethical loneliness, defined as suffering injustice without a proper repair process. I next discuss current health conditions in Gaza, focusing on healthcare providers who, according to the UN, are being intentionally targeted by Israel. (...) I explain how the various kinds of loneliness are reflected among people in Gaza. I lastly relate together the notions of solidarity, responsibility and personal autonomy, arguing that bioethicists and healthcare providers have a duty to support the people in Gaza, stemming from solidarity and an extended responsibility perspective. (shrink)

This article discusses an aspect of Hannah Arendt’s treatment of the conflict between the Zionists and the Palestinians that has thus far been overlooked in scholarship: her justification of Zionism through the achievements of the Jewish pioneers in cultivating the land, in contrast to the Palestinians’ failure to do so. The inability of natives to cultivate their land was a familiar argument in the history of colonialism, used to legitimize the colonialists’ right to settle a land and often to displace (...) the natives. How should we understand Arendt’s use of this argument? I show that Arendt’s argument should be understood in the context of, first, the recurrence of this argument in Western political thought and practices. Second, the Zionists’—Arendt included—need of legitimizing Jewish settlements in Palestine. And third, the influence of Arendt’s own political philosophy on her understanding of culture in general, and Palestinian culture in particular. (shrink)

Whether to allow the presence of family members during cardiopulmonary resuscitation has been a highly contentious topic in recent years. Even though a great deal of evidence and professional guidelines support the option of family presence during resuscitation , many healthcare professionals still oppose it. One of the main arguments espoused by the latter is that family members should not be allowed for the sake of the patient's best interests, whether it is to increase his chances of survival, respect his (...) privacy or leave his family with a last positive impression of him. In this paper, we examine the issue of FPDR from the patient's point of view. Since the patient requires CPR, he is invariably unconscious and therefore incompetent. We discuss the Autonomy Principle and the Three-Tiered process for surrogate decision making, as well as the Beneficence Principle and show that these are limited in providing us with an adequate tool for decision making in this particular case. Rather, we rely on a novel principle and a novel integrated model for surrogate decision making. We show that this model is more satisfactory in taking the patient's true wishes under consideration and encourages a joint decision making process by all parties involved. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 6-7, September–October 2022.