In the years of National Socialism, and even during World War II, German scientists traveled abroad extensively. While international travels by natural scientists were studied in some detail, travels by scholars in the humanities have been studied to a much lesser degree, even though travel documents offer valuable insights into the regulated internationality of National Socialism. – We provide a first overview of international travels of scholars in the humanities between 1933 and 1945. The examples demonstrate how travelling academics dealt (...) with conflicting expectations, justified their intentions, articulated disappointment, offered pragmatic advice for the further shaping of contacts abroad, and in this way became active participants of the resource ensemble of academia and politics. The study is based on extensive material from the political archive of the Auswärtiges Amt and the archive of the Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung from the Bundesarchiv which to this date have been hardly explored. (shrink)

Any attempt to elucidate the nature and mechanism of passivity phenomena, i.e., experiences that one’s conscious actions or thoughts have not been ‘willed’ by oneself, requires an integrative philosophical–neurobiological approach. The model proposed here adopts some fundamental positions that have long been advocated by philosophers and theoretical psychologists and have now found support from functional neuroanatomy. First, we experience our actions not from the standpoint of the executive but through the perception of its effects. Second, the ‘self’ is not an (...) agent of behaviour. Third, behaviour is energised and integrated by basic drives . Fourth, the view that the experience of an acting self is related to drive reduction associated with voluntary actions is perhaps less well developed. The model thus proposes that passivity phenomena are actions that are induced by the perception of salient events but that are not integrated with or conducive to the overall motivational state of the organism. It has been suggested that, following the perception of salient events, competition arises between automatic response tendencies seeking expression. The prefrontal cortex appears to play an important role not only in determining which events are to be perceived but also which of the corresponding response dispositions is to be selected and actualised in overt behaviour. Thus, action selection is the outcome of competition between response tendencies in the context of prefrontal biasing signals that represent drives and strivings for goals. Action selection may be uncoupled from drives and strivings as a result of a lowering of the threshold for action selection—as is suggested to be the case in schizophrenic passivity phenomena—or due to disconnection from prefrontal regions—as may be the case in the alien limb syndrome. (shrink)

Sensationalistic Phenomenalism and Economy of Thought. On Ernst Mach's Concept of Science. Ernst Mach, natural scientist and major precursor of the Vienna Circle, never wants to be a philosopher. Nevertheless his writings are full of valuable hints for a modern theory of human knowledge – with respect to economical, historical and evolutionary aspects. His kind of phenomenalism is sensationalistic, monistic and instrumentalistic. This article deals with some contributions of his approach to actual debates in the general philosophy of science.

Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. – Trotz ihrer prominenten Rolle im Grundgesetz und in vielen anderen Dokumenten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hat sich die moderne Philosophie lange Zeit nur wenig um die Menschenwürde gekümmert. Erst als um die Jahrtausendwende herum die Würde von Embryonen zur Diskussion stand, zeigte es sich, wie spannend und schwierig es ist, ein angemessenes philosophisches Verständnis der Menschenwürde zu finden. Dieses Buch basiert auf drei Grundgedanken: dass die Menschenwürde aus ihren Verletzungen heraus verstanden werden muss, (...) dass wir sie in ihrem historischen Kontext betrachten sollten und dass es vor allen Dingen wichtig ist, ihre vielfältige Verwendung in unterschiedlichen Feldern der Angewandten Ethik zu untersuchen. Entsprechend vereint das Buch theoretische philosophische Überlegungen mit konkreten Untersuchungen zu öffentlich vieldiskutierten Themen wie Hirntod, assistiertem Suizid, Todesstrafe und Ehrenmord. Reflexionen zur Würde des Kindes, des Alters und des Sterbens bilden den Abschluss des Buches. Dabei erweist es sich, dass der Menschenwürde eine unverzichtbare Rolle in der Ethik zukommt, weil sie die Bedeutung eines für jedermann geltenden Schutzes vor Erniedrigungen ausdrückt, und damit für uns alle einen – vielleicht sogar den – Kern unseres moralischen Status formuliert. (shrink)

Inhalt Einfuhrung - Staat im Wandel. Rudiger Voigt zum 65. Geburtstag I. Konzeptualisierung und Systematisierung von Staatswandel Ralf Walkenhaus: Entwicklungslinien moderner Staatlichkeit.

The present paper investigates the power of proper forcings to change the shape of the universe, in a certain well-defined respect. It turns out that the ranking among large cardinals can be used as a measure for that power. However, in order to establish the final result I had to isolate a new large cardinal concept, which I dubbed “remarkability.” Let us approach the exact formulation of the problem—and of its solution—at a slow pace.Breathtaking developments in the mid 1980s found (...) one of its culminations in the theorem, due to Martin, Steel, and Woodin, that the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them all implies that AD, the axiom of determinacy, holds in the least inner model containing all the reals, L. One of the nice things about AD is that the theory ZF + AD + V = L appears as a choiceless “completion” of ZF in that any interesting question seems to find an at least attractive answer in that theory. Beyond that, AD is very canonical as may be illustrated as follows.Let us say that L is absolute for set-sized forcings if for all posets P ∈ V, for all formulae ϕ, and for all ∈ ℝ do we have thatwhere is a name for the set of reals in the extension. (shrink)

Since the middle of the 20th century our ability to manage death has changed. The dying of a human being can be hastened, slowed or even forestalled. As a result we need to reconsider death as a prerequisite for organ donation and hence the brain death criterion. In Germany, the debate about that criterion has been going on for some months. The author outlines that debate and discusses problems arising from a new category of donors, the so-called non-heartbeating donors. He (...) explains what consequences follow for the ethics of organ donation, especially for the notion of death as its prerequisite. Im vorliegenden Beitrag zeichnet der Autor zunächst die Grundzüge der Hirntod-Debatte nach. Daran anschließend setzt er sich mit der Problematik der neuen Spendergruppe der non-heartbeating donors auseinander. Am Ende erläutert der Autor, welche Konsequenzen daraus für die Ethik der Organspende, genau genommen für die Rolle des Todes als Voraussetzung der Organspende, zu ziehen sind. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractCarrying out research means being innovative, which requires novelty. Novelty is an important source of scientific breakthroughs and has great technological impact. Research institutions stand to benefit from fostering innovation. Here, we outline what academic institutions can do to help their scientists become more innovative.

It is shown in this paper that a classical way of speaking about the past can be rejected when quantum systems without superselection rules are considered. To show this, use is made of a formal quantum language. The noncontextuality of quantum measurements is a presupposition of the quantum language. In addition, it is shown that introspective measurements, in contrast to the claims of Albert et al., do not violate the noncontextuality, and hence the result of rejecting the classical way of (...) speaking remains still applicable to introspective measurements. (shrink)

We show that weakly compact cardinals are the smallest large cardinals k where k+ < k+ is impossible provided 0# does not exist. We also show that if k+Kc < k+ for some k being weakly compact , then there is a transitive set M with M ⊨ ZFC + “there is a strong cardinal”.

We show that weakly compact cardinals are the smallest large cardinals k where k+ < k+ is impossible provided 0# does not exist. We also show that if k+Kc < k+ for some k being weakly compact , then there is a transitive set M with M ⊨ ZFC + “there is a strong cardinal”.

Der Begriff der Verantwortung spielt eine zentrale Rolle für die Moralphilosophie. Verantwortung ist eine Konsequenz unserer Handlungsfähigkeit sowie eine Vorbedingung von Verdienst und Schuld. Was allerdings in der Moralphilosophie häufig unter Verantwortung verstanden wird, ist in einer wichtigen Hinsicht simpler als unser alltägliches Verantwortungsverständnis, weil ihm dessen dynamischer Charakter fehlt. Ziel meines Beitrags ist es, auch in der Philosophie stattdessen für einen komplexen, dynamischen Verantwortungsbegriff zu plädieren. Nach meiner Überzeugung lassen sich dadurch eine Reihe schwieriger philosophischer Probleme auflösen und vor (...) allem gelangt man auf diesem Weg zu einem attraktiven Verständnis des Verhältnisses zwischen Handlungen und Verantwortung. Ausgangspunkt meiner Überlegungen ist ein Problem, das meines Wissens bislang in der Philosophie nicht thematisiert wurde, obwohl es, wie der Name andeutet, den ich ihm gegeben habe, eine prominente Vorgeschichte hat, das Pilatus-Problem. (shrink)

Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, we augmented (...) a causal Bayes net model with separate error sources for causes and effects. In several experiments, we tested this new model using the size of Markov violations as the empirical indicator of differential assumptions about the sources of error. As predicted by the model, the size of Markov violations was influenced by the location of the agents and was moderated by the causal structure and the type of causal variables. (shrink)

The following paper is devoted to the discussion of three important and closely interlocked topics in the philosophy of Donald Davidson, the questions: What are reasons? — What are actions? — And: What is the relation between a reason and an action, when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? The last question is actually a quotation; it is the first sentence of Davidson's famous article Actions, Reasons, and Carnes. Although subse-quently modified (...) in various important respects, it still provides the meta-physical groundwork for Davidson's later views on action theory and the philosophy of mind. It is this metaphysical basis that I want to concentrate on. Offhand, Davidson's answers to all the three questions are common in philosophical action theory: Actions are events, reasons are causes of those events, and giving the agent's reason explains an action because it explains the action causally. In what follows, I shall first recapitulate Davidson's reasoning toward the third claim, which I take to be true and to be what Davidson thinks. In discussing a possible objection against this claim I shall then try to show that the second thesis, the thesis that reasons are causes, is neither true nor is it Davidson's opinion. And finally, I want to argue with regard to the first thesis that although Davidson actually holds that actions are events, he should better abandon this position. (shrink)

It is shown in ZF that if $\delta are such that δ and δ + are either both weakly compact or singular cardinals and Ω is large enough for putting the core model apparatus into action then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal.

In his new book, Fred Schauer adopts a prototypical approach to the law in order to reestablish the importance of “The Force of Law”, and I strongly support his claim that there are interesting things to be said about the relationship between law and force. One aspect concerns the special kind of force to which the law is related. In the tradition of political philosophy, this kind of force has often been characterized with the state's monopoly on legitimate force. Whereas (...) the essay will support the idea that the law has a monopoly of force, it will challenge the idea that it is its legitimacy that makes it characteristic. It is a monopoly not so much on legitimate, but on ultimate force. The robustness of the force the law is—prototypically—related to, however, should not obscure the fact that the relation between law and force is quite delicate and precarious. Three strategies of the law to manage this fundamental precariousness are pointed out. (shrink)

If we call something ‘natural’ that occurs by itself without human intervention, and if cultural philosophy is interested precisely in what depends on human poiesis (production), praxis (action) and synthesis (conceptualization), then cultural philosophy refers ex negativo to the other of human intervention in the world. In this specific sense cultural philosophy can be understood as a negative philosophy of nature and is important for any kind of positive philosophy of nature insofar as it provokes natural facts to show themselves (...) in human poiesis, praxis and synthesis. (shrink)

Affect mirroring allows infants to distinguish emotional and intentional states of significant others, which – in the pursuit of their own drive satisfaction, including satisfaction of the affiliative drive – become important contextual stimuli predictive of reward. Learning to perceive and manipulate others' attitudes toward oneself in pursuit of affiliative reward may be an important step in social development that is impaired in autism.

This paper develops a valid reconstruction in first-order predicate logic of Leibniz’s argument for his complete concept definition of substance in §8 of the Discours de Métaphysique. Following G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, it construes the argument as resting on two substantial premises, the “merely verbal” Aristotelian definition and Leibniz’s concept containment theory of truth, and it understands the resulting “real” definition as saying not that an entity is a substance iff its complete concept contains every predicate of that entity, but iff its (...) complete concept contains every predicate of any subject to which that concept is truly attributable. An account is suggested of why Leibniz criticises the Aristotelian definition as merely nominal and how he takes his own definition to overcome this shortcoming: while on the Aristotelian basis the predication relation could generate endless chains, so that substances as endpoints of predication would be impossible, Leibniz’s definition reveals lowest species as such endpoints, which he therefore identifies with individual substances. Since duplicate lowest species make no sense, the Identity of Indiscernibles for substances follows. The reading suggests a Platonist interpretation according to which substances do not so much have but are individual essences, natures or forms. (shrink)