This paper presents the design and development of intelligent tutoring system for teaching Oracle. The Oracle Intelligent Tutoring System (OITS) examined the power of a new methodology to supporting students in Oracle programming. The system presents the topic of Introduction to Oracle with automatically generated problems for the students to solve. The system is dynamically adapted at run time to the student’s individual progress. An initial evaluation study was done to investigate the effect of using the intelligent tutoring system on (...) the performance of students. (shrink)

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and (...) argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

We introduce tame abstract elementary classes as a generalization of all cases of abstract elementary classes that are known to permit development of stability-like theory. In this paper, we explore stability results in this new context. We assume that [Formula: see text] is a tame abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation property with no maximal model. The main results include:. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that [Formula: see text] is not only tame, but [Formula: see text]-tame. If [Formula: see text] and [Formula: (...) see text] is Galois stable in μ, then [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] is a relative of κ from first order logic. [Formula: see text] is the Hanf number of the class [Formula: see text]. It is known that [Formula: see text]. The theorem generalizes a result from [17]. It is used to prove both the existence of Morley sequences for non-splitting and the following initial step towards a stability spectrum theorem for tame classes:. Theorem 0.2. If [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in some [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text] is stable in every κ with κμ=κ. For example, under GCH we have that [Formula: see text] Galois-stable in μ implies that [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in μ+n for all n < ω. (shrink)

The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for the predicate view on proper (...) names, which is still used by several current philosophers in defence of this view. I have called this argument the unification argument. I will present a stepwise interpretation and reconstruction of this argument, consider several possible responses to it and defend a specific response to it in detail. (shrink)

A widely held assumption is that hallucinations are not a type of perception. Coupled with the idea that hallucinations possess phenomenal character, this assumption raises a problem for naive realism, which maintains that phenomenal character is at least partly constituted by perceived worldly objects. Naive realists have typically responded by adopting a disjunctive view of phenomenal character. But in what follows, I argue that to resolve the conflict we should instead reject the idea that hallucinations are not a type of (...) perception. I argue that this idea is supported by six alleged differences between hallucination and perception, but these differences are all accommodated for in a particular type of perception, picture perception. Drawing on picture perception’s resources, I offer an account of hallucinations which construes them as a type of perception, and does so in a way that that preserves their idiosyncrasies and varieties, and in a way compatible with naive realism. (shrink)

We prove the following main theorem: Let be an abstract elementary class satisfying the joint embedding and the amalgamation properties with no maximal models of cardinality μ. Let μ be a cardinal above the the Löwenheim‐Skolem number of the class. If is μ‐Galois‐stable, has no μ‐Vaughtian Pairs, does not have long splitting chains, and satisfies locality of splitting, then any two ‐limits over M, for, are isomorphic over M.

In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. Secondly, two (...) general motivations for an indexical view on names will be introduced and defended. Thirdly, I will criticize the two most popular versions of the indexical view on names: formal variable accounts and salience-based formal constant accounts. In the fourth and final section, I will develop my own use-conditional indexical view on names in three different steps by confronting an initial version of this view with three different challenges. (shrink)

Many scientific models in biology are how-possibly models. These models depict things as they could be, but do not necessarily capture actual states of affairs in the biological world. In contemporary philosophy of science, it is customary to treat how-possibly models as second-rate theoretical tools. Although possibly important in the early stages of theorizing, they do not constitute the main aim of modelling, namely, to discover the actual mechanism responsible for the phenomenon under study. In the paper it is argued (...) that this prevailing picture does not do justice to the synthetic strategy that is commonly used in biological engineering. In synthetic biology, how-possibly models are not simply speculations or eliminable scaffolds towards a single how-actually model, but indispensable design hypotheses for a field whose ultimate goal is to build novel biological systems. The paper explicates this by providing an example from the study of alternative genetic systems by synthetic biologist Steven Benner and his group. The case will also highlight how the method of synthesis, even when it fails, provides an effective way to limit the space of possible models for biological systems. (shrink)

We prove that from categoricity in λ+ we can get categoricity in all cardinals ≥ λ+ in a χ-tame abstract elementary classe [Formula: see text] which has arbitrarily large models and satisfies the amalgamation and joint embedding properties, provided [Formula: see text] and λ ≥ χ. For the missing case when [Formula: see text], we prove that [Formula: see text] is totally categorical provided that [Formula: see text] is categorical in [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text].

We prove a categoricity transfer theorem for tame abstract elementary classes. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that K is a χ-tame abstract elementary class and satisfies the amalgamation and joint embedding properties and has arbitrarily large models. Let λ ≥ Max{χ.LS(K)⁺}. If K is categorical in λ and λ⁺, then K is categorical in λ⁺⁺. Combining this theorem with some results from [37], we derive a form of Shelah's Categoricity Conjecture for tame abstract elementary classes: Corollary 0.2. Suppose K is a χ-tame (...) abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation and joint embedding properties. Let μ₀:= Hanf(K). If χ ≤ ‮ב‬(2μ0)+ and K is categorical in some λ⁺ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+, then K is categorical in μ for all μ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend a new compositional semantics for single-domain free logic. This semantics makes use of a distinction between the semantic value of a singular term and its semantic referent. The semantic value of a singular term is conceived of as a set that either contains the semantic referent or no element at all. The semantic referent is the object that the term designates. Before I will introduce this new semantics for single-domain predicate and an S5-type modal (...) logic in detail, I will present five related problems of compositionality of the standard semantics for these logical systems. After that I will show in detail how my new proposed alternative semantics can be used to solve nearly all of the outlined five problems. (shrink)

Several recent accounts of modeling have focused on the modal dimension of scientific inquiry. More precisely, it has been suggested that there are specific models and modeling practices that are best understood as being geared towards possibilities, a view recently dubbed modal modeling. But modalities encompass much more than mere possibility claims. Besides possibilities, modal modeling can also be used to investigate contingencies, necessities or impossibilities. Although these modal concepts are logically connected to the notion of possibility, not all models (...) are equal in their affordances for these richer modal inferences. This paper investigates the modal extent of selected models and argues that analyzing singular model-target pairings by themselves is typically not enough to explain their modal aptness or to identify the kinds of modalities they can be used to reason about. Furthermore, it is argued that some important concepts that are not explicitly modal - like biological robustness - can be understood modally through their relational nature to a background space of possibilities. In conclusion, it is suggested that the strategy of modal modeling is contrastive, situating particular possibilities in larger modal spaces and studying the structural relations within them. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend the thesis that proper nouns are primarily used as proper names—as atomic singular referring expressions—and different possible predicative uses of proper nouns are derived from this primary use or an already derived secondary predicative use of proper nouns. There is a general linguistic phenomenon of the derivation of new meanings from already existing meanings of an expression. This phenomenon has different manifestations and different linguistic mechanisms can be used to establish derived meanings of different (...) kinds of expressions. One prominent variation of these mechanisms was dubbed in Nunberg. (Linguist Philos 3:143–184, 1979, J Semant 12:109–132, 1995, The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, 2004 meaning transfer.) In the essay I will distinguish two different sub-varieties of this mechanism: occurrent and lexical meaning transfer. Nunberg conceives of meaning transfer as a mechanism that allows us to derive a new truth-conditional meaning of an expression from an already existing truth-conditional meaning of this expression. I will argue that most predicative uses of proper nouns can be captured by the mentioned two varieties of truth-conditional meaning transfer. But there are also important exceptions like the predicative use of the proper noun ‘Alfred’ in as sentence like ‘Every Alfred that I met was a nice guy’. I will try to show that we cannot make use of truth-conditional meaning transfer to account for such uses and I will argue for a the existence of second variant of meaning transfer that I will call use-conditional meaning transfer and that allows us also to capture these derived meanings of proper nouns. Furthermore, I will try to show that the proposed explanation of multiple uses of proper nouns is superior to the view supported by defenders of a predicative view on proper names. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

In this paper, I will show that typical formal semantic reconstructions of the rigidity of proper names neglect the important aspect that the rigidity of names is determined by our ordinary use of a name relative to the actual world. This fact was clearly pointed out by Kripke, but overlooked by the subsequent discussion concerning this topic. Based on this diagnosis, I will distinguish three different actualized notions of rigidity. Firstly, I will introduce two different new varieties of known versions (...) of rigidity; namely, actualized persistent and actualized obstinate rigidity. Secondly, I will make use of the tools provided by free logic and introduce a new and overlooked version of rigidity, which I will call actually restricted rigidity. Against this background, I will argue that we have different options to formally model the rigidity of proper names in natural languages. Which option we choose, mainly depends on our philosophical background assumptions. For someone who believes in non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, it is the best choice to hold that proper names are actually obstinately rigid designators. For someone who rejects non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, actually restricted rigidity is a better choice than actualized persistent rigidity. (shrink)

Critics of multiple realizability have recently argued that we should concentrate solely on actual here-and-now realizations that are found in nature. The possibility of alternative, but unactualized, realizations is regarded as uninteresting because it is taken to be a question of pure logic or an unverifiable scenario of science fiction. However, in the biological context only a contingent set of realizations is actualized. Drawing on recent work on the theory of neutral biological spaces, the paper shows that we can have (...) ways of assessing the modal dimension of multiple realizability that do not have to rely on mere conceivability. (shrink)

In this article, we argue for the distinction of three different types of predicates: existence entailing, (existence) neutral, and nonexistence entailing predicates. We provide linguistic tests as well as examples to motivate this distinction. After motivating our views on predicates, we show how our theory is able to deal with a multitude of problematic data both known from the literature as well as new. Then, we develop a multi-domain predicate logic inspired by certain versions of free logics in order to (...) represent these entailments in a formal way. (shrink)

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

Recently, several critics of the multiple realizability thesis have argued that philosophers have tended to accept the thesis on too weak grounds. On the one hand, the analytic challenge has problematized how philosophers have treated the multiple realization relation itself, claiming that assessment of the sameness of function and the relevant difference of realizers has been uncritical. On the other hand, it is argued that the purported evidence of the thesis is often left empirically unverified. This paper provides a novel (...) strategy to answer these worries by introducing a role for multiple realizability in the context of biological engineering. In the field of synthetic biology, bioengineers redesign the evolutionary realizations of biological functions, even constructing artificial chemical surrogates in the laboratory. I show how in the rational design approach to biological engineering, multiple realizability can function as a design heuristic in which the sameness of function and difference of realizers can be controlled. Although practically motivated, this engineering approach has also a theoretical, exploratory component that can be used to study the empirical limitations of multiple realizability. Successful realization of the engineering designs would amount to a concrete demonstration of multiple realizability, taking evidence for MRT beyond what is readily found in nature. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend a version of the view that ‘exist’ expresses primarily a property of individual objects, a property that each of them has. In the first section, I will distinguish the three main types of rival conceptions concerning the semantic status of ‘exist’ that will define the subsequent discussion. In the second section it will be shown that the best explanation of our overall use of ‘exist’ in natural language requires the treatment of ‘exist’ as (...) a predicate that can be applied to individual objects. The third section will be concerned with the problem of the semantic analysis of negative singular existential sentences that contain proper names. I will briefly defend a specific solution to this problem that makes use of a single-domain free logic. In the following sections, I will try to defend this view of existence in more detail. That is, I will deal with three different specific challenges that prima facie seem to speak against the proposed view and for some rival alternatives; and I will show how these challenges can be met. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to present the main components of my non-standard interpretation of Frege’s views on existence to the English-speaking public. First, I will outline the standard interpretation and show how to a great but not full extent the standard interpretation can be justified on the basis of Frege’s writings. Second, I show that the main error of the standard interpretation consists in the assimilation of the contents of the ordinary language expressions “exist” and “there is” according to (...) Frege. Third, I evaluate possible sources for this unfounded assimilation. After that, I outline my alternative interpretation that distinguishes in opposition to other non-standard interpretations between a substantive and a deflationary part of Frege’s complete conception of existence in analogy to Frege’s analysis of truth and negation. Fifthly, I justify my interpretation by the reconstruction of a so far overlooked master argument of Frege against the above-mentioned assimilation. In the last section, I introduce and discuss five objections against my interpretation that came to my attention. (shrink)

Dolf Rami contributes to contemporary debates about the meaning and reference of proper names by providing an overview of the main challenges and developing a new contextualist account of names. Questions about the use and semantic features of proper names are at the centre of philosophy of language. How does a single proper name refer to the same thing in different contexts of use? What makes a thing a bearer of a proper name? What is their meaning? Guided by (...) these questions, Rami discusses Saul Kripke's main contributions to the debate and introduces two new ways to capture the rigidity of names, proposing a pluralist version of the causal chain picture. Covering popular contextualist accounts of names, both indexical and variabilist, he presents a use-sensitive alternative based on a semantic comparison between names, pronouns and demonstratives. Extending and applying his approach to a wide variety of uses, including names in fiction, this is a comprehensive explanation of why we should interpret proper names as use-sensitive expressions. (shrink)

Metaphors of mind and their elaboration into models serve a crucial explanatory role in psychology. In this article, an attempt is made to describe how biology and engineering provide the predominant metaphors for contemporary psychology. A contrast between the discursive and descriptive functions of metaphor use in theory construction serves as a platform for deliberation upon the pragmatic consequences of models derived therefrom. The conclusion contains reflections upon the possibility of an integrative interdisciplinary psychology.

Freges Konzeption der Existenz zählt zu seinen einflussreichsten und originellsten Beiträgen zur Philosophie. In diesem Buch wird Freges Konzeption neu interpretiert, historisch eingeordnet, mit den wichtigsten verwandten Konzeptionen verglichen und einer detaillierten systematischen Kritik unterzogen.

In this paper we give a detailed comparison of the key elements of Frege’s formal language of thought and apparently similar views in Stoic formal logic. That is, we compare their views on the following topics: connectives, negation, simple sentences, propositional content, predicates and their incompleteness, and quantifications. We show that in most of these cases the similarities between Frege’s views and the Stoic views are only superficial. Frege’s views are far more systematic, better developed and can in no case (...) directly or fully be traced back to Stoic ideas. Furthermore, we show that Prantl, pace Bobzien 2021, is in most of these cases not a reliable source with respect to Stoic logic and that it is very unlikely that Frege’s views on logic were influenced by Prantl’s interpretation of Stoic formal logic. (shrink)

Let κ and λ be infinite cardinals such that κ ≤ λ (we have new information for the case when $\kappa ). Let T be a theory in L κ +, ω of cardinality at most κ, let φ(x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . Now define $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, T) = \operatorname{Min} \{\mu^\ast:$ If T satisfies $(\forall\mu \kappa)(\exists M_\chi \models T)(\exists \{a_i: i Our main concept in this paper is $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, \kappa) = \operatorname{Sup}\{\mu^\ast(\lambda, T): T$ is a theory (...) in L κ +, ω of cardinality κ at most, and φ (x, y) ∈ L λ +, ω }. This concept is interesting because of THEOREM 1. Let $T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ of cardinality ≤ κ, and φ (x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . If $(\forall\mu then $(\forall_\chi > \kappa) I(\chi, T) = 2^\chi$ (where I(χ, T) stands for the number of isomorphism types of models of T of cardinality χ). Many years ago the second author proved that $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth_{(2^\lambda)^+}$ . Here we continue that work by proving. THEOREM 2. $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \aleph_0) = \beth_{\lambda^+}$ . THEOREM 3. For every κ ≤ λ we have $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth)_{(\lambda^\kappa)}^+$ . For some κ or λ we have better bounds than in Theorem 3, and this is proved via a new two cardinal theorem. THEOREM 4. For every $\kappa \leq \lambda, T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , and any set of formulas $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\lambda^+,\omega}$ such that $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , if T is (Λ,μ)-unstable for μ satisfying μ μ * (λ, κ) = μ then T is Λ-unstable (i.e. for every χ ≥ λ, T is (Λ, χ)-unstable). Moreover, T is L κ +, ω -unstable. In the second part of the paper, we show that always in the applications it is possible to replace the function I(χ, T) by the function IE(χ, T), and we give an application of the theorems to Boolean powers. (shrink)

Besides having potential medical and biosafety applications, as well as challenging the foundations of biological engineering, xenobiology can also shed light on the epistemological and metaphysical questions that puzzle philosophers of science. This paper reviews this philosophical aspect of xenobiology, focusing on the possible multiple realizability of life. According to this hypothesis, what ultimately matters in understanding life is its function, not its particular building blocks. This is because there should, in theory, be many different ways to build the same (...) function. The possibility of multiple realizability was originally raised in the context of AI’s hypothesized capacity to realize mental functions. Because we still do not have any incontrovertible examples of digital minds, not to mention alien life of foreign biochemistry, the best way to test this philosophical idea is to examine the recent results and practices of synthetic biology and xenobiology. (shrink)

The idea that reason can justify induction was famously criticized by David Hume. Hume concluded that there is no rational justification for inductive inferences and hence, no rational justification for most of our daily beliefs. Many philosophers attempted to solve Hume's problem with no success. Bertrand Russell commented regarding Hume's problem: "[if we cannot justify induction] we have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow, to expect bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or to expect that (...) if we throw ourselves off the roof we shall fall." The New Riddle of Induction was introduced by Nelson Goodman in his book Fact, Fiction and Forecast, published in 1954. Goodman's problem raised some serious doubts about our ability even to describe inductive principles. In this Book Rami Israel is attempting to solve Both Hume's and Goodman's philosophical problems by introducing a new approach to the subject and by drawing a new picture of our inductive practices. (shrink)

Let M be a given model with similarity type L = L(M), and let L' be any fragment of L |L(M)| +, ω of cardinality |L(M)|. We call $N \prec M L'$ -relatively saturated $\operatorname{iff}$ for every $B \subseteq N$ of cardinality less than | N | every L'-type over B which is realized in M is realized in M is realized in N. We discuss the existence of such submodels. The following are corollaries of the existence theorems. (1) If (...) M is of cardinality at least $\beth_{\omega_1}$ , and fails to have the ω order property, then there exists $N \prec M$ which is relatively saturated in M of cardinality $\beth_{\omega_1}$ . (2) Assume GCH. Let ψ ∈ L_{ω_1, ω, and let $L' \subseteq L_{\omega 1, \omega$ be a countable fragment containing ψ. If $\exists \chi > \aleph_0$ such that $I(\chi, \psi) , then for every $M \models \psi$ and every cardinal $\lambda of uncountable cofinality, M has an L'-relatively saturated submodel of cardinality λ. (shrink)

. We study a local version of the order property in several frameworks, with an emphasis on frameworks where the compactness theorem fails: (1) Inside a fixed model, (2) for classes of models where the compactness theorem fails and (3) for the first order case. Appropriate localizations of the order property, the independence property, and the strict order property are introduced. We are able to generalize some of the results that were known in the case of local stability for the (...) first order theories, and for stability for nonelementary classes (existence of indiscernibles, existence of averages, stability spectrum, equivalence between order and instability). In the first order case, we also prove the local version of Shelah's Trichotomy Theorem. Finally, as an application, we give a new characterization of stable types when the ambient first order theory is simple. (shrink)

Este texto analizará críticamente la actual fase económica para mostrar la importancia de los bienes comunes intangibles. Sondea la tesis de un nuevo modo de producción «en ciernes», basado en la gestión colaborativa. Analiza los intangibles de acuerdo a su calidad y carácter. Compara los sistemas de patentes y derechos de propiedad intelectual que permiten su apropiación y las resistencias a su «comoditización» desde el software libre y las propuestas de flexibilización de derechos de autor. Advierte sobre el «fetichismo tecnológico» (...) y propone un marco mínimo de discernimiento en dilemas vinculados a estas materias.It will scan critically the current economic phase to show the importance of the intangible commons. Investigate the thesis of a new mode of production based on collaborative knowledge management. Analyze the specificities of the intangible commons according to their quality and character. We will compare the patent and intellectual property rights that allow its appropriation. Study the resistance to its «commoditization» from the free software paradigm and the proposed relaxation of copyright. Warn of the risks of new forms of «technological fetishism» and conclude by proposing a minimum framework of discernment dilemmas in these matters. (shrink)

Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of the brain were (...) hard at work. If we want to properly understand the evolution of the mind, we must explore this more primal capability that we share with other animals: the power to feel. Emotions saturate every thought and perception with the weight of feelings. The Emotional Mind reveals that many of the distinctive behaviors and social structures of our species are best discerned through the lens of emotions. Even the roots of so much that makes us uniquely human—art, mythology, religion—can be traced to feelings of caring, longing, fear, loneliness, awe, rage, lust, playfulness, and more. From prehistoric cave art to the songs of Hank Williams, Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel explore how the evolution of the emotional mind stimulated our species’ cultural expression in all its rich variety. Bringing together insights and data from philosophy, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and psychology, The Emotional Mind offers a new paradigm for understanding what it is that makes us so unique. (shrink)

Scholars studying the global diffusion of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practices and the associated rise of privatized forms of economic governance have tended to shift attention away from the role of corporations in motivating these processes to the one played by nonbusiness forces seeking social control of corporations. We bring corporate power back in by turning the spotlight to the agency of business classes, the business entities capable of pursuing transcorporate, societal-level, macro-political endeavors. Building on a comparative investigation of two (...) of the world’s earliest mass CSR adoptions, in postwar Venezuela and Britain, we argue that business classes responding to anti-capitalist challenges were the original diffusers of CSR practices and, interrelatedly, promoters of CSR-based, privatized forms of regulation and governance. Organized by peak business associations, the purpose of these “business-class CSR mobilizations” was to weaken the state in its relation to corporations and increase the control of business over social trends. We discuss the contribution of our historical perspective and analytical approach to a more complete and balanced picture of the global rise of CSR in late capitalism. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.

Basic results on the model theory of substructures of a fixed model are presented. The main point is to avoid the use of the compactness theorem, so this work can easily be applied to the model theory of L ω 1 ,ω and its relatives. Among other things we prove the following theorem: Let M be a model, and let λ be a cardinal satisfying λ |L(M)| = λ. If M does not have the ω-order property, then for every $A (...) \subseteq M, |A| \leq \lambda$ , and every $\mathbf{I} \subseteq M$ of cardinality λ + there exists $\mathbf{J} \subseteq \mathbf{I}$ of cardinality λ + which is an indiscernible set over A. This is an improvement of a result of S. Shelah. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend a first‐order non‐discriminating property view concerning existence. The version of this view that I prefer is based on negative (or a specific neutral) free logic that treats the existence predicate as first‐order logical predicate. I will provide reasons why such a view is more plausible than a second‐order discriminating property view concerning existence and I will also discuss four challenges for the proposed view and provide solutions to them.

In this paper I am concerned with the semantic analysis of sentences of the form 'It is true that p'. I will compare different proposals that have been made to analyse such sentences and will defend a view that treats this sentences as a mere sytactic variation of sentences of the form 'That p is true'.