Mixed reality is an increasingly prevalent technology that merges digital simulations with physical objects or environments. This article presents principles for the design of mixed reality compositions. The principles are illustrated by projects and experiments by the author involving architecture and robotics.

How does perception give us access to external reality? This book critically engages with John McDowell's conceptualist answer to this question, by offering a new exploration of his views on perception and reality in relation to those of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In six chapters, the book examines these thinkers' respective theories of perception, lucidly describing how they fit within their larger philosophical views on mind and reality. It thereby not only reveals the (...) continuity of a tradition that underlies today's fragmented scholarly landscape, but also yields a new critique of McDowell's conceptualist theory. In doing so, the book contributes to the ongoing bridging of traditions, by combining analytic philosophy, Kantian philosophy, and phenomenology. Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell will appeal to scholars and students working in the history of philosophy, phenomenology, Kantian philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

This book proposes a new phenomenological analysis of the questions of perception and cognition which are of paramount importance for a better understanding of those processes which underlies the formation of knowledge and consciousness. It presents many clear arguments showing how a phenomenological perspective helps to deeply interpret most fundamental findings of current research in neurosciences and also in mathematical and physical sciences.

This essay explores the cultural and political processes which shape human worldviews. I examine the functions, mechanisms, and consequences of cultural distortions of perception, and the evolution of the western scientific worldview from its ancient animistic roots. From the evidence reviewed here I infer that collective deceptions are endemic in human culture, that physicalism is a collective deception and that the 'hard problem' of consciousness, defined in physicalist terms, is a false problem.

We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of (...) reality is two-way independent from the spatial and sensory contents of experience. We suggest that the sense of reality is an affective experience akin to a metacognitive feeling. Finally, we present a potentially important implication of our account for the current debate between Intentionalism and Naïve Realism. Since perception is “opaque” with respect to the reality of what is perceived, Intentionalism cannot refer to the sense of reality as what differentiates perception from sensory-like experiences such as imaginings. In contrast, Naïve Realism has an independent explanation of the specificity of perception. (shrink)

Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we (...) respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications. (shrink)

The present study assessed the degree to which probabilistic reasoning performance and thinking style influenced perception of risk and self-reported levels of terrorism-related behaviour change. A sample of 263 respondents, recruited via convenience sampling, completed a series of measures comprising probabilistic reasoning tasks (perception of randomness, base rate, probability, and conjunction fallacy), the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT), the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, and a terrorism-related behaviour change scale. Structural equation modelling examined three (...) progressive models. Firstly, the Independence Model assumed that probabilistic reasoning, perception of risk and reality testing independently predicted terrorism-related behaviour change. Secondly, the Mediation Model supposed that probabilistic reasoning and reality testing correlated, and indirectly predicted terrorism-related behaviour change through perception of risk. Lastly, the Dual-Influence Model proposed that probabilistic reasoning indirectly predicted terrorism-related behaviour change via perception of risk, independent of reality testing. Results indicated that performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks most strongly predicted perception of risk, and preference for an intuitive thinking style (measured by the IPO-RT) best explained terrorism-related behaviour change. The combination of perception of risk with probabilistic reasoning ability in the Dual-Influence Model enhanced the predictive power of the analytical-rational route, with conjunction fallacy having a significant indirect effect on terrorism-related behaviour change via perception of risk. The Dual-Influence Model possessed superior fit and reported similar predictive relations between intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational routes and terrorism-related behaviour change. The discussion critically examines these findings in relation to dual-processing frameworks. This includes considering the limitations of current operationalisations and recommendations for future research that align outcomes and subsequent work more closely to specific dual-process models. (shrink)

In recent philosophy it has been much disputed whether the content of perception is conceptual or not. This paper advocates the view that it is trivial to say that the content of perception is conceptual, if one considers perception in its mere epistemic significance. In this regard, the concept of perception is indeed completely determined by the idea of the object of perception. The concept of perception, however, is bi-dimensional. Perception, certainly, is essentially (...) intentional. However, a certain reality plays an essential part in it: the one of the sensible being that can be determined thus or thus in a perception, but that, as sensible reality, nevertheless remains as it is. Gestalt Theory can be interpreted as an exploration of one side of this reality, insofar as it has to do with something other than the intentionality of perception: i.e. with those structures of the perceivable thing that make it perceivable. In perception, the reality of the sensible element and the unreality of content should be logically distinguished. Thus, to open a new, non-epistemic dimension for perceptual realism, is possible. (shrink)

A collection of some of Sellars' lectures and articles from 1951 to 1962.

Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and others claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful presentation of various aspects of reality. On this view, familiar properties such as colours and solidity, to take just two examples, do not belong to external objects, (...) but are fictions generated by the brain that we mistakenly ascribe to the world around us. Contrary to this view, I argue that properties like colour and solidity are as much a part of the fabric of reality as gravity and electrons, and that our scientific and common-sense world views are not as opposed to one another as it might first appear. (shrink)

A host of factors, technical and cultural, have combined in our day to establish the journal article as the genre of philosophical writing. The next step is to collect them in the more available format of a book. Whatever be one’s judgment of the practice, it seems established; and, we think, in the case of Sellars’ offerings, is a fortunate one. One may more readily take the measure of a meticulous and probing philosophical mind by surveying its work over a (...) ten-year span. But a collation of essays is not a book, and one may take issue with the ordering of the chapters. We would suggest, for those beginning to read Sellars, the trilogy of lectures: ‘Being and Being Known’, ‘Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind’, and ‘Grammar and Existence’—in that order. These will give a comprehensive and sufficiently detailed view of his over-all strategy. After them one may either pursue the basic analogy of thought to speech in the systematic and particulate fashion of ‘Truth and “Correspondence”’ and ‘Naming and Saying’, or gain a feel for Sellars’ manner through the applications of the analogy to the questions of ‘Particulars’ and the ‘Synthetic A Priori’. (shrink)

I argue that pain sensations are perceptual states, namely states that represent (actual or potential) damage. I defend this position against the objection that pains, unlike standard perceptual states, do not allow for an appearance-reality distinction by arguing that in the case of pain as well as in standard perceptual experiences, cognitive penetration or malfunctions of the underlying sensory systems can lead to a dissociation between the sensation on the one hand, and what is represented on the other hand. (...) Moreover, I refute the objection that the allegedly weak correlation between pain and bodily damage forces intentionalist accounts of pain to postulate so many malfunctions (misrepresentations respectively) that such accounts become implausible. I also rebut Murat Aydede’s objection that our linguistic practice supposedly shows that there is a conceptual difference between standard perceptual experiences and pain sensations by challenging Aydede’s premise that we always withdraw standard perceptual reports in case of counterevidence, while we never do that with pain reports. At the end, I propose an explanation as to why we do not express perceptual reports of (potential) bodily damage in objectivist, but in mental terms. (shrink)

In 1984, John W. Yolton published Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid. His most recent book builds on that seminal work and greatly extends its relevance to issues in current philosophical debate. Perception and Reality examines the theories of perception implicit in the work of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers which centered on the question: How is knowledge of the body possible? That question raises issues of mind-body relation, the way that mentality links with physicality, and the nature (...) of the known world. In contrast to commonsense realism, which suggests that the world is as it appears to be, a more complex theory developed throughout this period. Yolton traces its evolution from Descartes to Kant, via Arnauld, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Yolton explains that the new theory postulated two interactive relations between perceivers and the physical world, one physical and causal, the other cognitive. An understanding of this double relation is important for an accurate construction of the history of philosophy. It is also important for contemporary thought because it suggests a way to account for representation (cognitivity) and realism at the same time. (shrink)

Extensive and critical review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl and McDowell, written by van Mazijk, Corijn focussing on his discussion of McDowell.

Dichotomizing perceptions, by those that have an objective reality and those that do not, is rejected. Perceptions are suggested to fall along a multidimensional continuum in which neither end is totally “pure.” At the extreme ends, perceptions neither have an objective reality without some subjectivity, nor, at the other end, even as hallucinations, are they totally dissociated from reality.

This book is about the nature of sensory perception. Contributions focus on five questions, i.e.: (1) What distinguishes sensory perception from other cognitive states? Is it true, for instance, that perceptual content, in contrast to the phenomenal content of sensations like pain, always depends on the perceivers conceptual resources? (2) How do we have to explain the intentionality of perceptual states? (3) What is the nature of perceptual content? (4) In which sense do the objects of sensory (...) class='Hi'>perception depend on the constitution of the perceiver? How, for instance, do secondary qualities like colours, sounds and smells depend on the perception of human subjects? (5) How can we account for the intentionality of misperceptions? These questions are addressed through the interpretation of classical historical texts as well as in the context of systematical reflections. With contributions by Margaret Atherton, Michael Ayers, Peter Baumann, Martha Brandt Bolton, Thomas Grundmann, Gary Hatfield, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Andreas Kemmerling, Bertram Kienzle, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Dominik Perler, Jay F. Rosenberg, Katia Saporiti, Ralph Schumacher, Gerald Vision, and Russell Wahl. (shrink)

Social reality of a group emerges from interpersonal perceptions and beliefs put to action under a host of environmental conditions. By extending the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics, we view social perceptions as judgment tools and assert that perceptions are ecologically rational to the degree that they adapt to the social reality. We maintain that the veracity of both stereotypes and base rates, as judgment tools, can be determined solely by accuracy research.

This book focuses on the social psychology of belief systems and how they influence perceptions of reality. These belief systems, from politics to religion to science, shape one¿s thoughts and views, but also can be the cause of conflict and disagreement over values, particularly when they are enacted in political policies. ¿ In¿Belief Systems and the Perceptions of Reality, editors Bastiaan Rutjens and Mark Brandt examine the social psychological effects at the heart of the conflict, by bringing together (...) contributions under five themes: Motivated Reasoning; Inequality; Threat; Scientists Interpreting Science; and People Interpreting Science. This book aims to create a more integrated understanding of reality perception and its connection with belief systems, viewed through the lens of social psychology. ¿ The synthesis of expert contributors as well as the literature around social psychology and belief systems makes this a unique resource for students, researchers and academics in behavioural and social sciences, as well as activists and journalists working in this political field. (shrink)

We currently exist in a post-biological age. Mixed-realities shape the way in which we live modern life; half in physical form, half in a hyper-mediated virtual environment of network protocols. This article discusses network-based impacts on neurological navigation and the ways in which the human auditory cortex is developing through conjuncture with post-biological combinations of sound. In doing so, it examines the capacity of the human brain in decoding and understanding the abundance of sound in confluent, variegated realms of existence (...) and how such increased perceptions expand consciousness and, in turn, affect sonic creativity as a somewhat mimicry or response to our immediate auditory environments. Conclusively, it will be argued that the exploration of sound-based creativity can be reinterpreted for post-biological spaces, taking particular aim at the reflective approaches of musique concrète and how such technologically infused ideas can be transformed and recontextualized to match the power and capacity of today’s hybrid environments of occupancy. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, the reality television phenomenon has transformed the face of television in many countries. In Spain, for instance, the private domain has gradually invaded the public domain in an attempt to increase audience ratings and also reflect patterns of asymmetrical societal organization. Different television formats, which range from docusoaps to the most blatant examples of so-called ‘voyeur television’, have occupied the prime-time hours. In particular, a wide range of reality television shows has taken the place that (...) mini-series, sitcoms and films of the week used to occupy. These reality television programmes show the transformation of the private domain into one which can be manipulated and incorporated as an essential element in the theatricalization of the intimate experiences of anonymous people. By addressing the relationship between mothering and gendered styles, this study adds to the field of research on reality television research by investigating language and gender within the institutional setting of a docusoap and throwing light on the discursive strategies which two different generations of women use to express anger and assertiveness and impose on others. The study reveals that the strategies used by the Spanish female teenagers under scrutiny are associated with hostile laddish verbal behaviour, whereas the mothers’ strategies relate to an instrumental view of aggression. (shrink)

THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION by David Kelley Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986. 286 pp., $24.95.

Recent interpreters portray Aristotle as a Protagorean antirealist, who thinks that colors and other perceptibles do not actually exist apart from being perceived. Against this, I defend a more traditional interpretation: colors exist independently of perception, to which they are explanatorily prior, as causal powers that produce perceptions of themselves. They are not to be identified with mere dispositions to affect perceivers, or with grounds distinct from these qualities, picked out by their subjective effect on perceivers (so-called “secondary qualities”). (...) Rather, they are intrinsic qualities of objects, which are in reality just as they appear to be. At the same time, Aristotle rejects any “simple theory of color” according to which the essence and nature of colors is fully revealed in experience. Although the character of perceptibles as they are experienced is “better known to us,” their essence and nature only comes to be known through a correct theory. (shrink)

Realistic uses of Virtual Reality technology closely integrate user training on virtual objects with VR-assisted user interactions with real objects. This paper shows how the Interactive Theory of Perception may be extended to cover such cases. Virtual objects are explained as concrete models that have an inner generation mechanism, and the ITP is used to explain how VR users can both perceive such local CMs, and perceptually represent remote real objects. Also, concepts of modeling and representation are distinguished. (...) The paper concludes with suggestions as to how the ITP methodology developed here could be extended to iconic external representations and models generally. (shrink)

Unlike many books of its kind, this collection of essays is more than a mere aggregate of papers loosely ordered around a set of common themes. In fact, for a work sensitive to the values inherent in the analytical tradition, it is surprisingly systematic, and strikes a happy balance between the products of the system-builders and the deliverances of those who are content to give us merely isolated insights. It embodies a sound knowledge of the history of philosophy, a sensitivity (...) to the contributions of the British philosophers since Bradley, and a desire to take science seriously without succumbing to the reductionism which so often characterized the contributions of the positivists. Throughout the papers the influence of Carnap, Kant and Wittgenstein is especially evident; and perhaps most characteristic are the repeated attempts to tread carefully, with their help, the sometimes narrow lines dividing realist and phenomenalist, realist and idealist, and realist and nominalist. Sellars is at pains to incorporate in his system the partial truths which always characterize conflicting philosophical alternatives. This book is well worth careful, critical study by philosophers of all persuasions.--C. V. (shrink)

The concept of information is related to fundamental philosophical questions: the relationship between being and thinking, truth and delusion, problems of communication in human society, problems of virtual reality, their connection with language, etc. The topic of information in its various aspects has recently become one of the most popular among scientists, publicists, journalists, and politicians. To date, there is a wide variety of definitions of the concept of “information”, however, there is no generally accepted understanding of the nature (...) of information and the ways of its existence. On the basis of the semantic approach in the theory of information using semiotic methodology, the problem of the relationship and relationship between information and reality is considered; on this basis, the symbolic nature of information is analyzed, the problem of perception and interpretation of information by its recipients is investigated, the reasons and mechanisms of information distortion are analyzed. Information is considered as a sign, a representative of reality. There is always an uncertain, unstable, situational connection between signs and reality. There is a possibility of the existence of information in its pure form, without real events, which is not tied to real reality. Distortion is considered as a property of information; it is caused by the symbolic nature of information. The concept of “reality” is analyzed. Reality is largely a cultural construct, culture and society play a significant role in shaping perceptions of reality. Information becomes a model of reality, and at the same time information models reality. The concepts of “virtual reality” and “informational reality” are in use, which, in fact, are iconic constructions simulating reality. (shrink)

This chapter first argues against the widely accepted “mentalist” interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the perception of external objects. On that view, the perception of objects results from an act of synthesis of the diverse perceptual input provided by the different sense modalities. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of perception does not require such mental “construction” of external objects. For him, we unfailingly perceive external objects by way of modally specific perception: perception without qualification is (...) primarily of external 3-D objects, while modally specific perception is of perceptual qualities. As the special senses cannot operate in isolation from the perceptual system as a whole, it follows that we see colors, hear sounds, etc., and thereby perceive the objects whose colors and sounds they are. The second part offers a causal interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of perception as “reception of the form without the matter,” according to which the causal history of sensory affection fixes the content of the resulting act of perception: perception is cognitive in virtue of being the matterless presence of external things’ qualities in the perceiver. (shrink)

Can the rise of populism be explained by the growing chasm between rich and poor? With regard to Germany, such a causal relationship must be rejected. Income distribution in Germany has been very stable since 2005, and people’s knowledge on actual inequality and economic development is limited: inequality and unemployment are massively overestimated. At the same time, a persistently isolationist and xenophobic group with diverse concerns and preferences has emerged within the middle classes of society that riggers support for populist (...) parties. This mood is based on welfare chauvinism against immigration rather than on a general criticism of distribution. Since the immigration of recent years will inevitably affect the relevant indicators concerning distribution, an open, cautious but less heated approach is needed in the debate on the future of the welfare state. In order to address and take the local concerns of citizens seriously, an increased exchange with public officials on the ground is needed. (shrink)

The extent to which Pavlovian feed-forward mechanisms operate in primates is debatable. Monkeys and apes are long-lived, usually gregarious, and intelligent animals reliant on learned behavior. Learning occurs during play, mother-infant interactions, and grooming. We address these situations, and are hesitant to accept Domjan et al.'s reliance on Pavlovian conditioning as a major operant in primates.