Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails. Consequently, I shall argue, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent with treating offenders as equals qua persons. The nature of criminal punishment, and of our interactions with offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery, risks causing harm to offenders. Harm is normalized when central to definitions of punishment, desensitizing us to unintended harms and obscuring caring practices. Offenders (...) may be partially silenced and excluded by mainstream criminal justice practices which limit interaction between offenders and practitioners. When we ignore significant harms, or silence and exclude, we treat others as passive non-subjects. This partially objectifies offenders, and is inconsistent with treatment as equals. Penal theories employing harm-centred and harm-normalizing definitions of punishment can provide few resources to help practitioners either avoid, or recognize and respond to, harms. Care ethics, by contrast, motivates the avoidance of harm, ongoing inclusive engagement, and respectful interaction with others. I argue that defining punishment without presupposing harm facilitates the identification of morally problematic harms, and recognition of caring practices. I offer a principled argument, and political and pragmatic supplementary arguments, for responding to offenders without intentional harm and with care. Principles drawn from care ethics can help to strengthen mainstream criminal practices by structuring decision-making and action. Bottom-up alternative criminal justice practices share some values with these proposed guiding principles, allowing a partial test of the principles. I consider examples of restorative justice practices, therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice and other problem-solving court practices, in addition to considering how well mainstream punishment practices measure up to these principles. My analysis illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the principles, and how they might contribute to securing treatment as equals for offenders in mainstream practices. (shrink)

Should those who get dirty hands be punished? There is strong disagreement among even those who support the existence of such scenarios. The problem arises because the paradoxical nature of dirty hands - doing wrong to do right - renders the standard normative justifications for punishment unfit for purpose. The Consequentialist, Retributivist and Communicative approaches cannot accommodate the idea that an action can be right, all things considered, but nevertheless also a categorical wrong. This paper argues that punishment is indeed (...) appropriate for those who dirty their hands and that there are three normative justifications that can be used to support this claim. These are the justifications from ‘Catharsis’, ‘Recognition of Evil Suffered’ and ‘Causal Responsibility’. Together they provide the sui generis justifications for punishing dirty hands. (shrink)

L’article essaie d’expliquer la nature éthique de l’action par l’analyse de la peine. C’est dans la justification de l’acte pénal que Hegel présenta le premier noyau de la dialectique qui « dépasse » et relativise le commandement du droit positif. C’est même dans la justification de l’action pénale que Hegel expose de façon systématique le principe capital selon lequel le droit n’est réellement juste que lorsqu’il se constitue comme un acte « reconnaissable » par le destinataire.

This paper explores one aspect of the political in the early Hegel, that of criminal action and its relationship to the concept of recognition in the System of Ethical Life. While it is clear that in this work Hegel thinks that criminal action plays an important role in the transformation of simple ethical communities, it is not clear that, for Hegel, the formal character of crime in the struggle for recognition is anything but negative. I attempt to show how this (...) role for crime leads Hegel to a legalistic conception of Right that has no solid connection with recognition as a social force. (shrink)

Written by interdisciplinary authors from the fields of educational policy, early childhood education, history, political philosophy, law, and moral philosophy, this volume addresses the use of disciplinary action across varied educational contexts. Much of the punishment of children occurs in non-criminal contexts, in educational and social settings, and schools are institutions where young people are subject to disciplinary practices and justifications that are quite unlike those found elsewhere. In addition to this, the discipline they receive is often discriminatory, being disproportionately (...) focused on students of colour and other minoritized identities, and unjust in other ways. This timely text is a comprehensive examination of punishment in schools, prompting discussions on racial equity, social justice in education and the school to prison pipeline. Each chapter offers empirically informed, theoretical investigations into punishment in educational settings, including how punishment is understood, whether it is permissible to discipline students, and whether such punishment can be considered educational. (shrink)

The present study sought to determine the extent to which individuals'' ethical ideologies, as measured by Forsyth''s (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), impacted the degree of punishment they advocated for differing ethical infractions, as well as their selection of non-ethics related variables that might be used to modify judgments of disciplinary action. The data revealed that individual ideology does impact both advocated punishment and choice of non-ethics related variables, but only in some measures. The data are discussed (...) in terms of potential moderating variables that could be examined in future studies. (shrink)

Many moral theories hold individuals responsible for their marginal impact on massive patterns (for instance overall value or equality of opportunity) or for following whichever rules would realise that pattern on the whole. But each of these injunctions is problematic. Intuitively, the first gives individuals responsibility for too much, and the second gives them responsibility for too little. I offer the outlines of a new approach to ethics in collective action contexts. I defend a new collaborative principle that assigns (...) recognisably worthwhile responsibilities to agencies wherever possible. This principle supports a fractal model of moral responsibility, one that favours restructuring divisions of labour in ways that enhance the prospects of recognition at every level of social organisation. This essay is programmatic: starting from a conjecture about the moral significance of recognition, it sketches a new way of approaching a range of collective action problems that combines the importance of the perspectives of both moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

There is considerable variability across people in their punitive responses to employee offenses in the workplace. We attempt to explain this variability by positing a novel antecedent of punishment: moral recognition. We find consistent evidence that identifying moral considerations and implications for workplace offenses predicts punitive responses toward employees who commit those offenses. Drawing on functional theoretical accounts of morality and punishment, we posit that people are motivated to punish others to the extent that they believe a moral offense has (...) been committed, because much of what it means to commit a moral offense (as opposed to a non-moral offense) is to act in a way that prevents, or inhibits, cooperative behavior to achieve social goals. Punishment can discourage group members from committing those offenses in the future, thereby regulating behavior in a way that facilitates cooperation and social cohesion. We offer correlational and causal evidence that the link between moral recognition and punishment is explained, in part, by participants’ beliefs that committing these offenses prevents cooperative behavior to achieve organization-related goals. (shrink)

In this significant contribution to Hegel scholarship, Robert Williams develops the most comprehensive account to date of Hegel's concept of recognition. Fichte introduced the concept of recognition as a presupposition of both Rousseau's social contract and Kant's ethics. Williams shows that Hegel appropriated the concept of recognition as the general pattern of his concept of ethical life, breaking with natural law theory yet incorporating the Aristotelian view that rights and virtues are possible only within a certain kind of community. (...) He explores Hegel's intersubjective concept of spirit as the product of affirmative mutual recognition and his conception of recognition as the right to have rights. Examining Hegel's Jena manuscripts, his _Philosophy of Right_, the _Phenomenology of Spirit_, and other works, Williams shows how the concept of recognition shapes and illumines Hegel's understandings of crime and punishment, morality, the family, the state, sovereignty, international relations, and war. A concluding chapter on the reception and reworking of the concept of recognition by contemporary thinkers including Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze demonstrates Hegel's continuing centrality to the philosophical concerns of our age. (shrink)

This article examines the ethical framing of employment in contemporary human resource management (HRM). Using Axel Honneth's theory of recognition and classical critical notions of reification, I contrast recognition and reifying stances on labor. The recognition approach embeds work in its emotive and social particularity, positively affirming the basic dignity of social actors. Reifying views, by contrast, exhibit a forgetfulness of recognition, removing action from its existential and social moorings, and imagining workers as bundles of discrete resources or capacities. After (...) discussing why reification is a problem, I stress that recognition and reification embody different ethical standpoints with regards to organizational practices. Thus, I argue paradoxically that many current HRM best practices can be maintained while cultivating an attitude of recognition. If reification is a type of forgetting, cultivating a recognition attitude involves processes of "remembering" to foster work relations that reinforce employee dignity. (shrink)

In this chapter I use virtue theory to critique certain contemporary punishment practices. From the perspective of virtue theory, respect for rational agency indicates a respect for choice-making as the process by which we form dispositions which in turn give rise to further choices and action. To be a moral agent one must be able to act such that his or her actions deserve praise or blame; virtue theory thus demands that moral agents engage in rational choice-making as a means (...) to develop and exercise the character traits from which culpable action issues. With respect to criminal offenders, virtue theory indicates the state is obligated to recognize offenders’ right to form their own moral character via rational choice-making, even while under state supervision. I will argue below that punishment practices should limit choice-making only to the extent necessary to achieve the functions of punishment : whenever possible, punishment should preserve opportunities for the rational exercise of character and development of virtue. This means that even within a prison setting incarcerated offenders should be able to make some choices about their daily lives. Offenders should also be offered opportunities to develop virtuous traits through rehabilitative programming such as drug addiction treatment, educational programming, and job training. I will also argue that two contemporary punishment practices unjustly undermine an offender’s moral agency. The first is the overuse of isolation sanctions, which very severely limits offender choice-making. The second is chemical castration, which results in limiting an offender’s capacity to develop his character within a specific realm of choice-making. I conclude that these two punishments violate offenders’ moral agency, and that this violation cannot be justified by appeal to the aims of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. (shrink)

Virtue theory provides a unique perspective to critique certain contemporary punishment practices. To be a moral agent one must be able to act such that his or her actions deserve praise or blame; virtue theory thus demands that moral agents engage in rational choice-making as a means to develop and exercise the character traits from which culpable action issues. With respect to criminal offenders, virtue theory indicates the state is obligated to recognize offenders’ right to form their own moral character (...) via rational choice-making, even while under state supervision. Punishment practices should limit choice-making only to the extent necessary to achieve the functions of punishment: whenever possible, punishment should preserve opportunities for the rational exercise of character and development of virtue. (shrink)

G.W.F. Hegel focuses his treatment of Sophocles' drama, Antigone , in the Phenomenology of Spirit, on the ideal of mutual recognition. Antigone was punished with death for performing the burial ritual honoring her brother, Polyneices, to whose irreplaceability she attests in her well-known speech of defiance. Hegel argues that Antigone's loss of Polyneices was the irreparable loss of reciprocal recognition. Only in the brother sister relation, Hegel thought, could there be equality in mutual recognition. I argue that this equality cannot (...) be found in a marriage union with a husband or in the public sphere of civil society. Situating Hegel's account of marriage in the Philosophy of Right within the history of marriage and historical literature on the emerging market economy of Hegel's time, I demonstrate that Hegel's perception of equality in the reciprocal recognition of the brother sister relation was a function of both economic realities and his relationship with his sister, Christiane. I show desire in the Phenomenology to be the desire for dominance, and I show the brother sister relation to be free of desire. (shrink)

In what we might call its particularly Christian manifestation, “guilt” denotes the feeling or fact of having offended, the failure to uphold an ethical code. Under such terms, “guilt” connotes negative consequences: shame, punishment, and estrangement. Yet, penetrating further into its meaning and value, one finds that guilt extends beyond this narrow classification, playing a productive, necessary, and ineluctable role for recognitive sociality. This paper examines guilt as it appears in Hegel’s thinking. I find that Hegel’s understanding of Schuld (guilt) (...) in the Phenomenology , undergoes a crucial development over the course of the chapter titled, “Spirit,” culminating in a robust understanding of guilt that represents not a hopelessly broken bond, but a bond that awaits its fulfillment, its very incompleteness exerting a palpable pull upon the guilty party towards its fulfillment. I examine three key moments in “Spirit”: Hegel’s treatments of Antigone , the French Revolution, and the confession and forgiveness of evil. By comparing these moments, I distinguish between “abstract guilt,” guilt that only brings about shame and punishment, and what we might call “determinate guilt”: guilt that brings about action, reminds one of her/his indebtedness to the other. Understanding the development of guilt from the beginning to end of “Spirit” provides an entryway into a discussion of the social and political relevance of Hegel’s conception of the subject as—in a certain sense—always already guilty. I go on to argue that guilt as indebtedness and responsibility only exists as embedded within an already recognitive social structure. Re-thinking guilt as responsibility is not, therefore, a call to a new objective a priori moral system. Rather, it invites us to think through our recognitive being-together in a way that shakes off its metaphysical fetters. Such an ethics of recognitive intersubjectivity is an infinite task—not in the futile sense of the “unhappy consciousness”—but in the sense that we are responsible for constantly understanding, critiquing, and reforming ethical commitments that can only be (understood as) ours. (shrink)

In A Treatise on Virtues and Rewards, Dragonetti advances a theory of action based on rewards for virtues. The idea of rewards, especially of awards, relies on the hypothesis that intrinsic motivations drive the actions of good or virtuous citizens. We apply this theory to virtuous entrepreneurs who voluntarily adopt ethical principles as promoted by a recent Italian law. These firms receive an ethical rating by the Italian Competition Authority and can access a set of economic and non-economic benefits. We (...) survey a sample of 152 private companies with an ER and examine their views on the economic and social motivations and benefits as well as the perceived usefulness of the ER for improving ethical behaviour. An exploratory factor analysis detects four categories of motivation and two categories of benefits, which we use in regression models to test Dragonetti’s theory. Overall, respondents see the ER as an effective tool, except in terms of improving economic performance. We also find that entrepreneurs with lower economic and higher responsiveness motivations attain higher ERs. However, in the respondents’ opinions, the ER is not producing any concrete benefits since we find no relationship between the ER and economic or competitive rewards. These findings have implications for the ICA as well as for private companies. (shrink)

THE PAPER ANALYZES THE NATURE, FORMS AND PURPOSE OF JUST ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, LAYING DOWN THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IT. THEY INCLUDE: (1) SELF-ADMINISTRATION OF PUNISHMENT; (2) PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT (DEPRIVATION OF VALUES, MENTAL PAIN, ETC.) TO THE VICTIM’S DEPRIVATION OF VALUES AND HIS PAIN; (3) NON-INFLICTION OF PHYSICAL PAIN OR MENTAL CRUELTY; AND (4) THE PUNISHER’S MORAL ENTITLEMENT (AND PROPER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT) TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER. THE CONCLUDING SECTION CONSIDERS WITTGENSTEIN’S VIEW THAT ETHICAL PUNISHMENT "MUST RESIDE IN THE (...) (WRONG) ACTION ITSELF," AND THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, RELATING THEM TO THE EARLIER DISCUSSION. (shrink)

Care ethics takes as central the discerning of needs in those being cared for and attempts to meet those needs. Perceptive caring agents are more likely to be able to identify needs in those for whom they are caring. The identification of needs is no small matter, not least in teaching encounters. This paper modestly proposes that at least some of the needs a caring agent should attempt to meet are a function of the identity of the patient of (...) caring action. Taking Nel Noddings’ account of care ethics as representative, I present it in outline. This leads to the needs-identification problematic. Following this I turn to Soran Reader’s account of needs. I interpret this to offer what I designate as identity as ‘what-ness’. Such an understanding of identity-based needs is a starting point for the caring agent but a more nuanced account, of identity as ‘who-ness’, is argued to be preferable. Identity as ‘who-ness’, as expressed in Paul Ricoeur’s work, advances the discussion, culminating in his concept of the ‘capable human being’. Having brought this aspect of Ricoeur’s thought into conversation with care ethics, I offer an account of identity-based needs conducive to the broader aims of the care ethical project. Finally, I consider what this bolstered account of care ethics might say about a brief and illustrative teaching encounter. (shrink)

This book proposes, from a civil perspective —such as that developed by Stefano Zamagni— and a cordial perspective —such as that developed by Adela Cortina—, orientations to design an economy in tune with what the historical moment demands. Among other things, this comes from encouraging institutions, organisations and companies to include in their designs aspects as important for carrying out their activities as cordial reciprocity, mutual recognition of the communicative and affective capacities of the linked or linkable parties, public commitment (...) and the active participation of civil society. The book first shows the conceptualisation of the process of self-interest as operating for one’s own benefit and its inclusion in the orthodox economic model. In Chapter 2 it then displays some of the logical/formal and experimental limits of the axiomatic economics model to discover the possibility of building bridges between theoretical modelling and factual validation. Chapter 3 demonstrates the fragility of a rationality model based on the paradigmatic figure of homo oeconomicus. Chapter 4 reflects on the critical process that has identified reciprocity as a determining factor for human cooperation, turning this behaviour into a paradox in which the lack of a reasonable explanation from the selfish perspective becomes inconsistent in the predominant economic theory. Chapter 5 is from a moral point of view it describes and criticises the different approaches to reciprocity observed by sociologists, biologists, psychologists and economists. Chapter 6 analyses three mutual recognition proposals as possible foundations for human cooperation, highlighting one of them –cordial recognition, developed by Cortina– because it is more closely related to studies of reciprocity, particularly the most recent contributions from the neurosciences. Chapter 7 proposes cordial reciprocity as a horizon of meaning for the various approaches to reciprocity observed. Chapter 8 explores the possible emergence and development of cordial goods, a type of relational and communicative good that enables joint actions to take place in different contexts of human activity. Chapter 9 analyses the application and implementation of cordial reciprocity at the macro, meso and micro levels of the economy. And finally, it proposes guidelines for designing a monitoring and compliance system which, based on the communication, storage and processing of big data and the committed participation of stakeholders, offers businesses the possibility of inspecting their underlying dimensions of morality, emotions and responsibility. (shrink)

Within moral and political philosophy and the social sciences, recent conceptual developments in the concept of recognition cannot be dissociated from an opposition to those theories inspired by what is commonly called rational action theory or the economic model of action. The paradigm of recognition represents the heart of those theories that are both alternative and complementary to the theory of individual action. Nonetheless, this conceptual development calls out for an alliance between political philosophy and the social sciences. We argue (...) that the paradigm of recognition can only be developed to its full potential if it is interpreted in the wake of what Marcel Mauss and the Revue du MAUSS, has called the paradigm of the gift. The gift only takes on its full sense when understood as a means, performer, and symbol of public and/or private recognition. (shrink)

Within moral and political philosophy and the social sciences, recent conceptual developments in the concept of recognition cannot be dissociated from an opposition to those theories inspired by what is commonly called rational action theory or the economic model of action. The paradigm of recognition represents the heart of those theories that are both alternative and complementary to the theory of individual action. Nonetheless, this conceptual development calls out for an alliance between political philosophy and the social sciences. We argue (...) that the paradigm of recognition can only be developed to its full potential if it is interpreted in the wake of what Marcel Mauss and the Revue du MAUSS, has called the paradigm of the gift. The gift only takes on its full sense when understood as a means, performer, and symbol of public and/or private recognition. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of moral justification of humanitarian intervention by modern just war theorists. At the beginning of the article, we discuss the evolution of the dominant paradigms of the moral justification of war and explain why the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention appears only at the present stage of the development of ethics and the law of war. It is noted that theorization of humanitarian intervention began in the last decades of the 20thcentury. This (...) is due to a significant transformation, a retreat in the legal and ethical studies of war from the position of radical condemnation of aggressive actions and the recognition of the political subjectivity of non-state groups. Thus, there is a rethinking of the long tradition, the Westphalian system of international relations, according to which the state was recognized as the main participant of big politics, and its sovereign right to conduct domestic policy was considered indisputable. Further, we take the works of Michael Walzer as the main source of modern conceptualization of the ethics of humanitarian interventionism, since Walzer repeatedly addressed this topic and formulated a position on this issue that is representative of the entire modern Just War Theory. The arguments of Walzer and his supporters in favor of the moral justification of humanitarian intervention are considered. Among them are the following. First, the argument about the state as an organization which goal is to protect the rights of its own citizens. If this goal is not not achieved, the state shall loose its power over these people and in this territory. Second, Walzer calls for identifying governments and armed forces involved in mass murders as criminal and, therefore, deserving of punishment. Finally, there is, perhaps the most important, demonstrative argument: an appeal to the self-evident impossibility to stand aside in cases of mass violence in any state. This is followed by a critique of these arguments, as well as a demonstration of how the modern Just War Theory can respond to these criticisms. (shrink)

This paper investigates how social enterprises navigate through the ethical complexity of social change and extends the ethical quandaries faced by social enterprises beyond organisational boundaries. Building on the emerging literature on the ethics of SEs, I conceptualise ethics as an engagement with power relations. I develop theoretical arguments to understand the interaction between ethical predispositions of a SE and the normative structure of the social system in which it operates. I applied this conceptualisation in a hierarchical and (...) heterogeneous rural Indian context to provide insights into the moral ambiguity of ethical decision-making and suggest pathways for ethical actions. Taking a qualitative case study approach, I followed an exemplary SE’s implementation process in India. I observed ethical challenges in designing the implementation process, selecting the beneficiaries and sustaining the programme. I also identified three actions of the SE—the action of recognition, the action of reposition and the action of collaboration—and developed a transformative process model. I discuss the theoretical implications of this research for SEs and recommend a critical engagement with ethical theories to address systemic problems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition by Robert R. WilliamsLawrence S. StepelevichRobert R. Williams. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xviii +433. Cloth, $60.00.The eminent Hegel scholar, Vittorio Hoesle, perceived the major weakness of Hegel’s philosophy in its seeming failure to adequately deal with the issue of interpersonal relations. Hardly a new objection, as Hoesle’s critique has a lineage that reaches at (...) least as far back as Schleiermacher. Against this thesis, Robert Williams had earlier developed a counter-argument which he presented in his work, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (1992). In this foundational work, Williams drew out and clarified Hegel’s concept of recognition from its inchoate source in Fichte; and by so doing defended “Hegel against charges that his thought violates intersubjectivity and difference by reducing the other to the same.”(1) In the present work, the conceptual and textual grounds established by Williams in his first work on the topic allow for a more extensive extrapolation of Hegel’s doctrine, and argues that “The story of recognition is a story about Fichte and Hegel. Fichte introduced the concept but did not make it the basis of either his ethics or his politics. Hegel appropriated and transformed the concept of recognition and regarded it as the fundamental intersubjective structure of ethical life.” (26)After a brief introductory critical survey of some of the more or less misleading contemporary views of both Hegelians and non-Hegelians regarding Hegel’s concept of interpersonal recognition, Williams proceeds to present its historical genesis, of how it emerged from its early and unfocused appearances in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. Williams then traces the further development and elaboration of this concept as it gains expression in the course of Hegel’s own ethical theory, not only as it is found in such major works as the Phenomenology of Mind and The Philosophy of Spirit, but also as it appears in his earlier and lesser known Jena Manuscripts of 1805. After this preliminary doctrinal and historical introduction, Williams turns to the most substantial section of his study, that work of Hegel’s in which the concept of recognition would be expected to and does indeed play its most evident ethical role: The Philosophy of Right.Almost every category within The Philosophy of Right is examined not only for the appearance of the concept, but for the defining role which it plays in the construction of that category. Such an examination is necessary for Williams, since “Reciprocal recognition in its various determinate types and instances is the general structure of ethical life and the embodiment of social reason that underlies and supports the concepts of law and state.” (364) Among the categories considered, categories that Williams discusses within the context of contemporary issues and each of which is taken up in a separate chapter of his work, are Family, Crime and Punishment, Poverty, and the State. In every instance considered he argues that an understanding of the defining role of recognition is a necessary prerequisite not only for a clear and correct comprehension [End Page 174] of Hegel’s ethical theory but of all ethical theory. Certainly, after this scholarly tour de force Hegel’s concept of recognition will have to be taken into account in any credible discussion of his ethical theory. In a final chapter Williams turns to some contemporary ethical theorists who have not taken that concept into consideration, or if they have, have either misunderstood or have rejected it. For Williams, such thinkers as Kojeve, Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida and Levinas, in their misunderstanding or rejection of the ethically mediating concept of recognition, have all contributed toward the “disrupted and fragmented cultural situation at the end of the twentieth century.” (412)In sum, Williams’ presentation and support of Hegel’s ethical employment of the concept of intersubjective recognition cannot but encourage theorists to reconsider the subject, and to see in it not only a conceptual tool which can serve to lucidly contextualize Hegel’s ethical theory into the matrix of his total philosophical system, but also as a needed ethical concept able to transcend both... (shrink)

Across two studies the hypotheses were tested that stressful situations affect both leadership ethical acting and leaders' recognition of ethical dilemmas. In the studies, decision makers recruited from 3 sites of a Swedish multinational civil engineering company provided personal data on stressful situations, made ethical decisions, and answered to stress-outcome questions. Stressful situations were observed to have a greater impact on ethical acting than on the recognition of ethical dilemmas. This was particularly true for situations involving punishment and lack of (...) rewards. The results are important for the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of an organization, especially with regard to the analysis of the Stressors influencing managerial work and its implications for ethical behavior. (shrink)

The further development of public health ethics will be assisted by a more direct engagement with political theory. In this way, the moral vocabulary of the liberal tradition should be supplemented—but not supplanted—by different conceptual and normative resources available from other traditions of political and social thought. This article discusses four lines of further development that the normative conceptual discourse of public health ethics might take. The relational turn. The implications for public health ethics of the new (...) ‘ecological’ or ‘relational’ interpretation that is emerging for concepts such as agency, self-identity, autonomy, liberty and justice. Governing the health commons. The framework of collective action problems is giving way to notions of democratic governance and management of common resources. The concept of membership. Membership is specified by the notions of equal respect and parity of voice and agency. The concept of mutuality. Mutuality is specified by the notions of interdependent concern and care. (shrink)

There is a problem about the punishment of potential or future consequences under the principles of the invisible hand and of utility. In the free market, a social pattern and institution, in which the wicked merchants have harmed others and been punished, is obviously evolved at least for protecting individual freedom and security. In the views of Smith and Mill, it is related to the sentiment of justice from sympathy extended by morality of our internal sentiment and sanctions to social (...) lives. In a society or poor country, however, which has never experienced a case such as that of the wicked merchants, a baker, who makes bread with less harmful poison and intends only to satisfy self-interest, can be evaluated as a case of exemplary self-interest by both principles, for example, because he gives the greatest help to solve social hunger. At that moment, we cannot expect any possible evolution of social pattern and institution; and, if another result of his own self-interest is the concentration of poison after a generation, and if the baker is punished, this feature is to reveal a contradiction of the principles of the invisible hand and, in particular, of utility. At the moment, this essay will examine two possible resolutions: the responsibility for the actual and potential consequences, and desert or merit by socially useful behaviour. The former is to regulate certain actions or to examine its propriety and moral rules in the free market and the latter is to have a limit that to calculate future values for returns or merits now is improper as well as injust. By exploring the two alternatives, it might be persuasive that the principle of moral action in the free market be modified in terms of potentially wrong consequences. (shrink)

Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will (...) and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

There is an underlying idea of symmetry involved in most notions of rationality. From a dialogical philosophical standpoint, however, the symmetry implied by social contract theories and so-called Golden Rule thinking is anchored to a Cartesian subject–object world and is therefore not equipped to address recognition – at least not if recognition is to be understood as something happening between subjects. For this purpose, the dialogical symmetry implied by Habermas' communicative action does a much better job. Still, it is insufficient (...) to embrace those kinds of recognition that are dependent on asymmetry and concrete difference. This article explores how communicative action could meet the demand of recognition by investigating a complementary source of validity in communicative rationality, apart from Habermas' validity claims, in which ‘inter’ is better characterized as mutuality than as symmetry. By recognizing both sources of validity, communicative action can open the door more fully to all aspects of recognition without giving up its universal pragmatic core. Key Words: communicative action • communicative rationality • discourse ethics • Jürgen Habermas • Axel Honneth • recognition • universal pragmatics. (shrink)

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and resulting health and economic crisis has caused major disruptions in the functioning of food systems and revived the discussion on what forms balanced, effective and responsible crisis management. As part of its thought leadership and its social responsibility in times of crisis, WUR is uniquely placed to contribute to the scientific knowledge base and data collection mechanisms required for early recognition and rapid response. In addition, WUR takes on the challenge to generate timely insights into (...) the possible scenarios for the prevention of a crisis and during and after emergencies to enable our clients and stakeholders to make informed decisions. Lastly, WUR can provide a better understanding of the mechanisms of spillover, and tangible and practical tools to help reduce the risk of spillover events from occurring, prevent pathogen spread, or mitigate the impacts of a future pandemic. In its research institutes and university, WUR brings together expertise in human, animal, plant and environmental health, the global agri-food system, economics, social sciences, food safety and security, ethics, and policy. Here, in the knowledge that COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic, we present WUR’s ambition and capabilities towards an integrated global multi-stakeholder approach to the prevention and management of potentially pandemic diseases, across the four phases of crisis management; prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery and learning. (shrink)

Much attention has been paid to the role of the nurse in recognizing and addressing ethical dilemmas. There has been less emphasis, however, on the issue of whether or not nurses understand the ethical nature of everyday practice. Awareness of the inherently ethical nature of practice is a component of nurse ethical sensitivity, which has been identified as a component of ethical decision-making. Ethical sensitivity is generally accepted as a necessary precursor to moral agency, in that recognition of the ethical (...) content of practice is necessary before consistent action on behalf of patient interests can take place. This awareness is also compulsory in ensuring patient good by recognizing the unique interests and wishes of individuals, in line with an ethic of care. Scholarly and research literature are used to argue that bolstering ethical awareness and ensuring that nurses understand the ethical nature of the role are an obligation of the profession. Based on this line of reasoning, recommendations for education and practice, along with directions for future research, are suggested. (shrink)

(Abstract: To say that there is a moral right to act in a certain way is to say that there is a presumption that such acts are morally right, which implies that others should not blame, punish or deliberately obstruct. A community’s recognition of such rights is a way of reducing conflict among its members. Natural or human rights are rights that ought to be recognised in every community. Statements of natural rights are not analytic; they may be self evident, (...) at least in the sense that everyone can easily see the usefulness of recognising such rights. The concept of a right has not changed since the middle ages and neither have the kinds of justifications given for recognising rights. Medieval moralists clearly recognised the human freedom presupposed by all ethical and legal systems and valued the liberty that consists in not being excessively constrained by legally and socially enforced duties. In modern times more recognition has been given to the rights of conscience, and this has led to some attempt to formulate duties we have toward conscientious agents whose actions we cannot accept as morally permissible.). (shrink)

In order to defend moderate retributivism Anthony Duff and Christopher Bennett have invoked the idea of the enduring of punishment (including imprisonment) as a form of apologetic penance that is needed to reach atonement. They successfully argue that the concept of penance makes plausible the positive retributivist conviction that the guilty deserve to suffer. Two crucial steps in their argument however still harbor problems. (1) punishments are usually imposed against the will of the offender, which is at odds with the (...) character of penance, even if one stresses the ritual character of apology. Stubbornly unapologetic offenders who are forced to apologize cannot be said to have made an apology and be ‘reconciled’ even though they performed the ritual. (2) The claim that we need to limit offenders’ rights and liberties in order to express withdrawal of our recognition and respect (or as a sign that communal bonds are fractured) may have implications that are unacceptable for liberals. We could also limit offenders’ rights and liberties by forcing them into moralizing, educative or other rehabilitative programs. Suggestions will be given on how Duff and/or Bennett can adapt their approaches to avoid these problems. (shrink)

My aim in this article is threefold: First, I wish to challenge the view put forward by A. Flew and H. L. A. Hart which has won widespread recognition, namely, that the concept of punishment entails a legal or quasi-legal system of punishment. In my view all that is necessary for a case of punishment to occur is that a person inflicts deliberately and not primarily for the sake of any beneficial consequences which may flow from his action, anything likely (...) to cause discomfort to a victim who is capable of experiencing it, provided that the person inflicting the discomfort would claim, if asked to give a reason for his action, that he is inflicting it because of something for which he holds the victim accountable. If I am right it follows that punishment is not necessarily retributive, and that utilitarian ‘punishment’ like reformative and compensatory ‘punishment’ is not true punishment, since the discomfort inflicted in these cases is merely ancillary to another end. Secondly, I hope to show that Hart does not succeed in discrediting the retributive theory, and that his treatment of punishment, though functional in aim, perpetuates the confusion between the meaning of punishment and its justification. Thirdly, I shall contend that retribution is not a proper aim of a legal system, whatever place it may actually have or ought to have in our moral code. Looking to the future, I shall venture to predict that the legal institution of punishment will sooner or later give way to a system designed to reduce crime and to rehabilitate offenders. Such a system will be adjusted to the needs of the community and of individual offenders, and will not involve the infliction of discomfort as an end. Hence, it would be wrong to call it a system of punishment. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is a case study in public health ethics. It considers whether there is a basis in ethics for political action by health professionals and their associations in response to inhumane treatment. The issue arises from Australia's treatment of asylum seekers and the charge that this treatment has been both immoral and inhumane. This judgement raises several questions of broader significance in bioethics and of significance to the emerging field of public health ethics. These questions (...) relate to the role of health professionals in response to inhumane treatment of people in their charge; to the discipline of public health in light of a growing recognition of its ethical basis; and the role of public health and bioethical associations in response to ethical issues arising in a political context. It is argued that, in serious cases of humanitarian and human rights abuses affecting health and well‐being, there is a case for political action by health professionals, academic and professional institutions, and associations of public health and ethics. (shrink)

The Laws of Armed Conflict require that war crimes be attributed to individuals who can be held responsible and be punished. Yet assigning responsibility for the actions of Lethal Autonomous Weapon...

This thesis examines some of the legal philosophical issues that are implicated in the problem of outcome luck. In the context of criminal law, the problem asks whether we should hold agents criminally liable for the consequences of their actions given that those consequences are never wholly within anyone’s control. I conclude that outcomes should matter to an agent’s liability and punishment, and I make this argument indirectly by examining some of the foundational questions in legal theory. The thesis begins (...) by considering a current trend in some areas of philosophy. This trend involves attempts to address philosophical problems surrounding luck by doing conceptual analyses on the nature of luck. Chapter 1 critically examines modal theories, which conceptualize luck, as well as the related concept of risk, in terms of close possible worlds rather than probabilistic likelihood. I argue that not only are modal theories uninformative, but conceptual analyses on luck are unhelpful in addressing philosophical questions surrounding luck. Chapter 2 then returns to the traditional notion of luck as lack of control, and focuses on the relationship between luck, risk, and culpability. Some theorists argue that culpability, for any offence, is in part a function of the degree of risk the agent imposes on others. In the context of criminal law, degrees of luck and risk can both be understood in terms of degrees of control, so the suggestion that culpability is a function of the level of risk imposed (and thus of the degree of control an agent exercises) is attractive for insulating culpability judgments from luck. However, I argue that this view is mistaken because culpability is only sensitive to risk in reckless actions, but not in purposeful actions. The problem of outcome luck may raise different questions for reckless actions and purposeful actions. Chapter 3 looks at the mens rea element of criminal attempts, which is crucial for understanding the problem of luck in the context of purposeful actions. I discuss a variation of what are sometimes referred to as impossible attempts, which have helped shape current English law. I argue that the current doctrine is largely correct, and that perhaps with the exception of few paradigm sexual offences, the mens rea element for attempts should require a direct intention as to the consequence element of an offence, and knowledge or belief as to the circumstance element of that offence. Chapters 4 and 5 then look at normative justifications of criminal punishment. In order to understand whether outcomes should matter for punishment, we must first understand whether and why punishment is an appropriate response to criminal offending. Here, I defend a communicative theory, where punishment is a communicative process between the offender, the political community, and the victim. What punishment communicates is the appropriate degree of censure that is warranted in response to the offender’s wrongdoing. And in doing this, it publicly recognizes the wrong that has been committed by the offender. Chapter 4 offers a detailed explanation of this account, and argues that the political community’s recognition of wrongdoing is a valuable aim of communication. Chapter 5 then takes up a crucial challenge against communicative theories of punishment, which is that such theories fail to take crime prevention seriously. Against this criticism, I will show that general prevention can in fact be an essential part of communicative punishment. And I will show that it is specifically the political community’s recognition of wrongdoing that entails punishment’s preventive aims. (shrink)

This paper challenges recent influential arguments which would encourage legislators and courts to give weight to an assessment of the “evaluative judgements” expressed by the emotions which motivate crimes. While accepting the claim of Kahan and Nussbaum and others that emotions, other than moods, have intentional objects , and are not mere impulses which bypass cognition, it suggests the following criticisms of their analysis. First, the concept of an emotional “evaluative judgement” tends to elide the distinction between “judgements” that are (...) merely the sense of an emotion, and do not have the character of acts, and deliberative emotional judgements that do resemble acts and so properly fall within the corrective scope of the law. Second, intentional emotions are empowered by pre–intentional psychological resources which are less amenable than intentional states to the agent's conscious supervision: The traditional recognition of “infirmity” in mitigation of crimes uncharacteristic of the criminal's overall conduct towards others is justified by the unpredictable action of these pre–intentional elements and can survive the abandonment of the mechanistic conception of emotion. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the theory of changes in perspectives allows a different presentation of the problems which arise from a loss of recognition as an element of punishment, particularly in reference to others, the entire structure of the interaction is changed. Communicative conditions of moral discourses assume that every participant of the argumentation process takes place in all spheres of social life and can assume the perspective common to all other participants. The main task (...) of criminal law is, then, the protection of elementary aspects of one’s role as a participant of interaction without which the chain of mutual recognition and understanding could be freely and at any moment infringed by any given participant of interactions, i.e. the protection of such rights. (shrink)

This paper employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to interpret ‘quiet quitting’ – the practice of limiting work efforts to contracted requirements – as a strategic response by workers facing misrecognition in their work environment. Honneth argues that misrecognition in any one of three social spheres (the family, political society, and the workplace) constitutes disrespect and causes psychological harm. While Honneth contends that experiences of disrespect tend to motivate collective “struggles for recognition,” we suggest that quiet quitters present an alternative response (...) to disrespect, individually seeking recognition in other social spheres rather than engaging in collective action. Further, we draw on Honneth to suggest that the contemporary “entrepreneurial” work ethic – the widespread expectation that workers invest emotionally in their work role – can in practice undermine workplace recognition, contributing to quiet quitters’ compensatory emphasis on recognitive relations outside of work. This recognition-theoretical approach extends current discussions around quiet quitting and yields valuable insights for management theory and practice regarding the critical role of genuine employee recognition in promoting individual well-being and meaningful work experiences. (shrink)

When engaging in a philosophical analysis of body and corporeality in a political context, it is essential to ask to what extent, under what circumstances, and in accordance with what moral norms the state performs actions that have the bodies and lives of citizens as their object. This issue was already discussed in ancient philosophy, examples of which can be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, but also in ancient jurisprudence, especially in the law and the legal doctrine (...) of ancient Rome. Aware of such a previous history of studies on this topic, this analysis will discuss the three main ways in which state power over the life and health of citizens is manifested. Namely: (i) capital punishment (ii) policing and (iii) warfare. In addition, it will be indicated, based on Thomistic philosophy, what moral norms govern these state actions. The fundamental differences between the three main state powers — judicial, police, and military — will also be shown in the context of lethal actions undertaken on their basis. (shrink)

This essay suggests that while Antony Duff's model of criminal punishment as secular penance is pregnant with possibilities for theological reception and reflection, it proceeds by way of a number of separations that are brought into question by the penitential traditions of Christianity. The first three of these—between justice and mercy, censure and invitation, and state and victim, constrain the true communicative character of his account of punishment. The second set of oppositions, between sacrament and virtue, interior character and external (...) action, and formal and moral reconciliation, subject the model of state punishment as secular penance to problematic liberal and libertarian constraints. A postsecular analogy, outlining a theology of the invitational nature of divine judgment, and drawing on Thomas Aquinas's account of penance as both sacrament and virtue, is proposed. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the question of (...) what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have documented the racial disparities of mass incarceration. In this paper we argue that, although retributivism and deterrence theory appear to be race-neutral, in the contemporary U.S. context these seemingly contrary theories function jointly to rationalize racial inequities in the criminal justice system. When people of color are culturally associated with criminality, they are perceived as both irresponsible and hyperresponsible, a paradox that reflects their status as what Charles Mills calls subpersons. Following from this paradox, criminality (...) is understood as an atemporal characteristic of people of color, such that they are conceived as pre-criminals, criminals, or post-criminals. In Frantz Fanon’s account, overdetermination expresses this exclusion of people of color from full agency by capturing them within a rigid, immutable essence, which then controls the social meaning of their actions. The backward-looking quality of retribution and the forward-looking quality of deterrence then treat people of color as more deserving of punishment (and more severe punishment) and as threats to the social order who have to be restrained. We should read the racialization of mass incarceration as a symptom of how precariously people of color participate in the social contract and as reflections of how theories of punishment have been racially deployed. (shrink)

Behavior analysis, a rapidly growing profession, began with the use and application of conditioning and learning techniques to modify the behavior of children or adults presenting severe management problems, often because of developmental disabilities. Now behavior analysts work in a variety of settings, from clinics and schools to workplaces. Especially since their practice often involves aversive stimuli or punishment, they confront many special ethical challenges. Recently, the Behavior Analysis Certification Board codified a set of ten fundamental ethical guidelines to be (...) followed by all behavior analysts and understood by all students and trainees seeking certification. This book shows readers how to follow the BACB guidelines in action. The authors first describe core ethical principles and then explain each guideline in detail, in easily comprehensible, everyday language. The text is richly illuminated by more than a hundred vivid case scenarios about which the authors pose, and later answer questions for readers. Useful appendices include the BACB Guidelines, an index to them, practice scenarios, and suggested further reading. Practitioners, instructors, supervisors, students, and trainees alike will welcome this invaluable new aid to professional development. (shrink)

I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger and its influence on action. First, I consider a prominent argument by Peter Singer and Joshua Greene. They conclude that evolutionary explanations of human cooperation debunk – or undercut the evidential value of – the moral intuitions supporting duty ethics (as opposed to utilitarian or consequentialist ethics). With this argument they aim to defend (...) consequentialist theories. However, their argument also threatens to debunk intuitions that support consequentialist theories. I give a novel argument that overcomes this difficulty. Specifically, I offer an evolutionary story about anger that can explain retributive, duty-oriented intuitions concerning punishment. This explanation debunks these intuitions (and not others) by showing that they were selected for their biological consequences rather than their accuracy (concerning duties to punish). I develop this explanation by raising and resolving three additional problems. First, prominent evolutionary explanations of retributive motives fail because they appeal to models that apply only to organisms with strategic insight. To mitigate this problem, I explain the existence of a retributive-like motive in rodents by appealing to an economic model of resource competition, which applies to organisms without strategic insight. Second, I show that human anger was shaped by resource competition of this kind. To do so, I develop evidential criteria to determine when psychological systems in different species share common evolutionary origins. I deploy these criteria to argue that human anger and the retributive motive in rodents derive from the same ancestral trait. Finally, the continuity of anger across human and nonhuman animals stands in tension with the idea that anger causes purposive behavior like retribution or retaliation. I argue that differences between the angry behaviors of human and nonhuman animals are differences in degree and not in kind. In the end, this evolutionary story both explains and undermines retributive intuitions, but not in the straightforward way that Singer and Greene suppose. (shrink)

Introduction The act of caring in nursing requires previous deliberation and decision, however this perception only arises when an ethical problem emerges. Objective: Identify ethical problems of nurses action in the area of beginning of human life Method: Exploratory and descriptive method, with a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, who were submitted to content analysis. The sample was constituted by 26 nurses. Results 18 categories of problem areas and 56 ethical problems in early human life were (...) identified. The results obtained are very diverse, including areas such as termination of pregnancy, informed consent or maintaining privacy. However, other problem areas also emerge and numerous new subcategories/ethical problems, including: dealing with miscarriage, extreme situations, minors’ pregnancy, serious malformations detected at birth, consent regarding care during childbirth, Non- identification of a ethical problem, nurse social recognition and non-involvement of the person in labour. Conclusion Nurses face different ethical problems that impact their lives. We intend to contribute in helping to make decisions in this field, which the outset is of hope and joy, but which hides, behind this evidence, countless situations of suffering for everyone involved. The identification of ethical problems in this field, it is the first step to reflect about theme and helping decision-making for nurses that are taking care in this area of beginning of human life, when confronted whit the same type of ethical problems. (shrink)

Background: Increasing interest in empirical ethics has enhanced understanding of healthcare professionals’ ethical problems and attendant decision-making. A four-stage decision-making model involving ethical attention, reasoning, intention and action offers further insights into how more than reasoning alone may contribute to decision-making.Aims: To explore how the four-stage model can increase understanding of decision-making in healthcare and describe the decision-making of an under-researched professional group.Methods: 23 purposively sampled UK community pharmacists were asked, in semi-structured interviews, to describe ethical problems in their (...) work and how they were resolved. Framework analysis of transcribed interviews utilised the four decision-making stages, together with constant comparative methods and deviant-case analysis.Results: Pharmacists were often inattentive and constructed problems in legal terms. Ethical reasoning was limited, but examples of appeals to consequences, the golden rule, religious faith and common-sense experience emerged. Ethical intention was compromised by frequent concern about legal prosecution. Ethical inaction was common, typified by pharmacists’ failure to report healthcare professionals’ bad practices, and ethical passivity emerged to describe these negative examples of the four decision-making stages. Pharmacists occasionally described more ethically active decision-making, but this often involved ethical uncertainty.Discussion: The four decision-making stages are a useful tool in considering how healthcare professionals try to resolve ethical problems in practice. They reveal processes often ignored in normative theories, and their recognition and the emergence of ethical passivity indicates the complexity of decision-making in practice. Ethical passivity may be deleterious to patients’ welfare, and concerns emerge about improving pharmacists’ ethical training and promoting ethical awareness and responsibility. (shrink)

There is increased recognition of the importance of well-designed scholarship on how immigration status and policies impact migrants in the United States, including those who are unauthorized. Some researchers have looked to community-based and participatory methods to develop trust, place migrants’ voices at the forefront, and engage collaboratively in using research as a tool for social change. This article reviews three ethical ambiguities that emerged in the process of a series of participatory action research projects with migrants in the United (...) States, many of whom were unauthorized. Specifically, three themes are discussed: the tension between the human desire to respond to injustices, and the challenges of doing so in ways that recognize one’s privilege and power as an outsider and supports the migrants’ agency and autonomy; the complex definition, explanation, and dimensions of “risk”; and the complexity of using a methodology that prioritizes participants’ collective identity and community in the context of regulations that are designed primarily to protect individuals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17.1 (2003) 73-75 [Access article in PDF] Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. Sonia Kruks. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 200. $35.00 h.c. 0-8014-3387-8; $16.95 pbk. 0-8014-8417-0. Sonia Kruks' latest book, Retrieving Experience, is a valuable contribution to ongoing debates about the relevance of feminist philosophy in a period of relative political quietism. It also offers timely (...) reminders of historical continuities between phenomenological and postmodern conceptions of subjectivity and political engagement. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, Fanon, and the later Sartre, Kruks proposes to "explore women's embodied experiences" and to "ask whether they might not offer some means to help build affective bonds among women who are in many ways radically different from one another" (6). The book approaches this task by means of two secondary issues. First, should feminist thought be oriented by phenomenological or postmodernist theoretical strategies? Second, can women's embodied experience be the conceptual basis for political and epistemological practices that avoid the pitfalls of "identity politics" or an "epistemology of provenance"? The answer to both questions comes through the notion of praxis developed in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason. By thinking of embodiment as praxis or work, a strategy implicit in Beauvoir's idea that "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." Kruks seeks to resolve the ethical affront of finding one's individuality reduced to the "generality" of a collective—the ethical affront to which feminists of various generations and theoretical persuasions must respond.Retrieving Experience explores the significance of recognition as a political norm. Identifying Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew as a pivotal work in the history of identitarian theorizing, she situates recent appeals for race- and gender-based political mobilization in the United States with respect to the dialectical relationship between the Look, shame, and recognition existentialists observed in situations of anti-Semitic and colonial domination during and immediately after the Second World War. Legitimating knowledge gained under oppressive conditions formed an important element of African, Southeast Asian, and ultimately African-American and feminist resistance to cultural imperialism. However, Kruks warns, discourses of "recognition" risk placing the blame for group domination on individuals' face-to-face interactions while concealing the role of state and economic institutions in enabling social disdain to systematically damage a group's quality of life. Moreover, they suggest that the experience of subjugation alone justifies knowledge claims or counts, without further elaboration, as an act of political engagement. Kruks argues that knowers and actors need to identify conceptual and practical mediations enabling individual interactions, experiences, and strategies to prompt the recognition and transformation of [End Page 73] group situations. Sartre's notion of praxis, she suggests, explains how an individual can participate in a collectivity while acting autonomously or acquiescing to subjection.The most important passages in Retrieving Experience examine the affective aspects of the decision to take up a political identity or engage in political action. Going beyond Sartre's account of mediations, Kruks suggests that the sensory and emotional qualities of embodiment are themselves mediators, the products of praxis as well as its vehicles. Since any act of social knowledge involves the emotions, affect plays an important role in the process whereby individuals from different cultural, economic, and bodily situations learn about and shape one another's' environment through the act of knowledge. Individuals, then, may have a moral responsibility to learn about others in a way that gives them "sympathetic bodies." Drawing on Maria Lugones' social epistemology, Kruks argues that "world-traveling" or existing simultaneously in several communities or sets of power relations is a bodily act, but also a fully cultural, ethical act rather than a natural way of being. One is not born, but becomes, an embodied knower. Understanding female embodiment as a kind of work or "world-traveling" praxis enables feminist solidarity—"respectful recognition" to replace a historically implausible "sisterhood" or a distinct epistemological perspective as a regulative ideal for feminist politics.But how far can the... (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as an extreme retributivist, but recently commentators emphasize the importance of deterrence in Kant's basic justification of punishment. Kant's combination of deterrence and retributive elements, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. To interpret Kant as merely adding retributive side-constraints to a basic deterrence aim fails to capture fully the retributive strain in Kant's thought. The basic questions are: who should be punished, how much, in what manner, and why? Kant held that all (...) and only the legally guilty ought to be punished, the legally guilty being also morally guilty, except when the legal requirement was to do something "immoral in itself." This case aside, violations of law also transgress an ethical duty to obey the law. Criminal punishments should be designed to match victims' empirically discernable losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals, which depends on their inner "will." "Punishment" is not a mere disincentive in a "price" system of social control; it has an inherent expressive function, conveying a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct in question. Understanding this together with Kant's basic theory of justice may help to explain his acceptance of ius talionis and condemnation of making exceptions for pragmatic reasons. It also accounts for the retributive "tone" of Kant's remarks, despite his insistence that public courts deal only with "external actions," not overall moral worth and character assessment. Kant wird oft als Vertreter einer extremen Vergeltungstheorie gesehen. Auf der anderen Seite betonen verschiedene Autoren in der letzten Zeit die Abschreckung als grundlegendes Element in Kants Rechtfertigung der Strafe. Ihnen gegenüber muß Kants Verknüpfung von Vergeltung und Abschreckung von anderen ähnlichen Verknüpfungen unterschieden werden, die weniger plausibel sind. Kant so zu interpretieren, als füge er zum Hauptziel der Abschreckung nur einige nebensächliche Elemente der Vergeltung hinzu, verfehlt den Vergeltungsaspekt in Kants Straftheorie. Die grundlegenden Fragen sind: Wer soll bestraft werden, wie schwer, in welcher Weise und warum? Kant war der Ansicht, daß alle, aber auch nur diejenigen bestraft werden sollen, die sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht haben. Wer sich vor dem juridischen Gesetz schuldig gemacht hat, hat sich auch moralisch schuldig gemacht, es sei denn, das vom Recht Geforderte sei etwas "an sich selbst Unmoralisches". Sieht man von diesem letzteren Fall einmal ab, dann enthält jede Übertretung des juridischen Gesetzes immer auch eine Verletzung der ethischen Pflicht, dem juridischen Gesetz zu gehorchen. Strafe sollte darauf angelegt sein, den empirisch erkennbaren Verlusten des Opfers nach Art und Ausmaß zu entsprechen, außer, wenn dies unmöglich oder erniedrigend wäre; Gerichte können die tatsächliche moralische Schuld von Verbrechern, die von ihrem inneren "Willen" abhängt, nicht messen. "Strafe" ist kein bloßes Abschreckungsmittel in einem "Preis"-System sozialer Kontrolle. Statt dessen hat sie die ganz wesentliche und ausdrückliche Funktion, die moralische Mißbilligung des jeweiligen verbrecherischen Verhaltens öffentlich zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Diese Interpretation, zusammen mit Kants grundlegender Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, kann helfen zu verstehen, warum Kant das ius talionis akzeptiert hat und warum er Ausnahmen, die aus pragmatischen Gründen gemacht werden, mißbilligt. Sie erklärt auch den "Tonfall" in Kants Äußerungen, der mir seiner Vergeltungstheorie zusammenhängt, auch wenn Kant darauf beharrt, daß staatliche Gerichte sich immer nur mit "äußeren" Handlungen befassen, nicht mit dem moralischen Wert insgesamt oder mit einer Beurteilung des Charakters einer Person. (shrink)