"Descartes is rightly considered the father of modern philosophy" - Schopenhauer "The effect of this man on his age and the new age cannot be imagined broadly enough... René Descartes is indeed the true beginner of modern philosophy, insofar as it makes thinking the principle. "- Hegel "Descartes was the first to bring to light the idea of a transcendental science, which is to contain a system of knowledge of the conditions of possibility of all knowledge." - Kant A (...) new 2023 translation directly from the original manuscripts into English of Descartes' famous work "Rules for the Direction of the Mind" (Règles pour la direction de l'esprit). This edition contains a new introduction and afterword from the translator, as well as a timeline of Descartes' life and summaries of each of his works. Here, Descartes lays out a method for approaching problems and seeking knowledge. The importance of this work lies in the fact that it established the scientific method as a way of investigating the world, and had a significant influence on the development of modern science. This work is one of the foundational texts of Western Philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Driven from Home: Protecting the Rights of Forced Migrants Edited by David Hollenbach, SJ, and: Kinship across Borders: A Christian Ethic of Immigration by Kristen HeyerRené M. Micallef SJDriven from Home: Protecting the Rights of Forced Migrants EDITED BY DAVID HOLLENBACH, SJ Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. 296 pp. $20.46Kinship across Borders: A Christian Ethic of Immigration KRISTEN HEYER Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012. 210 pp. (...) $29.23Although based on a conference held at Boston College in November 2008, Driven from Home is no less timely today, given the context of current debates on immigration in the United States, the European Union, Australia, and the Middle East. David Hollenbach’s introduction explains how the book brings together Christian (mostly Catholic) theologians, human rights activists, humanitarian practitioners, and legal scholars to help us focus on a class of persons referred to as “forced migrants” or “persons needing protection.” These individuals are neither classical “convention refugees” (according to international law definitions) nor are they simply “migrant workers” (in the classical sense) since their basic human rights to security and subsistence cannot [End Page 230] be adequately guaranteed in their home country or region. They do not emigrate merely in search of a higher standard of living; rather, forced migrants enter and settle in foreign lands seeking some sort of “protection” similar to that afforded to “conventional” refugees. More concretely, the book focuses on persons on the move—individuals fleeing violence and the extreme poverty rampant in regions devastated by ecological degradation and natural disasters.Extending the logic of the 1952 Refugee Convention and adapting it to the realities of today, one can argue convincingly that the international community has a duty to protect such persons when their states of origin are structurally unable or unwilling to afford protection (as argued in Susan Martin’s essay). However, paternalistic approaches that diminish rather than augment the agency of local governments and migrants are to be avoided (as maintained in M. Brinton Lykes’ essay). The book helps us reflect on what can be done to guarantee the basic rights of forced migrants not only at the level of international law and institutions but also through domestic and regional policymaking spurred and inspired by both Christian and secular global-humanitarian values. Such values are eminently compatible when applied to this particular issue (see Silvano Tomasi’s contribution). Agbonkhianmeghe Orobator’s essay—which offers insightful reflections (albeit rather general ones) from Christian ethics, ecclesiology, and biblical theology—likewise points to the need for a truly interdisciplinary approach to the issue. The other authors help the book achieve precisely this. Theological ethics finds its own distinctive place and voice in dialogue with a range of perspectives: legal and political sciences and case studies (Frank Brennan, Daniel Kanstroom); philosophical approaches (Arash Abizadeh); and sociological research on particular migrant populations (M. Brinton Lykes, Maryanne Loughry). The book includes essays that integrate case studies, technical reflections, useful summaries of theological principles and doctrines (J. Bryan Hehir, Mary M. DeLorey, and Tomasi), and philosophical stances (Abizadeh, Thomas G. Weiss), and present practical and legal proposals (see Martin’s essay). A stimulating read for scholars and for the general public, the volume provides good training material for faith-based activists and practitioners.The argumentation strategy in many of the essays in Driven from Home is to appeal to the reader’s sense of solidarity with the needy or suffering neighbor. It promotes the virtues of hospitable citizenship and hospitable disciple-ship while carefully trying to convince national and international policymakers to reinforce and expand the international protection regime. Emboldened by the 2005 “Responsibility to Protect” breakthrough at the United Nations, the authors seek to remain acceptable to a wide audience in an atmosphere of resurgent nationalism, nativism, and protectionism. The authors generally avoid harsh critiques of Westphalian models of sovereignty and do not dwell [End Page 231] on the Catholic doctrines of the universal destination of created goods and the (circumscribed) right to immigrate (and not only to emigrate). Rather, they seek to introduce a new protection niche without fundamentally challenging the prevailing ideology of sovereignty, gently proposing new legal instruments as though they... (shrink)

This edition features reliable, accessible translations; useful editorial materials; and a straightforward presentation of the Objections and Replies, including the objections from Caterus, Arnauld, and Hobbes, accompanied by Descartes' replies, in their entirety. The letter serving as a reply to Gassendi--in which several of Descartes' associates present Gassendi's best arguments and Descartes' replies--conveys the highlights and important issues of their notoriously extended exchange. Roger Ariew's illuminating Introduction discusses the Meditations and the intellectual environment surrounding its reception.

This bilingual edition of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is aimed both specifically at serious students and professors of philosophy, and generally at anyone motivated by a strong philosophical interest.

Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired (...) capacity. Fourth, I analyze empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data show that in order to be appropriate moral demands have to acknowledge the target's autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if they can adequately respond to the moral demands. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In social psychology, the concept of implicit attitudes has given rise to ongoing discussions that are rather philosophical. The aim of this paper is to discuss the status of implicit prejudices from a philosophical point of view. Since implicit prejudices are a special case of implicit attitudes, the discussion will be framed by a short discussion of the most central aspects concerning implicit attitudes and indirect measures. In particular, the ontological conclusions that are implied by different conceptions of implicit attitudes (...) will be scrutinized. The main question to be discussed involves whether implicit prejudices are mental states at all, or whether they are rather dispositions to behave in a certain way. This question will be discussed against the background of principles for belief ascription, which requires ascribed mental states to fulfill some specific explanatory role. We defend a conception of implicit prejudices that... (shrink)

While National Human Rights Institutions are widely regarded as particularly promising tools in the emerging transnational regime for the regulation of business and human rights, we still know little about their potential and actual contribution to this field. This article bridges the gap between business and human rights research and NHRI scholarship, proceeding in three steps: Firstly, I analyze the structural conditions for NHRIs to tackle business-related human rights abuses effectively, focusing on the key conditions of legitimacy and competences. Secondly, (...) I examine the envisaged role and functions of NHRIs in business and human rights regulation according to the Paris Principles and the UN Guiding Principles. Thirdly, I reconstruct and critically assess NHRIs’ mandates and powers to address corporate human rights abuse, based on the analysis of surveys and reports. I argue that there is a significant mismatch between the essential structural conditions for effective NHRI engagement with business and human rights, the expected contribution of NHRIs to the prevention and remedy of corporate human rights abuses, and the limitations of their mandates and powers in practice. To overcome that misalignment and unlock NHRIs’ full potential, this article proposes a reform of the Paris Principles which would provide these institutions with a robust source of international legitimacy and increase the pressure on state governments to extend their powers. (shrink)

Daß Descartes – im Anschluß an den "Discours de la méthode" (1637) und die "Meditationes de prima philosophia" (1641) – mit der Veröffentlichung der "Principia" die Zäsur setzte, die seinen Rang als erster Denker der "Philosophie der Neuzeit" begründete, ist ein Topos der Philosophiegeschichte. Uneinigkeit besteht aber bis heute unter den Biographen und Interpreten über die Frage, ob Descartes selbst sich dessen bewußt war, daß alle Aussagen bzw. Erkenntnisse über das Geschehen in der Natur notwendig hypothetisch bleiben (unter metaphysischem Aspekt) (...) und dennoch (sofern methodisch gewonnen) die Wirklichkeit treffen und berechenbar machen. Oder ob er in den "Principia" nur deshalb darauf verfiel, alle seine Aussagen über die Prinzipien der körperlichen Dinge, die sichtbare Welt und die Erde in bloß hypothetischer Form vorzutragen, um der Verfolgung durch die Inquisition zu entgehen. Diese neue, zweisprachige Ausgabe der philosophiegeschichtlich Epoche machenden Schrift bietet neben dem lateinischen Originaltext und der völlig neu erstellten, terminologischen Unterscheidungen genau Rechnung tragenden Übersetzung erstmals auch eine umfassende Erschließung der von Descartes herangezogen Quellen, d. i. der zeitgenössischen Publikationen zur Untersuchung von Naturphänomenen, die wir heute – seit Descartes – als physikalische oder naturwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen einordnen können. (shrink)

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which reflects the power of the individual positions in the network. Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution, which turns out to be (...) proportional to the well-known degree measure. We compare the β-measure and degree measure by providing characterizations, which differ only in the normalization that is used. (shrink)

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse (...) behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. (shrink)

1 contient:Les préambules ; Les observations ; Les olympiques ; Les règles pour la direction de l'esprit ; Le traité de l'homme ; Le discours de la méthode ; Le traité de la mécanique... 2 contient: Les méditations ; Les objections et les réponses ; Réponse aux instances de Gassendi ; Lettre au P. Dinet ; La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle ; Des extraits de la correspondance.3 contient:Les principes de la philosophie ; Les notae in programma (...) ; Les passions de l'âme... (shrink)

Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x (...) has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief. (shrink)

Grotius's notion of natural law is, as he himself makes clear, founded upon two demands of nature, which are to be connected with what is now known as the Stoic doctrine of appropriation. However, Grotius's understanding of the notion of natural law as a set of rules is not Stoic, but rather goes back to an interpretation that can be ascribed to Antiochus of Ascalon. By moving away from the Stoics Grotius could not only easily accommodate the Aristotelian doctrine of (...) equity, otherwise rejected by the Stoics, but he could also formulate a minimalistic interpretation of human dispositions or 'rights', in contrast to the Stoics' maximalistic understanding of these dispositions as virtues. (shrink)