The purpose of this study is to examine the statements of Ibn al-ʿArabî regarding religions and beliefs through the perspectives of William Chittick and Reza Shah-Kazemi comparatively. Even though his expressions are occasionally elaborated in the light of the theory of the religious pluralism based on Western-Christian thought, by considering the universal message of the Qur’ān Chittick and Shah-Kazemi identify these expressions with “universalism.” This universalist approach bases on the distinction between “ontological will” and “religious (...) will,” and “submission” which is the substance of the term “islam.” While Chittick and Shah-Kazemi agree on issues mostly, it is possible to see that in some sense they differ from each other in their departure points and results. From this perspective, it is going to be seen that Ibn al-ʿArabî’s expressions encompass both the divine religions and other religions which do not have a revelation. To examine Ibn al-ʿArabî’s expressions by taking into account the propositions of the religious pluralism will be helpful to comprehend his outlook on the Qur’ān and the Prophet Muhammad. (shrink)

BackgroundCognitive impairments are prevalent in patients with unipolar and bipolar depressive disorder. Considering the fact assessing cognitive functions is increasingly feasible for clinicians and researchers, targeting these problems in treatment and using them at baseline as predictors of response to treatment can be very informative.MethodIn a naturalistic, retrospective study, data from 120 patients with UDD and BDD were analyzed. Patients received 20 sessions of bilateral rTMS and were assessed regarding their depressive symptoms, sustained attention, working memory, and executive functions, using (...) the Beck Depression Inventory and Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery Cambridge, at baseline and after the end of rTMS treatment course. Generalized estimating equations and logistic regression were used as the main statistical methods to test the hypotheses.ResultsFifty-three percentage of all patients responded to treatment. In particular, 53.1% of UDD patients and 46.9% of BDD patients responded to treatment. Bilateral rTMS improved all cognitive functions except for visual memory and resulted in more modulations in the working memory of UDD compared to BDD patients. More improvements in working memory were observed in responded patients and visual memory, age, and sex were determined as treatment response predictors. Working memory, visual memory, and age were identified as treatment response predictors in BDD and UDD patients, respectively.ConclusionBilateral rTMS improved cold cognition and depressive symptoms in UDD and BDD patients, possibly by altering cognitive control mechanisms, and processing negative emotional bias. (shrink)

_Keys to the Sciences (Maqālid al-ʿulūm)_ contains the definitions of Arabic technical terms in twenty-one sciences. Written by an unknown author, the work was dedicated to Shāh Shujāʿ, who reigned Shiraz and its neighbouring region in the 8th/14th century.

The iconic building was designed by American architects–Benjamin Brown and Spero Daltas–who set up shop in Tehran in 1957 during the rule of King Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979). The Shah had made it his mission to construct in Iran a “great civilisation”. To do so, Tehran had to become a modern globalised city, with vast avenues and planned design.

A superstitious reading of the world based on religion may be harmless at a private level, yet employed as a political tool it can have more sinister implications. As this fascinating book by Ali Rahnema, a distinguished Iranian intellectual, relates, superstition and mystical beliefs have endured and influenced ideology and political strategy in Iran from the founding of the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century to the present day. As Rahnema demonstrates through a close reading of the Persian sources and (...) with examples from contemporary Iranian politics, it is this supposed connectedness to the hidden world that has allowed leaders such as Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mahmud Ahmadinejad to present themselves and their entourage as representatives of the divine, and their rivals as the embodiment of evil. (shrink)

Depuis le début du XXe siècle, se sont succédé en Iran quatre générations d’intellectuels. La première a vu officiellement le jour sous la Révolution constitutionnelle, et se réclamait d’un pluralisme politique entretenant des relations ambiguës avec l’islam. La seconde, sous Réza Shah, dans les années 1930 et 1940, se réclamait du nationalisme ou du marxisme, l’islam étant marginal dans leur horizon intellectuel. La troisième génération, à partir des années 1960, revient à l’islam et y puise les ressources pour lutter (...) contre l’autocratie du chah et l’impérialisme occidental. L’islamo-marxisme en est la conséquence pour la grande majorité d’entre eux. Enfin, après la Révolution islamique s’ouvre, dans les années 1990, une nouvelle période où les intellectuels « religieux » présentent une version pluraliste de l’islam qui remet en cause la théocratie islamique au nom d’un islam spirituel ou qui laisse le champ politique à la société. Cette nouvelle version de l’islam remet en cause le gouvernement du Jurisconsulte Islamique sur lequel est fondée la République Islamique d’Iran. L’opposition intellectuelle au pouvoir se décline désormais pour la première fois de manière explicite à partir d’une vision qui entend concilier islam et démocratie.Since the early 20th century, four generations of intellectuals have followed each other in Iran. The first was officially born in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution. It was based on a political pluralism maintaining ambiguous relations with Islam. The second, under the rule of Reza Shah, in the 1930s and 1940s, combines nationalism and marxism, Islam being of marginal interest at the time. The third generation, after the 1960s, reverts to Islam, in which it finds the intellectual weapons against the despotism of the monarch and Western imperialism. As a result, a combination of Islam and marxism defines their intellectual horizon. Eventually, after the Islamic Revolution, in the 1990s, a new period sets in, in which the « religious intellectuals » work out a pluralist version of Islam that questions Islamic theocracy in the name of a spiritual Islam or a religion that does not impose its views on the political arena. This new version of islam puts into question the Government of the Islamic Jurist upon which the Islamic Republic in Iran is based. From now on, the intellectual opposition to the government expresses itself from a perspective that intends to reconcile Islam and democracy. (shrink)

As a result of the successful religious policy of the Great Leader, the preserved traditions of tolerance, restored historical-religious, architectural monuments, rich art and literature of our people are our greatest contribution to world culture and our most valuable heritage for future generations. There is no doubt that the Azerbaijani people will remain in history as the owner of this heritage, Heydar Aliyev as its protector, and the Heydar Aliyev Foundation as its patron and promoter. In recent years, many religious (...) monuments, including Mohsun Salim and Imam Reza mosques in Bina settlement of Azizbayov district, Shah Abbas and Hazrat Zeynab mosques in Ganja city, Juma mosque in Buzovna settlement, Pir Hasan shrine in Mardakan settlement, were repaired and restored. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative (...) judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.RÉSUMÉDans une série d'articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen et Nick Zangwill font valoir que, puisque les jugements d'attribution d'attitude propositionnelle ne se comportent pas comme des jugements normatifs en étant soumis à la survenance normative a priori et à la contrainte du Parce que, les AP ne peuvent être constitutivement normatives. Je soutiens que, pour une version spécifique du normativisme, selon laquelle les AP sont des engagements normatifs, ces arguments échouent. À cette fin, je soutiens d'abord que les engagements et les obligations devraient être séparés. Ensuite, je démontre que les intuitions qui régiraient prétendument tous les jugements normatifs ne prétendent même pas s'appliquer aux jugements attributifs d'un engagement. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed (...) in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity. (shrink)

In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well exp...

Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is (...) shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists. (shrink)

The current study aimed to explore effective strategies for preventing cheating in online examinations by surveying students to determine their cheating strategies. A total of 406 Iranian students at BA, MA, and PhD levels in four programs, including English language teaching, English literature, Linguistics, and English language translation, participated in this study using a convenient sampling technique. The sample was drawn from 83 universities across all 31 provinces of Iran. The researchers developed a 30-item questionnaire and a 4-item interview to (...) collect data. The results revealed that searching in PDFs and using social media groups were the most commonly used cheating strategies. To prevent this form of academic dishonesty, teachers used various strategies, the most effective being the use of conceptual questions and one-by-one oral exams with turned-on webcams. The main reason for students to cheat was their desire to perform better. The implications of this study are relevant for educational stakeholders, particularly teachers, and students, in promoting academic integrity. (shrink)

That it can explain the phenomenon of transparency, namely the fact that if you resolve whether p, you have thereby resolved whether to believe that p, was originally put forward as a great virtue of normativist conceptions of belief. However, non-normativists have convincingly shown that the permissive version of the truth norm of belief, which is one of the most plausible and promising versions of it, cannot in fact accommodate this phenomenon. Alarmed by this situation, in this paper I re-assess (...) the transparency phenomenon and its relation to different versions of the truth norm of belief. I argue that, contrary to how it appears, it is not even clear that the most tenable injunctive versions of the truth norm explain this phenomenon. I then argue that the transparency phenomenon consists of two distinct aspects which should be, but have not been, distinguished. What I call the ‘question-shifting’ aspect is explained by the truth norm, irrespective of how it is formulated, while what I call the ‘answer-shifting’ aspect is explanatorily empty and does not require any explanation, be it normative or otherwise. Therefore, understood properly, explaining transparency does remain a strength of normativist accounts of belief, and has no implications for which particular formulation of the truth norm we may adopt. (shrink)

Scientific study of dreams requires the most objective methods to reliably analyze dream content. In this context, artificial intelligence should prove useful for an automatic and non subjective scoring technique. Past research has utilized word search and emotional affiliation methods, to model and automatically match human judges’ scoring of dream report’s negative emotional tone. The current study added word associations to improve the model’s accuracy. Word associations were established using words’ frequency of co-occurrence with their defining words as found in (...) a dictionary and an encyclopedia. It was hypothesized that this addition would facilitate the machine learning model and improve its predictability beyond those of previous models. With a sample of 458 dreams, this model demonstrated an improvement in accuracy from 59% to 63% on the negative emotional tone scale, and for the first time reached an accuracy of 77% on the positive scale. (shrink)

Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...) that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)

Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.

In a recent paper in this journal, Ulf Hlobil has argued for an account of deontic notions in terms of good reasoning. He suggests that we should first explain permissibility in terms of good practical inference and we can then explain other deontic notions based on it. I argue that this specific way of explaining deontic notions by good reasoning is unmotivated and also leads to implausible consequences. I also show that if we instead start by explaining obligation in terms (...) of good reasoning and then explain other deontic notions based on it, these problems vanish. (shrink)

Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: God’s commands are never morally wrong, God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition tend to appeal to epistemic (...) failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained. (shrink)

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

This important and comprehensive work of 18th-century Islamic religious thought written in Arabic by a pre-eminent South Asian scholar provides an extensive and detailed picture of Muslim theology and interpretive strategies on the eve of the modern period.

An inventory of his entire oeuvre provides detailed information on the extant manuscripts. The volume furthermore includes editions of nine of his writings.

When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...) a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. (shrink)

What could Wittgenstein's body of texts contribute to the rapidly growing literature on life's meaning? This book not only examines Wittgenstein's scattered remarks about value and 'sense of life' but also argues that his philosophy and his 'way of seeing' has far reaching implications for the way current strands in the literature (naturalism, supernaturalism, and nihilism) approach the question of life's meaning. Hosseini argues that Wittgenstein's method of doing philosophy would suggest that the focus should be shifted from finding the (...) metaphysical and theoretical conditions of a meaningful life to an anthropological observation of the ways we enquire about life's meaning. Some of the ideas that Hosseini explores and examines are the relation between meaning in life and 'world-picture', the precedence of life over the intentional pursuit of meaning, the absence of doubt in everyday life, the rejection of theoretical dichotomy between the great and ordinary meaning, and the confessional nature of our enquiry into life's meaning. (shrink)

In his Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams puts forward a theistic framework for ethics according to which finite objects of value become good through resembling God who is the infinite Good and is the source and criterion of goodness. One question that immediately arises regarding this theory is whether any resemblance to God is sufficient for goodness or not. Adams’ answer to this question is negative. He puts forward further qualifications that resemblances to God have to meet so that (...) they can constitute goodness in finite objects of value. In his God and Moral Law, Mark Murphy objects to these qualifications as inadequate for addressing the sufficiency question and puts forward his own suggestion as to how Adams’ theory has to be amended. In this paper I will first argue that Murphy’s suggestion for fixing the goodness as Godlikeness thesis is not an alternative to Adams’ proposed qualifications on resemblances to God and is best understood as an insightful interpretation and elaboration of Adams’ proposed qualifications. I will then show that as it stands, Murphy’s suggestion is not up to this task and itself is in need of reconstruction. Drawing on Judith Thomson’s discussions of goodness and virtue in her book Normativity, I will try to reconstruct Murphy’s suggestion and come up with an interpretation of Adams’ goodness as Godlikeness thesis that is more elaborate, informative, and plausible than Adams’ original formulation. (shrink)

The field of socio-legal research has encountered three fundamental challenges over the last three decades - it has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to legal doctrine, for failing to develop a sound theoretical foundation and for not keeping pace with the effects of the increasing globalization and internationalization of law, state and society. This book examines these three challenges from a methodological standpoint. It addresses the first two by demonstrating that legal sociology has much to say about justice as (...) a kind of social experience and has always engaged theoretically with forms of normativity, albeit on its own empirical terms rather than on legal theory's analytical terms. The book then explores the third challenge, a result of the changing nature of society, by highlighting the move from the industrial relations of early modernity to the post-industrial conditions of late modernity, an age dominated by information technology. It poses the question whether socio-legal research has sufficiently reassessed its own theoretical premises regarding the relationship between law, state and society, so as to grasp the new social and cultural forms of organization specific to the twenty-first century's global societies. (shrink)

Islam politik sejak peristiwa 11 September 2001 telah menjadi trend dalam wacana Islam kontemporer dan menjadi tema utama dalam ruang-ruang diskusi baik formal maupun informal. Tumpukan wacana Islam politik menyebabkan minimnya pemahaman atas historisitas yang panjang dari islamisme. Padahal dalam historisitas tersebut akan terlihat bahwa banyak pemikir-pemikir Muslim, selain Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rasyid Ridha dan seterusnya, yang memikirkan tentang Islam politik. Salah satunya adalah Tan Malaka. Artikel ini mengkaji pemikiran Tan Malaka dalam konteks Islam politik. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode (...) penelitian filsafat dengan teknik studi historis-faktual tokoh yang berfokus pada pemikiran salah seorang filsuf atau tokoh, baik pada topik tertentu dalam karyanya, maupun dalam seluruh karyanya. Di samping itu juga digunakan konsep eksternalisasi sebagai pendekatan analisis. Hasilnya adalah bahwa Tan Malaka memikirkan Islam Politik dalam konteks gerakan Pan-Islamisme. Pan-Islamisme merupakan gerakan mempersatukan umat muslim di seluruh dunia untuk perjuangan kemerdekaan dari kolonialisme. Namun untuk mempersatukan umat Muslim diperlukan penyelesaian terhadap problem mistik dominasi kapitalisme. Tan Malaka mengatakan bahwa jika ingin mempersatukan umat muslim di dunia, maka harus melawan kapital dunia. (shrink)

In recent years, the non-relativistic quantum dynamics derived from three assumptions; probability current conservation, average energy conservation, and an epistemic momentum uncertainty. Here we show that, these assumptions can be derived from a natural extension of classical statistical mechanics.

This study examines the sequential and situated organization associated with framing locational formulations by dislocated parties to mobile phone calls for the joint accomplishment of location-related social action. The data come from 22 mundane Farsi mobile phone calls involving location inquiring and/or reporting. The analysis of the data, informed by conversational analysis and Levinson’s conceptual framework of perspective-taking, adds frame of reference to Schegloff’s location, membership, and topic or activity analyses operative in the selection of locational formulations. The trajectory plotted (...) for location-related action indicates the contingent roles which material, linguistic and semiotic resources play in the selection of locational formulations deployed for co-presence purposes. The findings suggest consequentiality of the-relevant-next action for the framing of locational descriptions and provide insight into how conversationalists interact with their physical environment in a wider social context. (shrink)

I develop and defend a novel norm-based explanation of Moore’s paradox in thought, according to which the sheer absurdity we intuitively feel in judging an instance of Moore’s paradox stems from violating the constitutive norm of belief inexplicably, i.e., in a way that cannot be made sense of through the categories of mistake, ignorance, cheating, akrasia, and flouting. I highlight the ways my explanation is different from other normative proposals and argue that this explanation is not subject to the problems (...) that beset other normative explanations of Moore’s paradox. The normative explanation of Moore’s paradox proposed here can also shed light on absurdity in norm-constituted practices in general. (shrink)

Visual masking of primes lowers prime visibility but spares processing of primes as reflected in prime–target congruence and prime–response compatibility effects. However, the question is how to appropriately measure prime visibility. Here, we tested the influence of three procedural variables on prime visibility measures: prime–target similarity, prime–response similarity, and the variability of prime–response mappings. Our results show that a low prime–target similarity is a favorable condition for a prime visibility measure because it increases the sensitivity of this measure in comparison (...) to a high prime–target similarity. (shrink)

The creation of the human being is an issue that has arisen from time to time in both Western and Eastern philosophy. Does the human soul have an eternal preexistence, or was it, just like the body, created at a point in time? If created at a point in time, does the soul join the body as a created but incorporeal existence or does it join the body as a physical thing that changes into an incorporeal existence? Finally, does God (...) produce the human soul instantaneously? The present essay is a comparative investigation of the views of Thomas Aquinas and Mullā Ṣadrā on this topic.In his writings Thomas treated the problem of the creation of the human being from both philosophical and theological perspectives. His .. (shrink)

Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation is among the notable contributions made to mainstream jurisprudence in the last three decades. Remaining true to its rational discursive mission, it engages with both analytical positivism and natural law theories. A recent collection of essays edited by George Pavlakos explores Alexy’s theory from a number of philosophical standpoints, revealing its theoretical potential and flaws. By doing so, this volume helps us to gain a better understanding of the implications of Alexy’s theory of legal (...) argumentation, but also to identify new areas of research within the discourse theory of law. Although this collection is concerned with a critical examination of various aspects of Alexy’s work, it nonetheless draws attention to the dual characteristics of positive law, that is, the problematic separation of facts from values, law from morality, legal certainty from justice, which continue to preoccupy legal theory. In what follows I shall attempt to examine the debate between Alexy and the contributors to Pavlakos’s volume in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of dichotomies in legal theory. Part 1 starts by explaining the theoretical background against which I have read the debate on Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I have explored the role of dichotomies in socio-legal research elsewhere. However, in the following pages, I shall use Alan Norrie’s critical examination of antinomies to throw light on some of the shortcomings of Alexy’s theory and also to discuss the concerns of mainstream jurisprudence. In that sense, this essay presents both Norrie’s and Alexy’s works, using the former to critically assess the latter. In Part 2, I briefly sketch the layout of Pavlakos’s collection to provide an overview of the type of questions that are discussed by the various contributors. Parts 3 and 4 bring into focus two issues that loom large in the collection. The first issue is Alexy’s central thesis on law’s claim to correctness, while the second concerns the duality of law exemplified by the attempts of mainstream jurisprudence to cope with the tension between the positivist notion of law and the idea of justice. In Part 5, I conclude the essay by reflecting on some of the implications of Alexy’s thesis. (shrink)