Semantic and soritical paradoxes display remarkable family resemblances. For one thing, several non-classical logics have been independently applied to both kinds of paradoxes. For another, revenge paradoxes and higher-order vagueness—among the most serious problems targeting solutions to semantic and soritical paradoxes—exhibit a rather similar dynamics. Some authors have taken these facts to suggest that truth and vagueness require a unified logical framework, or perhaps that the truth predicate is itself vague. However, a common core of semantic and soritical paradoxes has (...) not been identified yet, and no explanation of their relationships has been provided. Here we aim at filling this lacuna, in the framework of many-valued logics. We provide a unified diagnosis of semantic and soritical paradoxes, identifying their source in a general form of indiscernibility. We then develop our diagnosis into a theory of paradoxicality, which formalizes both semantic and soritical paradoxes as arguments involving specific instances of our generalized indiscernibility principle, and correctly predicts which logics can non-trivially solve them. (shrink)

The semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness display remarkable family resemblances. In particular, the same non-classical logics have been applied to both kinds of paradoxes. These facts have been taken by some authors to suggest that truth and vagueness require a unified logical framework. Some authors go further, and argue that truth is itself a vague or indeterminate concept. Importantly, however, there currently is no identification of what the common features of semantic and soritical paradoxes exactly consist in. This (...) is what we aim to do in this work: we analyze semantic and soritical paradoxes, and develop our analysis into a theory of paradoxicality. The unification of the paradoxes of truth and vagueness we propose here has a wide scope, but for the sake of concreteness we focus on four three-valued logics. (shrink)

The use of assistance systems aimed at reducing road fatalities is spreading, especially for car drivers, but less effort has been devoted to developing and testing similar systems for powered two-wheelers. Considering that over speeding represents one of the main causal factors in road crashes and that riders are more vulnerable than drivers, in the present study we investigated the effectiveness of an assistance system which signaled speed limit violations during a simulated moped-driving task, in optimal and poor visibility conditions. (...) Participants performed four conditions of simulated riding: one baseline condition without Feedback, one Fog condition in which visual feedback was provided so as to indicate to the participants when a speed limit was exceeded, and two post-Feedback conditions with and without Fog, respectively, in which no feedback was delivered. Results showed that participants make fewer speeding violations when the feedback is not provided, after 1 month, and regardless of the visibility condition. Finally, the feedback has been proven effective in reducing speed violations in participants with an aggressive riding style, as measured in the baseline session. (shrink)

Introduzione di Pietro Rossi - Bobbio e il diritto di Gustavo Zagrebelsky - Bobbio e la politica di Massimo L. Salvadori - La teoria generale del diritto di Riccardo Guastini - La teoria generale della politica. Per la ricostruzione del "modello bobbiano" di Michelangelo Bovero - Realismo politico e dottrina dello Stato di Pier Paolo Portinaro - Le relazioni tra gli Stati di Luigi Bonanate - Gli autori - Indice dei nomi.

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate (...) normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the family business as an organizational entity and as a proprietary form useful to transmit personal values and company assets to the next generations. This paper aims to introduce the legal instruments in Italy to transfer family businesses and to evaluate how these are useful for ensuring not only the survival of the company in the market but also that family values and characteristics pass from one generation to the next maintaining a prosocial humanistic management perspective. The (...) legal status of the family business and the fact that most small- and medium-sized companies in Italy are not listed, which considerably affects disclosure obligations and makes it more challenging to get consistent and reliable information at affordable costs, has to date limited research on this model. In recent years, given their growth in size and market share, the strategic potential of family businesses was recognized by both academics and practitioners, giving rise to further study. A primary goal of a family business is to maintain its competitive advantage in the market and pass down its values in the succession line. Hence, one of the most important themes on which scholars focused has been how this process takes place to ensure continuity. This paper argues that the trust and the family pact are both valid legal instruments to this end, albeit with different advantages depending on the circumstances surrounding the succession. (shrink)

Revenge arguments purport to show that any proposed solution to the semantic paradoxes generates new paradoxes that prove that solution to be inadequate. In this paper, I focus on revenge arguments that employ the model-theoretic semantics of a target theory and I argue, contra the current revenge-theoretic wisdom, that they can constitute genuine expressive limitations. I consider the anti-revenge strategy elaborated by Field and argue that it does not offer a way out of the revenge problem. More generally, I argue (...) that the difference between ‘standard’ and ‘revenge’ paradoxes is ill-conceived and should be abandoned. This will contribute to show that the theories that provide a uniform account of truth and other semantic notions are the ones best equipped to avoid the paradoxes altogether—‘standard’ and ‘revenge’ alike. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's (2008) fitting-attitude analysis of value relations, two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to strictly prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite strict preference. Rabinowicz’s account is subject, however, to one important objection: if strict preferences involve betterness judgements, then his analysis contrasts with the intuitive understanding of parity. In this paper, I examine Rabinowicz’s three responses to this objection and argue that they do not (...) succeed. I then propose an alternative solution. I argue that the objection can be avoided if we ‘relativize’ Rabinowicz’s account and define parity in terms of opposite strict preferences between two items that are only relatively permissible, rather than permissible simpliciter. I argue that this account of parity can be defended if we take seriously the distinction between sufficient and decisive reason for a preference relation. I also show that, on the basis of this distinction, we can arrive at a more extensive taxonomy of value relations than the one proposed by Rabinowicz. (shrink)

In this essay we criticise Rainer Forst's attempt to draw a connection between power and justification, and thus ground his normative theory of a right to justification. Forst draws this connection primarily conceptually, though we will also consider whether a normative connection may be drawn within his framework. Forst's key insight is that if we understand power as operating by furnishing those subjected to it with reasons, then we create a space for the normative contestation of any exercise of power. (...) He calls this the noumenal understanding of power. Against the conceptual connection between power and justification, we argue that (i) on most plausible accounts of political freedom, some freedom-restrictions commonly attributed to the successful exercise of power would perplexingly count as failures of power on Forst's view, and that (ii) on the most plausible account of reason-recognition, namely an appropriateness of response account, a justification relation is only a sufficient but not necessary condition for recognition. Against the normative connection, we argue that (iii) Forst can establish the existence of a right to justification only if he reconsiders the transcendental aspirations of his theory. (shrink)

‘Attempted negligence’ is a category of criminal offense that many jurists and philosophers have law have deemed conceptually incoherent. In his Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Gideon Yaffe challenges this dismissal, anchoring his argument in cases of what he calls ‘mental self-management’ in which agents plan to bring about that they perform unintentional actions at a later time. He plausibly argues that mental self-management-type attempted negligence is possible. However, his account raises the question whether such (...) attempts can be successful: whether, in other words, attempts to perform unintentional actions at a later time could issue in actions that are, indeed, unintentional. Intuitively, at least, it would seem that we should answer in the affirmative. However, that answer poses problems for a plausible and widely-held account of intentional action. Al Mele, responding to Yaffe’s account, has pointed out this problem without, I think, providing a satisfactory resolution. I propose another way of vindicating the possibility of successful attempted negligence with small, if significant, revision to the standard view of intentional action. In these cases, I argue, agents fail to act intentionally because they render themselves, through their acts of self-management, unaware that they are successfully executing their intentions. Moreover, I argue that these agents’ intentions to bring about that they perform unintentional actions do not commit them to acting intentionally because of the nature of intentions to bring about actions. I offer an account of the intention to bring about that one A’s and defend it against some objections. (shrink)

The “center” is a key concept in early Chinese philosophy. While readings of the Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 often rely on concepts of “nature” and the “natural”, this article proposes the “center” as an interpretive key that informs discussion of contemporary issues while remaining faithful to the core concerns of the texts. While both texts use the “center” to promote a philosophy of moderation, in the Laozi, “holding to the center” (shou zhong 守中) refers to a focus on one’s (...) inner center to counteract the dangers of the external, whereas the Zhuangzi speaks of a centeredness between inner cultivation and outward socialization. In the Laozi, we examine images of one-, two- and three-dimensional centers as well as the bodily practice of focusing on the inner stomach rather than the outward-looking eyes. Our discussion of the Zhuangzi focuses on occupying the “center” (zhongyang 中央) between extreme inward and outward modes of being. The result is a philosophy of moderation that fosters a sense of humility, balance, and impartiality, cautioning against a drive for overreaching solutions for all humanity, and tempering attempts to conform to extreme “naturalness” or reject all “artificiality”. (shrink)

Il existe un lien intuitif entre le bien-être et le bonheur. Nous souhaitons proposer une nouvelle théorie selon laquelle le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié. Notre théorie peut être considérée comme la combinaison de quatre thèses. La première thèse est que le bonheur psychologique consiste en une balance largement positive d’états affectifs tels que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels. La seconde est que les émotions, les humeurs et les plaisirs sensoriels sont différents types d’expériences perceptuelles de (...) propriétés évaluatives. Il s’ensuit que le bonheur consiste en une balance largement positive d’expériences perceptuelles de propriétés évaluatives. La troisième thèse est que, dans la mesure où le bonheur est constitué par des états qui ont des conditions d’adéquation, alors le bonheur aussi peut être évalué comme étant approprié ou inapproprié. La quatrième thèse est une thèse concernant le bien-être : elle affirme que le bien-être consiste en un bonheur approprié ainsi défini. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value, it is possible to analyse both standard and non-standard value relations in terms of the standard preference relations and two levels of normativity. In a recent article, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz's analysis violates a principle of value–preference symmetry, according to which for any value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation. Gustafsson has proposed an alternative analysis which respects this principle and which allegedly accounts for the idea that (...) originally motivated Rabinowicz's analysis, namely, that in some cases different preference relations between a pair of items are equally permissible. The goal of my article is to show that the arguments offered by Gustafsson in favour of his account do not succeed. In particular, I argue that Gustafsson faces a dilemma: either he abandons the principle of value–preference symmetry or he cannot make conceptual room for multiple permissible preferences. (shrink)

Taking hints from the Italian writer and comedian Paolo Villaggio’s works having the unlucky-to-the-utmost accountant Fantozzi as their hero, the essay tackles the issue of the role, and the possible foundations, of the law in the theoretical scenario of a perfectly deterministic world, where everything is determined by pre-set nexuses of cause-and-effect. Fantozzi is condemned by such an inescapable law of causation (Fate) to meet constant failure, in a social context structured along stiff hierarchies which are completely independent from individual (...) merits, where law enforcement always sides with the lucky ones. Within such a context, the law cannot be grounded on rational foundations-thinking, since the only possible rational conclusion is that the law is completely useless. At the same time, the law cannot be considered an outcome of power, since any power different from that of Fate is mere illusion. The essay wonders whether, in such a theoretical setting, there is the possibility of finding an alternative foundation for the law on non-objectifying thinking, starting from imagination and the idea of justice. Is it possible to imagine reliable rules based on imagination? (shrink)

Esta pesquisa propõe refletir sobre as políticas de isolamento social, decorrentes do quadro de Emergência de Saúde Pública de Importância Internacional causado pela pandemia do COVID-19, como formas capazes de implicar em um controle social mais intenso a um grupo social específico. Parte-se do pressuposto de que processos de criminalização não necessariamente alcançam os comportamentos mais agressivos, pois o que determina a criminalização é uma correlação de forças políticas e econômicas. Utiliza-se a metodologia dialógica, que busca a construção de conhecimento (...) compartilhado por meio do uso de fontes interdisciplinares do saber, a proposta desta pesquisa é analisar a medida de isolamento social a partir de discussões entre a biopolítica e a criminologia crítica, refletindo sobre a quem é endereçada a proteção do isolamento social e uma eventual criminalização do descumprimento das medidas públicas. (shrink)

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

L’acquisition des pronoms chez les enfants à développement langagier typique est complexe car elle combine de nombreux paramètres, notamment une capacité d’abstraction. Dans une première partie, ces paramètres sont décrits en rapport avec les trajectoires d’apprentissage mises en évidence par la littérature. La seconde partie est consacrée aux difficultés que pose l’acquisition des pronoms chez des enfants à développement langagier atypique, pour des raisons de troubles spécifiques du langage ou de surdité profonde.

LA CRITIQUE PAR RAMSEY EN 1926 DE LA THESE DU DUALISME DES CONSTITUANTS DE LA PROPOSITION CONSTITUE UNE DES MANIFESTATIONS LES PLUS IMPORTANTES DE L'EBRANLEMENT DE LA CONSEPTION STANDARD ASSOCIANT LE DUALISME ONTOLOGIQUE (PARTICULIERS ET UNIVERSELS), LA DICHOTOMIE DES CONSTITUANTS DE LA PROPOSITION ET LA DISTINCTION METAPHYSIQUE ENTRE SUBSTANCE ET QUALITES. LA CRITIQUE DE LA NOTION DE SUBSTANCE AMORCEE AVEC L'EMPIRISME, NOTAMMENT CHEZ HUME, VA TROUVER DANS LA THEORIE DE LA RELATIVITE DE NOUVELLES JUSTIFICATIONS, ET L'EFFONDREMENT DE LA NOTION DE (...) SUBSTANCE VA METTRE EN CAUSE LA CONCEPTION STANDARD. LE DUALISME ONTOLOGIQUE SEMBLE SURVIVRE A CES ATTAQUES MAIS AU PRIX D'UN COMPLET REAMENAGEMENT CONCEPTUEL. LA SUBSTANCE CEDE LA PLACE A L'EVENEMENT COMME PARADIGME DES PARTICULIERS. (shrink)

A scoping review was conducted to explore the metaphors and related expressions older adults use to describe extremely stressful events that may lead to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Complex PTSD (CPTSD), Prolonged Grief Disorder (PGD), or Adjustment Disorder (AjD). Relevant databases from psychology, gerontology, and related fields were searched. In addition, relevant references found in included papers were considered. Inclusion criteria were: qualitative study, sample of older adults (age 65+), and focus on maladaptive rather than adaptive psychological aspects. Eleven studies (...) focusing on PTSD, 5 on CPTSD, 13 on PGD, and 10 on AjD were included. Metaphors and other expressions related to extremely stressful events were then extracted and analyzed. Multiple linguistic expressions to describe extremely stressful events and stress-related symptoms were identified. Metaphors and related expressions often referred to the body and the theme of moving on with one’s life. (shrink)

The term “modernity” is used to refer to the cultural component of modernization, which encompasses also the political component (state formation) and economic component (capitalism). Historical analysis shows that in the phases of merchant and Dutch capitalism the dominant culture provided a religious justification and stimulus to capitalism, the Scottish philosophers provided an ethical framework based on human sentiments, especially empathy. With the secularization and turbulence of the 19th century a series of cultural critiques of the capitalist system emerged in (...) the form of “modernism”, “postmodernism” and finally “global civil society”. Presently, we experience a hiatus between certain counter-cultural movements and the capitalist system as well as an ideological divide and a political impasse between social policy concerns and capitalist priorities. A human-centered cultural framework is proposed to serve as a tool for “civil society” to formulate societally agreed guidelines of political economy. (shrink)