In her important work, Hasidism as Mysticism: Quietistic Elements in Eighteenth Century Hasidic Thought, the late Rivkah Schatz-Uffenheimer depicted early eighteenth-century Hasidism as a movement with pronounced ‘quietist tendencies’. In this paper I raise several difficulties with this thesis. These follow from social-activist features of early Hasidism as well as from a selection from the writings of leading early Hasidic masters. I conclude that a major stream of thought in early Hasidim was not quietist in tendency. Finally, I (...) compare the intentions of the masters I cite to some non-quietist themes in Eastern mystical thought. (Published Online July 10 2006). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Thomas Aquinas’s Two Approaches to Female RationalityElisabeth Uffenheimer-LippensAlthough the female human being was never at the center of his daily and intellectual attention, Thomas Aquinas as a religious thinker had no choice but to consider her in a wide range of different contexts. She is found in theoretical-speculative discussions (about creation, original sin and its punishment, resurrection) and in more practical ones (about marriage, reproduction, ordination of (...) women, women as teachers, as witnesses). Thomas’s ideas about the female human being have been investigated by theologians, philosophers, and historians. Often, but not always, the research has been inspired and even distorted by one form or another of feminism.In this article I shall not discuss all the different aspects of the topic “woman” as they can be found in Thomas’s works, but limit myself to one of them, namely, his understanding of female rationality. I have become intrigued by the fact that he thought about the rationality of woman in two different ways which he never integrated or explicitly connected. In the majority of his texts Thomas describes woman’s rationality as “inferior” in comparison to the “superior” male rationality. This justifies her subordination to the male human being and is expressed in her inability to control her passions. There are, however, other texts in which Thomas discusses the human mind in general, without specifying whether he means the mind of the male or the female human being. He recognizes in the human mind two aspects or functions of rationality, namely, a ratio superior which he labels symbolically “masculine” and a ratio inferior which he calls “feminine.” The meaning of this is [End Page 191] that woman’s rationality is not of an inferior kind, but includes both aspects of rationality.The thesis underlying this article is that not enough attention has been paid to the fact that two fundamentally different ways of understanding female rationality can be found in the work of Thomas Aquinas. His symbolic use of male and female has too often been confused with what one could call the “real” relationship between man and woman. The aim of this article is to present these two different understandings in Thomas, without making any detailed attempt to trace their historical origins. In addition, I want to show the new perspectives that are opened up by his second approach.The first part of this article will focus on the “inferior rationality” of women and try to understand what is meant by inferiority. The discussion will develop around an analysis of the words mollis and mollities. This will lead me to the relationship between inferior rationality and bodily weakness on the one hand, and between inferior rationality and the passions on the other hand. The practical consequences of woman’s inferior rationality shall also be treated. The second part of this article will focus on the human mind, and on the difference between ratio inferior and ratio superior. The definition of these two functions of human rationality will be followed by an analysis of texts where Thomas describes original sin as a paradigm for concrete sin, and where he connects ratio inferior to woman/feminine and ratio superior to man/male. The discussion will be completed by a study of the relationship between the ratio inferior and the vis cogitativa. This will allow me to bring out the importance of this second understanding of female rationality.I. Woman’s Inferior RationalityWoman’s intellectual capacity is repeatedly described by Thomas with the unflattering comparatives debilior (debilis meaning, among other things, “disabled, infirm, feeble, frail, [End Page 192] weak”)1 and inferior. Almost every woman does not have a “firm judgment of reason”; she is “unstable of reason.”2 She does not possess “sufficient strength of mind” (to resist concupiscence).3 There is clearly a “deficiency of reason”4 because she has an overall “weakness of nature.”5These descriptions of female rationality can only be understood insofar as they stand over and against the male rationality which is described in almost bodily comparatives as fortior, firmior, robustior. The male has more “strength of soul.”6 In him “the discretion... (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas wrote for the first time in the history of philosophy a systematic treatise on the human passions that considered them from an anthropological as well as from a moral point of view. His theory of the passions belongs to this third or what we could call “Aristotelian” approach. The aim of this article is to bring out the richness of Aquinas’s insights by analyzing his theory within the broader framework of his anthropology.

Having children is probably as old as the first successful organism. It is often done thoughtlessly. This book is an argument for giving procreating some serious thought, and a theory of how, when, and why procreation may be permissible.Rivka Weinberg begins with an analysis of the kind of act procreativity is and why we might be justifiably motivated to engage in it. She then proceeds to argue that, by virtue of our ownership and control of the hazardous material that (...) is our gametes, we are parentally responsible for the risks we take with our gametes and for the persons that develop when we engage in activity that allows our gametes to unite with others and develop into persons. Further argument establishes that when done respectfully, and in cases where the child's chances of leading a life of human flourishing are high, procreation may be permissible. Along the way, Weinberg argues that the non-identity problem is a curiously common mistake. Arguments intending to show that procreation is impermissible because life is bad for people and imposed on them without their consent are shown to have serious flaws. Yet because they leave us with lingering concerns, Weinberg argues that although procreation is permissible under certain conditions, it is not only a welfare risk but also a moral risk. Still, it is a risk that is often permissible for us to take and impose, given our high level of legitimate interest in procreativity. In order to ascertain when the procreative risk is permissible to impose, contractualist principles are proposed to fairly attend to the interests prospective parents have in procreating and the interests future people have in a life of human flourishing. The principles are assessed on their own merits and in comparison with rival principles. They are then applied to a wide variety of procreative cases. (shrink)

Life is pointless. That’s not okay. I show that. I argue that a point is a valued end and that, as agents, it makes sense for us to want our efforts and enterprises to have a point. Valued ends provide justifying reasons for our acts, efforts, and projects. I further argue that ends lie separate from the acts and enterprises for which they provide a point. Since there can be no end external to one’s entire life since one’s life includes (...) all of one’s ends, leading and living one’s life as a whole cannot have a point. Finally, I argue that since we live our lives and structure our living­a­human­life efforts both in parts and as a whole, it is fitting to be sad to recognize that leading and living a life is pointless. My discussion helps make sense of the literature that frequently talks around this topic but often does so vaguely and indirectly. (shrink)

Sperm donation is a widely accepted and increasingly common practice. In the standard case, a sperm donor sells sperm to an agency, waives his parental rights, and is absolved of parental responsibility. We tend to assume that this involves no problematic abandonment of parental responsibility. If we regard the donor as having parental responsibilities at all, we may think that his parental responsibilities are transferred to the sperm recipients. But, if a man creates a child accidentally, via contraception failure, we (...) tend to assume that the man does indeed have parental responsibilities. Assessing these contrasting conclusions requires a theory of parental responsibility. I analyze prevalent theories of what makes someone parentally responsible and show that none of these theories can withstand scrutiny. I propose a new theory of parental responsibility, which, I argue, is more plausible than the alternatives. My theory of parental responsibility is based on our ownership and control over hazardous materials, namely, our gametes. I show that neither my theory, nor the theories I reject, can support our contrasting intuitions. I conclude that sperm donors are fathers, with parental responsibility. I argue that the alternative conclusion, that neither sperm donors nor accidental fathers are parentally responsible for their resulting offspring, is less plausible. I then consider whether parental responsibility can be transferred and argue that it is far from clear that it can. Finally, I address objections and consider some practical implications of these views. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s (...) and Woodward’s direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the NIP. My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the NIP only arises when we concern ourselves with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the NIP is dissolved. (shrink)

Once the Luwian hieroglyphics for God “” and Gate “” were discovered at Göbekli Tepe, this author was able to directly link the site’s carved pillars and pillar enclosures to the Abrahamic/Mosaic “Word of God”,. Archaeologists and anthropologists have long viewed the Bible as mankind’s best guide to prehistoric religion, however, archaeologist Klaus Schmidt had no reason to believe that the site he spent years excavating at Göbekli Tepe might be the legendary “Pillars of Enoch”, carved by the first Biblical (...) holy man and scribe. To make this connection, the author first had to decipher Judaism’s Razah D’Oraytah (Secret of Knowledge) from the Sefer Yetzirah (Book of Creation). The Book of Creation is the only text to explain the Secret of Knowledge, and the only text attributed to the prophet Abraham within the rabbinical community. The Zohar, Judaism’s most accessible Kabbalistic text, admits that it lacks knowledge of “deep and hidden things which issue from God’s thought and are taken up by the Voice [of God] which are not disclosed till the Word [] reveals them”. Abrahamic/Mosaic “Word of God” encrypts the mathematics of sound that emanates from God’s “Voice” in terms of ancient string theory. Just as modern string theory defines a Theory of Everything (ToE) within theoretical physics, so too does this ancient string theory define the Theory of Everything that Abraham named the “Living God”. The author’s previous paper ties Jewish sources to Göbekli Tepe, while the current paper applies this sonic “God Table” to the textual exegesis and hermeneutics structuring all religious creation allegories, including the writings of Sumer, Assyria, Babylonia, Vedic India, pre-Dynastic Egypt, Ugarit, and Israel. This paper will apply Göbekli Tepe’s structural template to archaeology’s oldest legible cuneiform tablets, including the Kesh Temple Hymn, Sumerian King List, and the Akkadian Ark Tablet. It will also be demonstrated that Göbekli Tepe holds the key to the Rig Veda, Hinduism’s oldest text, and defines the essence of Plato’s metaphysics. (shrink)

The moral justification of intellectual property is often called into question when placed in the context of pharmaceutical patents and global health concerns. The theoretical accounts of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick provide an excellent ethical framework from which such questions can be clarified. While Nozick upholds an individuals right to intellectual property, based upon its conformation with Lockean notions of property and Nozicks ideas of just acquisition and transfer, Rawls emphasizes the importance of basic liberties, such as an (...) individuals right to health, superceding such secondary rights as intellectual property rights. From a policy perspective, patent protection for pharmaceutical products necessarily entails the balancing of corporate intellectual property interests and public interests in healthcare. The moral dilemma that occurs when these two interests clash is not easily resolved. Aside from corporate and public interests, the state maintains an interest in creating and preserving policies that regulate the moral dilemma itself. This paper analyzes the economic and ethical factors surrounding the production and distribution of the anti-HIV medication, AZT. Potential policy implications and recommendations are also discussed. (shrink)

Life stinks. Mel Brooks knew it, David Benatar knows it,1 and so do I. Even when life does not stink so badly, there’s always the chance that it will begin to do so. Nonexistence, on the other hand, is odor free. Whereas being brought into existence can be harmful, or at least bad, nonexistence cannot be harmful or bad. Even if life is not clearly bad, it is at the very least extremely risky. David Benatar argues, somewhat notoriously, that since (...) it is better never to exist, one is harmed by being brought into existence and, therefore, procreation is likely always wrong and certainly always morally problematic. (shrink)

One might think that parental obligation to children ends with the end of childhood. I argue that if we consider why parents are obligated to their children, we will see that this view is false. Creating children exposes them to life’s risks. When we expose others to risks, we are often obligated to minimize damages and compensate for harms. Life’s risks last a lifetime, therefore parental obligation to one’s children does too. Grown children’s autonomy, and grown children’s independent responsibility for (...) some of their own problems, can sometimes limit what parental responsibility demands of parents but it doesn’t do away with the responsibility. I argue that my conclusions are not as counterintuitive as they might initially seem. I also consider the implications that parental obligation to grown children might have on the oft assumed obligation that grown children have to care for their parents. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper, I argue that the most significant contribution of the Jesuits to early modern science consists in the introduction of a new “image of knowledge.”In contradistinction to traditional Scholasticism, this image of knowledge allows for the possibility of a science of hypothetical entities.This problem became crucial in two specific areas. In astronomy, knowledge of mathematical entities of unclear ontological status was nevertheless proclaimed certain. In theology, God's knowledge of the future acts of man, logically considered as future (...) contingents, was also proclaimed certain. In both cases the concept of certain knowledge of hypothetical entities was problematic and challenged a central premise of the accepted canons of logic, i.e., that the objects of true knowledge must be real objects.The main argument of this paper is that the practical orientation of the Jesuit cultural milieu enabled Jesuit scientists and theologians to ignore accepted logical considerations and to modify traditional Thomist images of knowledge. Nevertheless, this modification was not so radical as to change the contemporary organization of knowledge. This was due to the peculiar status of the Jesuits within the church establishment, which exposed them to harsh criticism and created a deep need for legitimation. Thus, the limitations of Jesuit scientific culture are accounted for in institutional, rather than in logical terms. (shrink)

Where do we come from? Is our destiny determined by the genes we inherit? Do we all see the same blue color when we look at the sky? In this book Gottfried (Jeff) Schatz, the world-renowned biochemist and co-discoverer of mitochondrial DNA, gives lucid - albeit often surprising - answers to universal questions and takes the reader on a fascinating journey of discovery across the boundaries of scientific disciplines. With passion and a keen sense of wonder, he draws on (...) philosophy, cultural history and art to formulate his reflections on the mystery of life. The key to understanding life is to be found in its chemistry, and he proves that this is no dry endeavor and certainly not devoid of beauty. The result is a collection of eloquently and poetically written essays dealing with key issues in the natural sciences. It will appeal not only to scientists, but to all curious minds, regardless of educational and professional background. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper, an attempt at an institutional history of ideas, compares patterns of reproduction of scientific knowledge in Catholic and Protestant educational institutions. Franciscus Eschinardus'Cursus Physico-Mathematicusand Jean-Robert Chouet'sSyntagma Physicumare examined for the strategies which allow for accommodation of new contents and new practices within traditional institutional frameworks. The texts manifest two different styles of inquiry about nature, each adapted to the peculiar constraints implied by its environment. The interpretative drive of Eschinardus and a whole group of “modern astronomers” is (...) here seen as pushing beyond the traditional task of “saving the phenomena,” towards celestial hermeneutics which is thoroughly experimental and mathematical. In spite of the insistence on physical interpretation of celestial phenomena, Eschinardus' astronomical discourse is yet constrained by a complex game of intellectual-political considerations. Commitment to the Thomistic organization of knowledge, which sets a boundary between a science of motion and the “geometry of heavens”, suppresses any impulse to ask about the mechanical causes of celestial appearances. The Copernican cosmology is thus rejected qua an attempt to cross this guarded boundary. Chouet in Geneva, by contrast, frees himself from these constraints on the organization of natural knowledge. By strictly separating philosophy from theology, he can combine physics and astronomy, favor a Copernican cosmology and adopt a Cartesian mechanistic worldview. Moreover, unlike the Jesuit Eschinardus, Chouet seeks toexplainnatural phenomena in terms of causes, rather than justinterpretthem. Yet he does so within a philosophical discourse largely scholastic in nature, which best suits the conservative institutional framework in which he teaches. Whereas the Jesuit Eschinardus employs a new type of discourse without severing his links with the traditional Thomistic worldview, the Calvinist Chouet adopts a new Cartesian worldview and adapts it to a largely traditional type of discourse. (shrink)

In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...) often doesn't merit moral consideration since the alternative person one would have been had what might have happened actually happened is a merely possible person about whom one has no reason to care. He argues that his way of thinking can eliminate the non-identity problem. Caspar Hare argues that merely possible people have interests and are morally relevant. He argues that we can solve the non-identity problem by rejecting the view that merely possible people are morally irrelevant. Both Hare and Velleman argue that focusing on one's de dicto rather than on one's de re children can help us avoid the non-identity problem. I analyze the role that merely possible, nonexistent hypothetical entities ought to play in our moral reasoning, especially with regard to procreation. I refute both Velleman's and Hare's views and demonstrate the difficulties we encounter when we try to apply their views to common non-identity cases. I conclude with the common-sense view regarding who matters, morally: only those who do, did, or will exist. (shrink)

Two of God’s holiest names are אלוהים (Elohim) and יהוה (transliteration: YHVH, Yahweh, or Jehovah). In Genesis 1 the creator is Elohim, while in Genesis 2 the creator is Yahweh. There is only one text that reveals the deep and hidden meaning of these names and the differences between their respective versions of Creation. That text is the Sefer Yetzirah or Book of Creation, and it is the only text attributed to the prophet Abraham by many within the Chasidic rabbinical (...) community. “According to a reliable tradition, it was Rabbi Akiba who actually wrote the Sefer Yetzirah, even though its teachings are attributed to Abraham” (Kaplan, 1979: p. 185). The author contends that this allegedly “Abrahamic” text has never been properly deciphered and authenticated—until now! Deciphering this text reveals an Old Babylonian oral tradition of Base 60 mathematics that is encrypted within יהוה which explains the original conceptualization of monotheism’s God and Creation. Within the Jewish mystical tradition of Kabbalah, deciphering יהוה reveals the long-lost Razah D’Oraytah (the Secret of Knowledge, the Secret of the Torah, or the Secret of the 22 Foundation Letters). 2 Kings 25:18 tells us that Seraiah, the last High Priest of Solomon’s Temple, was murdered by the Neo-Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar when he destroyed the temple in 586 BCE. Kabbalistic tradition tells us that Seraiah would have been the last High Priest to know the “Secret of the Torah.” Since that time, the Jewish people have considered themselves in exile from Zion (Jerusalem), and from God Himself. The Jewish people are anticipating a Moshiach (Messiah or “Anointed One”) to reveal the lost “Secret of the Torah” said to be encrypted in יהוה. With the coming of this “Messiah,” the expectations are for that “savior” to physically lead the diaspora of “Chosen People” out of their exile and to the “Promised Land.” While laying no claim to a mantle of religious authority, this article’s author is convinced that he has successfully deciphered the lost meaning and “pronunciation” of the Holy Tetragrammaton (יהוה). The author then applied this recovered mathematical יהוה template to interpret the deep and hidden meaning of both Genesis 1 and Genesis 2. (shrink)

This paper suggests that there are three kinds of meaning: Everyday, Cosmic, and Ultimate. Everyday meaning refers to the value and significance in our everyday lives, including values such as beauty, morality, and truth, and the significance of engagement with them. Cosmic meaning refers to our meaningful role in the cosmos: to the significance and value of our cosmic niche, to the purposes of the cosmos and our place in it. Ultimate meaning is the end-regarding justifying reason, the valued end, (...) or the point of leading a life at all. It is here argued that procreating can be a deep source of Everyday meaning, and perhaps Cosmic meaning. But nothing can provide us with Ultimate meaning. The implications this may have for procreative ethics is considered. (shrink)

This article responds to the two replies, published in this issue, to my article “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” published in the first issue of this journal. In the first reply, Turp, Hollinshead, and Rowe present an internalist challenge to my account of value, and a relational conception of the self as a challenge to my premise that leading a life includes everything you do and aim at within (...) the project, effort, or enterprise of living and leading a life. I respond to the internalist challenge by showing it does not succeed in inserting values into acts. I respond to the relational conception of the self by noting that, regardless of the nature of the self, the project of leading a life includes all the things you do and aim at within that project, effort, or enterprise. Thus, we can accept a relational account of the self and allow for other-regarding values but that does not change the location of our pursuit of those values: they remain located within the meta-project of leading a life, leaving the meta-project of leading and living a life with nowhere to reach for a point. In the second reply, Cowan argues against feeling sad about life’s pointlessness. In response, I argue that sad facts warrant sadness. I further argue that there are reasons other than happiness to value truth, including the very, very sad truth about the ultimate pointlessness of our lives. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself of the shared vulnerability to risks (...) and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper three canonical studies of the scientific revolution are subjected to narratological analysis. Underlying this analysis is the assumption that in any single product of historical writing it is possible to distinguish, for analytical purposes, between three levels of reference: the object of the text — the events; the representation of the events — the narrative; and the text in which a story is represented by means of narrative. Through texts one learns about historical events, but also (...) about the process of producing the texts. Techniques of representation are means of production of texts that represent, in addition to the events, also the producer and his or her authority. The distinction made for any specific text allows the reader to play the two levels against each other in order to create a space within which historical writing should be criticized. Such criticism may draw attention to the difficulty of controlling the meaning of historical stories, and to the need to analyze narrative structures in order to appreciate the ideological changes of historical texts. (shrink)

Der Biologe Erich Wasmann SJ ging in seinem Buch “Die moderne Biologie und die Entwicklungstheorie” und in seinen Berliner Vorträgen 1907, in denen er sich mit dem Monisten Ernst Haeckel auseinandersetzte, das Problem der Evolution an. In Bezug auf die Entwicklung des Menschen vertrat er in beiden eine offene Position: Er hielt die Entwicklung des Menschen aus dem Tierreich für nicht erwiesen, rechnete jedoch damit, dass sie eines Tages bewiesen werden könnte, und betonte, dass sie nicht prinzipiell der Offenbarung widerspreche. (...) Dies führte zu Klagen in Rom. Der Jesuitengeneral Wernz erklärte, es sei “theologice certum”, dass der Mensch auch dem Leibe nach nicht aus dem Tierreich abstammen könne. Wasmann solle daher in künftigen Neuauflagen seines Buches nur die biologische Seite behandeln und Spekulationen über die prinzipielle Vereinbarkeit einer Humanevolution mit der Offenbarung unterlassen. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass es keine Neuauflage mehr gab.The Jesuit and biologue Erich Wasmann dealt in his book “Die moderne Biologie und die Entwicklunstheorie” and in his Berlin conferences in 1907, dealing with the monist Ernst Haeckel, the problem of evolution. Regarding the evolution of mankind, he defended an open position: he judged that it had not been proved, but reckoned with the possibility that it could be proved one day, and insisted that there would be no contradiction with Christian revelation. That provoked, in the time of the Modernist crisis, complaints to Rome. The Jesuit General Wernz declared that it would be “theologice certum” that mankind could not descend, not even regarding the body, from animal ancestors. Therefore Wasmann should deal, in future editions, only with the biological questions and omit speculations about the theoretical compatibility of human evolution with the revelation. That had the consequence, that no new edition of the book was ever published. (shrink)

This essay reads Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) alongside influential mid-century Victorian psychology studies—paying special attention to those that Carroll owned—in order to trace the divergence of Carroll’s literary representations of the “dream child” from its prevailing medical association with mental illness. The goals of this study are threefold: to trace the medico-historical links between dream-states and childhood, to investigate the medical reasons behind the pathologization of dream-states, and to understand how Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland contributed to Victorian interpretations of (...) the child’s mind. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 6, June 2022.

This article examines Kevin Scharp’s formal solution to the alethic paradoxes, ADT, which stands for ascending and descending truth. One of the main supposed benefits of ADT over its competitors is that it alone can validate the uses of truth concepts in theoretical contexts, such as truth-theoretic semantics. The appendixes contain a new consistency proof for ADT, and additionally show that it is conservative. As a result of its conservativity, the article argues that ADT faces a problem in accounting for (...) certain mathematical uses of truth. Thus, Scharp’s theory needs to be amended in order to fulfill its aim of replicating all substantive uses of truth. (shrink)

Pragmatic competence includes the capacity to express illocutionary force and successfully achieve perlocutionary effects, in order to guarantee fully functional communication exchanges. Alzheimer’s Disease is characterized by a constellation of limitations derived from progressive cognitive impairment, which is usually viewed as a global uniform phenomenon. In this paper it is argued that looking independently at the loss and recovery of pragmatic function related to illocutionary and perlocutionary abilities can be a productive way of understanding the progressive deterioration of communicative capacities (...) by patients or their improvement under targeted treatment. (shrink)

In his Guide to the Lakes (1810, 1835), the English Romantic poet William Wordsworth used the word 'nature' in two senses. Sometimes it denoted a holistic ideal, in the manner of metaphysicians, and sometimes a concrete landscape of discrete things, in the manner of natural scientists. The Guide to the Lakes thus marks a watershed in Western philosophy of nature. Although chronologically the ideal preceded the concrete landscape, conceptually the concrete landscape precedes the ideal, much as in Nietzsche's 'fiction of (...) causation'. (shrink)