Since the turn of the twenty-first century, we have seen a revival of interest in world literature and, in its wake, interest in its parent discipline: comparative literature. Many of the more recent interventions charge these disciplines, including the subdiscipline of poetics, with Eurocentrism. Though the debate ranges most intensively in US academe, Chinese scholars also have increasingly ventured onto this terrain. The present contribution elaborates on the "re-orientation" of comparative poetics and on the possibility of a world poetics.

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to severe shortages of many essential goods and services, from hand sanitizers and N-95 masks to ICU beds and ventilators. Although rationing is not unprecedented, never before has the American public been faced with the prospect of having to ration medical goods and services on this scale.

This paper was written for and presented at a symposium on Multiple Realizability at the Central Division of the APA in 2022. It's in somewhat rough shape, especially the later parts. I hope to be in a position soon to post a revised and more carefully worked out version. The basic argument of the first half is this: Realization of the interesting sort (and thus MR of the interesting sort) requires tidy separation of levels (with realizers being at a lower (...) level than that which they realize). The success of mixed-scale, mixed-resource (i.e., multi-grain) modeling strongly suggests that such a tidy separation of levels is not in the cards. Thus, MR is (likely) not a widespread phenomenon in our universe. The second half of the paper develops a relation of "multiple explainability" that is meant to play the role, in many contexts, of MR, while being metaphysically and methodologically messier than MR. (shrink)

_A moving meditation on recent geopolitical crises, viewed through the lens of ancient and modern tragedy__ “Spare, elegant and poignant.... If there is a single contemporary book that should be pressed into the hands of those who decide issues of war and peace, this is it.”—John Gray, _New Statesman_ “It is tragic that Robert D. Kaplan’s luminous _The Tragic Mind_ is so urgently needed.”—George F. Will_ Some books emerge from a lifetime of hard-won knowledge. Robert D. Kaplan has (...) learned, from a career spent reporting on wars, revolutions, and international politics in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, that the essence of geopolitics is tragedy. In _The Tragic Mind_, he employs the works of ancient Greek dramatists, Shakespeare, German philosophers, and the modern classics to explore the central subjects of international politics: order, disorder, rebellion, ambition, loyalty to family and state, violence, and the mistakes of power. The great dilemmas of international politics, he argues, are not posed by good versus evil—a clear and easy choice—but by contests of good versus good, where the choices are often searing, incompatible, and fraught with consequences. A deeply learned and deeply felt meditation on the importance of lived experience in conducting international relations, this is a book for everyone who wants a profound understanding of the tragic politics of our time. (shrink)

Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view. He also argues for a conciliatory understanding of the relation between the computational approach to cognition and the embedded and embodied views.

In this article I chronicle the emergence of two interrelated themes that crystallized in my investigations of emotional trauma during the more than 16 years that followed my own experience of traumatic loss. One pertains to the context-embeddedness of emotional trauma and the other to the claim that the possibility of emotional trauma is built into our existential constitution. I find a reconciliation and synthesis of these two themes—trauma’s contextuality and its existentiality—in the recognition of the bonds of deep emotional (...) attunement we can form with one another in virtue of our common finitude. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 149 temporary, might he an eyeopener to young Thomists who know so little about his work. In the meantime, however, in this English version of The Eyes of Faith a primary source of first importance has come our way. Catholic libraries should definitely have it on hand for philosophers and theologians to consult. Fordham University Bronx, New York GERALD A. McCooL, S.J. The Phuosophy of Thomas Aquinas: (...) Introductory Readings. Edited by CHRISTOPHER MARTIN. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1988. Pp. 202. $57.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). One has a difficult time finding a wholly satisfactory collection of writings from Thomas Aquinas in a single volume. In different ways, the well-known collections of Mary Clark, Robert Goodwin, Thomas Gilby, Vernon Bourke, and Anton Pegis have their merits, hut they have their defects too-one of which is that they all came out twenty to forty years ago. Christopher Martin has recently produced a new collection of readings, and his selection is much different. Add to this that many of the texts in his work are rare or nonexistent in translation, and one begins to see why it is delightful to see this work appear. Christopher Martin has gathered a number of philosophical texts from Aquinas for those who have already cut their teeth in philosophy. (Hence, the uninitiated to philosophy will find things here hard going.) Texts were selected principally with an eye to interesting those students who are most familiar with philosophy in the analytic tradition. They are often unacquainted with theology and at a loss as to how to sort out Thomas's philosophical claims from his theological claims. The aim was to produce a volume which would help such students read Thomas fruitfully and show them that Thomas has many genuine philosophical insights. To this end, texts were chosen that presupposed no, or a minimal, understanding of theology. Not every side of Thomas's philosophical thought is reflected in this work, hut a number of important sides of it are, and an idea of the breadth of it comes through. The format of this work is something like that of Ralph Mclnerny's recent A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas. Each chapter begins with an essay that is closely tied to a Thomistic text or two given at the end of the chapter. In Martin's work, however, the emphasis lies more on the itexts than on the expository essays. Apart from the introduction, the 150 BOOK REVIEWS book is divided into five chapters: Aquinas on Logic; Aquinas on Metaphysics; Aquinas on God; Aquinas on Truth, Knowledge and the Mind; and Aquinas on Ethics. The chapters by design follow the major divisions and order of Anthony Kenny's Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays. The essays which begin each chapter and introduce the texts that follow are solid pieces. They make many references to Thomas's depend· ence on Aristotle and to parallels between Thomas's handling of a problem and recent discussions of the same. They also give guidance in reading the Thomistic texts and explain what is difficult in the doctrine found in the texts. Throughout these essays, the influence of Peter Geach's writings is evident (especially God and the Soul and Three Philosophers). At times it is just an example or the choice of a term, and at other times it is something more substantial. Though Martin's essays are quite accurate and helpful, a reader can find things to quibble with. Thomas's distinction, for example, between id a quo nomen imponitur ad significandum and id ad quod nomen imponitur ad significandum does not seem, as Martin suggests, to be Frege's distinction between sense and reference or Kripke's distinction between the reference of a name and the fixing of a reference. Rather, Thomas seems to be distinguishing more the etymology of a name from its meaning. Again, it will not do to say that the principle of individuation for individuals of the same kind is " distinct lumps of matter " and that the lumpiness of matter in turn is responsible for the individuation of forms. The " lumpiness " of matter is itself a formal feature. Thomas's teaching... (shrink)

In this article I draw on some personal experiences of my own as a springboard for a theoretical discussion of the contextuality of the several varieties of unconsciousness and, in particular, of a form of unconsciousness that I propose to call the ontological unconscious.

A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...) this approach is the idea of an integrated system. A formal characterization of integration is laid out in the form of a conditional-probabilitybased measure of the clustering of causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior. I relate the view to the debate over extended and embodied cognition and respond to objections that have been raised in print by Andy Clark, Colin Klein, and Felipe de Brigard. (shrink)

The author's phenomenological-contextualist psychoanalytic perspective, characterized as a form of applied philosophy, investigates and illuminates worlds of emotional experience and the constitutive intersubjective contexts in which they take form.

This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- which looks (...) more like an embedded view -- and if the criterion is rejected, bloat follows) and as a problem for extended views more generally -develops a dilemma critical of Clark and Chalmers's "explanatory kinds" argument for extended mind and cognition (arguing that their reasoning faces serious problems regardless of whether one individuates the kinds in question in a fine-grained or a coarse-grained way) -argues that an appeal to functionalism doesn't resolve the issue -argues for the priority, in debates about extended cognition, of the identification of cognitive systems (e.g., because a functionalist approach can't be applied unless we already know what count as inputs and outputs, which requires having already identified the boundaries of the cognitive system). (shrink)

Clinical ethics is a relatively new discipline within medicine, generated not so much by the Can we . . . ? questions of fact and prognosis that physicians ...

An exploration of shunning reactions to psychobiographical accounts of theoretical ideas, this article delves into the question of why this particular reaction is the most widespread, as well as the reactions one of the authors experienced to his own work on Heidegger.

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PINPOINT EXPLICITLY THE VICIOUS\nCIRCULARITY IN PROPOSITION I OF DESCARTES' "GEOMETRICAL\nDEMONSTRATIONS" OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. THE ARGUMENT IS TREATED\nBOTH DISCURSIVELY AND SYMBOLICALLY. SINCE THE PHRASE\n"NATURE OR CONCEPT" OCCURS CRUCIALLY, THE TERM "CONCEPT" IS\nEXAMINED RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING DISTINCTIONS: (I)\nPROPERTY CONCEPTS--GENERAL AND INDIVIDUAL (ENUMERATIVE AND\nDESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE) (II) PSYCHOLOGICAL\nCONCEPTS--DEPENDING ON HOW ONE INTERPRETS "CONCEPT," THE\nARGUMENT DIFFERS IN FORM AND CONCLUSION. WHEN "CONCEPT" IS\nTAKEN IN THE SENSE OF: GENERAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND\nDESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE, INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS--ONLY A\nHYPOTHETICAL CONCLUSION IS DERIVABLE.

This paper asks about the ways in which embodimentoriented cognitive science contributes to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. It is first argued that central work in the field of embodied cognitive science does not solve the hard problem of consciousness head on. It is then argued that an embodied turn toward neurophenomenology makes no distinctive headway on the puzzle of consciousness; for neurophenomenology either concedes dualism in the face of the hard problem or represents only a slight methodological variation on (...) extant cognitive-scientific approaches to the easy problems of consciousness. The paper closes with the positive suggestion that embodied cognitive science supports a different approach to phenomenal consciousness, according to which the mind is massively representational, cognitive science has no use for the personal-level posits that tend to drive philosophical theorizing about consciousness and mind, and the hard problem is illusory. (shrink)

The hypothesis that there is a 1:1 correspondence between LTP and learning is simplistic, and the correlation approach to testing it is therefore too limited. The alternative hypothesis that LTP plays a role in arousal is consistent with activity-dependent neuromodulation, but ignores the Hebbian properties of LTP. LTP may involve both types of mechanisms, suggesting a possible synthesis of the two hypotheses.

Designed for those wanting to be teachers, administrators, or other educational practitioners, this work shows how the study of educational philosophy should ...

Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...) that this view misrepresents the structure of cognitive-scientific enquiry. Taken at face value, cognitive science makes no commitment to the existence of a distinctive level at which persons or selves appear. Thus, in the age of cognitive science, we should not expect to find the self in an ontologically distinct realm. Instead, we should expect to locate it in cognitive-scientific models themselves. In closing, I indicate likely results of this approach. (shrink)

By way of preface it should be noted that Jordan was mainly concerned with formulating a metaphysics of value and a philosophy of art. And although this formulation can serve as a foundation for specific art criticism, Jordan was not attempting such criticism, and should not be held responsible for not doing what was extraneous to his purpose. It is helpful to remember also that Jordan's polemics are directed against a philosophy of subjectivism in the theory of art criticism and (...) art creation; i.e., he denies that the private consciousness is the sole standard of the nature and value of a work of art, and he denies that the artist creates by merely revealing the state of his own internal feelings and emotions. (shrink)

The boundaries, the influences on, and consequences of a short-term memory (STM) capacity of 4 leads us to consider global versus local processing. We argue that in schizophrenia cognitive problems can lie partly in pre-conscious automatic selective attention and partly with the speed of processing in later controlled processes (including compound STM). The influence of automatic attentional mechanisms may be under-estimated in normal psychology and explain the loss of the magic 4 in schizophrenia.

The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...) species of mental and cognitive properties as individual humans. In this essay, I evaluate a defensive move made by some proponents of the group-oriented view: to concede that group states and individual states aren’t of the same specific natural kinds, while holding that groups instantiate different species of mental or cognitive states – perhaps a different species of cognition itself – from those instantiated by humans. In order to evaluate this defense of group cognition, I develop a view of natural kinds – or at least of the sort of evidence that supports inferences to the sameness of natural kind – a view I have previous dubbed the ‘tweak-and-extend’ theory. Guided by the tweak-and-extend approach, I arrive at a tentative conclusion: that what is common to models of individual cognitive processing and models of group processing does not suffice to establish sameness of cognitive (or mental) kinds, properties, or state-types, not even at a generic or overarching level. (shrink)