System effects often stand in the way of attempts to come up with simple explanations of politics. Systems are often characterized by nonlinearities, where an effect is more than the sum of the effects of the actions taken by multiple actors. Another system effect is feedback, where the effect of actions is to amplify the problem the actions are intended to solve. There may also be indirect effects, where an incidental aspect of an action becomes more important (to other actors) (...) than the primary intention; contingencies, such that an effect is not inevitable but depends on idiosyncratic or even anti-strategic initial actions; interaction effects, where the behavior of an actor changes the environment of action, so that other actors do not respond as anticipated; and unintended consequences, where the long-term or secondary effects of an action differ from the intended effect. Each of these system effects can frustrate scholarly attempts to understand political behavior using simple models of action, and, even more, can frustrate the attempts of political decision makers to predict the effects of their actions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is conventional wisdom that the laws of physics that govern our everyday world are different from those that explain the smallest particles and forces. Alexander Wendt argues that, to the contrary, quantum theory in fact can apply to the larger-scale world, and to human behavior as well. An alluring possibility to be sure, but we may need multiple theories of different types to explain diverse human behavior and behavioral patterns. Theories, furthermore, can be self-confirming or self-denying. In quantum theory, (...) classical physics, and social life, uncertainty looms large and political leaders in particular face multiple choices in dealing with it, including whether attempts to reduce uncertainty will change the world to their detriment. In these efforts, they often conflate estimates of likelihood with judgments of confidence and incorrectly assume that an estimate that an event is unlikely is flawed if the event actually occurs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We like to believe that our world is regular, that we can predict it fairly well, and that we can control the risks we run. Nassim Taleb argues that we are fooling ourselves and that the course of history is driven by rare and extreme events, which he calls Black Swans. There is much to this, but scholars—at least in political science—are less oblivious to the problem than he believes. More thought needs to be given to hard issues of (...) whether key events were anticipated, whether there were functional substitutes for events that are seen as turning points, the role of beliefs and expectations in Black Swans, and the dynamics that might explain unpredictability. (shrink)

Historical chapters show how understanding the workings of complex systems allowed statesmen to devise the Concert of Europe and how the collapse of the Concert in the Crimean War was triggered by the tsar's failure to comprehend the indirect impact his strategies would have on British public opinion. Another chapter highlights the feedback processes between domestic politics and the international monetary system that led to the rise and fall of the gold standard and to the creation of the European monetary (...) system. The diplomacy of the Moroccan crisis of 1905 is used to show that conventional wisdom places unwarranted weight on a state's reputation for standing firm in the interconnected international system. The discussions also explore the systemic causes of World War II: Contributors examine how the international financial system unwittingly helped destroy Weimar democracy and offer a challenging reinterpretation of the workings of the balance of power in the 1930s. (shrink)