In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Brief History of Medical Ethics Code in PolandJacek A. Piątkiewicz (bio)On March 15, 1934 a Parliamentary Act authorized the General Medical Chambers, a body incorporating all Polish physicians, to establish general rules of medical ethics. These rules governed medical conduct in Poland until 1950, when the Communist government dissolved the General Medical Chambers.From 1950 to 1989 the only medical organization in Poland tolerated by the Communist government was (...) the Polish Medical Association, which included about 30% of the country's physicians. In 1967 this group produced the "Collection of Ethico-deontological principles of the Polish Physician" which constituted a kind of code of medical ethics. This collection was a compromise between objective ethical principles and the demands of the Communist regime. For example, Principle 1 of the Collection stated that the physician "had to observe the ethico-deontological principles obligatory in socialist society."During round-table talks in early 1989 with representatives of the Communist government, the Solidarity movement argued for the revival of autonomous medical organizations like the Medical Chambers. On May 17, 1989 an Act of Parliament re-established the group. The Act (article 33, part 1) also stipulated that the National Congress of Physicians, the legislative body of Medical Chambers, establish rules of medical ethics. The Act (article 15, part 1) also states that all practicing Polish physicians are obliged to observe these rules.When the revived Chambers began its work in January 1990, its governing body—the General Medical Council—created a Commission to prepare a draft of a medical ethics code. After a year and a half of work, the Commission completed its draft, which received preliminary acceptance by the General Medical Council. [End Page 361]On December 13-14, 1991 the Extraordinary Second National Congress of Physicians was held in Bielsko-Biala (South Poland) and one of the main items on the agenda was the Code. Every article of the Code was discussed exhaustively throughout the second day of the meeting, and close to midnight the Code, including the Physician' Oath, was approved by an overwhelming majority (449 for, 75 against, 58 abstaining).Some of the liveliest discussion centered on Article 37, which relates to abortion. The delegates realized that the Code was inconsistent with a 1956 Act on abortion then under discussion in the Parliament which was not as restrictive as the Code. They decided to defer implementation of the Code for five months, until May 3, 1992. As described in the following text by Robert Baker, Article 37 has now been appealed and a decision resolving the discrepancy would have to come from Poland's Constitutional Tribunal or its Parliament. [End Page 362]Jacek A. Piątkiewicz Jacek A. Piątkiewicz, M.D., Ph.D., is Chairman of the Legislative Commission of the General Medical Council of Poland in Warsaw.Copyright © 1993 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The crux of the dispute on the mutual relations between attention and consciousness, and to which I have referred in this paper, lies in the question of what can be attended in spatial attention that obviously resonates with the phenomenological issue of intentionality. The discussion has been initiated by Christopher Mole. He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the (...) things that one is conscious of. In other words, attention is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not necessary for consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention, but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. Mole seeks to validate his stance with data from psychology labs. His view is, however, partly confronted, for instance, by Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and Charles Heywood, who used their experimental research on a neurological condition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation between attention and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. In this meta-theoretical state of affairs, I would like to focus on the cognitive phenomenon most often referred to as Inhibition of Return and suggest that, following its micro dynamics from the perspective of micro-phenomenology, it can be used to actually showcase all of the options on both sides of the argument. One of my leading goals would be also to follow Mole’s attempt to link attention with agency but where we differ is that I wish to heuristically articulate the matter in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of embodied pre-reflective intentionality. (shrink)

Obcy Inny. Analiza przypadków. 2017, ed. Małgorzata Karwatowska, Robert Litwiński, AdamSiwiec. Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin.Obcy/Inny, Propozycje aplikacji pojęciowych. 2018, ed. M. Karwatowska, R. Litwiński, A. Siwiec,Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin.

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

The previous volume of the series Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University---entitled Imperatives from Different Points of View---was the first result of the project Theory of Imperatives and Its Applications realized by the group composed by Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki and Berislav Žarnić. The project was supported by the Foundation for Polish Science within the program Homing Plus. One of the most important points of this project was the International Symposium Imperatives in Theory and Practice which (...) took place in Warsaw, on the 18th and 19th May, 2012. The symposium was the meeting of many specialists in the domain of the theory of imperatives – from China, Croatia, Japan, Poland and The United States. Contents: Berislav Žarnić, Logical Root of Linguistic Commitment; Jacek Jadacki, Witwicki’s Square; Tomoyuki Yamada, On the Very Idea of Imperative Inference; Fengkui Ju, Semantics of Sentences in Mixed Moods of Indicative and Imperative; Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz, Two Faces of Obligation; Bartosz Brożek, Types of Obligations; Anna Brożek, Functional Ambiguity of Imperatives; Anna Brożek, Logic of Prescriptions and Instruction; Aleksandra Horecka, Imperative Sentence as a Performative Sentence, which Refers to the Optative State of Affairs; Jakub Bazyli Motrenko, The Concept of Praxiological Directive; Maciej Witek, How to Establish Authority with Words: Imperative Utterances and Presupposition Accommodation; Wojciech Załuski, Remarks on the Lexical Order of Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice; Natalia Miklaszewska, Acts of Will as Convictions; Anna Brożek, Imperatives in the Gospel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LettersZbigniew Szawarski and Jacek A. PiatkiewiczPolish Code of Medical EthicsMadam:In the December 1992 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal you published the Polish Code of Medical Ethics with introductions by Jacek A. Piatkiewicz and Robert Baker. Jacek Piatkiewicz writes (p. 362), and Robert Baker follows him, that the new code "was approved by an overwhelming majority (449 for, 75 against, 58 abstaining)." (...) I am afraid that these figures are inconsistent with the data supplied by the Polish mass media. The leading Polish newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (16 December 1991), states that 354 delegates voted for the new code and 317 against it. The same figures are quoted by the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka (4 January 1992).Mr. Piatkiewicz does not mention either that 40 delegates left the convention before the vote in protest over the undemocratic proceedings. If we add those 40 potentially negative votes to the 317 votes against, then the result is not at all "an overwhelming approval" for the new code.I am not a physician myself, and I was not present at the Second National Congress of Physicians in Bielsko-Biala, however, I find this discrepancy disturbing. Respect for facts seems to me equally imperative as respect for human life.Jacek A. Piatkiewicz Replies:In his letter Mr. Szawarski denies the data I presented on the vote approving the Polish Code of Medical Ethics. He has quoted the figures published by the Polish mass media as the true ones. Interestingly enough, he did not try to confirm them with the Polish General Medical Chamber, which has the original documents on the Extraordinary Second National Congress of Physicians. The figures I cited regarding the Code's approval are clearly stated on page 63 of the Congress proceedings.So where do the figures presented in Mr. Szawarski's letter come from? As Mr. Szawarski states, these figures have been published in some Polish newspapers, among them "the most authoritative Polish political weekly, Polityka" (a description that was especially accurate during the Communist period of Poland's history). The figures are simply untrue. The figures presented refer only to the result of the vote on article 37 of the Code, which concerns abortion. The very narrow margin (354 for, 317 against, 38 abstaining) decided the formulation of the exceptions to the abortion ban, which are "saving the mother's life and health" and "when pregnancy is the result of a criminal act." But what was the alternative considered in the vote? It was the single exception, "to save the mother's life," that was in the [End Page 355] original draft of the Code (page 44 of the Congress proceedings).Mr. Szawarski finds the discrepancy in the figures cited disturbing. I am disturbed too, but the cause of my concern is of a completely different nature. Why does Mr. Szawarski not try to reconcile "the discrepancy" by asking organizers of the Congress for an explanation?Zbigniew SzawarskiCentre for Philosophy and Health Care University of Swansea, WalesJacek A. PiatkiewiczGeneral Medical Council of PolandCopyright © 1993 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In the paper two definitions of moments of time as the sets of events are considered. The first one is Russell’s definition based on a relation simultaneity of events. The second one is my construction of moments of time grounded on a relation of being immediately preceding.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Zwei Vorworte in einem. Evelyn DÖLLING: Alexius Meinong: "Der blinde Seher Theiresias". Jaakko HINTIKKA: Meinong in a Long Perspective. Richard SYLVAN: Re-Exploring Item-Theory. Francesca MODENATO: Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Ways of Dealing with Non-existence. Karel LAMBERT: Substitution and the Expansion of the World. Terence PARSONS: Meinongian Semantics Generalized. Reinhardt GROSSMANN: Thoughts, Objectives and States of Affairs. Peter SIMONS: Meinong's Theory of Sense and Reference. Barry SMITH: More Things in (...) Heaven and Earth. Michele LENOCI: Meinongs unvollständige Gegenstände und das Universalienproblem. Maria E. REICHER: Gibt es unvollständige Gegenstände? Dale JACQUETTE: Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing. Herbert HOCHBERG:s, Functions, Existence and Relations in the Russell-Meinong Dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism Controversy. Jacek PA_NICZEK: Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects? Marie-Luise SCHUBERT KALSI: Apriorische Elemente im Denken. Liliana ALBERTAZZI: Forms of Completion. Johann Ch. MAREK: Zwei Gegenstände und ein Inhalt. Zur Intentionalität bei Meinong. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor. Alberto VOLTOLINI: Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable? Markus S. STEPANIANS: Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff des Annahmeschlusses. Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Imagination and Necessity. R.D. ROLLINGER: Meinong on Perception: Two Questions Concerning Propositional Seeing. Wolfgang G. STOCK: Die Genese der Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion der Grazer Schule. Rudolf HALLER: Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie. Alfred SCHRAMM: Meinongs Wahrscheinlichkeit. Karl SCHUHMANN: Der Wertbegriff beim frühen Meinong. Wilhelm BAUMGARTNER: Wertpräsentation. Ursula ZEGLÉN: Meinong's Analysis of Lying. Seppo SAJAMA: Hitting Reality: France Veber's Concept of Zadevanje. Matja_ POTR_: Sensation According to Meinong and Veber. Róbert SOMOS: Zwei Schüler Brentanos: Ákos von Pauler und Meinong. J.C. NYÍRI: Palágyis Kritik an der Gegenstandstheorie. David M. ARMSTRONG: Reaction to Meinong. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we want to recapture the genesis of the logics of order. The origin of this notion is traced back to the work of Jerzy Kotas, Roman Suszko, Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer. A further development of the theory of logics of order is presented in the papers of Jacek K. Kabziński. Quite contemporarily, this notion gained in significance in the papers of Carles Noguera and Petr Cintula. Logics of order (...) are named there _logics of weak implications_. They play a crucial role in their monograph (Noguera and Cintula _Logic and Implication. An Introduction to the General Algebraic Study of Non-Classical Logics_, Trends in Logic 57, Springer, Berlin, 2021). But, more importantly, the other goal is to define some subclasses of the logics of order in reference to later results of Jacek K. Kabziński and Michael Dunn. The original conception of implication is due to Kabziński. Implication is a stronger notion than the notion of the connective of order aka weak implication. As a result, the three subclasses of logics of order are isolated: logics of implication, logics of symmetry, and tonoidal logics. These notions are uniformly defined and investigated from various viewpoints in terms of consequence operations. The emphasis is put on their semantics. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct (...) the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. We claim that "plain" and "necessitated" counterfactuals differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework. We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of the identification of "would" with "would necessarily".

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

Jacek Filek criticizes the modern “nonethical” ethics. He points out its break with philosophy, lack of self-criticism, inanity, undue and fruitless formalism, and academism. His article makes a general request for the restitution of ethics as the independent and dignified scholarly discipline closely connected with world and life.

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

Author: Migasiński Jacek Title: TRANSCENDENTALISM OF LEVINAS (Transcendentalizm Levinasa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 21-41 Keywords: LEVINAS, KANT, TRANSCENDENTALISME, PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:En s’inspirant de l’approche de Natalie Depraz qui defini la position théorique de Husserl tardif comme «l’empirisme transcendental», je propose retrouver aussi dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas une forme specifique du transcendentalisme, transcendentalisme de genese – différente de l’apriorisme transcendental de (...) Kant. Je demontre que – en dépit de l’apparence – on peut interpreter certaines couches de la réalité ou certains phénoménes ou encore événements que Levinas soumet à l’analyse – telles que «il y a», «la mort», «le feminin», «la fecondité», «la jouissance» et «le travail – la demeure» – comme les conditions empirico-transcendentales de la genese du sujet mur et susceptible de nouer «l’intrigue éthique». Je montre ainsi combine Levinas doit aux méthodes classiques de la phénoménologie. Cependant je demontre aussi que ni la transcendence de l’Infini qui se devoile dans «l’épiphanie du visage», ni cette figure du sujet qui est décrite dans la dernière période de Levinas, notamment «le soi» – le sujet dechiré de l’interieur par la diachronie propre a lui, le sujet an – archique, indicible dans un langage prédicatif – ne peuvent plus remplir les functions transcendentales. En fin j’essai de demontrer que la perspective transcendentale chez Levinas trouve ses limitations et qu’elle est remplacée dans la dernière période par une sorte de dialectique apophatique. (shrink)

Author: Sójka Jacek Title: STUDIES IN CULTURE AND THEIR ORIGINS (Kulturoznawstwo i jego źródła) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 171-181 Keywords: STUDIES IN CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, JÓZEF CHAŁASIŃSKI, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author traced the origins of studies in culture (in Polish: kulturoznawstwo). The first part deals with the philosophical tradition out of which (...) several philosophies of culture had emerged, esp. within German philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The second part is dedicated to the tradition of British cultural studies which has influenced considerably today’s reflection on culture. Finally, the third part points at the Polish sociology of culture of the last century. A special emphasis was put on the work of Józef Chałasiński who tried to work out a “science of culture in its totality”. His “American culture” from 1962 can be seen as a project of cultural studies in today’s sense of the word. In conclusion the author tries to relate all three sources of studies in culture to the theory of Jerzy Kmita, a founder of studies in culture developed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. (shrink)

In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world and whose concurrence prompted the image of an optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought (...) to existence both what is unworthy and what displays high degrees of excellence. On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility. (shrink)

Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, Patrick Todd (2016, 'Future contingents are all false! On behalf of a Russellian open future') advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as (...) an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal. (shrink)

In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive (...) causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise. (shrink)

It is argued that the assignment of truth values to future contingents is threatened not by a tensed metaphysics but by a temporally “local” notion of truth, i.e., by the assumption that whatever is true at a given time needs to be grounded in what exists at that time. If this assumption is accepted, tensed and tenseless metaphysics are equally vulnerable; if it is rejected, both can accommodate true future contingents. This means that semantic decisions are largely independent of metaphysical (...) considerations. The work of Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) is a clear example of how the tensed metaphysics of the growing block can incorporate true future contingents. Two potential worries are discussed in the context of their work: (a) that their grounding strategy overgeneralizes and admits true counterfactual contingents; and (b) that the growing block theory lacks sufficient resources to distinguish the unique possible future course of events that is relevant for the grounding of future contingents. (shrink)

The book is comprised of three components. The first component analyses the creative contribution to the theory of imperatives and norms provided by 20th-century Polish researchers. The second component summarizes their reflections and considerations. The third component is an anthology of the classic writings of Polish authors of the time; it constitutes an illustration of the first part and indicates that their research covered practically the whole scope of this theory. Author Jacek Jadacki (born 1946) is professor at Warsaw (...) University. His scholarly production includes approximately hundred works spanning almost every domain in philosophy: from logic, through ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics, to the history of these disciplines. Among his more than twenty books are Possible Ontologies (with Zdzislaw Augustynek; 1993), From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School (2003), and Polish Analytical Philosophy (2009). His pupils include such well-known figures of modern Polish thought as Anna Brozek, Mariusz Grygianiec, Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, and Mieszko Talasiewicz. (shrink)

This book is dedicated to the life and work of logician Janusz Czelakowski on the topic of logical consequence. It consists of three parts – a biography, a survey and research sections. The volume begins with an autobiographic chapter by Janusz Czelakowski followed by a historical chapter written by Jacek Malinowski. The survey section forms the backbone of the volume with each chapter covering one of Janusz Czelakowski’s results. They focus on his results in the area of logical consequence, (...) demonstrate how his results influenced following research, and presents potential future results, problems and applications. This volume is of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate some basic semantic and syntactic conditions characterizing the equivalence connective. In particular we define three basic classes of algebras: the class of weak equivalential algebras, the class of equivalential algebras and the class of regular equivalential algebras.Weak equivalential algebras can be used to study purely equivalential fragments of relevant logics and strict equivalential fragments of some modal logics. Equivalential algebras are suitable to study purely equivalential fragment of BCI and BCK logic. A subclass of the (...) class of regular equivalential algebras is suitable to study equivalential fragments of ukasiewicz logics. Some subvarieties of the class of regular equivalential algebras provide natural semantics for equivalential fragments of the intuitionistic prepositional logic and various intermediate logics. (shrink)

The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

In this text, in discussion with J. L. Schellenberg, I develop a position that I call Christian ultimism. This position lies between Schellenberg’s simple ultimism and traditional Christian theism. Christian ultimism is more apophatic than personalistic, though it more clearly emphasizes the presence of a supra-personal and communicative element in the Ultimate Reality. The proposed position is resistant to a philosophical version of the hiddenness argument, but it must answer to the challenge of the theological problem of the lack of (...) universal access to Christian revelation. Schellenberg’s idea of deep time both magnifies this problem and provides the tools for solving it: the awareness of deep time does not allow us to judge the future, but it does allow us to hope for a revelation accessible to all at the eschatological end of time. (shrink)

In this text I discuss and debate Adam Jonkisz’s book Questions and Answers: Set-theoretic approach. I consider, among other things, the problem of the minimal component of question, of the division of questions, of the specificity of existential questions. I put forward a thesis that every question is a question to be completed, in the sense that every question expresses a ‘gap’ in our knowledge that should be filled. The natural division of questions corresponds to the numbers and types of (...) these ‘gaps.’. (shrink)

t. 1. Etyka ogólna -- t. 2, cz. 1-2 Etyka szczegółowa.

Recently, constructivism has become one of the most important movements in metaethics. According to metaethical constructivism, moral judgements do not refer to moral facts but are constructed as solutions to practical problems. At the same time this claim is not seen as incompatible with cognitive realism. A variant of metaethical constructivism, developed in opposition to the dominant Kantian branch, alludes to Aristotle’s practical philosophy. In this article I raise two issues. Firstly, I present a new version of the Aristotelian constructivism (...) in metaethics, more elaborate than the previous proposals. Its fundamental element is the concept of the coherence of emotional response seen as a complex cognitive-affective state. Secondly, I argue that the acceptance of the Aristotelian version of metaethical constructivism entails the need to accept constructivism in the area of the theory of knowledge, which is contrary to the metaethical premises of constructivism. (shrink)

Bóg i przypadek W niniejszym tekście analizuję sześć pojęć przypadku oraz – dodatkowo – definiuję pojęcie zdarzenia losowego. Odrzucając istnienie zdarzeń całkowicie bezprzyczynowych, zastanawiam się nad relacją zdarzeń losowych do Boga. Moją koncepcję opieram na trzech zasadach: zasadzie jednoczesnego współdziałania, zasadzie komplementarności oraz zasadzie wiedzy pośredniej. Przyjęcie tych trzech zasad pozwala mi pogodzić istnienie klasycznie pojętego Boga z istnieniem zdarzeń losowych. W ten sposób uzyskuję model alternatywny do modeli proponowanych przez teizmy rewizyjne, w tym przez teizm probabilistyczny Łukasiewicza.

Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. (...) According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism. (shrink)

In the article I reconstruct Karol Wojtyła’s argument against atheism. According to Wojtyła, an atheist is unjust because of not rendering absolute honour to God. In my opinion the argument is sound if one applies it to theists or negative atheists and if one presupposes that there are moral obligations to only supposed persons. The argument meets some objections. A discussion of them leads me to an interpretation of the theism-atheism controversy as being the conflict of two imperatives: the imperative (...) of justice and the imperative of evidence. (shrink)

Main headings: Introduction: Philosophy and precision. - Part I. Being and essence. - Part II. Truth and nonsense. - Part III. Understanding and silence. - Conclusion: Science and creation.