Medicine is arriving at a new millenium. One of its most urgent tasks is to reconcile social health demands with a renewed medical paradigm capable of including them. This challenge requires a reexamination of the definition of medicine.This work takes up the original greek definition of medicine (Tekhne Iatrike) and the Medical Act according to P. Lain Entrago, and analyzes Heidegger's interpretation of Tekhne. It points out the two main ways in which current medical practice is sustained: the Instrumental Medical (...) Act (IMA), which organizes medical production, and the Productive Medical Act (PMA), which motivates it. (shrink)

I present an argument proving that there are no fundamental facts, which is similar to an argument recently presented by Mark Jago for truthmaker maximalism. I suggest that this argument gives us at least some prima facie, defeasible reason to believe that there are no fundamental facts.

The present article proposes a reading of the novel Elfriede Jelinek’s The Piano Teacher as a deconstruction of the configuration of female sexuality in Freud. For this, it investigates the theoretical elaborations of Foucault and Derrida and the main elements of the differentiation of Freudian female sexuality: preoedipal phase, mother-daughter bond, castration fantasy. Finally, we try to show that The Piano Teacher deconstructs the way in which psychoanalytic discourses install subjectivation regimes that place women in a position of inferiority.

To a greater extent than in other technical domains, research and progress in Artificial Intelligence has always been entwined with the fictional. Its language echoes strongly with other forms of cultural narratives, such as fairytales, myth and religion. In this essay we present varied examples that illustrate how these analogies have guided not only readings of the AI enterprise by commentators outside the community but also inspired AI researchers themselves. Owing to their influence, we pay particular attention to the similarities (...) between religious language and the way in which the potential advent of greater than human intelligence is presented contemporarily. We then move on to the role that fiction, science fiction most of all, has historically played and is still playing in the discussion of AI by influencing researchers and the public, shifting the weights of different scenarios in our collectively perceived probability space. We sum up by arguing that the lore surrounding AI research, ancient and modern, points to the ancestral and shared human motivations that drive researchers in their pursuit and fascinate humanity at large. These points of narrative entanglement where AI meets the wider culture should serve to amplify the call to engage ourselves with the discussion of the potential destination of this technology. (shrink)

Joseph Keim Campbell has recently criticized Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument against compatibilism for its reliance on the existence of a remote past. In response, Anthony Brueckner has offered a new version of the Third Argument showing that determinism and free will are incompatible for all times t relative to which there is a past . In this paper I argue that although Brueckner's retooled argument fails to prove anything in favour of incompatibilism, its conclusion can be exploited to provide (...) another version of van Inwagen's original argument that doesn't rely on the existence of past times, thus withstanding Campbell's criticism. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of quantum MV algebra (QMV algebra) as a generalization of MV algebras and we show that the class of all effects of any Hilbert space gives rise to an example of such a structure. We investigate some properties of QMV algebras and we prove that QMV algebras represent non-idempotent extensions of orthomodular lattices.

Some algebraic structures of the set of all effects are investigated and summarized in the notion of a(weak) orthoalgebra. It is shown that these structures can be embedded in a natural way in lattices, via the so-calledMacNeille completion. These structures serve as a model ofparaconsistent quantum logic, orthologic, andorthomodular quantum logic.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

We investigate certain Brouwer-Zadeh lattices that serve as abstract counterparts of lattices of effects in Hilbert spaces under the spectral ordering. These algebras, called PBZ*-lattices, can also be seen as generalisations of orthomodular lattices and are remarkable for the collapse of three notions of “sharpness” that are distinct in general Brouwer-Zadeh lattices. We investigate the structure theory of PBZ*-lattices and their reducts; in particular, we prove some embedding results for PBZ*-lattices and provide an initial description of the lattice of PBZ*-varieties.

Management of different types of partnerships plays a decisive role in company performance. Complex business ventures, such as those created to serve low-income populations, usually include both cross- and same-sector partnerships. However, the initial diversity featured in these alliance portfolios diminishes as companies take their ventures up to scale. This article develops theoretical propositions about the evolution and configuration patterns of portfolios that include both cross- and same-sector partnerships. Two longitudinal case studies serve to illustrate the theoretical framework developed for (...) alliance portfolios that include both types of partnerships. Companies that create such portfolios adopt partnership strategies that follow paths also identified in the evolution of portfolios only made up of partnerships with other private firms: i.e., an evolution from adapting to shaping and exploiting strategies. (shrink)

I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of (...) scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change. (shrink)

Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τὰ καθ᾽αὑτά and τὰ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates’ per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the (...) primacy of Plato’s binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4, over Aristotle’s list of the categories. (shrink)

The explanation of the phenomenon of Brownian motion, given by Einstein in 1905 and based on the kinetic–molecular conception of matter, is considered one of the fundamental pillars supporting atomism in its victorious struggle against phenomenological physics in the early years of this century. Despite the importance of the subject, there exists no specific study on it of sufficient depth. Generally speaking, most histories of physics repeat the following scheme: the discovery made by Robert Brown in 1827 , of the (...) continuous movement of small particles suspended in a fluid did not arouse interest for a long time. Finally, at the close of the century, Gouy's research brought it to the attention of the physicists. Gouy was convinced that Brownian motion constituted a clear demonstration of the existence of molecules in continuous movement. Nevertheless, he did not work out any mathematized theory that could be subjected to quantitative confirmation. All nineteenth-century research remained at the qualitative level and yet it was able to clarify some general characteristics of the phenomenon: the completely irregular, unceasing, motion of the particles is not produced by external causes. It does not depend on the nature of the particles but only on their size. The first significant measurements, carried out by Felix Exner in 1900, appeared to deny the possibility of reconciling the kinetic theory with Brownian motion. The discovery of the ultra-microscope then allowed Zsigmondy to perceive the presence of movements, which were completely analogous to Brown's, in the particles of the colloids; these movements were rather smaller in size than those invesigated up to then. Thus Zsigmondy aroused interest in the phenomenon. Finally, in 1905, Einstein succeeded in stating the mathematical laws governing the movements of particles on the basis of the principles of the kinetic–molecular theory. The following year Smoluchowski arrived at conclusions which corresponded to Einstein's. These laws received a first, rough confirmation in the years immediately following by the work of The Svedberg, Seddig and, for some historians, Henri. Then in 1908 Jean Perrin gave it a definitive confirmation. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on some of (...) Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

The word “utopia” was coined by Thomas More and refers to the unreal and ideal state described in his Utopia, first published in 1516. Following the example of Plato’s Republic, More as well as other thinkers and writers of the 16th and 17th century reflect on the political relevance of utopia and provide unique accounts of ideal, just, and perfect “no places”, as paradigms and standards of social, political, and religious reformation of the coeval world. However, the political significance of (...) utopia relies on a basic anthropological feature, which incidentally is already underlined by More: the relationship between imagination and experience. This means that: 1) the human being’s “eidetic” freedom is characterised by the inseparable relationship between imagination, reflection, experience and action; 2) utopia is capable of disclosing the transformative and normative features related to the human being’s constitution; 3) utopia can be fruitfully used to motivate human will and mobilise support for human flourishing. In this article I endeavour to show that among contemporary philosophers it is Hans Jonas who most fully develops the anthropological significance of utopia by investigating the very relationship between imagination and experience, and by underlining how the eidetic and reflective constitution of the human being leads to ethics. As a further goal, I wish to highlight that the anthropological relevance of utopia can shed light on our imaginative and ambivalent nature, and provide a practical and educational basis for the achievement of an “ethics of images” for the current digital era. For this purpose I shall draw on the thinking of Marie-José Mondzain and Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, among other scholars. (shrink)

Ce travail expose et discute la réception de Hans Jonas effectuée au sein de la « science de l’image » (Bildwissenschaft). On présente, en premier lieu, le débat actuel sur l’image dans le cadre de cette Bildwissenschaft. En second lieu, on expose les principaux moments de la réception de Jonas dans ledit contexte et on analyse les positions fondamentales de Jonas à propos de l’image et de l’imagination. Enfin, on évalue les avancées et les limites de la réception de Jonas (...) et on prend en considération quelques positions jonassiennes qui peuvent représenter un apport au débat actuel sur l’image. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with a logical system, called Brouwer-Zadeh logic, arising from the BZ poset of all effects of a Hilbert space. In particular, we prove a representation theorem for Brouwer-Zadeh lattices, and we show that Brouwer-Zadeh logic is not characterized by the MacNeille completions of all BZ posets of effects.

Hermodorus of Syracuse, a Sicilian disciple of Plato, is reported by Simplicius to have set out a classification of beings, which is of a piece with an argument for principle monism (in Ph. 247.30–248.18 > F 5 IP2; 256.28–257.4 = F 6 IP2). A similar classification appears in Sextus Empiricus’ Aduersus mathematicos X (262–75), where it is officially ascribed to some ‘Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικοί) or ‘children of the Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες), but seems ultimately based on Early Academic material. Virtually all commentators (...) have read these classifications conjointly. More radically, both have been taken to record Plato's oral teaching and to give essentially the same categorial scheme, which is regarded as the most developed instance of a so-called ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’. This article re-examines these texts and provides an alternative reading. Section 1 focusses on Hermodorus and defends three theses: (1) there was never such a thing as an ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’; (2) Hermodorus does not seem to recount what Plato said, but to propose an integrated interpretation and defence of aspects of his thought; (3) Hermodorus’ pronouncements about principles are incompatible with other testimonies on Plato's unwritten teaching, notably Aristotle's. Section 2 moves to Sextus and defends a fourth thesis: (4) despite their similarities, the classifications of Hermodorus and Sextus’ Pyrhagoreans are considerably different, though perhaps originated from the same debate. (shrink)

El presente esfuerzo se encuentra animado por la factura de un análisis comparativo entre Ernst Cassirer y Eduardo Nicol en torno al fenómeno de la expresión. Ambos autores tienen en común la preocupación precisamente por el tema de la expresión. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de Cassirer, ésta posee dos notas sobresalientes, a saber, por un lado, la expresión queda constreñida al ámbito del lenguaje, y por otro, ésta posee diferentes estratos, por así decirlo, geológicos de evolución. Por (...) su parte en Eduardo Nicol, la expresión no es reductible al lenguaje, ni va a tener estratos geológicos, sino más bien va a poseer un matiz estrictamente ontológico, es decir, la expresión va a ser la manera como el hombre va intentar en todo momento paliar su insuficiencia ontológica. Nicol va esbozar una nueva imagen del conocimiento a partir precisamente de una metafísica de la expresión. (shrink)

In this work I reconstruct the physical and mental descriptions of perception in Aristotle. I propose to consider the thesis that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης (DA II 11) as a description of the physiological aspect of perception, meaning that perceiving is a physical act by which the sensory apparatus homeostatically counterbalances, and thence measures, the incoming affection produced by external perceptible objects. The proposal is based on a revision of the semantics of the word mesotês in Plato, Aristotle and later (...) Greek mathematicians (mostly Nicomachus of Gerasa). I show how this interpretation fits the text, and how it solves problems that afflict the rival interpretations. I further develop a ‘non-dephysiologizing’ spiritualist reading of the additional description of perception as reception of forms without the matter (DA II 12). I show that Aristotle uses the expression ‘forms without matter’ to describe actually abstracted items in one’s mind rather than the way in which the form are received. In opposition to forms-in-matter, such items are causally powerless and metaphysically sterile: an F-without-matter somewhat determines the subject it is in (one’s mind content F) without qualifying or identifying it as an F-subject. Thus, we have a second ‘mental’ description of perception. Further parts of the thesis are devoted to settle interpretive questions raised by controversial statements about perception found in De Anima II 5 and III 2, and to discuss the question of how the mental and physiological descriptions of perception Aristotle offers are related. My conclusion is that Aristotle’s views combines a form of quasi-dualist vitalism about powers (the faculty of perception, and more generally the soul, are not just irreducible to matter, but also primitive and non-supervenient) which is nonetheless compatible with hylomorphism, and a form of epiphenomenalism (and thence the ‘bottom-up’ determination typical of modern supervenience) with regard to perceptual events (i.e., the activity of perceiving). (shrink)

In the Parmenides Plato claims that by relinquishing Forms one would entirely destroy tên tou dialegesthai dunamin. I argue that this peculiar phrase does not indicate, as often suggested, the power or possibility of all discourse or thought, but the power of dialectic, i. e. the highest science; and that its preservation is, for Plato, a decisive reason for the necessity of the Forms.

Welfare capitalism is going through a deep crisis, and alternative models to welfare state capitalism such as liberal socialism and property-owning democracy are once again becoming prominent in public debates. The aim in this article is to compare the merits and the limits of liberal socialism and of property-owning democracy through the specific case of the distribution of educational capital, by comparing two educational systems: the Pay It Forward (PIF) system and the Tax-subsidy scheme (TS) system. Based on the analysis (...) of these two educational systems, we provide three arguments in favor of liberal socialist institutions in general and the PIF educational system in particular: (1) the individual common assets argument, (2) the principle of reciprocity argument, and (3) the predistribution argument. (shrink)

In textbook illustrations of migrating cells, actomyosin contractility is typically depicted as the contraction force necessary for cell body retraction. This dogma has been transformed by the molecular clutch model, which acknowledges that actomyosin traction forces also generate and transmit biomechanical signals at the leading edge, enabling cells to sense and shape their migratory path in mechanically complex environments. To fulfill these complementary functions, the actomyosin system assembles a gradient of contractile energy along the front‐rear axis of migratory cells. Here, (...) we highlight the hierarchic assembly and self‐regulatory network structure of the actomyosin system and explain how the kinetics of different nonmuscle myosin II (NM II) paralogs synergize during contractile force generation. Our aim is to emphasize how protrusion formation, cell adhesion, contraction, and retraction are spatiotemporally integrated during different modes of migration, including chemotaxis and durotaxis. Finally, we hypothesize how different NM II paralogs might tune aspects of migration in vivo, highlighting future research directions. (shrink)

In the standard approach to quantum mechanics, closed subspaces of a Hilbert space represent propositions. In the operational approach, closed subspaces are replaced by effects that represent a mathematical counterpart for properties which can be measured in a physical system. Effects are a proper generalization of closed subspaces. Effects determine a Brouwer-Zadeh poset which is not a lattice. However, such a poset can be embedded in a complete Brouwer-Zadeh lattice. From an intuitive point of view, one can say that these (...) structures represent a natural logical abstraction from the structure of propositions of a quantum system. The logic that arises in this way is Brouwer-Zadeh logic. This paper shows that such a logic can be characterized by means of an algebraic and a Kripkean semantics. Finally, a strong completeness theorem for BZL is proved. (shrink)

The idea that what we perceive are tropes is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. (...) In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue. (shrink)

This chapter bears on the concepts of the animal epiphany and therioanthropy. The concrete, real animals in interaction interrupt humanism and human solipsism by showing animal protagonism in the world and by reflecting narcissistic human images back to them with a difference. This looking-glass-self or mirror with difference and continuity is a crucial dimension to the human relationship to nonhuman animals, which cannot be thought without an understanding of this co-belonging. Drawing on Portmann, who is also central to Merleau-Ponty’s account (...) of interanimality and Derrida’s concerns about animals and visuality, therioanthropy considers the particular dimensions of this “being-to-be-seen” and what it means for human–animal interactions. It links to animal subjectivity, an open reading of the Umwelt, and to the concept of animal epiphany. (shrink)

We investigate an expansion of quasi-MV algebras ([10]) by a genuine quantum unary operator. The variety of such quasi-MV algebras has a subquasivariety whose members—called cartesian—can be obtained in an appropriate way out of MV algebras. After showing that cartesian . quasi-MV algebras generate ,we prove a standard completeness theorem for w.r.t. an algebra over the complex numbers.

The Diuisio Aristotelea 67M/32DL draws a distinction between two categories of beings, per se and relatives. I defend three main theses. First, that the relation of dependence characterizing the members of the latter category is modal and symmetrical in nature and, accordingly, the per se-relatives contrast cannot be equivalent to the substance-accidents contrast. Second, that the type of relativity relevant to this diuisio is both ontological and semantic in nature (but with different emphases depending on the version of the diuisio (...) considered). Third, I argue, against a widespread opinion, that the last line of the DL version of the diuisio does not concern metaphysical principles. Here I also compare the diuisio to other Early Academic bicategorial schemes and show that they differ from one another significantly, especially as far as the alleged connection between categories and metaphysical principles is concerned. (shrink)

Norwood Hanson's last paper (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) presented an analysis of the very concept of "discovery". Many recent historiographical works discuss episodes of scientific discovery, but there are few epistemological analyses of this concept. The present paper attempts to improve Hanson's work, proposing a hierarchical series of discovery levels. The analysis presented here establishes the conditions that should be satisfied in order to ascribe the scientific discovery of a new phenomenon to somebody. It also points out the partial (...) aims that one should endeavour to attain in the investigation of a new phenomenon. RESUMEN: El último artículo escrito por Norwood Hanson (“An anatomy of discovery”, 1967) analizaba el concepto mismo de “descubrimiento”. Muchos trabajos historiográficos recientes discuten episodios de descubrimientos científicos, pero hay pocos análisis epistemológicos de este concepto. El presente artículo procura perfeccionar el trabajo de Hanson, proponiendo una serie jerárquica de niveles de descubrimiento. El análisis que se presenta acá establece las condiciones que deben ser satisfechas para que se atribuya a un individuo el descubrimiento científico de un novo fenómeno, e indica también las metas parciales que se deben buscar en la investigación de un fenómeno desconocido. (shrink)

According to Papineau’s qualitative view, experiences instantiate both representational and phenomenal properties. The instantiation of phenomenal properties is people undergoing the relevant experience. In contrast, the instantiation of representational properties relies on changing relationships between the person and the environment in which the person is embedded. The upshot is that phenomenal and representational properties are only contingently related: phenomenal properties are neither identical to, nor supervene on, representational properties. In this article, the author gives a detailed criticism of Papineau’s qualitative (...) view. Papineau’s qualitative view left unexplained the relevant causal role of consciousness in accounting for actions—assuming that a mental state only becomes conscious when it is poised to make a direct difference to what the subject believes and later remembers, how the subject reasons, what decisions the subject makes, and what rational actions the subject performs. The author argues that the same reasons that support Papineau’s complaint that it is hard to see how distal particulars and properties make their way into the realm of consciousness—namely some traditional arguments against representationalism—also show that it is hard to see how phenomenal consciousness makes its way back into the outside world in explaining the rational control of actions. (shrink)