Surging from the ontopoietic vital timing of life, human self-consciousness prompts the innermost desire to rise above its brute facts. Imaginatio creatrix inspires us to fabulate these facts into events and plots with personal significance attempting to delineate a life-course in life-stories within the ever-flowing stream – existence. Seeking their deep motivations, causes and concatenations, we fabulate relatively stabilized networks of interconnecting meaning – history. But to understand the meaning and sense of these networks’ reconfigurations call for the purpose and (...) telos of our endless undertaking; they remain always incomplete, carried onwards with the current of life, while fluctuating with personal experience in the play of memory. Facts and life stories, subjective desires and propensities, the circumambient world in its historical moves, creative logos and mythos, personal freedom and inward stirrings thrown in an enigmatic interplay, prompt our imperative thirst for the meaning of this course, its purpose and its fulfillment – the sense of it all. To disentangle all this animates the passions of the literary genius. The focus of this collection is to isolate the main arteries running through the intermingled forces prompting our quest to endow life with meaning. Papers by: Jadwiga Smith, Lawrence Kimmel, Alira Ashvo-Munoz, William D. Melaney, Imafedia Okhamafe, Michel Dion, Franck Dalmas, Ludmila Molodkina, Victor Gerald Rivas, Rebecca M. Painter, Matti Itkonen, Raymond J. Wilson III, Christopher S. Schreiner, Bruce Ross, Bernadette Prochaska, Tsung-I Dow, Jerre Collins, Cezary Jozef Olbromski, Victor Kocay, Roberto Verolini. (shrink)

Resumo: No presente artigo, busca-se esclarecer os conceitos agostinianos de “vontade” e “livre-arbítrio”, em especial com base no Livro I da obra De libero arbitrio. Procura-se situar a abordagem agostiniana no contexto da história filosófica do conceito de vontade, bem como detalhar aspectos próprios e específicos da primeira fase de escritos de Agostinho sobre a vontade e a liberdade em comparação com períodos posteriores. Defende-se a ideia de que a estrutura da teoria da ação livre de Agostinho é fundamentalmente apresentada (...) em De libero arbitrio I, de acordo com diferenças importantes entre vontade, livre-arbítrio, liberdade da vontade e liberdade de decisão. Defende-se, ademais, que a primeira teoria agostiniana da liberdade de ação pode ser vista como um tipo de libertarismo.Palavras-chave: Agostinho, De libero arbitrio I, vontade, livre-arbítrio, liberdade, teodiceia. (shrink)

According to the Bayesian view, scientific hypotheses must be appraised in terms of their posterior probabilities relative to the available experimental data. Such posterior probabilities are derived from the prior probabilities of the hypotheses by applying Bayes'theorem. One of the most important problems arising within the Bayesian approach to scientific methodology is the choice of prior probabilities. Here this problem is considered in detail w.r.t. two applications of the Bayesian approach: (1) the theory of inductive probabilities (TIP) developed by Rudolf (...) Carnap and other epistomologists and (2) the analysis of the multinational inferences provided by Bayesian statstics (BS). ... Zie: Summary. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Rizzo and Whitman’s theory of inclusive rationality in light of the ongoing cross-disciplinary debate about rationality, welfare analyses and policy evaluation. The paper aims to provide three main contributions to this debate. First, it explicates the relation between the consistency conditions presupposed by standard axiomatic conceptions of rationality and the standards of rationality presupposed by Rizzo and Whitman’s theory of inclusive rationality. Second, it provides a qualified defence of the consistency conditions presupposed by standard axiomatic conceptions (...) of rationality against the main criticisms put forward by Rizzo and Whitman. And third, it identifies and discusses specific strengths and weaknesses of Rizzo and Whitman’s theory of inclusive rationality in the context of welfare analyses and policy evaluation. (shrink)

A reconstruction of Johnson's main contributions to philosophy is provided. Johnson's theories are grounded on his distinction between "substantives" and "adjectives", which governs the oppositions between (1) particular and universal, (2) determinandum and determinans in thought, (3) acts of separation and discrimination, (4) subject and predicate, (5) thing and quality, (6) substance and determination, (7) proposition and fact, (8) external and internal relations, (9) extension and intension. While substantives divide between continuants and occurrents, adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into determinables and (...) determinates. The immediate (Stout, Broad) and later (Prior, Carnap, Searle, Armstrong, Hautamäki and Johansson) reception of Johnson's distinction between determinables and determinates is also discussed. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith’s objection of solipsism and S. Crowell’s problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard’s identification of (...) the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called ‘mindless coping’. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge. (shrink)

This article collects quotes on Homer made by Tertullian throughout his works. The textual analysis aims to explain the reasons for these references and thus to disclose their theological value. Moreover, this study will offer an insight into Tertullian’s understanding of and access to Homer. The article therefore offers a new perspective that confirms Tertullian’s highly noteworthy theological, philosophical and literary background.

Desde una perspectiva que parte de las ideas de Iván Illich sobre la noción de proporcionalidad, el presente artículo hace referencia a la idea de límites o umbrales como un elemento necesario para la reconstrucción de un mundo multicultural. Pero, igualmente bajo la inspiración de Illich, se desmarca de las prácticas científico-profesionales que producen enunciados ajenos a las prácticas populares. Desde afuera y desde arriba no se puede reconstruir “un mundo en el que quepan muchos mundos”. Esto no implica que (...) la búsqueda de nuevos paradigmas sociales sea algo simple. Por el contrario, la profundidad de la búsqueda nos lleva incluso a retomar la vivencia de lo sagrado, como lo describe Mircea Eliade en las sociedades tradicionales, como principio epistémico para ese “otro” mundo posible. (shrink)

Understanding of elementary topological equivalencies is impaired by preconceptions about the topological structure of ordinary objects, so that the equivalencies turn out to be counterintuitive. Here I will discuss some of these preconceptions, namely the dominance of gestalt properties of the visual display of the configuration, the neglect of holistic properties, the dominance of transformations the preserve metric properties over those that preserve topological properties only, the assumption that holes are objects of their own. These factors delineate an empirical research (...) field, intuitive topology. An explanatory hypothesis for the preconceptions suggests that they are hard-wired. (shrink)

El artículo destaca la importancia de distinguir entre dos roles diversos que la noción de dignidad humana juega en bioética: uno, como principio de orden jurídico-político, y otro, como estándar moral del trato debido al paciente. Cuando la dignidad es entendida en el primer sentido, nos encontramos con un concepto muy general, que cumple un rol fundacional y de orientación de las normas relacionadas con las prácticas biomédicas. En cambio, cuando es utilizada en el segundo sentido, intenta captar la exigencia (...) moral de tratar siempre al paciente como “persona”, es decir, con el mayor cuidado y respeto. Para clarificar el significado de la dignidad como principio, se apela a la distinción entre principios y normas elaborada en el campo de la filosofía jurídica. La dignidad como estándar moral de la relación médico-paciente se ilustra en base a una serie de estudios empíricos. (shrink)

If the values of younger citizens and voters are the trend of the future, in what direction do they point? Scholars have long noted a decline in political engagement and knowledge among youth in developed democracies, with the fear that this may undermine the stability of liberal institutions. However, youth electoral behaviour appears inconsistent: in much of continental Western Europe, younger voters support populist parties of both left and right, but in the United States and the United Kingdom, only left-wing (...) populist movements benefit from youth mobilization. We explain this divergence by arguing for a distinction between democratic apathy and democratic antipathy. Democratic apathy is characterized by scepticism regarding the value of democratic institutions, low turnout and lack of interest in politics, whereas democratic antipathy involves the active embrace of illiberal movements hostile to pluralistic institutions. In societies where youth do not face economic and social discrimination, democratic apathy is the more common trend, whereas in parts of continental Europe where youth face systematic social exclusion, apathy has become active antipathy. (shrink)

The article deals with John Hermann Randall’s theory of history, namely, the philosophical account of what it takes for an object to be a historical object. The goal of the article is to highlight the deep connections existing between Randall’s philosophical views on history and the writing of history, heavily indebted to Dewey’s and Woodbridge naturalism (the so-called Columbia Naturalism), and his historiographical work. In the first section, I briefly sketch some major aspects of originality of Randall’s historiographical work, as (...) well as the intellectual context to which he belonged. In the second section I lay out the most important features of Columbia Naturalism. In the third section I discuss in detail Randall’s theory of history, focusing on its ontological, epistemic, and epistemological features. In the fourth section, I confront Lovejoy and Randall’s historiographical works in order to show how philosophical theories affect historiographical practices. (shrink)

Este é um estudo sobre o conceito de vontade na história da filosofia. O centro de interesse está na obra De libero arbítrio, de Agostinho. Tanto se procura descrever a suposta “descoberta” da vontade por Agostinho quanto analisar a coerência do conceito obtido. Trata-se do segundo de dois estudos sobre a vontade e a liberdade em De libero arbítrio I.

In order to systematically explore the normative treatment of black slavery by Second Scholastic thinkers, who usually place the problem within the broad discussion of moral conscience and, more narrowly, the nature and justice of trade and contracts, I propose two stations of research that may be helpful for future studies, especially concerning the study of Scholastic ideas in colonial Latin America. Beginning with the analysis of just titles for slavery and slavery trade proposed by Luis de Molina S.J., I (...) show how his accounts were critically reviewed by Diego de Avendaño S.J., revealing basic features of Second Scholasticism’s normative thinking in Europe and the Americas. The normative knowledge provided by these two Scholastic intellectuals would be profoundly tested during the last decades of the 17th century, especially by authors who sharpened the systemic analysis and a rigorist moral assessment of every title of slavery and slaveholding, as well as the requirements of an ethics of restitution. (shrink)

That emotions are especially valuable for our well-being has become a widely agreed upon claim. In this article, we argue that many of the ways in which the emotions are commonly considered to be prudentially valuable – hedonically, experientially, and adaptively – are not specific to the emotions: they are in fact shared by other affective reactions such as drives and sensory affects. This may suggest that emotions are not prudentially valuable in any distinctive manner. We challenge this suggestion by (...) arguing that, unlike other affective reactions, emotions provide unique contexts in which to refine our general sensibility to a wide variety of evaluative properties – and that in this sense they are prudentially valuable in a distinctive way. (shrink)

A través de esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, un referente obligado para quien desea profundizar en el pensamiento de autores como Kant, Aristóteles, Husserl o Heidegger, exploramos los puntos de encuentro entre estas tradiciones, a fin de esclarecer la relación entre identidad práctica, virtud y sentido. Esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, además de permitirnos explorar parte de su itinerario intelectual, nos da la oportunidad de reflexionar sobre los alcances y las limitaciones de las propuestas filosóficas de cada uno de estos (...) autores. (shrink)