Abstract:In view of Kramer’s theory about paranoid cognition, this paper examines how exaggerated distrustand such cognition produce important negative effects upon social reality. The first section dealswith Searle’s theory of social reality, and how it is basically explained in terms of one world ofphysical particles and groups of intentional agents performing “we” actions. The aim of this sectionis to show that the “we” actions of collective intentionality allow fundamental social practices,namely, those related to institutions. Looking at trust, cooperation, and collective (...) intentionality, thesecond section examines in what sense these three elements form the triad of human civilization.Finally, the last section analyses which negative effects exaggerated distrust and Kramer’s paranoidcognition have upon the Searlean social reality: both, which break off cooperative relations andsolemn pacts, end up disrupting the triad.Keywords: trust; distrust; cooperation; collective intentionality; paranoide cognition. (shrink)

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, (...) from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

Este artículo examina cómo la separabilidad y unidad mente-cuerpo resultan clave para poner de manifiesto lo inapropiado del “teatro cartesiano”, metáfora creada por Daniel Dennett para criticar la experiencia consciente unificada en Descartes. La primera sección introduce al problema de la separabilidad cartesiana. La segunda examina cómo mente y cuerpo, separables mediante lo concebible según Descartes, resultan ser cosas metafísicamente distintas. La tercera enfatiza como separables no implica separados. La última sección enfatiza el argumento de la dis-analogía del piloto y (...) el navío, y cómo, según el filósofo francés, aunque separables, mente y cuerpo son substancias estrechamente unidas, formando un ens per se. En vista de este, criticamos la metáfora del “teatro cartesiano” de Dennett: es imposible que la mente sea un espectador, puesto que la experiencia consciente ya es unificada e incluso somatizada. Notamos, por último, que pese a Dennett, hay investigadores de la Ciencia Cognitiva que coinciden con Descartes en relación con la estrecha unión mente-cuerpo, i.e., quienes defienden que la mente es encarnada, incrustada o incluso extendida. (shrink)

En el marco de los estándares profesionalizantes de la academia, con sus “rankings” y productividad científica, las humanidades subsisten. Una explicación de este fenómeno es que, según la ontología social, las razones para la acción independiente de deseos son piezas clave en la educación. Por ello, dichas razones, que constituyen obligaciones, también serían claves para el desarrollo de las humanidades. Aquí examino de qué forma el individualismo y la competencia tensionan la dinámica entre deseos y obligaciones. Ciertamente, el mercado valora (...) más la satisfacción de deseos que la teorización sobre la intencionalidad colectiva y su producto: la civilización humana. (shrink)

En este artículo analizo como, dadas algunas tesis filosóficas compartidas, comparar a Searle y Descartes crea un efecto déjà vu. La primera tesis es la mente consciente que existe en primera persona. La segunda es que aquella se define mediante un concepto primitivo. La tercera es que la intencionalidad implica condiciones de satisfacción internistas. La cuarta es el cuerpo-máquina. Segundo, argumento que ambos hablan desde cosmovisiones incompatibles –la metafísica deísta versus los “hechos básicos”; y como un hecho “básico” biológico indica (...) la no separabilidad entre mente y cuerpo (cerebro)–, Searle ni es dualista cartesiano ni de propiedades. Palabras clave: dualismo cartesiano; dualismo de propiedades; Searle; mente consciente primitiva; intencionalidad; hechos básicos. (shrink)

Diferentes estudios sostienen que el perfil del profesional de relaciones públicas varía según los países y regiones; entre otras razones, por el desarrollo académico y las dinámicas del mercado profesional. Esta investigación analiza comparativamente, a nivel teórico (definición de competencias y marcos regulatorios) y empírico (programas académicos y tendencias) la principal oferta académica de grado en los casos de Ecuador y España, a partir de las siguientes dimensiones: desarrollo de competencias, áreas de desempeño y perfiles de egreso. El perfil profesional (...) de relaciones públicas está demandando nuevas competencias y habilidades que en muchos casos trasciende el quehacer tradicional del área. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que la cooperación, que explica la realidad social, no cesa necesariamente con la ofensa y el conflicto moral gianniniano. En la primera sección, introduzco el problema. En la segunda, caracterizo qué son la ofensa y el conflicto moral para Giannini. En la tercera, explicito cómo la intencionalidad colectiva serleana se fundamenta en la cooperación y en los pactos solemnes. En la cuarta, analizo cómo la ofensa y el conflicto moral no necesariamente impiden la existencia de cooperación (...) de nivel alto. Así, concluyo que la intencionalidad colectiva solo cesa cuando la cooperación alcanza su punto final. (shrink)

Ante la devaluación de la formación universitaria debido a la escisión entre docencia e investigación, se propone la “investigación formativa” como fórmula de aprendizaje significativo. Se ofrece un marco epistemológico basado en la complejidad del conocimiento en Humanidades, y un planteamiento metodológico organizado sobre la transversalidad y convergencia disciplinar. Se presentan resultados de su aplicación en el estudio de problemas relacionados con el patrimonio arquitectónico y urbanístico. Se muestran casos de estudios diversos que demuestran su flexibilidad, su interactividad en el (...) aprendizaje y su potencialidad de transcender de la comunidad universitaria a la ciudadanía en general. (shrink)

Según John Searle, las posiciones _por defecto_, _i. e_., las condiciones de inteligibilidad del pensamiento y la acción son algunos _puntos de partida_ que se presuponen de manera pre-reflexiva y pragmática. Su postulación es, además, una novel manera de tratar con algunos problemas perennes de la filosofía, dejándolos entre paréntesis. Dichos problemas son la existencia del mundo externo, la verdad y como esta tiene que ver con hechos, la percepción directa, los significados de las palabras y, finalmente, la causalidad. En (...) este artículo analizamos cómo las mencionadas posiciones conforman una humanidad _por defecto_, y cómo su ausencia, _deshumanizaría_. Esto es relevante en el caso de la cooperación, una posición _por defecto_ básica para la intencionalidad colectiva, y piedra angular de la civilización humana. (shrink)

En el marco de los estándares profesionalizantes de la academia, con sus “rankings” y productividad científica, las humanidades subsisten. Una explicación de este fenómeno es que, según la ontología social, las razones para la acción independiente de deseos son piezas clave en la educación. Por ello, dichas razones, que constituyen obligaciones, también serían claves para el desarrollo de las humanidades. Aquí examino de qué forma el individualismo y la competencia tensionan la dinámica entre deseos y obligaciones. Ciertamente, el mercado valora (...) más la satisfacción de deseos que la teorización sobre la intencionalidad colectiva y su producto: la civilización humana. (shrink)

Resumen:En este artículo trato con cómo Searle descuida la sociología en su ontología social. En particular, analizo dicho descuido mediante el problema de las instituciones y su reconocimiento colectivo. En la primera sección, contextualizo la aproximación serleana realista de base al estudio de la civilización humana con el objetivo de mostrar los supuestos antirrealistas constructivistas de Berger y Luckmann. En la segunda, explico cómo se vinculan los conceptos de “intencionalidad colectiva”, “reglas constitutivas” y “cooperación”. En la tercera, argumento que el (...) reconocimiento colectivo de las instituciones todavía es un problema filosófico abierto. En la cuarta, muestro de qué forma un concepto sociológico, el de “masa crítica”, permite explicar el reconocimiento de las instituciones serleanas. En la quinta, enfatizo la dinámica sociológica de los contextos C y cómo la teoría serleana subestima su rol fundamental. Finalmente, en la sexta sección, presento el ejemplo paradigmático de una institución, la del dinero, pues esta refrenda cómo la sociología ha aportado y puede seguir aportando a la ontología social serleana.Palabras clave: Searle; sociología; reconocimiento colectivo; masa crítica; dinero. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The objective of this study was to determine the accuracy of a brief informed consent quiz to detect consent comprehension in individuals with cognitive impairment and to explore the degree to which cognitive domains and recent substance use, independently, predict comprehension. We performed a secondary analysis of two cross-sectional studies in individuals with substance use disorders. The ICQ total score was used as the index test and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment as reference standard in receiver operating characteristic curves. Two (...) independent multiple binary logistic regression models were performed using cognitive domains and days of recent substance use as predictors of ICQ outcome. We analyzed data from 215 and 251 participants, respectively. The ICQ showed moderate accuracy for major cognitive impairment and lower accuracy for mild impairment. Optimal cutoff score was set at 10 points or less for detecting comprehension difficulty. Lower scores in Short-Term Memory, Attention, Language, and Orientation increased the probability of failing the ICQ. A procedure including both the ICQ and cognitive screening measure could improve the accuracy of consent comprehension assessments. (shrink)

Los siglos del gótico final de la Edad Media fueron, en el género pictórico en concreto, una época de continuidad de presupuestos en el terreno del arte y de incorporación de elementos naturalistas, pero también reflejaron la importancia del influjo del pensamiento en boga, por ejemplo, el del hermetismo. The artist-craftsman and microcosm in late Middle Age The centuries of the final Gothic of the Middles Ages were, particularly in the pictorial genre, a time of continuity of presuppositions in the (...) realm of arts as well as incorporation of naturalistic elements. However, they also reflected the significant influence of ways of thinking in vogue, such as hermeticism, for instance. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el rol que cumple la confianza en la construcción de la realidad social, argumentando que constituye uno de sus componentes esenciales. Lo es porque hace posible el nacimiento, permanencia y reconocimiento colectivo de las instituciones, así como su iteración y organización en subsistemas.

El artículo aborda la pandemia del covid-19 como elemento contingente y su efecto de develamiento respecto de algunas manifestaciones contemporáneas de la ideología neoliberal en Latinoamérica. De esta forma, en base a conceptos filosóficos y psicoanalíticos de orientación lacaniana planteados fundamentalmente por Slavoj Žižek, se examinan los usos críticos de la noción de ideología en sus diversas manifestaciones: miedo al otro, imposición de la lógica del empresario de sí, destrucción de lazos sociales, extractivismo de recursos naturales y fetichización de los (...) discursos de unidad frente a la pandemia. La hipótesis radica en que la pandemia presenta una oportunidad para repensar la subjetividad contemporánea, mediante la confrontación con el Real que bordea a la simbolización y, en definitiva, a la captura ideológica, a fin de poner en cuestión la afirmación de que no hay alternativa. (shrink)

Secondary findings for adult-onset diseases in pediatric clinical sequencing can benefit parents or other family members. In the absence of data showing harm, it is ethically reasonable for parents to request such information, because in other types of medical decision-making, they are often given discretion unless their decisions clearly harm the child. Some parents might not want this information because it could distract them from focusing on the child's underlying condition that prompted sequencing. Collecting family impact data may improve future (...) policy determinations. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes or to reserve the term “emotion” for them.

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and (...) ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions. (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...) of our evolved moral intuitions, and that _ii) _that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

This paper examines an insoluble Cartesian problem for classical AI, namely, how linguistic understanding involves knowledge and awareness of u’s meaning, a cognitive process that is irreducible to algorithms. As analyzed, Descartes’ view about reason and intelligence has paradoxically encouraged certain classical AI researchers to suppose that linguistic understanding suffices for machine intelligence. Several advocates of the Turing Test, for example, assume that linguistic understanding only comprises computational processes which can be recursively decomposed into algorithmic mechanisms. Against this background, in (...) the first section, I explain Descartes’ view about language and mind. To show that Turing bites the bullet with his imitation game, in the second section I analyze this method to assess intelligence. Then, in the third section, I elaborate on Schank and Abelsons’ Script Applier Mechanism (SAM, hereby), which supposedly casts doubt on Descartes’ denial that machines can think. Finally, in the fourth section, I explore a challenge that any algorithmic decomposition of linguistic understanding faces. This challenge, I argue, is the core of the Cartesian problem: knowledge and awareness of meaning require a first-person viewpoint which is irreducible to the decomposition of algorithmic mechanisms. (shrink)

O-minimal geometry generalizes both semialgebraic and subanalytic geometries, and has been very successful in solving special cases of some problems in arithmetic geometry, such as André–Oort conjecture. Among the many tools developed in an o-minimal setting are cohomology theories for abstract-definable continuous manifolds such as singular cohomology, sheaf cohomology and Čech cohomology, which have been used for instance to prove Pillay’s conjecture concerning definably compact groups. In the present thesis we elaborate an o-minimal de Rham cohomology theory for abstract-definable $C^{\infty (...) }$ manifolds in an o-minimal expansion of the real field which admits smooth cell decomposition and defines the exponential function. We can specify the o-minimal cohomology groups and attain some properties such as the existence of Mayer–Vietoris sequence and the invariance under abstract-definable $C^{\infty }$ diffeomorphisms. However, in order to obtain the invariance of our o-minimal cohomology under abstract-definable homotopy we must work in a tame context that defines sufficiently many primitives and assume the validity of a statement related to Bröcker’s question.Abstract prepared by Rodrigo Figueiredo.E-mail: rodrigo@ime.usp.brURL: https://doi.org/10.11606/T.45.2019.tde-28042019-181150. (shrink)

Abstract This paper reports the results obtained in an aid project designed to improve transport in the municipal area of Jocotán (Guatemala). The rural road network of an area occupied by indigenous people was analysed and a road chosen for repair using the labour-intensive method–something never done before in this area. The manpower required for the project was provided by the population that would benefit from the project; the involvement of outside contractors and businesses was avoided. All payment for labour (...) went into the pockets of the local people. The small earth movements made and the use of local materials guaranteed the project’s environmental sustainability, while the on-site training of the local community prepared its members for the continued maintenance of the road, thus investing the project with social sustainability. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-24 DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9290-2 Authors Rodrigo Ares, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain José-María Fuentes, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Eutiquio Gallego, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Francisco Ayuga, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Ana-Isabel García, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Journal Science and Engineering Ethics Online ISSN 1471-5546 Print ISSN 1353-3452. (shrink)

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

Are emotions bodily feelings or evaluative cognitions? What is happiness, pain, or “being moved”? Are there basic emotions? In this chapter, I review extant empirical work concerning these and related questions in the philosophy of emotion. This will include both (1) studies investigating people’s emotional experiences and (2) studies investigating people’s use of emotion concepts in hypothetical cases. Overall, this review will show the potential of using empirical research methods to inform philosophical questions regarding emotion.

In support of Descartes’ epistemology, Lex Newman advances the ‘Non-atheistic-knowledge- thesis’, i.e., indefeasible knowledge cannot be gained unless the existence of God is proved. Here I expound the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics’, which, unlike Newman’s, refers to how four Cartesian metaphysical conclusions require the existence of God. To test whether such conclusions need divine existence, we may ask what would happen if God did not play any decisive role in the Meditations. As I argue, four unpalatable consequences would follow for Cartesian metaphysics, which (...) would ruin Descartes’ plan to refute the skeptic and the atheist alike. (shrink)

This paper begins the study of first-order functions, which are a generalization of truth-functions. The concepts of truth-table and systems of truth-functions, both introduced in propositional logic by Post, are also generalized and studied in the quantificational setting. The general facts about these concepts are given in the first five sections, and constitute a “general theory” of first-order functions. The central theme of this paper is the relation of definition among notions expressed by formulas of first-order logic. We emphasize that (...) logic is not concerned only with the consequence relation among notions expressed by formulas. It also attends to the relation of definition among notions, where a notion is defined from other notions. Sections 5 and 6 deal exclusively with the relation of definition among notions expressed by formulas of first-order logic. In these sections, we study the systems of first-order functions, which are the sets of first-order functions closed under definitions. Sections 7 and 8 are concerned with the relativization of first-order functions to a class of structures. The relativization to a class of structures is a fundamental operation which is used in order to relate the theory of first-order functions with set theory and first-order model theory, a subject which we have barely scratched the surface. The apparatus developed in this paper enables us to define what is a vehicle for the foundation of classical mathematics in set theory, and, in Sect. 8, we prove that first-order logic with one binary predicate variable is not a minimal vehicle for the foundation of classical mathematics in set theory. Sections 9 and 10 introduce further operations and ideals of first-order functions. Besides some results on the influence of the arguments of a first-order function, a result about definability is proved in Sect. 10.1. It is this theorem that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a first-order function to be in a finitely generated ideal. In Sect. 11, this result is applied to the problem of predicate definability in classes of structures, the problem with which Beth’s theorem dealt in the case of elementary classes. (shrink)