Roger Ariew presents a new account of Descartes as a philosopher who sought to engage his contemporaries and society. He argues that the Principles of Philosophy was written to rival Scholastic textbooks, and considers Descartes' enterprise in contrast to the tradition it was designed to replace and in relation to the works of the first Cartesians.

In his own time, Lao Sze-Kwang formulated his own intra-cultural approach to the philosophy of culture that begins from the interdependence and organic nature of our cultural experience. In this essay, I address three questions: Why did Lao abandon his early reliance on the Hegelian model of philosophy of culture and formulate his own “two- structured” theory? Again, given Lao’s profound commitment and contribution to Chinese philosophy and its future directions, why is it not proper to describe him as a (...) “Chinese philosopher?” And why is the much accomplished Lao Sze- Kwang not installed in the CUHK pantheon as yet one more of the great “New Confucian” philosophers (xinruxuejia 新儒學家) to be associated with this institution? (shrink)

Wittgenstein's contribution to musical aesthetics is not often discussed, which is surprising, given his rare musicality and musical connections. His distinctive achievement is to have focused on the question of musical understanding, and to have connected this with two other philosophical problems: the nature of the first-person case, and the understanding of facial expressions. Wittgenstein's third-person approach to philosophical psychology leads him to emphasize the role of performance in the understanding of music, and also to introduce an ‘intransitive’ concept of (...) expression. At times Wittgenstein seems to be arguing for an entirely non-relational account of musical meaning; however, a proper analysis of the first-person case shows that his theory of musical understanding might allow that, at some level, you understand a piece of music only if you imaginatively grasp the state of mind expressed by it. (shrink)

There are predicates that I call “stubbornly distributive” based on what happens when they are combined with plural count noun phrases. I will use these stubbornly distributive predicates to identify and analyze a certain subset of mass nouns which I call “multi-participant nouns”. Traffic and rubble are multi-participant nouns but furniture and luggage turn out not to be. Importantly, ‘typical’ mass nouns like water are multiparticipant nouns.

This paper offers a general approach to ethics before considering its implications for the question of how to respond to religious preferences in healthcare, especially those of patients and healthcare workers. The first section outlines the two main components of the approach: (1) demoralizing, that is, seeking to avoid moral terminology in the discussion of reasons for action; (2) welfarism, the view that our ultimate reasons are grounded solely in the well-being of individuals. Section 2 elucidates the notion of religious (...) preferences and describes the history and importance of their protection by human rights legislation. The following section defends the ‘Preference Principle’, according to which there is a reason to satisfy any preference (in so far as that satisfaction advances well-being). Section 4 discusses the implications of this principle for religious preferences in healthcare, again seeking to bring out the special social and political importance of respect, and respect for such preferences in particular. The paper ends with a brief description of how to approach such problems from the perspective of a demoralized welfarism. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive biography of John Locke to be published in nearly a half century. Setting Locke's life within exciting historical and intellectual contexts, which included the English Civil War, religious persecution, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Roger Woolhouse interweaves an account of Locke's life with a summary and development of his ideas in theory of knowledge, philosophy of science, medicine, economics, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. Systematic and encyclopedic in its coverage, Woolhouse's biography offers (...) both an account and explanation of Locke's ideas, while treating seriously his emotional relationship with Elinor Parry. Based on broad research and many years of study of Locke's philosophy, this volume is an authoritative biography on one of the most significant early modern philosophers. (shrink)

The article traces the articulation of the principle of distributed authority, or sphere sovereignty, and its background in politics and theology. It considers the two Dutch national leaders who used and developed it most as well as noting some of its earlier sources. An account is given of the way the principle of distributed authority arose and what it meant to the thinkers and leaders of the Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands. The principle and its articulation is chronicled through the (...) long struggle for the distribution of educational, ecclesiastical, and political authority to those people active in various areas, each understood as sovereign spheres. The article shows the crucial role played by Kuyper in the step by step formulation of the principle, thereby laying to rest rival claims. Finally, the article suggests that the principle had great importance in Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought and in the development of his philosophy. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the _Investigations_ that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of _consisting in_. I explore this multi-faceted notion and its (...) connection with the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce ed. by Cornelis de WaalRoger WardThe Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce Cornelis de Waal, editor. Oxford, 2024.As scholars of the American tradition, we know Charles Sanders Peirce as an original thinker with personal foibles and complex ideas, a primary source and yet an enigma in the main channel of the tradition. He is most profound in developing an architectonic system (...) that rivals and proceeds beyond Kant in the interest of furthering the inquiry necessary for self-control and the development of the community of inquiry. The object of the Real consistently appears as a figure to Peirce's inquiry as its true home, and the community of self-and-other correcting minds sharing this goal of inquiry may bring themselves together in experience and work. This handbook is an example of such work that extends beyond this immediate occasion, as Peirce reminds us, because once alive within us, how could we conceive of such inquiry ever ending?The vision of Peirce that comes clear in this volume arises from the coherence of his philosophical, logical, and mathematical thought, drawn out by historical as well as recent applications. The significant advance of this handbook is the combination of US and international scholars drawing upon a wide circle of Peirce's influence and interest. The depth and breadth of analysis speaks to the power of Peirce's method of self-correction; it is the engine of his method. We can assess the changes, the principles, and the expressed sentiments, but the origin or character of Peirce's sentiments themselves or the full ground of the emergence of his ideas remains obscure. De Waal organizes the book in six parts. What follows is an interpretation of the content of these parts via summaries of the chapters and a brief concluding observation.Part I examines Peirce's personal life and interactions with organizations in order to qualify his successes and failures and perhaps explain why this genius had such a difficult life. Daniel L. Everett (chap. 1) represents Peirce as a special case of academic genius and faults the leadership of Johns Hopkins and Harvard for failing to accommodate his behavior and eccentricities and also includes touching narratives of children who knew and cared for the Peirces in Milford (17). Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena (chap. 2) examine Peirce's career through his five European trips and their importance for his collaborative scientific ventures, encounters with beauty (39), and as occasions of family drama with first wife Zina Fay and later with Juliette Froissy. [End Page 78] Cheryl Misak (chap. 3) focuses on the difficult behavior of Peirce that finds its complement in the personal animus of Simon Newcomb, who assailed Peirce both at Johns Hopkins and at the US Coast Survey (51, 54). Despite these attacks, Peirce's genius was recognized by Venn, C. I. Lewis, and—through Lady Welby—by Ramsey and Wittgenstein. Pierce's uniqueness as a scientist, philosopher, and logician was mishandled by Charles Eliot and Daniel Gilman, who failed to recognize him as America's leading thinker (55). This beginning brings Peirce's personality forward as an angle of vision on his philosophical and scientific production, setting the ground for the technical evaluations of Peirce's philosophical and scientific career and the lasting impact of his logic and metaphysics after his death.Part II develops the topics of phenomenology and the normative sciences in six chapters. Richard Kenneth Atkins (chap. 4) provides a brilliantly clear description of the development of Peirce's categories and the phaneron that "needs no special tools and is open to all" to engage "whatever comes before the mind" (71). But this does not exhaust the "phaneron" due to the Real that remains beyond the representation by minds. Nathan Houser (chap. 5) develops Peirce's empiricism as the "rain of percepts" that is the inflow of phenomenal content: the "deeper levels of our bottomless lake of consciousness and subconscious mind consists mainly of conceptual or intellectual content based on our perceptual judgments" (88). This challenges Locke's and Dennett's attempts to articulate a completely materialist account of reality. Tiago da Costa... (shrink)

Roger White; X*—Wittgenstein on Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 157–174, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

Population surveys of emotion offer great potential to understand subjective wellbeing, though most do not reveal how emotions other than happiness and satisfaction impact on daily lives. This article presents a case study analysis of data from Kahneman and Krueger’s (2006) Princeton Time and Affect Survey to demonstrate that the choice of emotions or affects measured in surveys does matter in determining wellbeing in contexts such as those in which gender plays an important role. It finds that that tiredness and (...) interest (excluded from Kahneman and Krueger’s wellbeing construct) comprise a large part of American women’s but not men’s unpleasant education, unpaid housework, and childcare. The article concludes by suggesting that the most appropriate method for establishing a “minimum” set of emotions is to conduct survey-based “audits” of emotions experienced in daily activities. (shrink)

Even if contemporary liberal political thought fails to provide an adequate basis for environmental protection, investigating its environmental implications may be a worthy enterprise, if only to foster discussion among liberal thinkers about the obligation to protect the environment. Examination of four contemporary liberal views of distributive justice?those of Rawls, Arneson, Sen, and the libertarians?shows that in these theories, environmental protection turns either on obligations to future generations or on the rights of individuals. The extent of environmental protection the four (...) views implicitly require may be quite extensive, and is probably far beyond what proponents of each view might have imagined. (shrink)

The paper argues that the act of looking, as defined between the story of Gyges, Candaules, and the offended queen and the story of Solon's visit to Lydia, functions in the first book of Herodotus, and perhaps also elsewhere throughout the Inquiry, as a metaphor for the relation of the histôr to the object of his investigation. Further, by a careful comparison of the Gyges story in Herodotus with the queen's own narration in the enigmatic "Gyges Tragedy" , we can (...) define a Herodotean psychology of spectation that bears a striking resemblance to the specifically tragic psychology manifest in the fragment. Herodotus positions his readers, the paper argues, in the place of Gyges, forcing them to look-in their imaginations-on what does not belong to them, just as the theatai in the Theater of Dionysus must look in imagination on the scene described by the queen. While the tragic audience is protected from the fate of Candaules and of Gyges' descendant Croesus by the constitutive blindness of tragedy that prevents the spectators from seeing what happens in the mukhos, Herodotus' audience must seek some other reassurance that they will not face the voyeur's penalty. This paper finally argues that Solon's theôria, with its crucial purpose of establishing the nomoi of Athens and its crucial ethic of looking not at the object of desire but at the end, installs in Herodotus' historiê the psychology of tragedy: to look desiringly is to lose, but to look inquiringly is to learn. (shrink)

The popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings or manipulations involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable Causal or Functionalist view is criticised in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in their head they (...) do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a restrained dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence. (shrink)

In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Anscombe characterises the virtue of justice by reference to two features of the just person: (a) that of having a standing intention not ‘to commit or participate in any unjust actions for fear of any consequences, or to obtain any advantage, for himself or anyone else’; and (b) that of being someone who ‘quite excludes’ certain types of action from consideration (viz. intrinsically unjust ones). I investigate what (a) and (b) together amount to and entail. The (...) investigation covers a number of issues, including the nature of moral dilemmas, the relevance or irrelevance of motive to the question whether an act manifests a given virtue (e. g. justice), backward-looking reasons and practical wisdom (phronesis), and the idea of moral bedrock, or moral ‘hinge propositions’. I conclude with a tentative endorsement of the view that there are intrinsically unjust kinds of acts, i. e. acts that are always and everywhere unjust. (shrink)

Features Leibniz's writings including letters, published papers, and fragments on a variety of philosophical, religious, mathematical, and scientific questions.

THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS by Ludwig M. Lachmann New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 173 pp., $29?95.